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Abstract 
 
This thesis explores the causes and consequences of growing flexibility in gender divisions of 
labour in Kitwe, Zambia.  It examines the relationship between four contemporary trends 
(1990-2011): worsening economic security, growing flexibility in gender divisions of labour 
in the form of increasing female labour force participation and occupational desegregation, 
and the weakening of gender stereotypes.  The evidence for these trends comes from census 
data, earlier ethnographies and my own qualitative research (April 2010 − March 2011).  The 
analysis draws upon a theoretical framework that interprets sex-differentiated practices as 
resulting from internalised gender stereotypes, cultural expectations and patterns of 
resource access.   
 
The substantive chapters of the thesis consider alternative hypotheses.  Did worsening 
economic security trigger flexibility in gender divisions of labour, which then weakened 
gender stereotypes (Chapter 4)?  Alternatively, was such flexibility actually contingent upon 
a prior rejection of gender stereotypes, due to particular formative experiences (Chapter 5) 
or gender sensitisation (Chapter 6)? 
 
This thesis argues that worsening economic security led many families to sacrifice the social 
gains accrued by complying with cultural expectations of gender divisions of labour in 
exchange for the financial benefits of female labour force participation.  But occupational 
desegregation is partly attributed to a prior rejection of gender stereotypes.   
 
Flexibility in gender divisions of labour seems to undermine gender stereotypes and related 
status inequalities, by enabling exposure to a critical mass of women performing roles that 
they were previously presumed to be incapable and that are valorised because they were 
historically performed by men.   
 
Common forms of gender sensitisation in Zambia were rarely said to be independently 
persuasive; impact generally appears contingent upon exposure to a critical mass of women 
in socially valued domains.  Sensitisation also seems more effective when it enables 
participants to see that others also endorse gender equality.  This can increase confidence in 
the objective validity of one’s own egalitarian beliefs and also shift cultural expectations.   
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Introduction 
 
‘Women can do what men can do’ (translated) has become a popular slogan of gender 
equality in Kitwe, Zambia.  This thesis explores the causes and consequences of increasing 
flexibility in gender divisions of labour (both in terms of rising female labour force 
participation and occupational desegregation), in the context of related theoretical debates 
about change and continuity in gender beliefs and practices. 
 
This ethnographic research began just as the price of copper was rebounding, after the global 
financial crisis that had halted mining activities, induced mass layoffs and stalled 
development more broadly.  By 2010, work contracts were resuming.  Yet notwithstanding 
Zambia’s impressive macro-economic resurgence and reclassification as a middle-income 
country, employment generation has not kept pace.  Current despair at widespread economic 
insecurity contrasts with nostalgic (somewhat distorted) recollection of an earlier time of 
decent work and ‘cradle to grave’ social protection.   
 
The fluctuating price of its chief export has not only shaped the Zambian Copperbelt’s 
economic fortunes but also its cultural and political landscape.  This includes the sense of 
self-confidence and modernity enjoyed in the early decades of independence, as well as 
subsequent political agitation, which catalysed both the shift to multipartyism in 1991 and 
also the more recent opposition victory in September 2011.  Kitwe, the largest city on the 
Copperbelt, has played host to these developments. 
 
The rich copper deposits on the Zambian Copperbelt have historically been mined, managed 
and administered by men – as wage labourers, breadwinners, trade union officials, civil 
servants and politicians.  This pattern also holds for related industries and financial gains 
therein.  Accordingly, Zambia fares comparatively poorly in composite indicators of gender 
parity in education, health, as well as political and labour force participation.  It scores 114th 
(out of 135 countries) on the World Economic Forum’s (2012) Gender Gap Index and 163rd 
(out of 186 countries) on the United Nations Development Programme’s (2012) Gender 
Inequality Index.  However, there is growing endorsement of women’s incursions into 
hitherto male-dominated sectors of the economy and politics.  The ratio of estimated female-
to-male earned income increased from 0.56 in 2006 to 0.64 in 2012.  The proportion of 
female legislators, senior officials and managers is also growing, from 6% in 2006 to 23% in 
2012 (World Economic Forum, 2006:143, 2012:360).  Why is this happening?  And to what 
extent does this erosion of gender divisions of labour erode gender status beliefs?  By ‘gender 
status beliefs’ I mean the presumption that men are typically more suited to positions of 
authority and more deserving of esteem, respect and deference. 
 
The Copperbelt provides an apt location for an analysis of the causes and consequences of 
changing gender divisions of labour.  Earlier ethnographic accounts – from the Rhodes-
Livingstone Institute, the first anthropological facility established in an African colony – 
provide detailed descriptions of historic gender roles and relations, as well as pertinent 
macro-structural factors.  The extent to which gender divisions of labour have changed over 
time can be ascertained from recent Demographic and Health Surveys, censuses and 
academic literature.   
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Part of my fieldwork involved examining the impact of exposure to egalitarian discourses.  
The vast majority of Kitwe’s residents have heard of women’s rights as a result of widespread 
gender sensitisation programmes.  For instance, gender equality is an examined component 
of the Zambian secondary school curriculum.  Those who have left school are similarly likely 
to hear egalitarian discourses, such as from radio discussions led by donor-financed Non-
Governmental Organisations.  At the time of fieldwork, Kitwe was also the national 
headquarters of the Zambia National Marketeers’ Association.  Like their elected 
counterparts in Local Government and trade unions, many market leaders attend workshops 
to discuss gender issues.  This broad exposure enables a comparative exploration of the role 
of gender sensitisation in promoting egalitarian gender beliefs.   
 
The data presented is analysed by drawing upon the theoretical framework outlined below. 
 
Chapter 1: Theoretical Framework  
 
This chapter begins by presenting a theoretical framework for analysing the gender structure 
of a society.  Following a number of scholars (including Hollander et al, 2011; Martin, 2004; 
Ridgeway, 2011; Risman and Davis, forthcoming), this structure is conceptualised as 
comprising three levels.  The first level concerns individuals’ self-perceptions and their 
internalised gender stereotypes about men and women in general.  The second level relates 
to cultural expectations in social contexts: how a man or woman anticipates that others in 
their society will endorse or condemn their behaviour on the basis of their presumed sex 
category.  In addition to these gender beliefs, the third level is the sex-differentiated pattern 
of resource access, relating to labour markets, laws and public policies.  This theoretical 
framework is subsequently used to conceptualise the causes and consequences of flexibility 
in gender divisions of labour.  Key questions for investigation concern how the different 
levels interact and which is analytically primary. 
 
The second half of Chapter 1 explores literature on the impact of flexibility in gender 
divisions of labour on gender beliefs and practices, relative to other influences such as 
association and gender sensitisation.  A key concept raised in this discussion is ‘exposure’, 
i.e. to egalitarian discourses and practices.  It also considers the comparative importance of 
‘interests’, e.g. the significance of desires for social respect and financial security.  The aim 
here is to identify outstanding questions to guide the empirical research and analysis thereof.   
 
Chapter 2: Methodology 
 
This chapter describes the research methodology and efforts taken to improve the accuracy 
of my analysis.  It further details four examples of life histories, in which participants identify 
salient dynamics: worsening economic security, paid work, association, formative 
experiences, exposure to role models and gender sensitisation.  These emergent themes are 
then interrogated over the subsequent chapters, so as to ascertain their broader significance. 
 
Chapter 3: A Gendered History of the Copperbelt (c.1900-1990)  
 
This chapter examines historical shifts in gender divisions of labour (c.1900-1990).  It 
considers the following sub-questions: 
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 Historically, what caused certain domains to become male-dominated, and to be 
perceived as only appropriate for men?   
 What have been the consequences of gender divisions of labour?   
 
Drawing on historical ethnographies and participant life histories, I suggest that gender 
stereotypes of female housewife and male breadwinner emerged in response to imported 
Christian ideologies, colonial-capitalist concerns and an economic climate that largely 
enabled men to provide for their families on their own.  Responding to the questions raised 
in Chapter 1, the analysis attempts to identify the interactions between and effects of 
internalised beliefs, cultural expectations and patterns of resource access.  Macro-level 
changes impacting on the latter are a key recurrent theme over this historical period. 
 
Reflecting back on earlier periods, informants suggested that as a consequence of gender 
divisions of labour, people had limited first-hand evidence of women’s competence in 
employment and politics.  Accordingly, women were often underrated and overlooked.  
These gender stereotypes appear to have perpetuated gender divisions of labour.  Besides 
exposure, participants also underscored the importance of macro-economic circumstances 
and men’s interests in perpetuating gender divisions of labour and in turn gender status 
inequalities.  The aim of this historical investigation is to contextualise and provide insights 
into contemporary trends. 
 
Chapter 4: Paid Work in a Context of Economic Insecurity 
 
This chapter begins by setting out four contemporary trends: worsening economic security, 
increasing female employment, occupational desegregation, and a weakening of gender 
stereotypes, relating to competence and status.  A range of quantitative data, qualitative 
research and different domains of gender relations are included in order to interrogate 
claims made.  Key research sub-questions include: 
 
 What is the relationship between worsening economic security and increasing 
flexibility in gender divisions of labour, i.e. women’s growing involvement in paid 
work, and those occupations that were historically male-dominated? 
 To what extent has flexibility in gender divisions of labour weakened gender 
stereotypes, relating to competence and status? 
 
The hypothesis put forward in this chapter is that worsening economic security is a key cause 
of flexibility in gender divisions of labour.  This macro-level change shifted interests, leading 
people to sacrifice the social benefits gained from compliance with cultural expectations in 
exchange for the economic gains derived from female labour force participation.  While most 
women have turned to stereotypically feminine occupations, growing numbers are pursuing 
occupations that were previously dominated by men (such as being a miner, electrician or 
mechanic).  Prolonged exposure to women undertaking activities that are both socially 
valued and previously presumed to be beyond their capabilities appears to provide 
disconfirming evidence of gender stereotypes, concerning both competence and status.   
 
The central hypothesis put forward in this chapter is that worsening economic security 
increased flexibility in gender divisions of labour, which in turn weakened gender status 
beliefs.  The subsequent chapters in this thesis explore other possible explanations for the 
latter two contemporary trends. 
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Chapter 5: Formative Experiences 
 
Reflecting a theme stressed by participants, as well as academic literature that theorises 
individuals’ development of gender beliefs, this chapter considers the impact of formative 
experiences (i.e. education and family background).  It seeks to answer the following 
research sub-questions:  
 
 Was worsening economic security sufficient for occupational desegregation or did 
those who pursue stereotypically masculine jobs already reject gender stereotypes, 
due to their formative experiences? 
 Which formative experiences influence support for flexibility of gender divisions of 
labour? 
 To what extent do the beliefs that individuals develop during their formative years 
influence their subsequent support for flexibility of gender divisions of labour? 
 
While worsening economic security appears to have been sufficient for increased female 
labour force participation, those undertaking stereotypically masculine occupations tended 
to emphasise their prior exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of labour.  Many 
emphasised the importance of co-education, where they learnt that girls can perform equally 
in tests and became accustomed to working together.  Other pivotal experiences mentioned 
were growing up in households financially supported by women and seeing women 
successfully undertaking non-stereotypical work.   
 
Conversely, participants who resisted women’s encroachment into historically male-
dominated domains tended to have grown up in homes with a gender division of labour, and 
had seen insufficient subsequent evidence to disconfirm their gender stereotypes.  Early life 
experiences thus seem to shape the way in which Copperbelt residents interpret 
contemporary performances of flexibility in gender divisions of labour.  Although formative 
experiences do seem to bias subsequent perceptions, there is evidence that attitudes towards 
flexibility in gender divisions of labour can change within a generational cohort.   
 
Chapter 6: Gender Sensitisation 
 
This chapter considers whether changes in gender divisions of labour were primarily caused 
by changes in gender beliefs, owing to exposure to egalitarian discourses.  This contrasts 
with the claim made in Chapter 4, that worsening economic security was the primary cause 
of increased flexibility in gender divisions of labour, which in turn was sufficient to weaken 
gender stereotypes.  Broadly, it examines: 
 
 Has gender sensitisation weakened gender stereotypes, relating to competence and 
status, thereby accounting for increased flexibility in gender divisions of labour and 
greater status equality? 
 Are abstract messages of equality commonly interpreted as disconfirming evidence 
of gender beliefs? 
 
This chapter begins by presenting evidence in support of the hypothesis that gender 
sensitisation can enable people to rethink their internalised status beliefs, enhance 
confidence in pre-existing beliefs and also revise their cultural expectations.  Participants 
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seemed most receptive to gender sensitisation when they were able to make sense of it 
through first-hand evidence of its veracity.  In the Copperbelt, experience of flexibility of 
gender divisions of labour seems particularly significant in this respect.  Others, without 
such exposure, tended to find gender sensitisation unconvincing.  This seems to be primarily 
because common modes of gender sensitisation provide neither safe spaces to critically 
reflect upon internalised stereotypes nor reason to change cultural expectations about what 
kinds of behaviour will be applauded by others. 
 
In summary, a chief aim of this thesis is to ascertain the extent to which greater flexibility in 
gender divisions of labour is primarily a cause or consequence of the erosion of gender status 
inequalities and related beliefs.  As outlined above, Chapters 4, 5 and 6 consider different 
hypotheses; this is intended to assess their relative influence and should not be read as 
denying the possibility (or likelihood) that all these factors have exerted some influence.    
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1. Theoretical Framework 
 
This chapter sets out the theoretical framework that will be used to examine the causes and 
consequences of growing flexibility in gender divisions of labour.  It considers three main 
influences upon sex-differentiated practices.  First, an individual’s internalised gender beliefs 
(their self-perceptions and gender stereotypes about others).  Second, their cultural 
expectations, about what kinds of behaviour will be endorsed or condemned by others.  
Third, patterns of resource access: for example resulting from labour markets, laws and 
public policies.  This thesis will discuss the interplay between and relative significance of 
these three influences, in relation to the causes and consequences of growing flexibility in 
gender divisions of labour. 
 
Central to this thesis is the concept of gender divisions of labour.  This can be broadly 
defined as the tendency of men and women in a particular social context to perform different 
tasks.  Benería (1979:210) suggests that ‘the most basic division is between domestic and 
non-domestic labour’, though adds that this analytical distinction obscures more than it 
informs because the two kinds of activities are so interrelated, especially in non-marketised 
economies (as also observed by Edholm et al, 1978).  This point is elaborated by Benería and 
Sen (1981a:292-293),  
 
[I]n a subsistence economy, the materials used for domestic production are not bought 
in the market; they are transformed in such a way that household and nonhousehold 
production are closely linked – to the extent that it is hard to draw a line between them.  
Domestic work extends itself into activities such as gathering wood for the domestic 
fire…  Similarly, the agricultural labour process extends itself into household 
production, as when cereals are dried and agricultural goods are processed for family 
consumption…  In agricultural societies… [t]he separation between productive and 
reproductive activities is often artificial...  By contrast, under the wage-labour system of 
industrialised, urban societies… unpaid housework becomes more and more isolated 
and differentiated from nonhousehold production. 
 
Benería (1979:211-212) suggests that while the distinctions between ‘domestic’ and ‘non-
domestic’ (or ‘reproductive’ and ‘productive’) are analytically tenuous (and thus crude 
characterisations of gender divisions of labour), there are some common characteristics to 
women’s work.  Women tend to specialise in activities compatible with their socially 
constructed childcare responsibilities.  Additionally, when women do earn money, it may be 
regarded as supplementary.  Meanwhile men are often stereotyped as breadwinners.  
Benería (ibid) also notes that gender divisions of labour vary across time, space (between 
countries and regions), over the life-course and between economic classes. 
 
Gender divisions of labour are also apparent within paid work.  The term ‘horizontal 
occupational sex segregation’ is used to refer to one sex category1 being predominantly 
employed in a particular kind of job, e.g. men’s predominance in skilled manual work.  By 
contrast, ‘vertical occupational sex segregation’ refers to one sex category (e.g. men) 
outnumbering another (women) at more senior levels.   
 
                                                        
1 ‘Sex category’ refers to the social labelling of people as either ‘male’ or ‘female’ upon their appropriate performance of gender; physical sex may 
not always conform to this binary model (see also West and Zimmerman, 1987). 
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This thesis refers to three main types of gender divisions of labour: men as ‘breadwinners’ 
and women as ‘housewives’; women continuing to undertake the lion’s share of unpaid care 
work even when employed; male domination of certain industries and occupations (e.g. 
mining and mechanics).  There are also sex-differentiated practices within occupations, such 
as in informal trading.  These differences will be discussed in subsequent chapters. 
 
This chapter now introduces the theoretical framework used in this thesis and considers 
different possible causes of gender divisions of labour.  It then examines empirical research 
on the consequences of increasing flexibility in gender divisions of labour.  It uses the three 
elements of the theoretical framework to discuss why flexibility does not always erode gender 
status inequalities.  A final section then considers what other factors, besides flexibility, 
might facilitate greater gender equality, again drawing on the theoretical framework to 
examine earlier studies.  From this literature review, research questions are derived for the 
analysis of the empirical material. 
 
The theoretical framework  
 
Internalised gender beliefs 
 
A woman might personally eschew stereotypically masculine activities due to her self-
perceptions: how she sees herself and her attributes.  Perhaps she does not think that she has 
the relevant abilities, nor have interest in the activity.  She may also internalise gender 
stereotypes – i.e. assume that women generally (not just herself) lack sufficient competence 
to succeed in male-dominated domains.  Another stereotype she may internalise is what 
Ridgeway (2011) terms a ‘gender status belief’ – the presumption that men are more 
deserving of esteem, influence and deference, and also suited to prestigious positions.   
 
The first point about self-perceptions includes the idea of self-efficacy – the belief that one is 
able to successfully perform a specific task, such as repairing a car or being economically 
independent.  Bandura (1990:9) argues that self-efficacy is important because ‘[p]eople’s 
beliefs about their capabilities affect what they choose to do, how much effort they mobilise 
[and] how long they will persevere in the face of difficulties’.  Self-efficacy has been found to 
be more important than actual academic achievement in determining occupational choices: 
higher self-efficacy is associated with consideration of a wider range of jobs.  Without 
confidence in their ability to achieve in certain domains, women may avoid them (as found 
by Bandura et al, 2001, drawing on data from Rome, Italy). 
 
However, other research suggests that women’s personalities and self-perceptions are not a 
primary cause of gender divisions of labour.  Instead, these beliefs seem to be a consequence 
of changes in the broader social environment, specifically women’s social roles and status.  
Twenge (2001) finds that between 1931 and 1993 American women’s self-reports of 
assertiveness tracked (though slightly lagged behind) selected social indicators, namely 
women’s educational attainment and women’s median first age at marriage.  Women’s 
reported assertiveness rose before World War II, thereafter declined, then rose again after 
the late 1960s.  Meanwhile, men’s self-reports of assertiveness exhibit no clear pattern over 
time.  These time-lagged effects suggest that gendered personalities may be largely 
consequence (rather than cause) of society-wide changes in women’s status and resources.  
Twenge (ibid:141) concludes,  
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When men’s and women’s roles become more similar, men’s and women’s personalities 
also become more similar.  Apparently the increase in women’s status and the 
broadening of their roles has eliminated the sex difference in assertiveness.   
 
Twenge hypothesises that this lagged effect could either be due to the way parents socialise 
their daughters (in view of changing social expectations) or girls’ own anticipations of likely 
social roles.  The wide-ranging influences upon Copperbelt women’s self-perceptions are 
explored throughout this thesis, in relation to both gender divisions of labour and status 
inequalities. 
 
As mentioned above, individuals may also internalise gender stereotypes.  Following 
Blakemore et al (2009:7), stereotypes can be defined as ‘beliefs about members of a 
particular group simply because they are members of that group’.  These are distinct from 
gendered self-perceptions because they are assumptions about the traits of the typical man 
and woman.  Some social psychologists suggest that children develop their gender 
stereotypes by observing the sex-differentiated practices of their community, i.e. exposure to 
gender divisions of labour.  Stereotypes may be used to make inferences about others, 
‘help[ing] us make guesses about how others are likely to behave’ (Eagly and Carli, 2007:84-
85).  While stereotypes may influence our perceptions and evaluations of others, they are not 
necessarily always salient.  As Wood and Eagly (2010:637) argue, 
 
Although social categories such as gender may be automatically activated outside of 
awareness and without conscious intent, such activation does not always occur.  Even 
when gender stereotypes have been activated, perceivers can control their potential 
effects on judgments, given sufficient motivation and cognitive resources.  However, in 
the hurly-burly of daily life, people often lack the motivation or resources to exert this 
control. 
 
This idea of gender stereotypes proffers another explanation of how internalised gender 
beliefs might affect gender divisions of labour (Cejka and Eagly, 1999; Charles and Grusky, 
2007).  If women feel that (by virtue of their sex category) they do not possess the qualities 
that they associate with highly paid and prestigious occupations then they may not apply.  
Similarly, if a girl believes that by virtue of being female she is not competent in Mathematics 
then she may give up easily in class and be less likely to pursue related occupations.  These 
gender stereotypes may also be internalised by employers, creating both demand-side and 
supply-side sources of horizontal and vertical occupational sex segregation.  These beliefs 
about the typical man and woman’s attributes and abilities in specific domains can be 
termed ‘descriptive gender stereotypes’. 
 
Internalised stereotypes may also be prescriptive: that is, normative standards of behaviour 
that apply differently to men and women, regarding what they should and should not do.  
Some stereotypes may be both descriptive and prescriptive, e.g. gender status beliefs.  This 
idea was developed by Ridgeway (2011:88-89), who explains that, 
 
Embedded in gender stereotypes are status beliefs that associate men and their 
traits with higher status than women and their traits...  The status implications 
of gender stereotypes associate men with greater overall competence, 
understood as the ability to master events and accomplish goals, while also 
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granting each sex some specialised skills.  Thus, the content of gender 
stereotypes implies not only difference between the sexes but also inequality 
[emphasis in original]. 
 
Ridgeway (ibid) suggests that because men are often seen as more competent in socially 
valued domains, they are thus deemed more worthy of status, respect, esteem and influence.  
Gender stereotypes about differing competencies are thus said to be infused with value 
judgements, such that stereotypically feminine and masculine traits are not equally 
appreciated.   
 
Some studies indicate that internalised descriptive and prescriptive stereotypes are 
commonly disavowed by those exposed to a more heterogeneous range of role models, who 
provide contradictory evidence of prior assumptions (Eagly et al, 2004:280).  However, 
exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of labour does not necessarily have this effect, at 
least not immediately.  Research from social psychology suggests that individuals who have 
already internalised gender stereotypes may interpret subsequent experiences in a way that 
is compatible with their presuppositions.  In order to achieve cognitive constancy, new 
information about sex-differentiated practices tends to be processed in a way that confirms 
and is congruent with existing schemas.  Otherwise it is ignored, discounted or forgotten.  
This has been noted by research on gender stereotypes in the United States (Eagly and Carli, 
2007; Rudman and Glick, 2008).  The idea of ‘confirmation bias’ would explain why gender 
stereotypes often lag behind flexibility in gender divisions of labour.  Ridgeway (2011:161-
162) explains, 
 
Social cognition research has shown that these confirmation biases make people more 
likely to notice, attend to, and remember events and experiences that confirm what they 
expect or want to see and to overlook, ignore, or discount things that disconfirm 
consistent with their expectations...  Even when people do clearly recognise an 
experience as disconfirming their cultural stereotypes, their first reaction is to treat the 
disconfirming event or person as an ‘exception’, with few implications for what can be 
expected in most situations.  If, over time, continuing social change causes people to 
have more and more of these exceptional experiences, pressure to change their 
stereotypes of what most people are like will build.  But because persistent change only 
slowly seeps through people’s confirmation biases, the content of their perceptions of 
what the typical man or woman is like will lag behind actual changes in others’ and their 
own material experience.   
 
Recall Twenge’s (2001) finding that women’s self-perceptions lag slightly behind changes in 
the broader environment.  Internalised descriptive stereotypes about the typical man and 
woman seem to lag even further behind.  This, Ridgeway (2011) suggests, is because people 
are more able to see that their own personal experience contradicts widely-held 
assumptions; they have greater access to disconfirming information in their own case.  For 
example, a girl may underrate her own aptitude in Mathematics because she assumes girls 
are weaker at this subject.  However, this gendered self-perception may be undermined by 
her own success in a Mathematics test, leading her to think that she is actually quite good at 
this subject.  However, with less information about others’ performance and being 
cognitively biased against disconfirming information of her gender stereotype, she may 
continue to presume that other girls generally fare poorly.   
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A further reason why internalised gender status beliefs in particular will lag behind changes 
in enacted practices is ‘interests’:  
 
[B]ecause gender status beliefs advantage men over women who are otherwise their 
equals, men, on average, have less interest in attending to information that under-mines 
expectations based on gender status… Multiple experiences are required, especially for 
people who benefit from gender status beliefs because their self-interest makes them 
more cognitively resistant to disconfirming information (Ridgeway, 1997:222-223). 
 
In summary, one possible way of explaining the persistence of gender divisions of labour and 
other sex-differentiated practices is with reference to the concept of internalised gender 
beliefs.  Compliance with gender divisions of labour may also stem from concern for social 
approval, based on the cultural expectation that others in one’s society will endorse 
behaviour that conforms to descriptive and prescriptive gender stereotypes.  This concept is 
examined below. 
 
Cultural expectations 
 
By witnessing how others are treated, people may ascertain what kind of behaviour is 
expected of them and what is necessary to avoid social sanction (ridicule, condemnation or 
loss of social respect).  Individuals learn that they will be monitored and evaluated on the 
extent to which they conform to normative expectations for their presumed sex category.  
This motivates the careful management of behaviour and compliance with the norms 
dominant in a specific society (as argued by Hollander, 2013; Ridgeway, 2011; Risman, 
1998:10; West and Zimmerman, 1987).  Deviant behaviour that goes against locally accepted 
practices is likely to be unsupported, e.g. isolated instances of individual men performing 
care work (Barker, 2011:13). 
 
Here we can distinguish between personal endorsement of gender stereotypes (internalised 
gender beliefs) and how a man or woman anticipates being judged by others in their society 
(cultural expectations).  Even if not personally supported, cultural expectations may ‘act as 
the implicit rules of the gender game in public contexts’ (Ridgeway, 2011:162-163).  By 
complying with these norms about gender appropriate behaviour, agents reproduce the 
social order.  Such self-regulation may be either habitual or consciously intended.   
 
This emphasis on cultural expectations is closely connected to ‘doing gender’ theory, which 
posits that people may conform to the gender divisions of labour prevalent in their society in 
order to express their gender identity and also publicly demonstrate that they are 
appropriately masculine or feminine (see Hollander, 2013; West and Zimmerman, 1987).  
This performance is not necessarily a solo act, 
 
Within the context of marriage, doing gender is also a team performance.  If one spouse 
fails to engage his or her part appropriately, this may reﬂect negatively on the partner.  
Conventional gender expectations require husbands to assume the identity of 
breadwinner and wives to assume the identity of homemaker.  Men derive the core of 
their identities by providing for their families and women by caring for other family 
members (Tichenor, 2005:194, writing with regards to the United States) 
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This contrasts with the earlier supposition that gender beliefs are endorsed by agents 
themselves.  As Deutsch (2007:107) explains, 
 
Rather than internalise a set of behaviours and practices or identities that were 
rewarded and modelled by parents, teachers, and other authority figures, men and 
women create gender within social relationships throughout their lives… Whereas 
socialisation theories assume that individuals internalise the gendered norms that were 
salient when they were growing up, the doing gender model assumes that people 
respond to changing contemporary norms. 
 
However, while people’s behaviour may indeed reflect changing contemporary norms, any 
such transformation may be impeded by cultural expectations and anticipated social 
sanctions.  Even if one privately questions gender stereotypes, the presumption that they are 
widely accepted by others may provide an instrumental reason to comply with cultural 
expectations or else risk social sanction.  The penalties incurred by transgressing or even 
openly questioning prescriptive gender stereotypes (about appropriate behaviour) provides a 
further explanation for the persistence of those stereotypes and related divisions of labour, 
besides that of internalised gender beliefs.   
 
Cultural expectations may influence behaviour.  For instance, even if a girl does not 
personally endorse gender stereotypes about differential competence in Mathematics, the 
expectation that others do not expect her to be good at Mathematics may trigger anxieties, 
thwarting her own success (as shown by Steele, 2011).  Similarly, if women believe that they 
will be discriminated against in stereotypically masculine occupations then they may be less 
likely to apply for such occupations.  In this way, cultural expectations may become, 
 
Self-fulfilling, shaping men’s and women’s assertiveness and confidence, their 
judgments of each other’s competence, their actual performance, and their influence in 
the situation (Ridgeway, 1997:221).   
 
Gender beliefs and social relational contexts help maintain the gender system by 
modestly, but systematically and repeatedly, biasing men’s and women’s behaviours and 
evaluations in ways that reenact and confirm beliefs about men’s greater status and 
competence (Ridgeway and Correll, 2004:521). 
 
In contexts where men’s pride, respect and identity lie in being a breadwinner, some 
husbands resist flexibility in gender divisions of labour.  For instance, earlier research in 
Zambia illustrates the ways in which men have maintained their masculine identities and 
secured social respect by eschewing stereotypically feminine activities.  ‘[C]onspicuous male 
involvement in home chores was seen as difficult because of the ridicule that men could face 
from peers and the community’, note Muvandi et al (2000) drawing on focus group 
discussions on gender in a range of localities (including the Copperbelt).  Meanwhile, urban 
Zambian women are said to gain respect through marriage and motherhood (Rasing, 
2001:89; Schlyter, 1999:113-114).  Gender stereotypes about the domestic role of the modern 
housewife are also promoted in social events, such as ‘kitchen parties’ where the bride-to-be 
receives gifts of domestic goods (Rasing, 2001:232).   
 
While these performances of gender may be attributed to cultural expectations, they are 
equally compatible with the notion of internalised gender stereotypes and self-perceptions.  
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For example, even if a woman’s desire for social respect furnishes her with an instrumental 
desire for motherhood, she may also desire this role intrinsically.  Thus even if appropriate 
performances of gender seem necessary to secure social respect in Zambia, such behaviour 
could also be due to an individual’s support for those practices.  Because the two theories 
often have similar empirical implications, it may be difficult to determine which cause is 
primary.  As England (2005:269) notes, 
 
Unfortunately, we have little evidence allowing us to choose between the internalised 
socialisation view and the ‘doing gender’ view.  Indeed, much of the evidence offered for 
the doing gender view seems equally consistent with a notion of internalised (though 
not entirely unchangeable) values or habits.   
 
These two theories are not mutually exclusive.  One task of this thesis is to gauge their 
relative significance in shaping the causes and consequences of flexibility in gender divisions 
of labour.  A further aim is to ascertain key determinants of cultural expectations themselves 
and why these may shift over time.  Explanations considered include worsening economic 
security, society-wide flexibility in gender divisions of labour, as well as early exposure to 
role models and abstract messages of equality. 
 
There is likely to be some interplay between internalised beliefs and cultural expectations.  
Perceiving others as endorsing gender stereotypes may lead people to be more confident in 
the objective validity in their own internalised beliefs.  As Wood and Eagly (2010:637) argue: 
 
Stereotypical beliefs that are supported by social consensus seem valid — after all, 
others endorse them, and this consensus establishes pressures to comply. 
 
Additionally, if gender divisions of labour largely rest on cultural expectations, they should 
be weakened if a critical mass of others signal their support for flexibility in gender divisions 
of labour.  This could occur through speech or behaviour; either way might lead others to 
revise their cultural expectations and gain confidence that atypical performances of gender 
will not be sanctioned in a particular social circle.  The second half of this chapter draws on 
earlier studies to consider what kinds of socio-economic processes and social interactional 
contexts might catalyse a transformation in cultural expectations.  These issues are further 
explored throughout the thesis.   
 
Patterns of resource access 
 
A third way of understanding sex-differentiated practices is in terms of patterns of resource 
access, as shaped by macro-level factors such as labour markets, demography, legal 
regulations, government policies and organisational practices.  For such theorists,  
 
[T]he continued gender stratification in contemporary American families is better 
explained by focusing on how the institutional arrangements shape contextual 
expectations than by relying on how women and men make personal gendered choices 
(Risman, 1998:153). 
        
There are no fundamental attitudinal differences in men and women, but there are 
differences in the opportunity structure and in their social position that affect both their 
choices and the choices of those who can control women’s access to power (Epstein, 
1988:186). 
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Such theorists downplay the significance of individual preferences, personalities or attitudes.  
This thesis will examine patterns of resource access as conceptually distinct from gender 
beliefs.  If policies increase the economic returns to male (rather than female) labour force 
participation they may thereby influence gender divisions of labour, irrespective of 
individuals’ gender beliefs.  Examples of such policies include: paternalistic labour laws that 
forbid women’s employment in certain areas; parental leave policies that hold the employer 
liable, rather than the state; as well as those that make no parental allowances for fathers.  
Patterns of resource access may also shape gender divisions of labour in conjunction with 
gender beliefs.  For example, if access to affordable childcare is limited and women are 
stereotyped as primary carers then they may be more likely to predominate in part-time 
work.     
 
A further example of how patterns of resource access may shape female labour force 
participation and thereby gender status inequalities comes from Ross (2008), in relation to 
oil-producing countries.  He argues that a rise in the value of oil production tends to cause a 
decline in the traded sector (e.g. agriculture and manufacturing) of these countries because 
the real exchange rate increases and it becomes cheaper to import traded goods.  Meanwhile, 
the new wealth increases the demand for non-traded goods (e.g. construction and services), 
which cannot be imported.  This affects female labour force participation in those oil-
producing countries where women are largely excluded from the growing non-traded sector.  
Such horizontal occupational segregation may be caused by the non-traded sector involving 
heavy labour (in the case of construction) or (prohibited) contact with men from outside the 
family (in services).  The decline of the traded sector would thus dampen the demand for 
female labour and the prevailing female wage.  This decreases the rewards to female labour 
force participation.  Ross (ibid) further posits that an oil boom would decrease families’ 
perceived interest in female employment, since men’s wages are growing with a boom in the 
non-traded sector.  Emphasing the significance of patterns of resource access, Ross 
(2008:9,14) argues that ‘some measures of female status in the Middle East can be partly 
explained by the region’s oil wealth, but not by its Islamic culture or traditions…  Without 
large numbers of women participating in the economic and political life of a country, 
traditional patriarchal institutions will go unchallenged’.  This explanation of a particular 
change in gender divisions of labour and related status inequalities does not deny the 
salience of gender beliefs but does downplay their primacy, relative to patterns of resource 
access.  
 
While Ross (2008) does not use the specific term ‘patterns of resource access’, he can still be 
understood as explaining sex-differentiated trends primarily in terms of the macro-economic 
structure of a society.  When examining the causes of growing flexibility of gender divisions 
of labour, this thesis explores the significance of changing patterns of resource access in 
terms of worsening economic security: men’s loss of permanent employment and rising 
living costs.  This concept of resource access is also used when exploring the consequences of 
growing flexibility, that is how does a woman’s independent access to income affect her 
status? 
 
Bear in mind that there are other conceptualisations of structural constraints in the 
literature.  Some theorists who stress structural causes of gender divisions of labour 
emphasise demand-side constraints, such as discrimination.  They critique supply-side 
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explanations (i.e. citing women’s beliefs and behaviour) as blaming the victim, for suggesting 
that society-wide sex-differentiated practices result from women’s own voluntary choices 
(see, for instance, Padavic and Reskin, 2002:89).  However, there seem to be two limitations 
of this approach.  First, discrimination partly stems from gender beliefs and thus is not 
conceptually distinct from other dimensions of my theoretical framework.  Accordingly, this 
focus is not helpful for the current project of trying to ascertain the relative significance of 
gender beliefs.  Second, this a priori objection to blaming the victim might narrow the field 
of inquiry.  Instead,  
 
We need to explore the various ways women participate in setting up, maintaining, and 
altering the system of gender relations...  Such a view highlights social interaction rather 
than more unidirectional processes of socialisation, adaptation, and/or oppression.  
This emphasis suggests that we appreciate women as the active creators of their own 
destinies within certain constraints, rather than as passive victims or objects (Gerson 
and Piess (1985:322, 327). 
 
The point here is that we should not shy away from examining why women might comply 
with cultural expectations.  If investigated in tandem with broader, enabling or constraining 
structures, this should not be conceived of as ‘blaming victims’.  As Charles (2011:365) 
argues, ‘acknowledging gender-differentiated aspirations does not blame the victim unless 
preferences are considered in isolation from the social contexts in which they emerge’.  
Accordingly, this thesis tries to identify interconnections between patterns of resource 
access, cultural expectations, internalised beliefs and gender divisions of labour. 
 
Examining interconnections 
 
The interplay between the three elements of the theoretical framework likely affects both the 
causes as well as the consequences of flexibility in gender divisions of labour.  Component 
questions include those raised by Risman and Davis (forthcoming): 
 
When does an individual choice of gendered options reflect internalised femininity or 
masculinity, and when do the expectational pressures of others prevail?  How does the 
behaviour chosen by individuals impact the expectations of others, and eventually 
institutions themselves?  When are gendered choices the only ones even imagined?  And 
do institutional changes affect individual imaginations of the possible?…  And what 
happens to interactional dynamics and male-dominated institutions when actors 
reflexively rebel?  Can we explore when people refuse to do gender whether they ‘undo’ 
it or simply do gender differently, forging alternative masculinities and femininities that 
are then internalised as identities?  And when does changing social policy effectively 
change the expectations people hold for others, or for themselves?  Future research 
should follow the causal relationships, as dominoes, to see when, and in what contexts, 
change begets change, and when it does not. 
 
As highlighted here, attention to any one dimension (of what they term the ‘gender 
structure’) does not negate the significance of another.  As England (2009:58) notes, ‘the 
field is converging on a theoretical view that sees gender differences and inequalities to be 
sustained at multiple levels and all across the life cycle, with the relative weight of each factor 
an empirical question, possibly differing by topic and time period’.  Risman (2004:433) 
similarly comments, ‘[w]e must pay attention both to how structure shapes individual choice 
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and social interaction and to how human agency creates, sustains, and modifies current 
structure’ (as also argued by Hollander et al, 2011; Martin, 2004; Ridgeway, 2011).   
 
These calls for attention to interplay build on Giddens’s structuration theory.  If ‘social 
reproduction occurs in and through the regularised conduct of knowledgeable agents’, it then 
follows that ‘[s]tructural constraints... always operate via agents’ motives and reasons, 
establishing... conditions and consequences affecting options open to others, and what they 
want from whatever options they have’ (Giddens, 1984:199, 310).  Given this duality, 
 
[A]ll explanations [of social practices and phenomena] will involve at least implicit 
reference both to the purposive, reasoning behaviour of agents and to its intersection 
with constraining and enabling features of the social and material contexts of that 
behaviour (Giddens, 1984:179) 
 
The second half of this chapter draws on the theoretical framework outlined above to 
examine how flexibility in gender divisions of labour has been found to affect status 
inequalities.  It notes mixed findings, offers reasons for persistent status beliefs, and finally 
explores how status inequalities have been undermined.  The overarching aim is to identify 
pertinent questions to be investigated in later chapters. 
 
The relationship between gender status inequalities and divisions of labour  
 
Arguably, men and women’s occupation of different social and economic roles perpetuates 
gender stereotypes relating to both competence and status.  To recall, these are assumptions 
that the typical man and woman differ in capabilities and that he is more entitled to respect 
and deference.  This causal connection between gender divisions of labour and gender status 
inequalities has been posited by a number of gender scholars: 
 
Exclusive clubs, special schools, and segregated workplaces not only function to keep 
women out of interesting and important areas of activity; they also prevent women from 
seeing that what men can do in these places is nothing women cannot do and might 
prefer to do.  Indeed, the male colleagues of women lawyers, doctors, prime ministers, 
and technicians have been repeatedly surprised to find women performing credibly 
(Epstein, 1988:236). 
 
It is this ubiquitous division of people into two unequally valued categories that 
undergirds the continually reappearing instances of gender inequality (Lorber, 2005:4). 
 
These quotes allude to three key ways in which gender divisions of labour might be 
associated with inequalities.  First, these divisions may constrain women’s access to 
resources and thereby compound material inequalities.  Second, divisions may foster 
descriptive stereotypes – both internalised and cultural – that women are less competent in 
male-dominated domains.  This cognitive association might be disrupted if men and women 
occupied a broader range of social roles (as argued by Ridgeway and Correll, 2004; Wood 
and Eagly, 2010:635-657).  Third, if the activities in which men are believed to be more 
competent are more valued than those of women then gender divisions of labour might 
reinforce gender status beliefs (as argued by Ridgeway, 2011:194).   
 
Gender status beliefs might be undermined in two ways.  One possibility is that 
stereotypically masculine and feminine tasks become equally valued.  This might occur 
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through awareness-raising campaigns about the value of domestic work or, as Ridgeway 
(2011) argues, if men take on a greater share of this activity.  Another way this cognitive 
association might be eroded is if more women take on stereotypically masculine activities 
and are thus perceived as equally competent in privileged domains.   
 
Alternatively, one might dispute the posited association between gender divisions of labour 
and gender status beliefs.  If men and women’s activities are equally valued then 
performances of difference need not entail inequalities.  For example, Leacock (1978:252) 
argues that women were ‘autonomous’ in ‘pre-class’ societies, ‘with their own rights, duties 
and responsibilities, which were complementary to and in no way secondary to those of 
men’.  In these contexts, women’s status depended on their control of access to resources, the 
conditions of their work and the distribution of the products of their labour.   
 
Similarly, some quantitative research suggests that gender divisions of labour are not 
incompatible with egalitarian societies.  In a survey of ten industrialised countries, Charles 
(2003) finds that respondents in countries with greater horizontal occupational sex 
segregation are more likely to disagree with the proposition that ‘men have greater rights to 
jobs during periods of high unemployment’.  Additionally, Blackburn and Jarman 
(2006:299-300) suggest that high levels of horizontal occupational segregation may even 
enhance women’s career progression.  Countries with high scores on the Gender 
Development Index (GDI)2 and the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM)3 often have high 
levels of horizontal occupational sex segregation and low levels of vertical segregation.  The 
authors attribute this association to reduced chances of discrimination: women have higher 
chances of reaching senior positions in occupations dominated by women.  If men are 
routinely favoured for promotion (due to gender stereotypes) then horizontal occupational 
sex segregation may better enable women’s career progression.  Such women might then act 
as role models, undermining other people’s gender status beliefs.   
 
However, there may be a confounding factor: the Scandinavian countries with high scores for 
the selected indicators of gender equality also have large public sectors employing women, 
egalitarian pay policies, strong trade unions and high investment in social welfare.  The latter 
may provide an alternative explanation of the relatively high GDI score.  Additionally the 
GEM may be regarded as an incomplete indicator of gender equality, since it concerns parity 
at the highest echelons of society.  This elite bias constrains the insights that the study 
provides into the lives of less economically advantaged women and men.  Therefore, the 
patterns that appear hold in Scandinavia do not reveal that gender divisions of labour are 
always compatible with an egalitarian society.  However, this data does highlight the 
possibility that some women may benefit from occupational segregation. 
 
Another gender division of labour in Zambia is male dominance of paid work in general, not 
just of specific occupations.  Some research indicates that Zambian women’s economic 
dependency on men restricts their room to renegotiate or exit patriarchal relationships 
(Wendoh and Wallace, 2006:81; YWCA, 1994:37).  Rural and urban Zambian women have 
also been said to comply with gender status inequalities in order to secure the derivative 
economic benefits that they are normatively entitled to from men (Crehan, 1997:103,134; 
                                                        
2 GDI comprises sex-based differences in life expectancy, adult literacy and estimated earned income. 
3 GEM refers to female shares in parliamentary seats; positions as legislators, senior officials and managers; professional and technical positions; 
as well as estimated earned income. 
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Schlyter, 1999:92).  Here gender status inequalities are primarily attributed to patterns of 
resource access rather than gender status beliefs.  Engels (1885:86-90) similarly suggested 
that women’s waged labour would improve their independent financial position in the event 
of marriage breakdown and thereby enhance their capacity to improve or end unsatisfactory 
relationships.  Kabeer (1997:292) likewise notes the theoretical possibility that economic 
independence might enable women to live without a male-breadwinner and thus not be 
married off in haste by natal families who would otherwise regard them as burdensome 
financial liabilities.  However, the empirical evidence is mixed. 
 
Some research finds that women’s economic advancement has little impact on gender 
relations.  In Lusaka, Zambia, many women have become ‘breadwinners’ yet are rarely 
identified as such by their peers or themselves.  Hansen (1997:103) argues that ‘the declining 
economy, which has turned many women into important contributors to household welfare 
in the face of men’s shrinking incomes from wage employment, has aggravated the built in 
tensions in the conjugal domain without transforming rights and claims in a manner that 
rewards women for their work efforts in their own rights’.  This research from an earlier 
period contrasts with my own and is discussed at length in Chapter 4.  Garikipati (2008) 
likewise explains that in Andhra Pradesh (India), ‘[w]omen’s increased employment and 
wage contributions seem to do nothing to challenge the domestic inequalities that confront 
them; indeed, they may intensify gender inequalities by allowing men to shift family 
provisioning onto women and to retain greater proportions of their incomes for personal 
expenses’.  Similarly in The Gambia, Costa Rica, the Philippines and Uganda, low-income 
women’s employment has reportedly added to their duties of unpaid care-work without 
enabling greater reward (Chant, 2007; Kwagala, 1999).  Indeed, a range of studies suggest 
that increased female labour force participation is not matched by men’s commensurate 
share of unpaid care work (Afshar and Dennis, 1992; Benería, 1991; Chant, 1996, 2007; 
Emmett, 2009; González de la Rocha and Grinspun, 2001; Jackson and Rao, 2009; Moser 
and Holland, 1997; Razavi, 2009).  In Bangladesh too, Kabeer (1997) observed that most 
female factory workers endeavoured to support rather than threaten established norms and 
practices of domestic patriarchy, given their dependence on marriage for social respect and 
physical protection.  These findings suggest that gender status inequalities are often not 
immediately diminished by changing patterns of resource access.   
 
Although enhancing women’s economic security may not immediately dissolve gender status 
beliefs, it may still form part of the gradual process of social change.  Some academics 
maintain that ‘[m]eeting daily practical needs in ways that transform the conditions in which 
women make choices is a crucial element of the process by which women are empowered to 
take on the more deeply entrenched aspects of their subordination’ (Kabeer, 1994:301; see 
also Agarwal, 1994:57, 1997:25).  In support of these claims, we find cases in which enhanced 
income (via either paid work, microfinance or land rights) do enable women to reconfigure 
conjugal relations (Agarwal, 1994; Benería and Roldán, 1987; Chant, 2002; Kabeer, 1997, 
2001, 2008; Kabeer et al, 2011a; Safa, 1996; Wolf, 1992).  Some studies in Zambia have 
similarly pointed to a positive association between women’s labour force participation and 
involvement in household decision-making (Muvandi et al, 2000; WLSA, 1997:122-123).  In 
a range of geographical contexts, improved financial security has also been found to enable 
women to avoid unwanted partnerships (Bradshaw, 1995; Chant, 1997; Safa, 1999; Oya and 
Sender, 2009).  In rural China, areas with lesser son preference tend to have more income-
generating opportunities for women: a smaller, local gender wage gap and higher rates of 
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female urban migration.  This implies that Chinese parents value daughters more when there 
are greater economic returns to their labour (Murphy et al, 2011).   
 
None of the above studies contradict the claim made in the previous paragraph that 
increased female labour force participation has rarely resulted in men’s greater share of care 
work.  This underscores the significance of the criteria used in evaluating the consequences 
flexibility in gender divisions of paid labour.     
Possible causes of persistent gender status inequalities  
Gender beliefs 
 
This section suggests that notwithstanding flexibility in gender divisions of labour, gender 
status inequalities may persist due to entrenched gender status beliefs.  These may be either 
internalised beliefs or cultural expectations.  As noted above, when outlining the theoretical 
framework, it is difficult to empirically distinguish these two causes.  For it may be ‘difficult 
to infer from people’s overt behaviour whether they are conforming because they fully accept 
the legitimacy of an unequal order, or partially accept it, or out of fear, or because they have 
(or believe they have) no other options’ (Agarwal, 1994:59-60).   
 
The salience of gender status beliefs, rather than unequal resource access, is apparent from 
qualitative research from a metropolitan area in the Eastern United States.  Here Tichenor 
(2005) finds that even when women earn significantly more than their husbands the latter 
continue to be defined as providers, retaining both decision-making power and the privilege 
of not having to perform unpaid care work.  This American study highlights that a woman’s 
greater access to resources still does not guarantee status equality in all domains.  Here 
‘[a]ppropriate “gender display” overrides the logic of resource exchange’ (Tichenor, 
2005:193).  Deutsch (2007:115) as well as Risman and Davis (2013:8) present similar 
findings, which they interpret as evidence of the primary importance of gender beliefs, rather 
than resource access. 
 
Irrespective of financial contributions, men and women may conform to cultural 
expectations in order to be respected by their peers.  Drawing on the life histories of middle-
class Zambian men, whom he had previously taught as adolescents, Simpson (2005:585) 
observes that, 
 
Many married men... continued to experience peer pressure to demonstrate that they 
were not ‘under’ any woman inside or outside the household, anxious not to be accused 
by fellow men  and indeed by other family members, both male and female  of 
acceding to ‘petticoat government’ in their households.  To demonstrate their 
independence they did not allow their wives to know their whereabouts or to question 
them about their movements.  In contrast, wives constantly reported their movements 
beyond the household.  Some men engaged in extramarital sex.  Concerned to appear to 
be ‘real men’, they sought multiple partners. 
  
These references to ‘peer pressure’, accusations, demonstrations and appearances of 
masculinity are all consistent with the cultural expectations hypothesis.  Additional studies 
similarly suggest that Zambian husbands are mocked if they appear unable to maintain their 
position as household heads (Crehan, 1997:153; Muvandi et al, 2000; Rude, 1999:12).  The 
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notion that the husband should act as household head appears to be a prescriptive gender 
stereotype.  Likewise, young women in Lusaka (Zambia) are said to be influenced by the 
cultural expectation that ‘submissiveness’ is a widely-held prescriptive stereotype; this 
arguably discourages them from speaking out (Schlyter, 1999:83).  Given concern for social 
respect and approval, a woman’s greater access to resources may not necessarily dislodge 
gender status inequalities. 
 
Besides cultural expectations, the persistence of gender status inequalities may be due to 
internalised gender beliefs.  If people accept the legitimacy of certain claims, needs and 
rights, they may not even imagine alternatives (Kabeer, 2002:441; Kandiyoti, 1998).  For 
example, even if women increase their financial contributions to the household, they may not 
ask their husbands to share housework if they have not even considered this possibility, or 
have but still think of it as abnormal and inappropriate.  Women in Zambia’s Northwestern 
Province reportedly accepted gender status inequalities as ‘natural’ and unalterable (Crehan, 
1997:104,133,137).  Ethnographic research indicates that they did not question men’s 
authority over women or the legitimacy of wife beating.  However, Crehan did observe 
frequent complains about men.  Also, some men were accused of abusing their authority in 
certain cases: abusing a woman in public, using unreasonable force or beating her while she 
was pregnant.  Similarly, when labour demands upon a wife exceeded the accepted range, 
they would be negotiated.  These observations suggest that sampled women did not accept 
status inequalities unreservedly but pushed back, while drawing on a culturally accepted 
framework that was not itself critiqued. 
 
Enduring status inequalities may also be due to men’s internalised gender status beliefs, 
persisting despite increased flexibility in gender divisions of labour.  If men consider 
themselves entitled to deference they may be deeply hostile to attempted disruption.  
Ridgeway (2011:81) hypothesises, 
 
Their [women’s] assertiveness contradicts the hierarchical aspect of gender status 
beliefs and, thus, violates others’ implicit expectations about gender and authority.  The 
gender status incongruity of their assertive behaviour makes it seem illegitimate and 
rudely dominant.  As a result, the women encounter a resistive, backlash reaction to 
their assertive claims for advancement. 
 
This emphasis on gender status beliefs can be used to explain Silberschmidt’s (1999) 
ethnography of rural Kenya.  Here, declining livelihoods weakened men’s abilities to fulfil 
their normative obligations of familial provision.  The social consequences of male economic 
disempowerment included feelings of frustration, marginalisation (from both domestic and 
national life), as well as the erosion of self-esteem and domestic authority.  Without the 
material basis of gender status inequalities (i.e. the erosion of gender divisions of labour), 
men’s gender status beliefs are often enforced through violence or temporarily evaded 
through alcohol abuse.  Here, in a context of declining access to land and employment, 
assertive demonstrations of sexual power through short-term extramarital relationships 
have become increasingly integral to men’s identity and standing.   
 
Research from Western Kenya in the late 1980s similarly indicates men’s entrenched gender 
status beliefs, notwithstanding increased flexibility in gender divisions of labour.  Men in this 
area previously resisted flexibility in gender divisions of labour.  But their opposition waned 
as structural adjustment induced unbearable financial hardship.  Women’s subsequent 
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greater resource access does not appear to have undermined men’s desire to dominate 
domestic decision-making.  Francis (2002:180) observed, 
 
Her voice carried most weight when her money financed these activities.  This greater 
authority seemed to come both from sheer financial clout, and from the assertiveness 
that came along with an independent income.   
 
This illustration suggests that by earning money women gained a sense of entitlement to 
participate in decision-making.  But their involvement was contingent upon their own 
financial input.  This implies that women’s ideas were not valued, since they were not sought 
nor listened to when the implementation of the activity was not contingent upon women’s 
economic contributions.  Notwithstanding women’s increased financial contributions, men’s 
support for domestic gender status inequality persisted.  This may have been due to men’s 
internalised gender status beliefs. 
 
Another example where gender status beliefs appear to cause male resistance to flexibility in 
gender divisions of labour comes from Guinea.  Many husbands reacted aggressively to their 
wives’ political participation in 1950s’ liberation movement (Schmidt, 2005).  The leadership 
of the RDA (Rassemblement Démocratique Africain) had purposefully recruited women in 
order to capitalise on their ability to mobilise members of their cultural associations.  
Leaders also recognised women’s important role in sustaining striking workers, as well as 
their families.  Sékou Touré also preached for women’s emancipation and proclaimed that 
‘the women are the fire of the RDA’ (ibid:125).  Despite elite support, women’s political 
involvement generated major domestic tensions, including ‘wife beating, marital breakdown, 
and the taking of more subservient wives were common responses’ (ibid:138-139).  Schmidt 
attributes this resistance to: the perceived failure of women to fulfil their normative domestic 
and sexual duties; men’s anxieties about women’s independent movement and infidelity; as 
well as the rapid pace of change in gender roles.  Again, women’s incursions into a male-
dominated domain (i.e. politics) appear to have resulted in tensions.  We might attribute this 
antagonism to persistent prescriptive stereotypes.   
 
In summary, a range of case studies suggest that gender status inequalities persist despite 
increased flexibility in gender divisions of labour.  It seems difficult to ascertain from the 
material presented whether this is largely due to internalised gender beliefs or cultural 
expectations.  One aim of this thesis is to ascertain when, how and to what extent these 
different kinds of gender beliefs account for the reproduction of gender status inequalities.  
The thesis also examines how these beliefs can be weakened – a question also explored 
towards the end of this chapter. 
Formative experiences 
 
Zambian men and women’s apparent commitment to gender status beliefs has been partly 
attributed to their early experiences.  For example, drawing on qualitative research with 
middle-class Zambian men, whom he had previously taught as adolescents, Simpson 
(2005:576) points to the ways in which gender beliefs are developed through formative 
experiences: 
 
Very early in their lives these men, as boys, discovered that in the prevailing hegemonic 
discourse, ‘real men’ claimed ‘superiority’ over women and expressed this, in part, by 
28 
 
exhibiting strength – at times in verbal and physical violence and in the repression of 
emotional expression...  Former students regularly based their claim of ‘superiority’ over 
women on men’s supposed greater physical strength and greater intelligence and upon 
women’s greater susceptibility to spirit possession.  In addition they pointed to ‘African 
tradition’ which, they claimed, always gave men precedence over women, and to 
Christianity – especially the Creation story in the Book of Genesis – where, they 
stressed, it was clear that man was created first and thus should take precedence...  Such 
instruction in masculine force combined with a boy’s education by his peers played a 
key role in the production of the majority of the cohort’s adult sexual identity and in 
their assertions of sexual virility.   
 
If certain formative experiences lead to the development of gender status beliefs, in the way 
described by Simpson (2005), then these stereotypes may be resistant to contradictory 
information.   
 
In some pre-marital initiation rituals in Southern Zambia, girls are taught that they should 
‘be quiet and suffer’, listening to their husbands and abiding by his authority.  Geisler 
(2000:66) argues that this stress on silently bearing ill-treatment ensures that women’s 
experiences of subordination are separated and individualised, thereby reproducing gender 
inequalities.  While Geisler focuses on the ceremonies themselves, it would appear important 
to test this socialisation hypothesis by exploring whether taught messages influence 
preferences and behaviour in later life, especially as constraints and opportunities change.   
Interests 
 
Another explanation of persistent status inequalities emphasises countervailing interests.  
Perhaps men resist change in order to preserve their relative privilege, both within the 
household and more broadly, in politics and employment.  Cha and Thébaud (2009) suggest 
that ‘[t]he most widely invoked explanation for men’s slow adoption of a gender egalitarian 
ideology is that traditional gender norms serve men’s interests’.   
 
I define ‘interests’ subjectively here as the satisfaction of desires.  This includes economic 
security as well as power within the home and social respect.  For instance, men might 
oppose women’s participation in decision-making because they want to implement their own 
ideas.  Likewise, men may refuse to participate in care-giving because they want the freedom 
to concentrate on their own economic, social and leisure activities.  This theory can also be 
used to account for male resistance to female employment: for instance, men may seek to 
preserve their privileged position in the labour market.  Assuming that women are more 
likely than men to perceive gender equality as beneficial, the interests theory would predict 
that they are more likely than men to support it. 
 
According to this view, performances of gender are expected to shift when men perceive this 
as beneficial.  Such interests may be shaped by gender beliefs and patterns of resource 
access.  For example, the prescriptive stereotype that men should be breadwinners may lead 
people to regard flexibility in gender divisions of labour as disadvantageous, given the social 
costs of non-conformity.  Also recall Ridgeway’s (1997:222-223) argument, outlined in the 
first section of this chapter, that the advantage men perceive themselves as deriving from 
status inequalities may cause them to be ‘cognitively resistant’ to information that 
contradicts their gender status beliefs.    
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The exigencies of the time may lead men and women to perceive flexibility in gender 
divisions of labour as advantageous, despite earlier resistance.  Worsening economic security 
appears to have increased popular support for female labour force participation in Mexico 
(Chant, 1994), Kenya (Francis, 2002), Zimbabwe (Kanji, 1995), Zambia (Moser and Holland, 
1997) and the Dominican Republic (Safa, 1999) for example.  Financial hardship seems to 
motivate a trade-off: some people may become more inclined to accept flexibility in gender 
divisions of labour, even though this goes against their gender beliefs.  This is also apparent 
in my research, as discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
Other illustrative examples come from liberation struggles in Africa.  In the battles for 
independence in Mozambique and Zimbabwe, some (but not all) gender divisions of labour 
were temporarily suspended in order to enhance collective strength against a common foe 
(Geisler, 2004:50; Kesby, 1996:581).  Given exigencies of the time, powerful groups regarded 
this shift as advantageous.  Sex-differentiated practices appear to have changed due to a shift 
in interests, not gender beliefs – for the latter were manifested after the conflict.   
Possible routes towards gender status equality 
 
If gender status inequalities endure because they are seen as legitimate then their erosion 
requires the ‘emergence of a critical consciousness, the process by which people from a 
position of unquestioning acceptance of the social order to a critical perspective on it’ 
(Kabeer, 1999a:441).  According to a major report on pathways to gender equality:  
 
[E]mpowerment is... also about shifting the horizons of possibility.  As women come to 
see themselves differently, they can begin to confront and overcome obstacles in their 
everyday lives.  Working with women’s empowerment calls for working with women’s 
imaginations as well as the material aspects of their lives (Pathways RPC, 2011:10). 
 
The pressing issue is to identify which processes and interventions lead people to question 
their internalised gender stereotypes.4  This section draws on existing studies.  It considers 
the comparative impact of exposure to egalitarian ideas and practices through flexibility in 
gender divisions of labour, migration, association and gender sensitisation.   
Exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of labour 
 
Some research suggests that macro-economic shifts can trigger men’s exposure to (and in 
turn empathy for) stereotypically female care-giving practices.  Drawing on research in 
Wisconsin, USA, Chesley (2011) finds that the global financial crisis and consequent 
redundancies have pushed many men into stay-at-home fatherhood.  Their greater 
involvement in parenting appears to have enhanced their appreciation of women’s daily care 
work.  This has affected relations in the home and in workplaces, where such men have 
become more supportive of employed mothers.  In this way, changing macro-level patterns 
of resource access may trigger flexibility in gender divisions of labour, which can provide 
disconfirming evidence of gender stereotypes. 
 
                                                        
4 The above quote could be referring to cultural expectations, though that seems unlikely.  Cultural expectations do not seem to be based on 
imaginations but on observations of others’ tendency to praise or condemn men and women’s behaviour.  That said, as noted earlier, 
preconceptions may influence the interpretation of subsequent experiences. 
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This observation chimes with the conclusion reached by Bolzendahl and Myers (2004:783), 
derived from longitudinal analysis of American men and women’s attitudes (1974-1998): 
 
[I]t is most likely that both interests and exposure contribute to the formation and 
maintenance of feminist attitudes — not one or the other.  In addition to making 
independent contributions, it also seems quite likely that these two processes interact in 
a cyclical fashion such that exposure causes a redefinition of interest structures and 
changes in life circumstances, which may in turn lead to further exposure [emphasis in 
original]. 
 
For example, if exposure to care-giving practices leads men to enjoy this activity then they 
are less likely to regard such flexibility in gender divisions of labour as disadvantageous.  
Bolzendahl and Myers’s (2004) conclusion is further supported by qualitative and 
quantitative research.  In South Africa, Naysmith and Rubincam (2012) point to the 
inspirational effect of female truck drivers, as well as positive community responses.  Their 
relations with male co-workers also became progressively respectful, notwithstanding initial 
incredulity and scrutiny.  Perhaps their colleagues became more accepting as a result of 
prolonged exposure to flexibility.   
 
Seguino’s (2010) longitudinal analysis of World Value Survey data likewise finds that 
women’s increased share of employment weakens gender stereotypes – when controlling for 
macro-economic conditions, as well as region and structure of production.  As people 
become accustomed to female labour force participation, gender beliefs appear to shift in 
turn, such that people are more likely to regard women as having an equal place in the labour 
market.   
 
On the other hand, recall the earlier cited findings that female labour force participation had 
little impact on gender status beliefs.  These studies raise questions about what kinds of 
flexibility in gender divisions of labour in which socio-economic contexts can undermine 
gender beliefs.  Additionally, the way that individuals respond to changing patterns of 
resource access may depend on their place in the class structure.  In Wisconsin, for instance, 
the observed trend of growing support for care-giving amongst unemployed men was less 
evident in working-class homes (Chesley, 2011).  A comparable study in Western USA 
likewise found a little change in gender divisions of care work amongst unemployed, 
working-class steelworkers (Legerski and Cornwall, 2010).  
Migration 
 
Some studies of female migration suggest that individuals may come to eschew their 
gender beliefs by encountering alternative possibilities.  For example, Dannecker (2005, 
2009) records that returned female migrants became critical of gender divisions of 
labour in their native Bangladesh, having observed alternative practices while working 
in Malaysia.  While overseas they found that Malayasian women working outside the 
home were respected.  They also saw Malayasian women successfully undertaking 
technical occupations that they had previously thought impossible for their sex.  Such 
exposure led some female migrants to criticise and even challenge inequitable practices 
upon their return home to Bangladesh.  We might explain this behaviour with reference 
to internalised stereotypes.  These dissolved as female migrants were exposed to 
alternative practices in Malaysia, which they sought to implement in Bangladesh 
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because they regarded them as in their interests.  Although this case study is an example 
of exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of labour, I have categorised it separately 
because the migrants were also exposed to greater gender status equality.  
 
Living in Iran for a number of years likewise provided Afghan women and some men 
with ‘a reflexive distance from which to evaluate their own society and to compare it with the 
different realities that prevailed in other Muslim countries’ (Kabeer et al, 2011b:19).  This 
account of migration indicates the importance of prolonged exposure to alternative ways of 
doing things, as well as the opportunity to personally discover related benefits.  
 
These examples also suggest that change in gender status beliefs can occur through working 
with existing norms: Iran and Malaysia are both Muslim societies, as are Afghanistan and 
Bangladesh.  This commonality may have been instrumental in enabling migrants to regard 
the foreign practices as compatible with their own core beliefs.   
Association 
 
Participation in forms of associational life where there is some support for egalitarian 
practices may facilitate an introduction to alternative beliefs and discourses.  This might also 
provide a safe place for women to explore and reflect upon those ideas without fear of social 
sanction.  Furthermore, learning that one’s private egalitarian beliefs are shared by others 
could enhance confidence in their objective validity.  Thus when people with atypical gender 
experiences share their ideas, they may collectively gain confidence in their egalitarian views 
by learning that they are endorsed by others.  This process may also shift cultural 
expectations, showing that gender atypical performances will not be penalised in this social 
circle (see also Ridgeway and Correll, 2004:514).   
 
This hypothesis is supported by a range of studies.  In Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, young male, 
low-income participants professed finding strength in belonging to a peer group that shared 
their more egalitarian ideas, enabling them to affirm such beliefs without ridicule (Barker, 
2000).  In apartheid South Africa, community-based women’s organisations provided a 
forum in which women discussed personal struggles, such as the burden of domestic labour, 
violence within marriage and sexual harassment at work.  Realisation of shared, structural 
(rather than idiosyncratic) grievances and constraints appears to have fostered solidarity 
between women (Hassim, 2006:52-53).   
 
The impact of association is also apparent from quantitative research.  In South India, 
targeted credit and women’s group membership led to greater investment in girls’ 
healthcare, whereas no such change resulted from resources being channelled to non-group 
member mothers.  Holvoet (2005) provides two explanations for this observation.  First, she 
suggests that group membership facilitated women’s access to resources without male 
mediation, thereby reducing their dependency on men.  Second, Holvoet (ibid:52) indicates 
that group membership enabled women to learn that their own, private concerns about 
gender inequalities were broadly shared.  Exposure to others disavowing gender stereotypes 
provided external validation of their pre-existing egalitarian beliefs and led to a shift in 
cultural expectations.  One such female member is quoted as saying,  
 
I always felt that discrimination against my daughter was wrong, but we just followed 
what others in the village were doing.  By talking to other women and NGO personnel in 
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the women’s group, I became conscious that my own ideas were not bad.  I also learned 
how to express myself.  I became more confident and I struggled to get my ideas 
implemented in the household. 
 
Holvoet (ibid:54) comments,  
 
[O]nly after they became a member of a women’s group were they convinced about the 
legitimacy of their diverging preferences and subsequently able to express their 
preferences through increased voice in household decision-making.  Extra-household 
bargaining within the community through women’s groups further reduced the external 
sanctions on nonconformist behaviour and made expulsion from the community a less 
viable threat, which changed the perceived costs and benefits of “deviant” behaviour.   
 
This case study suggests that individuals’ exploration and enactment of egalitarian beliefs 
depends upon the presence of a supportive social environment, where they will not be 
ostracised or sanctioned for atypical performances of gender.  As discussed in the beginning 
of this chapter, it is generally difficult to empirically separate the salience of internalised 
gender beliefs and cultural expectations.  However, as shown in the testimony above, at least 
one participant in Holvoet’s case study explicitly stated that she deferred to men due to 
cultural expectations, not internalised gender beliefs. 
 
Drawing on Benhabib (1992), as well as empirical research with NGO members in rural 
Bangladesh, Kabeer (2011:503-504) similarly makes the case for women’s participation in 
associational life: 
 
If it is through the ‘given’ relationships of family and kinship, the ‘communities of birth’, 
that women gain their sense of identity and personhood, then it is through participation 
in alternative forms of associational life that they can acquire a reflexive vantage point 
from which to evaluate these relationships.  Such ‘chosen’ communities may embody 
their own forms of inequality but if they expand women’s knowledge, information and 
interactions with others, they can allow a critical re-assessment of what was hitherto 
accepted as the natural order of things and open up the possibility of alternative was of 
living that were hitherto inconceivable… certain kinds of interactions can strengthen 
women’s capacity to recognise and articulate what they consider to be unjust, to decide 
what action to take and through their actions, come to formulate their vision of a better 
society.   
 
This leads to questions about the forms of association may enable critical reflection about 
given relationships.  Will groups of homemakers be just as likely as market traders to 
collectively disavow gender stereotypes or will their discussions be shaped by divergent 
experiences and interests?  Furthermore, for those persons who have internalised gender 
status beliefs, can these be undone by dialogue alone?   
Gender sensitisation 
 
If gender divisions of labour and status inequalities are caused by unquestioned, internalised 
gender beliefs then it is plausible that these may be eroded by exposure to egalitarian 
discourses.  Access to such information might lead people to question their assumptions and 
critique sex-differentiated practices.  Learning that one’s beliefs are widely-shared, through 
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participatory gender sensitisation with other supporters of gender equality, may also shift 
cultural expectations.   
 
This hypothesis is supported by a range of studies.  Verma et al (2006:138) find that young 
men in Mumbai (India) derived great satisfaction from group educational activities (role 
plays, games and debate).  The authors comment, ‘It was often their first opportunity to 
discuss these issues openly, and they particularly liked talking about them with other men’.  
The men appear to have relished the safe space in which to discuss private concerns.  The 
success of Promundo in Rio de Janeiro (Brazil) has similarly been attributed to ‘the activities 
[which] focus on creating a safe space in which young men can question traditional views 
about manhood and critically reflect on gender, gender injustices and gender rigidities’ 
(Barker et al, 2011b).  Similar observations have been noted of ActionAid’s ‘REFLECT’ 
approach (Cottingham et al, 1998); gender and sexuality lessons in rural Zambian schools 
(Gordon, 2008); social mobilisation in Bangladesh (Kabeer, 2003; Kabeer et al, 2009:25-
27); African churches addressing gender issues and HIV/AIDS (Marshall et al, 2009); the 
combined impact of atypical role models and critical reflection about gender norms in 
Uganda (Underwood et al, 2011); and in relation to masculinities in Nicaragua (Welsh, 2011).   
 
However, other studies of participatory gender sensitisation report only partial success.  One 
Indian-based network, called ‘Men’s Action to Stop Violence against Women’, is said to 
provide men with the opportunity to collectively discuss gender issues.  Yet a number of 
surveyed participants expressed persistent commitment to gender divisions of labour, ideals 
of violent masculinity, and tended to blame the survivors of sexual violence (Das, 2012:672).  
Frischmuth’s (1998) research in rural Zambia similarly points to varied responses to gender 
sensitisation.  She notes that some sensitised women spearheaded changes, seeking to 
become more vocal in public meetings.  Meanwhile, other sensitised women strongly resisted 
sharing unpaid domestic work and decision-making, even though many men became 
increasingly supportive.  Both studies raise questions about why exposure to egalitarian 
discourses might not be sufficient for a disavowal of gender status beliefs.  What other 
factors are relevant?  These might include countervailing interests, resource access or 
insufficient exposure to behavioural manifestations of the abstract ideals promoted.   
 
Conclusion 
 
The literature reviewed, questions raised and concepts outlined in this chapter will be used 
to analyse empirical data from Kitwe, Zambia.  The substantive chapters of this thesis 
explore the ways in which gender divisions of labour and status inequalities are shaped by 
internalised gender stereotypes, cultural expectations and access to resources.  This 
theoretical framework is influenced by the work of sociologists and social psychologists (such 
as Ridgeway, 2011) who attribute gender status inequalities in the United States to persistent 
gender status beliefs.  To test this theory in the Zambian context, this thesis also considers 
the relative significance of resource access.  For example, it explores the extent to which 
conjugal status inequalities are undermined by a woman’s increased access to resources.  To 
analytically isolate the particular impact of resource access, comparisons are made across 
occupations and historical contexts.   
 
The significance of shifts in interests is also examined.  The two main interests studied are 
desires for financial security (which vary with patterns of resource access) and for social 
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respect (accrued by compliance with gender stereotypes).  In order to ascertain the relative 
importance of interests and exposure, this thesis considers whether a shift in interests in the 
form of worsening economic security was alone sufficient for increased female labour force 
participation and occupational desegregation.  Financial hardship could have reduced 
parents’ and husbands’ interest in complying with cultural expectations of gender divisions 
of labour, possibly leading them to prioritise financial security through over social respect 
(see Chapters 3 and 4).  Alternatively, greater flexibility in gender divisions of labour upon 
worsening economic security may have been contingent upon prior exposure, such as to role 
models and egalitarian discourses (discussed in Chapters 5 and 6 respectively).   
 
The thesis draws on this theoretical framework to examine the consequences of growing 
flexibility in gender divisions of labour.  By enhancing their financial security, independent 
access to resources through paid work may lessen women’s economic interest in conforming 
to gender status inequalities within marriage.   
 
Additionally, the thesis reviews how gender beliefs may change with different kinds of 
exposure.  In this regard, it principally looks at exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of 
labour and exposure to egalitarian discourses.  In order to determine what (if any) forms of 
flexibility in gender divisions of labour are particularly transformative, Chapter 4 compares 
reactions to different kinds of gender atypical activities.  Chapter 5 explores whether it 
matters at what age people become exposed to flexibility in gender divisions of labour, i.e. 
the significance of formative experiences.  It assesses whether beliefs are stable over the life 
course or can be disrupted by exposure in later life.  Chapters also attend to social 
interactional contexts, contrasting the consequences of homemakers’ social isolation with 
association through paid work in the public sphere, as well as participatory gender 
sensitisation.   
 
This study of the relative importance of growing flexibility in gender divisions of labour 
primarily focuses upon how men and women are perceived and treated.  For example, 
Chapter 4 charts the impacts of women’s paid work on their financial autonomy, self-
perceptions, gender stereotypes, social relations with others, susceptibility to gender-based 
violence, share of unpaid care work and political participation.  The latter three topics have 
been specifically selected as indicators of gender status inequalities.  Covering a broad range 
of dimensions of gender relations should also prevent the possibility of biasing the narrative 
by selecting a particular indicator of gender equality.  A further advantage of this broad 
range is that many of these themes have been explored by other studies in Zambia, so 
comparisons can be made. 
 
In these ways, existing studies have been used to guide my analysis of contemporary trends 
in Kitwe.  They are drawn upon in order to answer the overarching research question 
regarding the causes and consequences of growing flexibility in gender divisions of labour. 
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2. Methodology 
 
My qualitative fieldwork was undertaken between April 2010 and March 2011.  It was largely 
based in Kitwe, a Copperbelt district with a population of 506,045 according to the last 
census (CSO, 2012b:2).  Data collection comprised life histories, thematic individual 
interviews, group discussions, student essays and observation.  Figure 2.1 provides a broad 
overview of this sample by grouping participants into occupational categories; a full listing of 
participants is included in Annex 1. 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Participants, grouped by occupational category and research 
method 
 
Out of the larger total, 119 narrated their life histories; an additional 58 were particularly 
detailed.  Four of these histories are included in the second half of this chapter.  A further 48 
participated in group discussions on more than one occasion.  This is my core sample.  The 
remainder were either interviewed individually about a thematic topic, submitted an essay or 
once contributed to a group discussion.   
 
As shown above, traders comprised a large proportion of my informants.  This is due to two 
factors.  First, interviewing members of this group provided some insight into typical 
circumstances since small-scale trading is a common livelihood in Kitwe.  Second, earlier 
studies on female labour force participation in urban areas of Zambia (e.g. Hansen, 1997; 
Schlyter, 1999) have likewise focused on traders, so this shared focus enables comparative 
analysis.  My own participants who traded in the market appeared to have similarly low 
levels of income as those described in these earlier ethnographies from the 1980s and 1990s.  
Without sufficient access to capital, many in my sample sold on someone else’s behalf, for 
which they were paid very low wages.  While other interviewees did invest in their own 
micro-enterprises, they stressed that profits had worsened over the past decade due to 
market saturation.   
 
Primary Occupation Female Male Total Female Male Total
Administrative support worker 2 5 7
Counsellor 6 2 8
Domestic worker 4 4
Health care worker 8 2 10 2 2
Housewife 13 13 2 2
Pastor 1 1
Politician 9 12 21 4 1 5
Professional/ managerial 16 15 31 3 3
Service worker 4 4 8 1 1 2
Skilled manual worker (not stereotypically 
masculine, e.g. hairdresser)
4 1 5
Skilled manual worker (stereotypically 
masculine, e.g. miner)
14 21 35 11 2 13
Student 52 45 97 5 1 6
Teacher 16 15 31 3 1 4
Trader 67 30 97 14 5 19
Unemployed 18 8 26 2 2
Total 233 161 394 47 11 58
All participants (interviews, focus 
groups, student essays)
Of which, detailed life histories
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Students also constituted a sizeable share of the total number shown above.  Their 
contributions largely comprised group discussions and essays, rather than life histories. 
 
Once I had communicated my research interests, the vast majority of participants were 
befriended over a period of several days, so that we built up a relationship of trust and 
understanding prior to the interviews.  Friendships with market traders, for example, were 
often fostered by me helping out with their stalls and inviting customers to buy their goods.  
As friendships developed, participants would often introduce me to others I was interested in 
meeting, thereby expanding my sample.   
 
Throughout my research I have tried to listen rather than direct the conversation or impose 
my own framework.  Accordingly, I invited people to tell me about their lives, reflect on their 
experiences and identify salient influences.  On other occasions, such as when interviewing a 
woman mechanic or politician, I might ask when she started to want to do such work and 
how she had progressed over time.  Sometimes I intervened with questions.  For example, if 
participants mentioned that they attended a particular type of school (such as single-sex or 
co-educational), I might ask their opinion of it.   
 
Group discussions focused on specific themes, such as female political participation.  These 
clusters of people were all pre-established, not artificially constructed for research purposes.  
Observing their interactions provided insight into the naturally-occurring effects of 
association: how participants express their views in social contexts, collectively construct 
history, share ideas and affirm or question each other’s accounts.  Indeed, being already 
familiar with each other (as kin, neighbours, co-workers or political colleagues), contributors 
were often sufficiently comfortable to dispute each other’s perspectives.  Some urged others 
to caveat or contextualise their claims, to accommodate diverse experiences.  Another effect 
of interlocutors being at ease with each other was that my role was generally limited to 
initiating the discussion and then remaining silent, intervening only occasionally to seek 
clarification.  This enhanced their collective control over the agenda – though clearly the 
content may still have been influenced by my presence, as well as power dynamics within the 
group.  Furthermore, since discussants were knowledgeable about each other’s lives, they 
could ask each other questions about issues of which I was not aware and had not 
considered.   
 
Observation of gender sensitisation and mainstreaming programmes formed another 
important part of my research.  This included NGO meetings with community leaders, NGO 
and government outreach activities in low-income urban areas, Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) efforts to lobby for electoral quotas for women 
parliamentarians, and lessons on gender in three schools (a co-educational government 
school, a government boys’ school and an elite, co-educational private school).  I spent a total 
of three months in these schools, with one or two particular classes in each.  Since teachers 
were often absent, I was encouraged to set students essays.  These papers (on future 
aspirations, school sex composition, role models and gender differences) provided 
tremendous insight.  By spending a long time with these organisations and schools, I hoped 
to become familiar to them and thereby observe typical behaviour.5  Although it remains 
                                                        
5 In other qualitative research on gender sensitisation in schools, one male teacher confessed to behaving differently because of the researcher’s 
presence.  Notwithstanding embarrassment, he said the word ‘sex’, because he felt that ‘he could not let her [the researcher] down since  she had 
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possible that events may have been biased by my presence, when I asked students in the 
class at the boys’ school whether this had changed anything, they reported no difference in 
teaching style, class content or staff absenteeism, only an unusual absence of corporal 
punishment.6  
 
A particularly illuminating part of my research process was living in homes across a socio-
economic range.  For four months I lived in one of the poorest areas of Kitwe, a high-density 
township, built for African non-mine employees during the 1940s and 1950s.  According to a 
local authority survey of low cost housing in 1951-1952, there were just over a thousand two-
roomed houses here at that time, a further 56 had a third room (Mutale, 2004:191).  Most of 
these houses now show signs of significant disrepair; they do not appear to have been 
renovated since colonial times.  Each house has an outdoor tap and area for bathing with a 
bucket – with mealie-meal sacks carefully pinned around a timber frame, which provides 
privacy when it is not windy.  The functionality of the outdoor taps varies: some families 
have been cut off due to non-payment of bills; meanwhile, those that do pay only receive a 
couple of hours of water each day.  Even then, the public supply sometimes gets polluted by 
the nearby mines, so it is essential to listen out for radio announcements in order to avoid 
skin or eye irritation when bathing.  The (outdoor) pit latrine was not supposed to be used at 
night time, given the possibility of armed gangs.  But the only act of violence I ever 
encountered involved two young women in the middle of the day, fighting over a mutual 
boyfriend.  With little privacy between homes, neighbours quickly came to observe the 
commotion, as the young women tore each other’s hair and second-hand clothes.   
 
Occasional disputes notwithstanding, there was a very communal atmosphere.  Unlike high-
income areas, there were no high wall fences to provide privacy.  Early each morning, 
passers-by would call out from the unpaved road, on their way to work or church, greeting us 
women and girls as we routinely swept the fallen leaves and debris from the numerous 
avocado, guava and mango trees, so that the surrounding ground should appear presentable.  
We would also exchange pleasantries while queuing for soft white buns at one of the 
numerous small roadside stalls, set up by those with capital in order to boost incomes.  But 
many neighbours skipped breakfast, due to the rising cost of bread.  Dinner was the most 
significant meal of the day, when the whole family sat down together on the floor, sharing 
bowls of ubwali (maize porridge), dried sardines and vegetables.  We usually waited to eat 
until my host father had returned from one of the many nearby taverns – there were two 
within 50 metres of the house.  Then, after dinner, we would place an old sponge mattress 
and blankets on the sitting room floor, upon which three of us slept.  The remaining children 
slept in a small cabin, with a corrugated iron roof, that became exceedingly hot in the rainy 
season.  The children were usually at school during the day but this pattern was sometimes 
interrupted because their parents struggled to source funds for their school shoes and fees.  
 
Living with participants was a crucial part of the research process, enabling me to observe 
attitudes and behaviour that might not be spoken of during interviews: love, family 
interactions, neighbourly relations, as well as sources of anxiety and barriers to personal 
freedoms.  Sharing participants’ personal spaces, observing their relationships with friends, 
                                                                                                                                                                            
come all the way to observe a sex education/HIV and AIDS lesson’ (Morrell et al, 2009:98).  In order to minimise the potential for such bias, my 
research was conducted over an extended period of time, with the hope that teachers would not make a special effort to please a ‘visitor’. 
6 Although corporal punishment is pervasive, it is illegal.  It was suggested that their teachers did not want to commit an offence in front of me.  
This said, I did witness beatings in another school. 
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neighbours and family members also helped me understand the nuanced realities behind the 
rhetoric. 
 
[This image has been removed for copyright reasons].  
Figure 2.2: The low-income settlement, Kitwe 
Note: one square = 100m x 100m; buildings are represented by dots. 
Source: Zambia Survey Department, 1:5,000 Topo-Cadastral Series Map, Sheet NO.2886, 
cited in Mutale (2004:189). 
 
I also stayed with BanaMulenga (38, a bank manager) and her family in a high-income area 
built for Europeans in the 1950s.  It is far less densely populated than the low-income area 
discussed above – as can be seen by comparing Figures 2.2 and 2.3.  She supported the 
extended family single-handedly; her husband had lost a significant amount of money during 
the global financial crisis and was yet to get back on track.  He was absent until late most 
evenings, away at a bar.  The two young daughters both went to private schools.  These, like 
many of the local social amenities, were originally established by the mine companies.  
Unpaid care was provided by a maid and two young female relatives, pursuing their own 
studies.   
 
[This image has been removed for copyright reasons].  
Figure 2.3: The high-income settlement, Kitwe 
Scale: one square = 100m x 100m 
Source: Mutale (2004:190). 
 
For several weeks I also stayed at a boarding house with six young women, two of whom 
were training as mechanics.  Others pursued more stereotypically feminine occupations: 
teaching and social work.  We stayed together in a single room, with bunk beds, in the 
servants’ quarters at the back of a house originally built for European mine managers.  Most 
of the houses on this road close to town similarly housed students, to boost incomes, so 
visitors were frequent.  Besides cooking, eating, dancing and joking together, we also 
reflected on their different career paths and gender beliefs.   
 
In my first few months in Kitwe I had lived further down this same road, which was so 
riddled with potholes that it was faster to walk than drive.  Here I shared a bed with two 
teenage school girls and their extended family: a mine supplier, his wife, her sister and their 
two infants.  Gender divisions of labour and status inequalities were omnipresent.  If men 
visited they would always eat separately, at the table, while women and children ate in the 
kitchen; women were largely silent in Bible study sessions; and when the father returned 
home from work the house would become a little quieter.   
 
During my time in Lusaka, I stayed at the National Assembly Motel, which houses 
parliamentarians.  Over breakfast they shared their experiences and opinions of gender 
sensitisation, female political participation and national governance more generally, which 
enabled me to contextualise gender specific issues.  They also invited me to parliamentary 
sessions, relevant workshops and also social events.   
 
Besides these medium-stay locations, I often stayed overnight with participants whom I 
knew well – they wished me to meet their families.  Interviews with informants’ family 
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members and friends helped to triangulate life history narratives.  Sometimes these 
discussions were facilitated by participants themselves (e.g. a young woman might interview 
her mother).  This enabled me to benefit from the daughter’s insights and minimise my own 
influence.  Conversations with third parties also enhanced my understanding of people’s 
backgrounds and family influences.  Another motivation for this kind of data triangulation 
was my increasing recognition that changes in gender roles and relations have ‘supply’ and 
‘demand’ aspects: a woman politician and supportive voters; a woman mechanic and 
employer; a wife keen to participate in decision-making and a receptive husband.  
Accordingly, it was important to listen to all parties, for the reasons behind a woman’s self-
confidence and other people’s confidence in her may be different.  Neglecting either 
narrative would limit our understanding of how change occurs.   
 
The nature and quality of my research was significantly enhanced by attaining fluency in 
Bemba, the language most commonly spoken in the Copperbelt.  Yet other features of my 
identity, such as my youth and non-marital status, may still have led participants to shield 
some information.  For instance, the Bemba icisungu ceremony and related trainings, in 
which I participated, are only for the bride-to-be and married women.  This secrecy is partly 
intended to prevent unmarried women from deploying that knowledge to ‘steal’ their 
husbands.  Ann Tweedie (a female researcher associated with the Rhodes-Livingstone 
Institute in the 1960s) was given only partial information about the Bemba girls’ initiation 
ceremony.  Schumaker (2001:127) suggests that this may have been because she was 
perceived as too immature to understand these matters.  
 
It was important for me to present myself in an appropriate manner so that I might gain 
access to a broad range of information.  None of the married women I interviewed seemed to 
see me as a threat – perhaps partly because I often mentioned my partner, about whose well-
being they would often inquire.  Although unmarried cohabitation is condemned in Kitwe 
and I only ever heard of one such instance, participants appeared to accept my own 
relationship as equivalent to marriage.  In addition to not drinking alcohol, not going out at 
night, not wearing tight or revealing clothing7 and attending church on a regular basis, I was 
particularly careful when associating with men.  For example, in the market, I first 
interviewed women in each section and then men, to develop rapport and understanding 
with women, so they would not be suspicious of me talking to men.  Also, once I had 
participated in the ceremony, at the invitation of a banacimbusa (traditional counsellor), 
others appeared to accept that my entry had been sanctioned.  To my knowledge, no one 
objected.  Married women would often delight in testing me about what I had learnt.   
 
Besides this specific knowledge, cultural knowledge of social decorum was equally valuable 
(as also noted by Robertson, 1983:64, in relation to her ethnographic research in Ghana).  I 
learnt how to properly convey respect, such as by sitting on a lower level than elders; 
stooping when giving or receiving something; and physically slapping someone’s arm to 
convey shared amusement.  Summarising participants’ comments by using Bemba idioms 
                                                        
7 The first time I walked into the central market, a middle-aged man tried to make a ‘citizen’s arrest’ on me.  He shouted in objection to the length 
of my dress, which had come to reveal my knees, as an inadvertent consequence of my efforts to manoeuvre over narrow, makeshift market 
pathways in rainy season.  Being new to the place and knowing little Bemba, I was terrified.  Also, over the past decade, there have been a number 
of occasions in which ‘indecently’ dressed women have been publicly stripped by gangs of unemployed male youths in Kitwe’s central market and 
bus terminals (The Post, 2012a,b).  While I personally never felt vulnerable to such attacks, they do reflect the ways in which female independence 
and appearances were closely monitored and often negatively judged. 
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also seemed to communicate an understanding of their perspectives.  In these ways, I sought 
to become an accepted ‘insider’. 
 
To record fieldwork data, I kept a diary and digitally recorded interviews or took hand-
written notes when in noisy contexts (such as markets, where I would make Bemba 
transcriptions).  All data was then coded using NVivo software so that I could identify trends 
and exceptions.  Bemba and English written summaries of my findings were then frequently 
discussed with participants, in person, by phone and via the internet.8  I see this feedback as 
important for accuracy as well as for accountability to research participants. 
 
When analysing data, recorded life histories were understood as a construction of the past.  
Writing on masculinities in Ghana, Miescher (2005:152) comments, ‘Oral history is less a 
factual representation of the past than in its rendering a reflection of the past’s meaning for 
the present and thus a reflection of the speaker’s subjectivity’.  This possibility is discussed 
throughout this thesis, particularly in discussing the extent to which gender status 
inequalities have eroded over time (Chapter 4).  In order to broaden my understanding of 
past events, I interviewed a range of respondents, repeatedly, both individually and with 
groups.  As mentioned earlier, members of the latter would sometimes ‘correct’ each other 
and debate varying interpretations and experiences.   
 
Despite attempts to improve accuracy, it remains likely that certain details were omitted 
from participants’ narratives.  The perceived importance of different influences may change 
over time and memories often fade.  Even if participants accurately recalled all pertinent 
experiences, some relevant macro-level trends might be obscured.  Besides trying to work 
out what actually happened in the past, it may be fruitful to use life histories as an insight 
into the present.  As Sangster (1994:6) comments,  
 
Rather than seeing the creation of oral sources as biased or problematic, this creative 
process can become a central focus for our research: we need to explore the construction 
of women’s historical memory.  Asking why and how women explain, rationalise and 
make sense of their past offers insight into the social and material framework within 
which they operated, the perceived choices and cultural patterns they faced, and the 
complex relationship between individual consciousness and culture. 
 
Participants’ accounts were also triangulated with important historical ethnographies (e.g. 
Richards, 1940; Epstein, 1981; Powdermaker, 1962 and others from the Rhodes-Livingstone 
Institute, as well as Ferguson, 1999).  The explanations provided in these texts sometimes 
contrasts with participants’ accounts of the past.  In this thesis I have noted disagreements 
and caveats in the presentation of disparate accounts.   
 
One point to bear in mind in reading historical ethnographies is that women’s accounts of 
pre-colonial practices may have been overshadowed by privileged groups’ capacity to 
articulate gender stereotypes (Wright, 1983), as well as the paucity of African women in 
urban survey teams in Northern Rhodesia.  Given their reproductive workloads and 
proscriptive stereotypes about female labour force participation, there were no women in 
urban survey teams till the late 1950s (Schumaker, 2001:211).  That said, even if women were 
underrepresented in survey teams, it cannot be assumed that Copperbelt women would have 
                                                        
8 For example, one young participant downloaded a summary of my findings, which she printed for her mother and other market traders to read. 
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eschewed the portrayals presented by men (see also Kesby, 1999:28-29, who makes a similar 
comment in relation to Southern Rhodesia).   
 
Examples of life histories 
 
Below I document four life histories.  These speak to themes commonly identified in other 
life histories and group discussions: changing patterns of resource access, female labour 
force participation, association, maternal employment, exposure to role models and gender 
sensitisation.  These influences are further explored and interrogated over the subsequent 
chapters, so as to ascertain their significance more broadly.  This section also seeks to 
provide background context about the participants whose stories are drawn upon in the main 
text and explain how their claims were corroborated.  Note that some inconsequential details 
(such as names, ages and dates) have been removed to preserve participants’ anonymity.  
 
BanaMayuka 
 
BanaMayuka9 and I were both a little nervous when we first met, about to give short 
speeches to an assembled crowd in the market.  She was to present her manifesto – what she 
would do if elected as a section leader of ZANAMA (Zambian National Marketeers’ 
Association).  I had also been invited say something in Bemba on the loudspeaker, to amuse 
people.  The President of ZANAMA, Elvis Nkandu was always been very supportive of my 
research, inviting me to association meetings in the Copperbelt and introducing me to a 
range of people.  He had appointed BanaMayuka as an interim committee member in 2009 
and now she was standing for election.   
 
Sitting together on a wooden bench, with a good view of proceedings, she explained what 
was going on.  This initial encounter became characteristic of our subsequent relationship: 
observing and discussing market events, dynamics and personalities.  With eighteen years’ 
experience of trading in the market, as well as a quiet smile that conveyed warmth, empathy 
and care, she was extremely well-liked.  When walking through the vast market together, 
manoeuvring around little bridges, she always encouraged me to greet every single trader we 
passed, regardless of whether I was to interview them or not.  I had not done this originally 
since I had not assumed that others would want to greet me; it felt rather presumptuous to 
greet strangers.  Moreover, it was rather time-consuming to take the time to speak to 
everyone.  But I followed her advice – to appear open and friendly – and thus became widely 
known.  Her longevity in the market enabled her to tell me about various individuals and 
broader social shifts.  As such, I spent a great deal of time sitting at her stall, behind mounds 
of dried sardines, listening to the traders collectively reflecting on social change.  Many 
called me her child – just as she did. 
 
Her father had died in a mine accident in 1973, when she was little over a year old.  Her 
mother never remarried; instead she sold kapenta (dried sardines) at the township market, 
to support her twelve children – six of whom have since passed away.  Together they lived in 
a house given to them by the mine company upon her father’s death.  BanaMayuka described 
her mother as being like herself: caring, hard-working, humble and always listening to others 
before speaking herself.  BanaMayuka left her single-sex state school when she became 
                                                        
9
 Bana means ‘mother of’; BanaMayuka means mother of Mayuka.  It is a term of respect.  I have used this prefix when participants introduced 
themselves to me in this way. 
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pregnant – as was protocol at the time.  Immediately after disclosing this information, she 
proudly reeled off the educational attainments of each of her children, as if to show that she 
had succeeded vicariously.   
 
BanaMayuka married upon pregnancy in 1988, to a Namwanga man, hailing from Northern 
Province, just like her own Bemba parents.  Although her education had ended abruptly, he 
continued in education and got a job at the mine.  This secured them a house in Nkana East, 
an area originally built for European mine managers during the colonial period.  But this 
benefit was lost when his contract was terminated.  BaShiMayuka10 remained unemployed 
for six years.  Sufferings entered the house, in terms of resource shortages.  When men lose 
work they develop ‘icifukushi’ – becoming frustrated and fraught with discontent – 
BanaMayuka once told me, in general terms, though not about her husband per se.  Perhaps 
out of spousal love and loyalty, she always described her husband as a ‘good man’.   
 
When staying at their house, I separately interviewed her daughter, Chimwemwe (an 
articulate young woman with her mother’s smile).  We had known each other for some while, 
having chatted when she visited her mother’s market stall.  Chimwemwe recalled that upon 
unemployment her father started drinking more with his new circle of friends.  Chimwemwe 
also narrated that her mother never used to rest: ‘working Sunday to Sunday’, until 8pm 
each day, selling dried sardines and importing clothes from overseas, when she had 
sufficient capital.  She now has high blood pressure.  BaShiMayuka husband has since 
resumed work, as a mine machine operator. 
 
Notwithstanding the negative effects identified by Chimwemwe, BanaMayuka often 
reiterated how increased female labour force participation had transformed stereotypes of 
women – from passive dependents to resilient, hard-working fighters.  She often proudly 
told me about other female breadwinners (especially widows), who single-handedly provided 
for their children.  She stressed that working women of today were much happier than those 
housewives of previous generations, when they used to be ‘oppressed’ (‘ukutitikishiwa’).  
Although she denied that she had ever been oppressed in her own marriage, she did suggest 
she had gained more knowledge, skills and confidence through travelling to new places, 
meeting different people and learning from them.  She also chorused a slogan popular 
amongst market women: ‘ifitenge kuntanshi, amatoloshi kunuma’ (skirts to the front, 
trousers to the back; meaning, women should lead). 
 
BanaMayuka first learnt about her rights when a national Non-Governmental Organisation 
(NGO) visited Kitwe’s central market and invited traders to learn more about gender at their 
local office.  Their words encouraged her greatly, to redouble her efforts, to work hard, with 
the confidence that she could do any work that men do.  Visibly animated, BanaMayuka 
narrated that their support led her to get a passport to travel overseas for business and to 
buy a plot of land, in 2006.  She had previously doubted herself, wondering whether she was 
right to work so hard – ‘to punish/exploit herself’ (translated).  Now, echoing a common 
refrain, she knows that if her husband dies she will not suffer.  She also described her 
husband as being pleased that she had visited the NGO, since she would now be able to look 
after the family if he died.  Though we did not discuss it explicitly, I understood the repeated 
references to her husband’s possible death in the context of life expectancy being 49 years in 
                                                        
10 BaShi means father of. 
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2011, up from 42 in 2000 (UNDP, 2013). 
 
BanaMayuka maintained that learning about rights had made no difference to her 
relationship with her husband – apparently it was already amicable, with trust and 
understanding.  Though she detailed multiple ways in which trading had changed her 
perceptions of others as well as herself, BanaMayuka strenuously denied that her tenure as 
breadwinner had changed her marriage.  Both comments should be understood in the 
context of social opposition to women explicitly challenging conjugal power relations.  So 
perhaps there is reason to think that either influence was more transformative than she let 
on.   
 
On the other hand, her account was supported by separate conversations with her husband, 
BaShiMayuka, and their daughter, Chimwemwe.  While staying at their house for a few days, 
her husband and I took walks round their township, passing the bars and visiting his 
unemployed friends who now volunteered at the local Victim Support Unit.  Both father and 
daughter pointed to his long-standing support for gender equality, which predated her 
labour force participation and exposure to gender sensitisation.  Chimwemwe narrated that 
she consulted her father when she heard about gender equality at school and was encouraged 
by his answer, given her trust in his opinion.  He also fostered her self-confidence by reading 
library books together and writing poems for her to present to his friends.  Another 
indication of his long-established commitment to equality is that, when asked for something 
by the children, he has always consulted his wife.  On occasion he also tells his four sons to 
wash the plates and clean up the kitchen.   
 
BaShiMayuka himself attributed his belief in gender equality to his childhood, especially the 
teachings of his white female secondary school teacher.  Also, by undertaking domestic jobs 
in the absence of sisters, he came to regard this behaviour as acceptable.  His egalitarian 
beliefs and behaviour appear to have preceded his wife’s labour force participation and 
exposure to egalitarian discourses.  Chapters 4, 5 and 6 of this thesis will consider the extent 
to which a disavowal of gender stereotypes was a cause or consequence of growing flexibility 
in gender divisions of labour in my sample more generally. 
 
BanaMayuka’s interactions with market women led her to insist on the need for more female 
leaders, whom she portrayed as more caring, empathetic and knowledgeable of women’s 
problems.  However, for a long time, she was reluctant to stand as a leader in the market 
association: she doubted her own capability to lead and was concerned about having to deal 
with difficult people.  But she was encouraged to stand by women who she had brought to 
the market, as well as those whom she had aided with interest-free loans, so that they could 
start trading or manage funeral costs.  (This account was independently corroborated by 
others).  Elvis Nkandu, the president of the nationwide market association, also wrote her a 
letter, urging her to stand.  She narrated the matter to her sister who further encouraged her 
to believe she had a gift for leadership.  As an interim committee member, she then became 
accustomed to interacting with male leaders, gained the confidence to speak openly and grew 
more confident in her disavowal of gender status inequalities.   
 
Being a member and leader in ZANAMA introduced a degree of bias: BanaMayuka was 
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protective of the association, as well as the ruling party with which it was allied.11  Also, she 
knew that I had interviewed and was on good terms with many of ZANAMA’s senior leaders, 
including its national president.  Hence perhaps she was concerned about whether she could 
trust me to keep her comments confidential.  In our early conversations she did not speak of 
gender discrimination within ZANAMA.  Another female market association leader however 
divulged that their proposal to prioritise and manage the upgrading of market toilets had 
been refused by their male counterparts.  BanaMayuka denied this version of events.  
Sometime later I brought up this same matter, asking what was happening with the 
infrastructure development.  On this occasion, BanaMayuka explained that the men had 
argued the upgrading should be delayed.  She first presented the men’s account of the 
problem: insufficient money.  Then she suggested that the real problem was that the men in 
question underrated female leaders, presuming them to be incapable.  Apparently one man 
objected at the meeting and the others followed.  After failing to convince them that the 
toilets should be prioritised, BanaMayuka relented because she did not want to cause discord 
within the group.  Subsequent to this conversation she gave further examples of male 
resistance to women’s initiatives.  She also suggested another reason for this behaviour: men 
did not want the women to perform well and be recognised by others.  This may have been 
due to concern to preserve their positions as leaders.   
 
To broaden my understanding of alleged discrimination, I spent several days with her male 
counterparts on the committee: we toured the Copperbelt together, visiting different market 
associations and meetings.  Unlike BanaMayuka, they tended to stress supply-side 
explanations of women’s paucity in leadership: women are less intelligent, do not put 
themselves forward and fail to support each other (referencing the alleged ‘pull her down’ 
syndrome).  
 
Key insights from BanaMayuka’s life history include the synergistic relationship of gender 
sensitisation and paid work in the public sphere, which enabled association with a range of 
women.  As a combined result of these influences, BanaMayuka exhibits great pride in 
women’s demonstrations of equal capabilities and fortitude.  This said, she has not really 
challenged the prescriptive stereotype that women should be responsible for unpaid care 
work.  This reflects broader, asymmetrical flexibility in gender divisions of labour – a very 
partial kind of change.  The dangers of this trajectory are also evident in the stress and high 
blood pressure that has resulted from, what she terms, her ‘self-exploitation’ (translated). 
 
In the course of this thesis I will draw on additional data to explore the extent to which this 
portrayal is shared by other women, and what accounts for any discrepancies.  For example, 
by comparing the accounts of market and home-based traders, we might ascertain the 
impact of certain kinds of association (Chapter 4).  We can also interrogate alleged synergies 
with gender sensitisation by exploring what happens when stay-at-home mothers hear 
abstract messages of equality but lack first-hand evidence of women’s competence through 
interactions in the public sphere (Chapter 6).   
 
Matthew 
 
                                                        
11 Following the change in government, ZANAMA and a number of other market associations were deregistered for their active support of 
political parties, contrary to the Societies Act.  This ruling was upheld by the Lusaka High Court (Times of Zambia, 2012).  Kitwe City Council 
subsequently took up responsibility for maintenance of the market. 
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Female leaders of a rival market association (ZATMA, the Zambia Traders’ and Marketeers’ 
Association) were much more publicly vocal than BanaMayuka.  They would not be quashed 
or quietened.  Moreover, male colleagues purposefully elicited their contributions in 
committee meetings.  Having spent several weeks together, narrating their own life histories 
and discussing gender relations in market politics, these female market leaders introduced 
me to one of their colleagues, Matthew, a politically active, middle-aged vegetable seller.   
 
Though extremely thin, swamped by clothes several sizes too large, Matthew appeared 
enlivened by discussions.  He reflected on the causes of change, both in society and his own 
life, while I filled small, clear plastic bags with carrots for sale.  His lengthy monologues 
required few prompts.  Only occasionally did I intervene, asking him to consider an 
alternative interpretation.  Sometimes we paused to attend market association or political 
meetings, to which I was always invited. 
 
Matthew had grown up locally, in a home characterised by gender divisions of labour and 
status inequalities.  Reflecting back, he portrayed previous generations as being ‘inferior 
about those things; they didn’t understand’.  Matthew took this setup as ‘normal’ and 
followed similar practices when he married in 1984: ‘I was thinking that a woman is 
supposed to be lower than the man’.  This remark aside, Matthew generally downplayed his 
own gender beliefs and emphasised women’s behaviour when accounting for gender status 
inequalities in previous years.  He portrayed his wife as previously being reliant upon him to 
provide for the family.  In those days, he explained, men bore the burden of work and 
responsibility for household provision.  Meanwhile, women were ‘relaxed’, ‘expectant’, and 
‘lax’.  The problem was their ‘mind-set’.  Also note Matthew’s suggestion that men are in 
some ways disadvantaged by the gender division of labour.   
 
When first asked about his previous employment, Matthew said he was a ‘miner’.  This 
occupational description implies physically demanding labour, in a valorised industry.  He 
was actually a store keeper at a local mine, though only clarified this subsequently.  His 
initial presentation reflects the broader pride and status in mining.  Indeed, some men 
trading in the market continued to wear their blue overalls, as if to shroud themselves with 
evidence of historical masculinity.  Having lost his job at the mine in 1988, Matthew entered 
the informal economy and began trading in the market.  They shifted to a smaller house, sold 
assets and stopped eating breakfast.  He reiterated the magnitude of the economic change, 
repeating over and over again how terrible it was, ‘descending’ down into a poverty they had 
never experienced before.  At first his wife remained at home, as before.  When he returned 
with little money, due to a precarious income-stream, she tended to blame and castigate him 
for his failure to provide, suggesting he was not even trying.  (We might speculate that 
without her own income, she had little other means of pushing for more resources, other 
than to pressure her husband).  Such accusations, combined with a dramatic change in living 
standards, caused arguments and violence: ‘I even used to beat my wife’. 
 
In 1991, as life became intolerably difficult and they struggled to pay school fees, his wife 
proposed that she should start selling dried sardines and beans at home.  After about two 
years of her trading, household decision-making become more bilateral.  Being equally 
responsible for household financial provision, she ceased to blame her husband: ‘she would 
never complain, she would never point the finger at someone’s fault, because when the fault 
comes, automatically that fault will be in the hands of both of us’.  Now, Matthew suggested, 
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they are working together, with shared responsibility for income-generation and household 
management.  Thus rather than relying on him, she initiates ideas.  Her mind ‘broadened’, 
apparently.  Furthermore, through personal involvement, his wife has come to understand 
the unreliability of income streams through trading, rather than doubting him as before. 
 
Just as Matthew attributed conjugal change to a shift in his wife’s attitude and behaviour 
(rather than his own), he gave a similar account of gender divisions in society more 
generally.  Women, in previous decades, had occupied themselves with ‘small issues’, 
relating to their roles as housewives, relying on men to solve more important issues, through 
political engagement.  According to his testimony, women rarely put themselves forward 
(tabaleipelesha) – and there was no mention of the social context that framed these choices.   
 
However, Matthew’ tendency to emphasise supply-side causes of gender divisions of labour 
waned over the course of his narrative.  While he never explicitly claimed that women had 
been purposefully excluded from high status roles, he did suggest that women may have been 
overlooked, since ‘we men’ did not know that they could provide for the family and nation.  
He maintained that he has only recently seen women coming to ‘stand up, to fight… and 
solve particular problems as equals’.  (Standing up is in contrast to sitting [ukwikala], which 
is also used to describe homemakers and unemployed people − who are just waiting to be 
provided for).  Seeing women earn money, to protect their families from starvation and send 
their children to school, changed Matthew’ perceptions of their importance.  He suggested 
that women are the ones suffering from hard-work nowadays, hence they deserve 
recognition.   
 
Matthew did not appear to appreciate unpaid care work (‘small issues’).  Instead, it was by 
seeing women successfully undertaking socially valued roles that his gender status beliefs 
have changed.  Furthermore, as we have seen, he focused on supply-side causes: women 
were underestimated since they had provided people with little reason to think otherwise.  
Later on, when we had developed more rapport and engaged in further reflection, Matthew 
suggested he had taken advantage of his position as breadwinner, making household 
decisions unilaterally.  Also, when asked why he subsequently agreed with radio messages on 
gender equality, he replied that this was because his historic behaviour was ‘inhuman… I had 
to change, for the betterment; it was changing me to be a better man’.  This implies a shift in 
his own behaviour.   
 
Besides changes in individual characteristics, Matthew also justified gender equitable 
participation in grassroots political campaigning by reference to macro-level shifts.  For him, 
Government failure to abate worsening economic security necessitated collective effort, 
drawing on all available skills.  He reiterated that nowadays, rather than automatically 
ascribe roles on the basis of sex category, we need to look at individuals’ capabilities: their 
leadership qualities.  By failing to capitalise on these strengths we might fail to advance.  
This metaphorical reference of being tied together in unity (ukwikatana) was frequently 
echoed by other members of grassroot branches of the political opposition in Kitwe. 
 
Matthew also explained gender divisions of labour with reference to cultural expectations.  
He suggested that his freedom is limited by observations and pressure from his extended 
family: ‘I’ve got others who are observing our marriage and our living’.  He explained that 
they might start to gossip or cause problems if they see him cooking while she listens to the 
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radio.   
 
To shift the discussion to the impact of gender sensitisation, I asked a broad, opening 
question about when they first started talking about gender on the radio.  Matthew, being 
naturally talkative, proceeded to reflect on this at length.  He suggested that when he first 
heard about gender, fifteen years ago, he accepted some messages, such as equitable 
participation in household decision-making.  However, like others, he rejected many 
prescriptions out of hand: they seemed laughable.  (By aligning his own response with 
cultural expectations of the time, Matthew may have been trying to defend his earlier 
position, suggesting that everyone did it.  Alternatively, he may have sought to elevate his 
position as a narrator, broadly knowledgeable about society, as well as his own life). 
 
Matthew suggested that he became more receptive to gender sensitisation once he had seen 
women demonstrate their equal competence in work and politics (i.e. undertaking socially 
valued roles in contemporary Copperbelt society).  He explained, ‘when you just listen to the 
radio minus knowing what is on the ground, it won’t carry weight… seeing is believing’.  He 
did not entirely dismiss the significance of sensitisation, however.  Radio broadcasts 
signalled wider social acceptance of his egalitarian beliefs: ‘ah, these things which I was 
thinking about, others also think about, then it’s normal’.  Previously he would beat his wife 
when she claimed to be too fatigued to wash the clothes.  The radio taught him that it is 
normal for a man to wash children’s clothes.  Matthew suggested that the Bible had played a 
similar role in endorsing his experiences.  His particular Roman Catholic Church distributes 
pamphlets on gender equality, denying gender status inequalities and preaching collective 
input. 
 
Two questions arise from this account.  First, has Matthew’ outlook changed as much as he 
implies?  Perhaps he is not as egalitarian as he professes.  Matthew suggested that ZANAMA 
(the rival market association) was recruiting female members in order to secure donor 
funding, while the male leaders maintain control.  Perhaps he had like ambitions and sought 
to portray his market association in a positive light to a European outsider, with possible 
links to donors.  This hypothesis seems unlikely on two counts: first, he never asked me 
about donors; second, a number of women do occupy senior positions within the market 
organisation, all of whom maintained that they were respected by male peers, regarding each 
other as equals. 
 
Although Matthew indicated that his gender beliefs have changed and that he can now help 
out with unpaid care work, he does not appear to have become more appreciative of unpaid 
care work – referring to it as ‘small issues’.  Moreover, when asked why he is at the market 
while his wife sells from home (where business is even slower), he said that it enabled her to 
look after their young child – possibly implying that this was her primary responsibility.  
(The limits to egalitarian change more generally are discussed in Chapter 4). 
 
Second, is it really the case that the main catalyst of change was others’ behaviour, rather 
than his gender beliefs?  The accuracy of Matthew’s account of the past is questionable.  
Perhaps his wife had always initiated ideas but he used not to listen.  Maybe the catalyst of 
change was not her contributions, but rather his perception of their importance.  This 
interpretation is indeed possible, but it is also unknowable.  What we do have data on, 
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however, is Matthew’ description of his own perceptions of her contributions, and these are 
worth understanding.   
 
Matthew suggested that he came to respect women as equals when he recognised their ‘vital 
importance’.  This did not result from reflection on the value of their unpaid care work – 
which he appears to continue to regard as non-productive and unimportant.  Rather, it 
appears that his gender status beliefs only changed when women proved their capacity to 
perform tasks he regarded as socially valuable.  He frequently reeled off examples of women 
succeeding in atypical domains – pointing to the significance of flexibility in gender divisions 
of labour.  This valorisation of male work was broadly chorused by his female counterparts in 
the market, who similarly portrayed men as previously taking responsibility for ‘hard work’ 
(incito yakosa) – implying that unpaid care and other feminine occupations are not.   
 
Helen 
 
Helen was ‘quiet’ and ‘reserved’ in the City Council chamber: she never initiated a motion – 
the town clerk as well as other interviewed clerks and councillors told me.  Interested in this 
female leader, I called and arranged to visit her low-income district.  Her daughter, Sibeso, 
prepared and brought the tea for us in a dainty, blue rimmed china teapot, which I never saw 
again during all my subsequent months of living with them.  On our first meeting I was 
treated as a visitor but our relationship changed over time, as did my understanding of 
Helen, who was not at all like the person described by the well-educated men in town. 
 
I once returned home in the rainy season to find Helen (sometimes called BanaSibeso, 
meaning mother of Sibeso) digging a trench, to manage the water flow, with her husband, 
BaShiSibeso (the father of Sibeso).  Their marriage was very much a team effort.  When 
friends came around, they would all sit together, often drinking cartons of chibuku (an 
alcoholic drink made from sorghum and maize, only sold in low-income areas).  Both 
husband and wife were vocal and opinionated; they would talk for hours about the economic 
suffering endured in our township, growing inequalities and capitalist exploitation of 
Zambia’s natural resources.  If male visitors expressed an opinion that she disagreed with, 
Helen would engage them in debate, rather than hold her tongue.  While her husband might 
disagree with her position, he never objected to her participation.  On one occasion, when his 
interruption caused her to lose her train of thought, she became embarrassed, frustrated and 
exited the group discussion.  But he would always treat her respectfully, calling out ‘my 
friend, BanaSibeso’ (translated).  For her part, she would never go to bed before BaShiSibeso 
came home, she insisted on waiting up for him – though often drifting asleep on the sofa.  
The only cause of friction was when she returned late in the evening and drunk; while 
waiting for her BaShiSibeso would ask me, ‘Where is your sister?’.   
 
Though her parents were Lenje and hailed from Central Province, Helen prided herself in 
knowing all the Bemba proverbs.  She had grown up in Kitwe, with 12 siblings.  Her father, 
formerly a driver for UBZ (the United Bus Company of Zambia), would hand over all his 
salary to his wife, a ‘hard-working businesswoman’, who traded at the central market, which 
was unusual back then.  Helen told me that most women depended on their husbands, who 
worked in industries, adjacent to our township.  Besides greater economic opportunities, 
costs were lesser: school fees, school books, medicine and health services were all free – she 
maintained.  When discussing change over time with her friends in the Residents’ 
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Development Committee, they similarly denied there was any poverty in the 1970s: people 
would have three meals a day, commencing with bread and butter, as well as tea with milk 
and sugar.  (Such nostalgia is commonplace, though not entirely accurate). 
 
Helen partly attributed her self-confidence to her formative years.  She became accustomed 
to interacting with the opposite sex in primary school, where she saw that she could 
outperform them.  This experience led her to reject some gender stereotypes.  At the time 
there were a number of social clubs in Copperbelt towns, financed by the mines.  Here she 
interacted with a range of people, undertook new activities and became sceptical of gender 
stereotypes.  Furthermore, her parents encouraged her to be ‘strong’, ‘tough’ and fearless.  
These experiences will be further discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
Her husband proposed while she was still at school; they courted for five years.  He was ‘very 
cool, welcoming me, gentle, not drinking, not smoking’.  Also, unlike school boys who she 
thought would just waste her time, he was working as a carpenter for a large company.  They 
married in 1986. 
 
Consumer goods became scarce in the late 1980s.  Life became even more difficult in the 
following decade, with the mass closure of industries.  But the new government’s promise to 
bring new investors gave hope to residents of our low-income settlement.  Still waiting, many 
of our neighbours had become depressed.  Nowadays, ‘[w]hen you wake up in the morning 
you don’t know where the money is coming from’, Helen laughed, when chatting with 
political colleagues.  This said, there was a temporary surge in consumption in the mid-
2000s, as high copper prices boosted local employment.   
 
Throughout her marriage, Helen ‘moved up and down’: she traded within Kitwe and beyond.  
By interacting with different people, she learnt about profitable enterprises.  In the years 
immediately preceding the global financial crisis she travelled to Botswana and Tanzania to 
import blankets, clothes and DVDs.  At that time, BaShiSibeso worked for the mines.  There 
he heard about a new political party, the Patriotic Front (PF), and sought his wife’s counsel.  
But she had no interest in politics, believing it to be a waste of time and preferring to 
concentrate on her business.  Instead he involved BaShiNsenga, a friend of theirs, who stood 
on a PF ticket in 2001.  The meetings were held at BaShiSibeso and BanaSibeso’s house.  
Being uninterested, Helen would exit and leave them to it, but this was perceived as impolite, 
so she subsequently stayed to listen.  By gathering with others, she started learning and 
thinking about politics.  (Her husband gave the same account, on one of the many evenings 
we talked together). 
 
They started campaigning, mobilising people and making structures.  Helen told me that she 
was originally appointed to a position in the women’s wing of the party but withdrew to 
contest a seat at a lower level, in order to have the confidence and power that comes from 
election by the people.  Moreover, she wanted to be in the main body: ‘I want to fight with 
men... interacting with men, I think it’s normal, I’m very comfortable’.  She expressed 
resentment of the historical tendency of women being used to sing and dance for male 
politicians.  This said, she did not aspire to political office at this time, considering this to be 
a role for men.   
 
In 2006, Helen was widely encouraged to stand as a politician – by voters, party colleagues 
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and her husband.  She initially refused, preferring to focus on business, but others were 
persistent.  Her popularity may have been partly due to her reputation for financial 
assistance.  In those days, she would be frequently called upon to help out with funerals.  
Helen denied that she had any more money than others; she was just more generous, having 
grown up with parents that always welcomed long-term guests without demanding rent.  
Being Catholic she also believes that generosity will ensure blessings.   
 
With a popular desire for change, Helen was elected as a community representative.  
Reflecting back she suggested that voters favoured whoever stood on the PF ticket, 
regardless of sex category.  On other occasions, she pointed to bias: ‘[p]eople wanted change, 
they wanted a female [politician]’.  This said, some others called her a ‘prostitute’.  This is a 
historically common label, implying that a woman can only succeed through sexual favours.  
This language still persists in some online discussions about female leaders.  It is partly a 
reflection of misogynist attitudes and also a discursive strategy of attempted intimidation – 
much like when she was attacked at home, by thieves allied with the ruling MMD party.  
Attitudes towards female politicians will be discussed in more depth in Chapters 3 and 4. 
 
Keen to understand why others at the City Council suggested that she was quiet in the 
chamber, I asked Helen how she solved community problems.  She explained that it was 
more effective to go directly to the Town Clerk, who would refer her to the relevant 
department.  Not all problems were effectively solved through initiating or debating motions 
in the chamber.  Helen always presented herself to me as fearless (this seemed like a self-
presentational strategy that she used in politics more generally).  However, she did explain 
that in her early years of being a politician she was still learning about how the system 
worked and so had not been very vocal in the chamber.  A further constraint was that ‘in 
chamber have to use icisungu [English], this makes it difficult’.  While Helen is fluent in 
English (her third language), it may be nerve-wracking to speak in this high-pressure, formal 
environment, where political opponents are ever ready to laugh at a mistake made by a 
woman from a poor township.  Because she was not seen to contribute, one Member of 
Parliament regarded her as useless and was very rude to her on occasion, using derogatory 
language.  Meanwhile, other female politicians independently narrated cordial and respectful 
relations with him.  So, it seemed that the clerks and councillors had provided an accurate 
characterisation of Helen’s behaviour.  However, this was not evidence of her ineffectiveness, 
moreover it was liable to change as she learnt the ropes (she was re-elected in 2011), and 
certainly not representative of her dealings back in the constituency.  It is equally important 
to note that a number of men were even quieter than Helen in the chamber.   
 
Besides being a politician, Helen is also a mother, of six children.  She described her first-
born, Sibeso, as social and sharp (unlike the second eldest Mwenya).  But Sibeso 
disappointed her parents by going to cohabit with her boyfriend.  Being socially 
unacceptable, this brings great shame upon them – BaShiSibeso described it as a ‘wound’.  
Neither parent has visited their place, for this would signal their approval.  Mwenya lived at 
her boyfriend’s mother’s place – in an unsuccessful attempt to embed herself in his life.  Both 
returned home some months into my stay, after mounting evidence of their partners’ 
infidelity.   
 
On our first meeting, when discussing women’s political participation, Helen volunteered, 
‘I’ve got one boy here, he sweeps, cooks, washes plates’.  ‘Every day?’, I asked.  ‘Every day’, 
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she replied.  However, I never saw her son clean anything, besides his own clothes.  What 
accounts for this discrepancy between her report and my observation?  Moreover, why did 
she even raise this issue?  Perhaps Helen supports the idea of men sharing domestic work, 
though has not concentrated her efforts on enforcing this at home, given a multitude of 
competing concerns.  Also, early in our relationship, Helen may have been trying to present 
herself as more successful in challenging gender stereotypes. 
 
There were several other occasions in which Helen’s testimony appeared at odds with her 
behaviour.  Although Helen had expressed condemnation of gender-based violence, having 
attended related trainings, she was never very responsive to the women who came round 
bleeding and battered.  They would talk but I never saw her encourage them to report the 
issue to the police, nor did she give them money to procure the requisite doctor’s report.  
This may reflect limited interest, a reluctance to interfere, or a belief that this particular 
course of action would not actually benefit the women concerned.   
 
Another apparent example of inconsistency was her insistence that women were not fighting 
for equal rights at home but in political decision-making.  She made this point in a 
conversation with her husband and their mutual friend, BaShiNsenga.  In other 
conversations she referred to her husband as ‘household head’.  This was surprising, given 
the seemingly egalitarian nature of their marriage.  On the other hand, she may have 
perceived the espousal of conjugal status inequalities as a way of publicly respecting her 
husband, in line with prescriptive gender stereotypes – a small price to pay for the freedoms 
gained through mutual understanding.  Moreover, given that there is greater social 
acceptance of equality in the public rather than private sphere, Helen may have thought it 
strategically effective to pay lip-service to gender stereotypes. 
 
Another area of ambiguity concerned the changing position of women more generally.  Helen 
explained that, in the past, when women married then ‘everything is finished’ (translated).  
The implications of this were two-fold.  On the one hand, even if educated, women were 
rarely permitted to participate in politics or employment, for the latter would signal her 
husband’s inability to provide.  Nowadays, however, ‘they say that a woman can do what a 
man can do, it’s true.  This time you can see a woman can drive a very big vehicle, a woman 
can be an electrician, a mechanic.  We have joined politics… I think women can perform 
much better than men’.  But the negative corollary of this flexibility of gender divisions of 
labour is that many women now share (or sometimes even single-handedly assume) men’s 
burdens of responsibility for household provision.   
 
Helen explicitly underscored the importance of several influences: her formative years, 
association (with men and women, through politics and employment), as well as the gradual 
process of political apprenticeship.  While these have had a cumulative impact, the effect of 
each individual experience appears limited.  For example, despite outperforming boys at 
school, Helen maintained that she did not previously consider politics to be open to women.  
This suggests that the disavowal of one gender stereotype (e.g. the assumption of men’s 
greater competence in education) does not entail the disavowal of gender status beliefs.  
While these gender beliefs may be related, they are built and eroded by distinct experiences. 
 
Another message was only implicit in her account: the way in which her husband and other 
men act as gatekeepers to gender equality.  Although Helen did not attribute her confidence 
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to her husband’s encouragement, it is nonetheless evident from her account and my 
observation that he has been with her every step of the way (encouraging her to enter politics 
and facilitating inclusive community discussions at home), just like her father before him.   
 
Gender sensitisation was another possible influence, though repeatedly repudiated by Helen.  
She resented the money that NGOs earned through gender sensitisation, talking about 
women in politics, while she (an actual woman in politics, struggling to fulfil community 
expectations) received no such benefits – though she was given a bicycle for campaigning a 
few years ago.  This sense of grievance may have coloured her judgement about the 
effectiveness of gender sensitisation.  Furthermore, her habitual references to slogans used 
by the women’s movement (such as ‘50:50 in decision-making’) suggested that these did 
have a positive impact, providing a sense of collective struggle and broader social acceptance 
of her incursions into a male-dominated domain.  This said, she was not greatly moved by 
exposure to other gender matters, in which she was not personally invested (such as gender-
based violence and unpaid care work).  The impact of gender sensitisation will be further 
discussed in Chapter 6. 
 
Rose 
 
Rose – a ‘blaster’ (explosives engineer), former 830 tonne dump truck driver, mine union 
leader at branch level, women’s rights activist, as well as pastor and divorced mother of six 
children – was introduced to me by her colleagues in the Mineworkers’ Union of Zambia.  
Having been invited to stay, I travelled to her low-income, informal compound.   
 
Born in 1969, Rose grew up with three siblings, chiefly supported by their father, a miner 
(fitter).  Though she initially described her mother as a ‘housewife’, Rose later revealed that 
she loaned money to others and thus had her own income.  This echoed a broader theme in 
my narratives, whereby women’s home-based enterprises were often neither mentioned nor 
valorised.  Nonetheless, Rose held her mother in high esteem: she characterised her as 
strong, good person, who would encourage her husband if he returned home disenchanted, 
and always urge others to be doing something, not just to be sitting.  Her parents would 
make the budget together.  Having been a cadet at school, aspiring to be a soldier, Rose was 
both accustomed to and interested in performing men’s manual work.  Her aptitude in 
several stereotypically masculine domains (Mathematics and sports) enhanced her sense of 
self-efficacy in others: it ‘makes me think I can challenge a man in that way’.   
 
Rose’s schooling was interrupted in Grade 9, when she became pregnant (though she 
subsequently returned, in adulthood – due to her restless ambition).  Her father died the 
following year, in 1990.  His family tried to take their house.12  Life became difficult.  Rose 
starting selling maize in Congo, with money from her brother, but this was stolen.  She 
assumed work at a grocery shop though was not happy there so got a job as a hospital 
cleaner.  Struggling on an extremely low wage, she applied for short-term work at the mine, 
to clear the bush to make way for new development.  Secretarial work was another 
possibility, but when Rose announced this ambition, her boyfriend of the time became 
enraged and tore up her certificates.  He wanted her to be a housewife.  They separated. 
 
                                                        
12 This practice is called ‘property grabbing’, where a husband’s natal kin claim ‘his’ assets after his death, evicting his wife and children. 
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In 1998 she became a pastor and also a member of the Zambian National Women’s Lobby: 
‘no more men can challenge me.  Already I had that spirit but when they brought that 
gender13 I started to believe in myself’.  Having learnt about rights and equitable sharing of 
domestic work, she came home and told her then husband.  He sat in silence, listening.  His 
behavioural changes were limited: cooking occasionally, such as if she was out or unwell – 
this is a common response to sensitisation, compatible with what men are taught by the 
bashibukombe in pre-marital counselling.  Rose’s narrative did not dwell on her marriage, 
though in one discussion with me and her church mate about gender-based violence she 
revealed that her husband once beat her on the road, when he discovered her drunk, having 
left a child home alone.  She subsequently divorced her husband when she discovered he had 
married someone else, without her knowing.  Being single had major benefits, she 
maintained, allowing her the freedom and time for her paid work, church and union 
activities.  Notwithstanding the associated stresses of such labour, this optimistic portrayal 
was chorused more widely, in discussions with other divorced/widowed women.  This theme 
is further explored in Chapter 4. 
 
In 2004, the same year as her divorce and her mother’s death, Rose applied for another six 
month contract at the mine – to work as a dump truck driver, taking copper and waste.  Out 
of 120, 37 were picked, including eight women: ‘Historically people were afraid, saying “It’s 
men’s work”.  But we women started to work and now we work better than men… It was a 
challenge because people said this belongs to the men.  But this challenge made us go out in 
the compound to encourage women, “Don’t just sit, you can do what a man can do” (partly 
translated).  I saw such evangelism in her participatory Pentecostal church service; Rose 
urged others to be financially active and believe in themselves.  Since working as a truck 
driver, she applied to become a blaster – ‘a gateway to promotion’.  Prolonged experience of 
financial hardship led her to expand her horizons: ‘as a woman you have to think twice about 
your future.  If you just think about what women can do you can’t do anything… They [other 
women] think their husbands will bring them money.  I have to look after my [six] children.’  
 
Besides economic motivations, Rose was also galvanised by a desire to ‘wake up my fellow 
women’.  Since she trained as a blaster three other women swiftly followed in her footsteps: 
‘they wanted to do it but were [previously] doubting themselves’.  Others are employed as 
electricians, boiler makers, mechanics, fitters, blasters and welders at the mine.  Rose also 
said that when she returns home, wearing her overalls, passers-by express their pride in her 
atypical labour and inquire about employment possibilities.  I saw evidence of this respect 
when living in their community. 
 
Rose explained that as she gained self-confidence and understanding about labour politics, 
she entered into and ascended up the ranks of Mineworkers’ Union of Zambia.  At the most 
recent election, where she stood against three men, people were saying ‘Let’s try a woman’.  
Support continues, from most colleagues (apparently), and Rose denied that she was 
troubled by the others.  During a separate focus group discussion, more senior male trade 
unionists expressed appreciation of and respect for Rose’s leadership at branch level. 
 
Notwithstanding her success in a number of atypical domains, there were limits to Rose’s 
support for gender equality.  When asked about the distribution of domestic work, Rose told 
                                                        
13 ‘Gender’ is a commonly used short-hand to refer to gender equality or gender sensitisation – in this case the latter reading seems more 
plausible.   
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me that all her sons know how to cook.  But when staying over, I observed that these jobs 
were always undertaken by girls.  Daughters, not sons, hauled up water from the well – few 
in their low-income township have taps.  Also, despite being local chapter person of a 
national women’s rights organisation, Rose blamed women for some occurrences of domestic 
violence, such as if a husband beats his wife to abate the noise she makes when he returns 
home exhausted with nothing to show for his toils.  This said, when discussing the issue with 
her female church mate, BanaMwansa (who endures an abusive marriage), Rose rejected her 
counsel that a wife should always receive her husband lovingly, never denying intercourse, 
even if he has returned home late in the night, or has beaten her.  The desperate screams of a 
woman being beaten next door disrupted this conversation.  The cries continued for some 
time, uninterrupted by neighbours.  Rose subsequently explained that she does not advise 
BanaMwansa to leave her husband, but will take her to programmes on women’s rights so 
that she can learn and reflect.  I got the impression that Rose had challenged some gender 
stereotypes more than others.   
 
Rose beamed with pride and joy in narrating her life history, visibly animated.  She claimed 
that her status as a result of entering male-dominated domains.  This was also apparent in 
my observation of the church service and visitors to the house; she appeared to be respected, 
congratulated and held in high esteem by other community members, who see her as a 
‘strong woman’.  This adjective, with connotations of masculinity, is generally only used to 
refer to women undertaking men’s roles.  Interviewed male and female members of the 
congregation (who were either unemployed or in precarious employment) portrayed her as 
inspirational and courageous.  Chapter 4 will further explore the extent to which public 
attitudes towards female leaders and miners have shifted. 
 
Another question concerns the key causes of Rose’s incursion into male-dominated domains.  
The answer seems to lie in a combination of factors: her mother’s character, her own 
aptitude in Mathematics, subsequent financial hardship, gender sensitisation and also a 
gradual process of gaining confidence through experience.  While Rose mainly stressed the 
impact of worsening economic security, other women have also experienced financial 
hardship yet not entered atypical occupations. Chapter 5 will explore this question more 
broadly, asking whether worsening economic security (a shift in interests) was a sufficient 
condition for occupational desegregation. 
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3. The Historical Causes and Consequences of 
Gender Divisions of Labour (c.  1900-1990) 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter explores the historical causes and consequences of gender divisions of labour.  
The stereotype of male breadwinner and female housewife appear to have emerged as a 
product of imported Christian ideologies, colonial-capitalist concerns and an economic 
climate that largely enabled men to provide for their families on their own.  Reliant upon 
husbands for status and financial support, many urban women had little conjugal bargaining 
power.  Gender divisions of labour also meant that people lacked first-hand evidence of 
women’s equal competence in employment and politics, who they thus often underrated and 
overlooked.  Such perceptions seem to have reproduced women’s exclusion from prestigious 
positions – a pattern sustained by macro-economic circumstances in the early decades of 
independence.  Compliance with the gender status beliefs promoted in pre-marital initiation 
thus became necessary to marital and economic security, as well as respectability, which was 
not previously the case.  While there were exceptions to these trends, the historical record 
illustrates the interplay between patterns of resource access, cultural expectations and 
individuals’ own gender stereotypes. 
 
This chapter is divided into five sections.  Section 3.1 suggests that although gender divisions 
of labour prevailed in the pre-colonial period, some aspects of women’s work were socially 
valued and the sexes were economically interdependent.  In Section 3.2 attention turns to 
the gendered effects of colonialism.  In the early colonial period (1920s-1930s), male 
preponderance in rural-urban migration gave women scarcity value and bargaining power in 
Copperbelt towns, even though men monopolised employment.  Section 3.3 details how 
these emerging freedoms had been thwarted by the late colonial period (1950s), due to 
colonial-Christian gender beliefs, legislative changes and women’s limited opportunities for 
economic independence.  Section 3.4 then argues that gender divisions of labour were 
perpetuated in the early decades of independence (1960s-1980s), as men’s access to 
employment was largely assured.  The rich copper deposits on the Zambian Copperbelt thus 
continued to be mined, managed and administered by men – as wage labourers, 
breadwinners, trade unionists, civil servants and politicians.  Housewives’ resulting social 
isolation and economic dependence appears to have curbed their opportunities to 
collectively reflect on their circumstances, develop confidence in their capabilities, and 
militate for change.  Section 3.5 examines the significance of traditional pre-marital 
initiation. 
 
3.1 The pre/early colonial period (1920s-1930s) 
 
Matrilocal protection, matrilineal importance and gendered economic 
interdependence in rural areas (1920s-1930s) 
 
Most residents in the Copperbelt came from matrilineal, Bantu ethnic groups, especially 
those of Northern and Central Zambia (Mitchell, 1956).  The earliest accounts of this area are 
found in Audrey Richards’ ethnographies of the Bemba ethnic group.  Other migrant-sending 
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communities (e.g. the Kaonde, Lozi, Ngoni and Tonga) seem to have been similar in some 
but not all respects.  These differences will be noted.   
 
Due to matriliny, matrilocality and the economic importance of women’s productive and 
reproductive capacities, pre- and early colonial Bemba women enjoyed a relatively high 
status, in comparison to subsequent generations on the Copperbelt. 
 
In pre-colonial times, Bemba men’s political strength depended heavily on the fertility of 
their sisters and matrilineal kin.  With limited means of storing wealth (due to practices of 
shifting cultivation), their power consisted in the right to demand labour services, rather 
than the accumulation of goods.  Thus, relative to patrilineal ethnic groups, Bemba women 
enjoyed high status, with parents welcoming the birth of girls, as potentially able to bring 
male labour to their village and thereby reproduce the lineage (Richards, 1940, 1995:27).   
 
With matrilocality, men moved to their wife’s village at marriage.  Instead of paying 
significant bride-wealth, a son-in-law would perform bride-service, working quietly and 
submissively under the authority of his wife’s kin (Richards, 1940; for similar practices 
elsewhere see also Lovett, 1997:174 on the Lakeside Tonga in Northern Nyasaland, a nearby 
labour reserve; and Wright, 1983:74-75 on the Tonga in Northern Rhodesia’s Southern 
Province).  Control over wives was gradually awarded to husbands, who acquired status as 
their families grew.  However, it was not difficult for dissatisfied Bemba women to initiate 
separation, since there were no high bride-wealth payments to be returned (Chanock, 
1998:146; Richards, 1940, 1995; see also Crehan, 1997:106 for parallel findings about the 
Kaonde in North-Western Northern Rhodesia).14  
 
A husband might acquire permission to relocate with his wife to his natal village.  But wives 
enjoyed the option of returning with their children to their own matrikin where they might 
have children with other men, thereby expanding the labour force.  So although a wife was 
supposed to obey her husband as household head, matriliny limited his rights, authority and 
control.  A wife was not tied or beholden to one particular man (i.e. her husband) since 
familial authority was dispersed between matrikin and spouses.  Further protection was 
provided by Bemba customary law (Epstein, 1981:109; Milimo, 1988:8; Richards, 1940:86).15  
However, even though no single male monopolised power over a woman, her brother and 
lineage would still claim extensive rights over her children (Richards, 1940:33; see also 
ibid:90-93 on ostensibly hierarchical aspects of gender relations).16  
 
Not only was a woman entitled to her own share of communal land but Bemba men and 
women (as spouses and kin) were also economically interdependent.  A Bemba husband was 
supposed to clear the bush to make his wife a garden, construct a house or granary and also 
provide clothes.  In turn a wife’s economic obligations were to garden, hoe, harvest, cook, 
fetch water and firewood, make pots and mud the hut her husband built (Richards, 
1940:22,85; see also Crehan, 1997:105,148-149 for parallel findings about the Kaonde in 
                                                        
14 Note that polygamy was rare among the Bemba, unlike the Southern Bantu ethnic groups, such as the Tonga (Richards, 1961:181). 
15 See also Gluckman (1987:180) on the ease of accessing divorce among the bilateral Lozi in Zambia’s Western Province.  By contrast divorce was 
historically impossible for Tonga women in Southern Province (Colson, 1961:229).   
16 Another indication of patriarchy is that the literal Bemba translation for ‘women’ is mothers of mothers (banamayo, where bana means 
mother of and mayo means mother), while ‘men’ are either labelled fathers of fathers (bashitata) or fathers of people (bashibantu).  The latter 
term implies that men have authority over people in general, not just members of their sex. 
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North-Western Northern Rhodesia; and Gluckman 1989:179 on the Lozi in Western 
Province).  Although there were distinct gender divisions of labour, it seems that women’s 
work was considered to be of equal importance as that of men.  Responsibility for food 
production gave women status since it facilitated reciprocity between kin (Moore and 
Vaughan, 1994; Powdermaker, 1962:158,193; Richards, 1995:25; see also Colson, 1961:104 
for parallel findings about the Tonga in Southern Province).   
 
Importantly, the protection and cooperation normatively afforded by matrilineal and 
conjugal ties was not predetermined but depended on on-going activation, such as through 
the exchange of services (Moore and Vaughan, 1994).  However, this social structure does 
seem to have at least enhanced women’s scope for social respect and status.  Audrey 
Richards (1940:91-94) notes that in this context of economic interdependence and kin 
support, 
 
The Bemba woman is never considered... as the possession of her husband... in the 
sense that an Englishman does, or did, consider his wife as belonging to him, or as the 
South African Bantu speaks of his wife as though she were his property...  Thus in lieu of 
a fixed pattern of dominance and subjection between husbands and wives, such as the 
formal teaching of the Bemba girls would suggest, there seems to be every kind of 
contradiction between the norm and the actual behaviour, and between the relative 
status of married persons of different rank, different ages and different stages in the 
marriage relationship. 
 
Richards elaborates that the position of women was not static (see also Moore and Vaughan, 
1994:225-229; Saidi, 2010:164).  Bemba women obtained authority with age, childbirth and 
particularly as grandmothers.  ‘[Older women] acquire great weight in family councils and 
often carry out important negotiations on behalf of their sons or other male relatives.  When 
past child-bearing the woman ranks as a man, can drink with men and talk her mind freely 
before them, and has a number of ritual duties and privileges’ (Richards, 1940:22-23).17  
 
By virtue of descent, some senior women also occupied important positions: hereditary 
guardians of ancestral shrines, heads of villages, chieftainessess and princesses (Richards, 
1940:22-23, 1995:48-49; see also Colson, 1961:116 on historical instances of Tonga women 
founding villages in Zambia’s Southern Province).   
  
Richards’ narratives reveal that a woman’s status was not determined by traditional marital 
teachings but instead dynamic over the life course and shaped by a woman’s perceived value 
(to her kin and husband) in a context of matrilineal and conjugal economic interdependence.   
 
Pivotal demographic, social, religious and economic changes were precipitated by 
colonialism, male wage labour and Christian influence.  Northern Rhodesia was officially 
claimed as a British colony in 1923, having been previously acquired by the British South 
Africa Company in the 1890s for mineral prospecting.  By 1930, four large mines had been 
established on the Copperbelt (Parpart, 1983).  Ethnographic accounts suggest that these 
                                                        
17 Older persons’ equal powers and responsibilities over people in general are also reflected linguistically; female and male grandparents are 
called ‘banakulubantu’ and ‘bashikulubantu’, meaning ‘big mother’/ ‘father of people’, in general.  This contrasts with sex-specific responsibilities 
of younger generations, as previously mentioned.  The significance of other markers besides gender is also indicated by third person descriptors 
being gender neutral in Bemba, as in Bantu languages more generally. 
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new dynamics fundamentally refigured the valuation of gender divisions of labour, as well as 
associated status beliefs. 
 
3.2 Colonialism and demographic change (1920s-1930s) 
 
To ensure the supply of wage labour for copper exports and to finance territorial 
administration a head tax was imposed on adult males.  To further increase labour supply to 
the mines and to protect European settler farmers, the colonial government restricted 
alternative rural livelihoods.  African farmers were limited in the crops they could grow and 
were paid a lower price for their maize in comparison to Europeans (Weeks et al, 2007:15-
16).  This fostered male rural-urban migration, uneven sex ratios and rural dependence on 
male wage labour.  This section will detail how these structural demographic and economic 
changes significantly transformed age- and gender-based status inequalities in the 
Copperbelt during the 1920s and 1930s.   
 
Some urban women in the Copperbelt became successful entrepreneurs and accumulated 
significant capital.  Others accrued incomes through employment in hospitals, small-scale 
trading, beer-brewing or vegetable gardening (Chauncey, 1981:58,153; Parpart, 1986:150-
152).  With economic independence from men, urban women gained greater control over 
their lives (Chauncey, 1981:143).  One claimed, ‘Many educated women I know… say we will 
leave a man, we have our own salary now, we can bring up our own children, we will do 
better without’ (quoted in Parpart, 1986:152).  However such potential was constrained by 
women’s limited access to resources.  One of the largest sectors  domestic service in 
European settler homes  was closed to women since colonisers considered them to be 
promiscuous (Hansen, 1989).  Accordingly, most women were economically dependent on 
men’s wages (Epstein, 1981:57; Parpart, 1986:152, 1988:118; Wilson, 1941:40-41).   
 
Crucially, however, urban women were not tied to a particular man, at least not in the 1930s.  
In this decade, when the ratio of men to women was 2:1 (owing to male dominance of urban 
migration), women found new partners with ease and were not permanently dependent on 
any one man in particular.  Men were generally keen to provide a higher standard of living 
for their wives or else risk losing them.  Being in high demand, women in the mine 
compounds could use marriage as a means of upward mobility.  Thus although women were 
economically dependent on men in general, they were not permanently tied to any particular 
man.  Many would divorce rather than endure abuse (Chanock, 1998:208-209; Chauncey, 
1981:152; Parpart, 1983:88-89, 1988:118-119; Wilson, 1941:65).   
 
By entering into temporary alliances with urban men, women found greater autonomy.  
Some fled villages in order to avoid unsatisfactory marriages, harsh toil and rural elders’ 
control of their reproductive and productive labour (Parpart, 1986, 1994; Geisler, 1992:441).  
Other women arrived in the Copperbelt as obedient wives but changed with urban influence, 
as they learned of alternative possibilities.  The urban situation thus enabled the realisation 
of what one colonial observer based in the Northern Province in the 1930s termed ‘the 
growing desire of native women for a more independent status’ (Ault, 1983:183).  This early-
to-mid colonial period thus enabled ‘the weakening of patriarchy... women were demanding 
their rights within marriages and asserting their right to break off unsatisfactory marriages 
either informally or through the courts’ (Parpart, 1988:117-119). 
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Drawing on the theoretical framework, we might conceptualise Copperbelt women’s informal 
relationships with men as a form of resource access.  Demographic circumstances in the 
early colonial period enabled women to bargain for better treatment because their 
consequent scarcity value allowed them to access resources through men without being 
dependent upon a particular man. 
 
However, it is important to note the limited kind of social change that evolved in 1930s.  
There is little evidence that women gained greater respect from men during this period.  As 
detailed in the next section, there was a subsequent patriarchal backlash.  Women’s growing 
autonomy appears to have been perceived as deviating from (rather than disconfirming 
evidence of) men’s gender status beliefs.  Note also that urban sex ratios evened up over 
time.   
 
3.3 The mid-to-late-colonial period (1940s-1960s) 
 
Resistance to women’s growing autonomy and the rising importance of 
marriage in the Copperbelt (1940s-1950s) 
 
The autonomous initiatives of the early colonial period were thwarted by a subsequent 
backlash.  The urban migration of independent women and the urbanisation of marriage 
were increasingly resisted because they undermined rural elders’ control of young men and 
marital transactions.  The availability of women in urban areas meant that men could marry 
women in town without serving their wife’s matrikin in rural areas.  Accordingly, provincial 
reports in the 1930s identified the ‘new independence and self-assertiveness of the young 
women’ as a major concern of rural African male elders (cited in Chanock, 1998:211).  
Anxieties stemmed from women’s defiance of village restrictions, their migration to urban 
areas and proclivities to leave unsatisfactory marriages (Ault, 1983:184-185; Chanock, 1982; 
Chauncey, 1981:155-157; Epstein, 1981:65-66,283-284).   
 
The colonial government was also worried.  In a context of the Great Depression, where two 
thirds of the Copperbelt workforce became redundant between 1929 and 1931, the 
government was concerned about urban control.  It came to oppose female urban migration 
and sought to limit the growth of Copperbelt families due to fear that this would create costly 
social responsibilities and undermine social stability (Ault, 1983:194; Chauncey, 1981:157-
158; Parpart, 1988:121).  In 1939, the colonial state gave Native Authorities power to demand 
that unattached women acquire special permission to travel to urban areas (Chauncey, 
1981:158). 
 
Colonial opposition to the migration of independent women may have also stemmed from a 
concern to placate anxious African leaders and thereby protect the imperial project.  Schmidt 
(1992:121) similarly portrays colonial support for patriarchy in Southern Rhodesia as an 
effort to ‘mollify male discontent by helping the men to regain control over their women’. 
 
Christian concerns also featured in this growing backlash against women’s increasing 
autonomy.  Their priorities shifted from protecting women to preventing social breakdown.  
Missionaries sought to impose insoluble, monogamous marriage by denying divorce to 
Church-members (Chanock, 1998:151-152,159,193; Parpart, 1988).  Churches also promoted 
female subservience and modesty (Parpart, 1988:133; see also Mizinga, 2000 on Southern 
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Zambia).  Influenced by this religious ideology, the emerging Christian, African elite feared 
that ‘bad girls’ would prohibit their respectable status in colonial towns.  In order to distance 
themselves from sexual immorality and gain respectability by virtue of their own marital 
status, this elite supported the rural repatriation ‘not only of out and out harlots but also of 
divorced and unattached women in general’ (Chingola court report cited in Parpart, 
2001:279).  For different reasons then, concerned African men, colonial officers and 
Christians sought to limit urban women’s independence.  The ramifications of their actions 
were long-lasting.   
 
Women’s previous gains of movement and access to divorce were reversed when British 
officials accorded male chiefs judicial authority, enabling them to define ‘tradition’ and 
‘customary law’ (Chanock, 1998; Geisler, 1992:450-451).  In 1944, rural elders’ control was 
restored when the mines only granted Africans married accommodation upon production of 
a marriage certificate from the woman’s home area.  Even when Urban African Courts 
(established in 1938 and no longer requiring the consent of rural Native Authorities after 
1953) came to authorise such proceedings, they always insisted on registered marriages 
(requiring the consent of kinsmen), bride-wealth payments and heavy fines of adulterers.  
Divorce was only granted reluctantly, after prolonged consultations (Chanock, 1998:207-
208,212-214; Epstein, 1981:110; Mitchell, 1957:4; Richards, 1940:110-111). 
 
To control wayward women, divorce was made less desirable, such as by preventing women 
from taking their children with them upon separation.  African elders also supported higher 
bride-wealth prices (to be returned to the husband upon divorce) in order to make marital 
dissolution unaffordable (Chanock, 1998:176,215-216; Geisler, 1992).  Such moves were 
supported by the colonial government and Copperbelt men, willing to pay more to prevent 
women from being ‘proud and cheeky’ (Chanock, 1998:175-178).  Bride-wealth remittances, 
rather than bride-service, were also encouraged by urban wage labour.  It was difficult for 
men to arrange the prolonged periods of absence from urban employment that were 
necessary to undertake bride-service for their rural in-laws (Chanock, 1998:180; Richards, 
1940:57,78; Seur, 1992:382; Wilson, 1941:49-50).   
 
There is disagreement over the extent to which urban courts ‘invented’ tradition.  Epstein 
(1981:109,279,283-284,305-306) maintains that the procedures and principles mandated by 
African urban courts merely followed, or at least universalised, existing customs and 
practices.  However, Chanock (1998:35,45) contends that some elements were 
manufactured.  Epstein defends his case about the continuity of broadly shared values by 
showing that judges and litigants invoked the same body of norms.  However, in my opinion, 
this does not show that litigants held the same beliefs as judges, for they may have just been 
strategically invoking those norms that they thought the courts would recognise – as appears 
to be the case for married female plaintiffs (Parpart 1988:127).  Vaughan (1994:12) raises 
another objection, that ‘it would not seem to me to be possible to reconstruct with any 
certainty a “before” against which to measure the distortions of the “after”’.  So, the extent to 
which customary law changed over time may be effectively unknowable.   
 
61 
 
But certain elements do seem to have changed, such as the shift from bride-service to bride-
wealth, which appears to have been significant.18  The increasing amount of bride-wealth 
payments seems associated with fathers’ increasing powers over children and husbands over 
wives.  While higher payments may not have changed the meaning of contracting a marriage 
(Moore and Vaughan, 1994:160-164), they do seem to have constrained women’s exit options 
as their families were reluctant to return their bride-wealth (Chanock, 1998:175-181; 
Richards, 1940:78-80; Mizinga, 2000).   
 
Even though bride-wealth repayments made divorce more difficult, few women were 
deterred from marriage because its legal importance also increased over time.  Unmarried 
women were deemed to have no proper place in town and some were forcibly repatriated to 
their villages, though often unsuccessfully (Chanock, 1998:193; Epstein, 1981:281-282,313; 
Parpart, 1988:121).  Fear of repatriation led many women to remain in unhappy marriages, 
rather than request a divorce (Epstein, 1981:117).   
 
Women also had a financial motivation for marriage registration.  They did not have access 
to municipal housing or rations from mining companies in their own right but only upon 
production of a marriage certificate (Mitchell, 1957:4).  Most women were thus economically 
dependent on men, given the limitations of their own livelihood options (Geisler, 1992:458; 
Hansen, 1997:28,40; Parpart, 1988:123).  With the increased legal and financial importance 
of marriage and marriage certificates in towns, more people registered (Epstein, 1953:8, 
cited in Parpart, 1988:121).   
 
Women fighting back in the mid-colonial period (1940s-1950s) 
 
Despite socio-economic change, some women fought back in an effort to regain the freedom 
they enjoyed in the 1920s and 1930s.  Drawing on the urban court records of the 1950s, 
Parpart (1986, 1988) argues that women were not passive pawns in patriarchal struggles but 
instead sought to secure ‘autonomy’ in various ways.  Some women maintained economic 
independence through beer-brewing and prostitution.  Others protected themselves against 
the event of conjugal breakdown by secretly keeping savings in friends’ and relatives’ houses, 
or investing in social networks to secure reciprocity.   
 
While the vast majority of women lived with a man in the 1950s, many eschewed binding 
marriage registration in favour of informal liaisons, where exit remained possible (Parpart, 
1988:123-124).  Although chiefs repatriated unmarried urban women to rural areas, they 
would often escape, pre-emptively, or return clandestinely.  Subversion became so common 
that urban courts were resigned to abandon the policy of repatriation in 1953 (Chauncey, 
1981:158-160; Hansen, 1997:33-34; Parpart, 1988:123).  Women who did marry sometimes 
refused bride-wealth payments in order to enable an easier passage out of marriage and 
better assurance of child custody (Parpart, 1988:124-125).  Married women’s resistance is 
also evident in court records.  The nature and frequency of female complaints and litigation 
illustrates they selectively invoked recognised custom to their advantage (ibid:123-127).  But 
                                                        
18 Barnes (1961) and Colson (1961:126) claim that many Tonga in Southern Province (matrilineal and patrilocal) and Ngoni to the East 
(patrilineal) practised bride-wealth instead. If not all Copperbelt residents hailed from areas that previously practised bride-service then this shift 
to bride-wealth was not universal.  However, Wright (1983) contests this claim about the magnitude of bride-wealth amongst the Tonga in earlier 
decades, pointing to men’s construction of history.  Mizinga (2000) and Wright (1983) do maintain that the economic value of Tonga bride-wealth 
increased under colonialism – echoing Copperbelt trends.   
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while some sought to preserve their cherished autonomy, many women had other desires, 
such as for social respect – which required compliance with Christian-colonial prescriptive 
stereotypes.   
 
Christian-colonial prescriptive stereotypes in the mid colonial period (1940s-
1950s) 
 
The British colonial regime expected women to be dependent housewives (Glazer, 1997:144).  
For example, one girls’ boarding school was established on the Copperbelt with the explicit 
moral mission of creating ‘town-bred girls who can become good wives and mothers in an 
urban environment’ (quoted in Parpart, 2001:278).  From the 1930s to 1960s, mining 
companies sought to stretch miners’ low wages by training their wives in domestic skills: 
sewing, hygiene, laundry, handicrafts, cooking, and sometimes reading and writing (Parpart, 
1983:79,142).  Gender divisions of labour (i.e. breadwinner and housewife) were thus 
prescribed, as part of a moral and colonial-capitalist mission. 
 
European prescriptive stereotypes of male breadwinner and female homemaker not only 
transformed gender roles of economic interdependence but also their symbolic importance.  
Food preparation was denigrated from honour to duty, thereby eroding the status women 
previously accrued from performing this gender role (Rasing, 2001:93).  While colonial ideas 
of female domesticity were not novel, their social meaning appears to have changed.  
Notwithstanding their historically multiple social roles, women became stereotyped as ‘just 
housewives’ – a position that became devalued in the market-based economy. 
 
Colonial-capitalist ideologies about ‘good housewives’ were communicated by mining 
companies, churches, government social welfare and the media.  These gender divisions of 
labour were adopted by the emerging elite, who sought to mark their social position and 
impress others.  The rest of society aspired to keep up (Epstein, 1981:71,75; Kallmann, 1999; 
Parpart, 2001:280-283).  Based on ethnographic research in the Copperbelt, Mitchell 
(1956:15) explains that ‘the prestige system in the urban area thus uses “civilisation” or “the 
European way-of-life” as a standard or scale of prestige’ (see also Ferguson, 1999:168-
169,175).  Newspapers, government social welfare and churches also promoted the notion 
that women should be housewives.   
 
With men keen to acquire respect and Christian missions’ prescriptive stereotypes being 
increasingly accepted, women were progressively assigned to an exclusively homemaking 
role.  For most women in the Copperbelt in the 1950s, their days largely revolved round their 
husband and his working hours, in symbolic recognition of his ‘new status as breadwinner 
and master of the household’ (Epstein, 1981:70; see also Chauncey, 1981:150; Powdermaker, 
1962:188-190).19  
 
Conjugal relations were also in flux.  Many women in the Copperbelt sought to secure 
respectability by accepting their husbands’ orders and only associating with reputable 
women (Parpart, 2001).  More subversive behaviour may have been discouraged by their 
limited exit options, stemming from the stigma of divorce.  In the 1940s and 1950s, marital 
stability became increasingly critical to respectability, for the urban poor and emerging elite 
                                                        
19 Although men dominated paid employment in domestic work throughout the colonial period, there is little evidence to suggest that such 
employment affected practices in their own homes (Hansen, 1989). 
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alike (Epstein, 1981:257).  Surveys suggest that marriages also stabilised during this mid-
colonial period, as a result of these processes (Parpart, 1988:122).   
 
However, there was variation by class.  In the mid-colonial period, women with wealthy 
husbands were less likely to divorce, since they derived significant financial benefits from 
marriage, in comparison with poorer women.  Even if they did seek divorce, their families 
were often unsupportive because they were reluctant to return their high bride-wealth.  
Accordingly, elite wives often resorted to ‘magic’ to improve their marriages (Parpart, 
1988:132).  New values of respectability also deterred middle class men from ‘excessive’ 
divorces (Powdermaker, 1962:152,169).  Accepted freedoms permitted within marriage also 
varied by class.  The urban poor, unlike the emerging urban elite, deemed it acceptable for 
women to frequent beer halls, though not to drink to excess, chase men or neglect their 
duties as housewives (Parpart, 2001:281).   
 
Intimate relationships may have also varied with women’s fall-back position.  For example, 
relationships with physically beautiful women were particularly precarious, since they had 
many other potential suitors (Epstein, 1981:255).  Women’s independent wealth may have 
also enhanced their autonomy.  However, such opportunities were limited by women’s 
widespread economic dependence on husbands, as will be elaborated in the next section. 
 
Women’s economic dependence on husbands in the mid-late colonial period 
(1950s and 1960s) 
 
In addition to widely-held gender stereotypes, women’s economic dependence on men also 
shaped Copperbelt gender roles and relations in the mid-to-late colonial period.  While 
colonial authorities and mining companies encouraged married women to care for, stabilise 
and reproduce labour, women’s income-generating opportunities were purposely held in 
check by government restrictions and fines on their economic activities (such as beer-
brewing and prostitution).  Such obstacles were imposed in order to entrench women’s 
economic dependence upon, and commitment to, male employees, thereby preserving social 
stability and cohesion (Chauncey, 1981:136,149; Epstein, 1981:57,116,309-310; Glazer, 
1997:144; Milimo, 1998:10; Parpart, 1988b:122; Powdermaker, 1962:151,192; Wilson, 1941).  
Like European authorities, many Africans were equally opposed to women being wage 
earners.  Men with working wives might be mocked and shamed.  Sending one’s wife to the 
market was seen as a failure to live up to prescriptive gender stereotypes: being a 
breadwinner had become key to men’s urban respectability (Epstein, 1981:58; Harries-
Jones, 1975:156). 
 
As a result of these colonial, capitalist and patriarchal desires, ‘the economic aspect of the 
woman’s role had been diminished under urban conditions’ (Epstein, 1981:68,116).  Very few 
women worked outside the home (Chauncey, 1981:150; Hansen, 1989:121,130-134; 
Powdermaker, 1962:188-190).  A 1954 study of Lusaka’s main African market found that one 
fifth of traders were women.  Further, these were not full-time, regular traders.  Most traded 
seasonally and were either married to a market trader or were a female head of household 
(Nyirenda, 1957:37-42, cited in Hansen, 1997:41) 
 
Such characterisations are also evident in collective memories of this period.  While none of 
my participants actually lived during this time, so could not provide a first-hand account, 
64 
 
they still provided valuable insights into popular representations of earlier generations.  
Markus, a 45 year old garage owner and mine engineer explained contemporary gender 
divisions of labour with reference to past stereotypes: 
 
The way I see things myself, it’s more of a historical issue, engraved in people’s veins, 
because men were coming out to work in town.  It became a law that a man should be 
moving up and down, even after they moved their wives here, they still just suffered in 
the kitchen, saying ‘He’s going to the mine’.  And remember, when we go through the 
mining regulation, it’s now that the government has changed the rules, there never used 
to be a woman underground.  Me, I’m a mine engineer...  We had a woman surveyor 
working underground, she had to be exempted by law, so you can see there are some 
deterrent factors which make women the way they are now. 
 
As Markus describes, women’s economic opportunities were intentionally hampered by the 
Government.  Additionally, because houses in mining towns were linked to employment 
(which was male-dominated), an adult woman could only access accommodation through a 
man.  Without a husband she remained with her kin, perhaps sleeping in the kitchen or 
makeshift shelter (Epstein, 1981:116,313).   
 
Throughout the colonial period, women’s economic dependence was perpetuated by gender 
bias in education, which may have in turn reflected labour market expectations.  As John 
(22, funding his secondary education through piece-work and church sponsorship) explained 
in an essay I commissioned: 
 
In those days back[,] men are the only people whom the government of this country 
were regarding as the strong compared to women.  And men were regarding themselves 
that they think wiser than women.  Women were not allowed to study further because 
they were thinking that women will get married but men are the one who studied hard 
and got advanced in the education so that in retain [return] they can marry and look 
after the family properly...  A long time ago, their was a rule were [where] they said that 
only men would go and work while the women are supposed to remain at home to look 
after the family. 
 
This description, echoed universally in my Copperbelt sample, is supported by quantitative 
data and ethnographic accounts (Mulenga, 1988:25; see also Mizinga, 2000:68 on Southern 
Province).  Girls’ education was often, though not universally, seen as unprofitable.  In 
general, parents were much more concerned about their sons’ rather than their daughters’ 
education (Epstein, 1981:155; Powdermaker, 1962:199-201).  Missionary sponsorship seems 
to have been similarly asymmetric.  For example, Gloria (66) married at 15, when her father 
died and no one would support her.  The Catholics had sponsored her brothers’ education 
but not her own.  She explained, 
 
They didn’t count us women historically.  We were suffering [translated, see Annex 2 for 
original Bemba].i 
 
Ensuing gender divisions of labour meant that women became dependent on their husbands 
for respect, as well as material resources.  By comparison, Copperbelt male miners have 
always had great pride in their status as ‘bashimine’ (fathers of the mine), providing the 
country’s lifeblood through their arduous toil (see also Ferguson, 1999; Larmer, 2007). 
Epstein (1981:75) observes, 
65 
 
 
Women were not able to seek achievement and the esteem of their fellows in the same 
ways that had become possible for men.  A woman’s status in town, and more 
particularly a wife’s, rarely rested on what she had achieved through her own efforts but 
was in most cases refracted through her husband.  To impress her own importance on 
another she might thus proclaim, “BaMuka Chief Clerk?” (Don’t you know that I am Mrs 
Chief Clerk?).   
 
With a weak fall-back position, women in the 1950s commonly remarked that they would put 
up with a lot to preserve their marriages.  Epstein (1981:67,109-110,120,313-314) notes that, 
 
In circumstances where employment was necessary to survival, and few jobs were 
available to woman, the husband immediately found his position enhanced...  [Upon 
finding a job and accommodation] he was master of the house... he could lay claim to a 
power and an authority over the affairs of the household that were not part of his 
customary role... a wife was obliged to defer to her husband in all things.   
 
Powdermaker (1962:203) similarly observed that ‘men were even more their masters than in 
the past’.  Some husbands controlled their wives by telling them what to do and forbidding 
certain actions, then constantly reminding them of their economic dependence and 
derivative status (Epstein, 1981:339).  Although some men allowed their wives to manage 
household funds (if they did not trust themselves to spend wisely), they would still publicly 
present themselves as masters of their households, with obedient and deferential wives 
(Chauncey, 1981:150; Epstein, 1981:76-77).  The salience of gender stereotypes is indicated 
by female students’ essays, which Powdermaker (1962:187-188) collected from a single-sex 
government boarding school.  In describing their fantasies, 73% of these middle-class girls 
wished to be men, envying their privileges, power, strength and bravery.   
 
The majority of my participants similarly described their parents and older generations as 
observing gender status inequalities at home.  This included symbolic displays of hierarchy 
(through food allocation, unpaid care work and kneeling when serving food); women having 
limited exit options; as well as being underrated and consequently having limited 
participation in household decision-making.  BanaMwimba (a 41 year old market trader, 
selling dried sardines at Kitwe’s central market) explained, 
 
Historically women were oppressed.  If you cook a chicken there were specific parts 
reserved for the father [meaning husband].  There was nowhere for women to be going 
to...  Women of previous generations didn’t talk at home.  Those who spoke were men...  
Their husbands didn’t permit them to sell because they were providing for them.  If one 
marries one has to listen to one’s husband.  So she can’t sell.  Some men were proud, 
others just wanted to make their wives suffer.  She can’t speak, she can’t make a 
decision.  Men didn’t have confidence in their wives [translated].ii 
 
However, Ferguson (1999:180-181) has disputed this portrayal of domestic patriarchy under 
colonialism.  He suggests that Copperbelt women in fact expected a ‘considerable measure of 
social and sexual independence’.  But Ferguson does not refer to specific evidence 
corroborating this claim, only mentioning Epstein’s (1981:112) observation that some women 
fought back when assaulted by their husbands and would ‘give as good as they got’.  Clearly, 
such retaliation does not itself prove that Copperbelt women were not oppressed by their 
husbands during the late colonial period.  Furthermore, Ferguson himself recognises that to 
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achieve independence women had to be ‘willing to brave divorce and domestic violence’.  
Given the price of this independence, it is not clear to what extent Ferguson contradicts my 
analysis.  If the only alternative to conjugal patriarchy was violence and/or divorce (which 
was heavily stigmatised), BanaMwimba’s suggestion that Copperbelt women were 
‘oppressed’ (ukutitikishiwa) during the mid-late colonial period seems plausible.  Also, since 
Ferguson largely draws on discussions with male mineworkers (ibid:36), his narrative might 
be biased by their particular perspectives.   
 
While marriages appear to have become more patriarchal during the 1940s and 1950s, other 
aspects of gender relations seemed to reflect alternative values.  In urban areas it became 
increasingly common to postpone marriage until after puberty and to choose one’s own 
partner (Epstein, 1981:255-256,270; Powdermaker, 1962:156,167; Wilson, 1941:70).  Some 
young women took the initiative to engage in sexual relationships rather than passively 
submit to an admirer’s advances.  Such a woman would live with her lover, cook, clean and 
enjoy romance.  With like-minded women, they would go to beer halls and European dances, 
enjoying a degree of independence unlike wives bound by restraint.  Boyfriends would 
support them with gifts of money and clothes (Epstein, 1981:312; Powdermaker, 1962:163-
164).  Adultery was largely blamed on these women, not the men who had sought these 
attractive partners for pleasure and status (Epstein, 1981:100,336,351).   
 
Equally important is the dissolution of historic forms of status inequalities.  Gerontocratic 
patriarchy was challenged by urban men in town, who formed inter-ethnic solidarities 
through work, as well as trade union and independence struggles (Gluckman, 1960; Larmer, 
2007; Mitchell, 1956). 
 
Women’s social relationships and political participation in the mid-to-late 
colonial period (1950s-1960s) 
 
As housewives, many women were socially isolated.  In the absence of emotional support and 
security from husbands, wives often turned to their own siblings and parents.  However, 
Epstein (1981) contends that kin-based support may have dwindled over time.20  If true, this 
shift would probably have worsened women’s economic security. 
 
While men’s work, union and leisure activities facilitated the formation of relationships 
outside the neighbourhood, Copperbelt housewives were often socially isolated.  ‘Most 
women on the township had no communal or social role, and their work was restricted to the 
household... which was a drastic change for them’ (Powdermaker, 1962:188-189).  Since 
most husbands refused to allow their wives to accompany them to beer halls, many 
reluctantly remained home alone (Epstein, 1981:107).   
 
Some women neighbours developed close relations.  But these relations were often transient 
and unstable, due to a (pre-1950s) colonial policy that discouraged Africans from 
permanently residing in urban areas (Epstein, 1981: Chapter 6).  Furthermore, even though 
                                                        
20 Although Ferguson (1999:184-185) has highlighted the continuing salience of matriliny in some respects, he does not suggest that this 
protected women’s economic security.  In the eyes of their matrikin, women’s role and value seemed to decline.  For example, pre-colonial Bemba 
matrikin often welcomed the birth of girls as bringing labour into the village.  But in the urban Copperbelt families were primarily supported by 
male waged labour.  Additionally, matrikin previously supported women’s exit from marriage, as they could increase the lineage through 
remarriage.  However, such tolerance seems to have been undermined by Christian prescriptive stereotypes.   
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urban social networks were economically important to women in many ways, they paled in 
comparison to both women’s earlier kin-based support in pre-colonial villages and to men’s 
access to industrial jobs (Epstein, 1981:166-179; Glazer, 1997:147; Hansen 1984:228; 
Parpart, 1986).  Being house-bound, with multiple children and a heavy burden of domestic 
work, not allowed to accompany their husbands to beer halls, nor economically 
interdependent with other households like their rural counterparts, many women became 
emotionally reliant on their husbands for company in the mid-to-late colonial period (see 
also Epstein, 1981:118-120,260-261).   
 
Economic dependence tended to reinforce women’s identification with their husbands and 
prevent collective action amongst women (Parpart, 1986:156).  Inter-female aggression 
(between lovers, co-wives, and matrikin versus nuclear family) over the scarce resource of 
male support became pervasive.  As Glazer (1992:166) comments, ‘[m]en became a resource 
worth competing for, particularly in the urban class-based society’ (see also Powdermaker, 
1962:157,164,167,207-214).  Patterns of resource access thus impeded women from 
developing solidarity with each other. 
 
However, many women were still politically active in support of their husbands’ livelihoods.  
For example, miners’ wives supported men’s struggle for higher wages during the 1940s and 
1950s (Parpart, 1986).  There was, however, one exceptional case of women spearheading 
their own action, when two thousand women demonstrated against the municipal beer 
monopoly in Lusaka in 1954.  They wanted to be allowed to brew beer so that they could 
provide for their families (Hansen, 1997:40). 
 
In the 1950s and 1960s, women’s participation in nationalist struggles was curbed by 
competing domestic and reproductive demands on their time (Epstein, 1981:70).  Few 
husbands allowed their wives to abandon these duties.  Nor would many men grant their 
wives permission to work with other men, lest they risk being labelled a ‘fool’ by their friends 
(Harries-Jones, 1975:31-32).  The United National Independence Party (UNIP) exacerbated 
such concerns by warning men that political participation and independent travel on the part 
of their wife would trigger rumours of her infidelity (Geisler, 2004:43).  While UNIP did 
create a respectable space for women’s political participation, in the form of the Women’s 
Brigade, this was only to support men’s endeavours: by providing food, housing, financial 
support for the movement and its leaders (Harries-Jones 1975:100; Schuster, 1993:17-18, 
cited in Geisler, 2004:24).   
 
Notwithstanding these constraints, the independence struggle did legitimate some new 
opportunities for women.  Geisler (2004:45,62-63) notes that ‘[w]omen members of 
nationalist movements... valued the small spaces they gained.  Dissatisfaction and 
disappointment only set in after independence (1964), when their achievements were not 
honoured in the ways anticipated and dreams of personal liberation did not come true’.   
 
3.4 Women’s continuing economic dependence on men in the early decades 
of independence (1960s-1980s) 
 
Although the ruling UNIP’s Women’s Brigade nominally included women, men ‘directed its 
organisation, policies and activities and appointed its officials’ (Schuster, 1993:17, cited in 
Geisler, 2004:24; see also Ng’andu, 1988:129).  Women’s role was to support men’s political 
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endeavours (Geisler, 2004:24).  Leaders of the Women’s League (the Brigade renamed) 
stressed that their political participation was to serve both husband and nation, in 
compliance with Christian models of the good wife, and not to challenge patriarchy at 
national or local levels (Crehan, 1997:141; Geisler, 1987:43, 2004:92-93).  Even at Zambia’s 
first Women’s Rights Conference in 1970, repeated efforts were made to reassure men that 
patriarchy was not threatened (Geisler, 2004:91).  The President’s wife, Betty Kaunda, 
assured Zambian men that, 
 
We do not intend to neglect our duties in the home...  We talk about woman power but 
we do not mean it as a threat to man power!  I see a new role for women, a new task for 
woman power: we must be the custodians of happiness and security in the home, the 
watchdogs of morality in our society (quoted in Geisler, 2004:91). 
 
Dissenting voices were also constrained by the authoritarian climate under UNIP, which 
pushed NGOs to welfare issues rather than gender politics (ZARD, 1994:18-19). 
 
Labour market statistics indicate marked gender divisions of labour during the early decades 
of independence, with men predominating in paid employment.  The 1969 Census puts 
Kitwe’s working African population at 36,017 men and 3,283 women (CSO, 1973:8).  
Subsequent, nationwide labour market surveys suggest that women’s share of formal 
employment remained low, only rising marginally from 6.3% in 1975 to 7.7% in 1980 (CSO, 
1986:30-31).  There appears to have been little change in aggregate levels of employment or 
occupational sex segregation over the 1970s, as shown by Figure 3.1.  Here, lighter colours 
indicate earlier decades. 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Sex-disaggregated employment by industry, Zambia, 1975, 1979 and 
1980  
Source: CSO, 1986:30-31 
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Although there are reasons to be sceptical of this labour market data, as discussed in the next 
chapter, the trend indicated by the available statistics was corroborated by all my 
participants, as well as previous studies in Zambia.  The latter further detail how urban and 
rural women’s income generation was constrained by Government policies (Long, 1968; 
Moore and Vaughan, 1994:215; Munachonga, 1989:147; Seur, 1992:330).  For example, work 
for urban women continued to be legally restricted, through bans on underground 
employment, night-work in industry and employers’ provision of housing/ housing 
allowances to married women.  Women’s remuneration was also limited by repeated 
absenteeism (due to children’s sickness or pregnancy) and refusal of men’s sexual advances, 
which jeopardised their chances of advancement (Caro, 1985:125, cited in Mulenga, 1988; 
Glazer Schuster, 1979:69,74-75).  Female employment was also curbed by employers’ 
preferences, such as for male domestic workers in the early post-colonial period (Hansen, 
1989:232). 
 
A global fall in copper prices in the mid-1970s triggered macro-economic decline in the 
Zambian Copperbelt – resulting in job losses, wage cuts, inflation, consumer shortages and 
riots in the subsequent decade (Ferguson 1999; Larmer 2007).  However, this decline does 
not appear to have been sufficiently significant to trigger ruptures in gender divisions of 
labour or gender beliefs – my participants maintained that this only happened later with 
economic restructuring in the 1990s.  In the 1970s and early 1980s at least, relative economic 
security and public welfare provisions meant that few families, husbands and women 
themselves felt compelled to push for women’s employment (on the historic public provision 
of social services and infrastructure see Fraser and Lungu, 2007:4; Larmer, 2007:122).  As 
Helen (whom I lived with in a low-income compound) said of her adolescence in the 1970s, 
 
A long time ago... [my mother] was selling at the Green Market, there were very few 
women selling.  The majority of women didn’t know about selling.  What they were 
doing is to depend on their husbands.  Because their husbands had jobs, they were 
working in industries, industries were all over...  There was free education and medical 
care...  Everything was free, even the books at school...  Historically women were 
oppressed.  Even if she was educated, men would not want that person to go and work, 
they just want her to be a housewife.  She cannot participate in anything: in political 
parties, you cannot go at the market and sell, because her husband will be feeling shy, 
“Why is she selling?  It looks like I’m not keeping her very well”...  A long time ago 
women were very oppressed because men didn’t want a woman to do things... to work 
or have her own money [translated].iii,21 
Helen (politician). 
 
We did not know we would suffer in the future, that’s why we married young.  In the 
past things were cheap [translated].iv 
BanaNyawa (41, married, runs a teashop in the market with her daughter). 
 
  
                                                        
21 By comparison, Helen added, ‘Now this time a woman is a human being, she can do what men can do.  Women have money, just like men may 
have money’ [translated]. 
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The society, they were saying a girl’s place is in the kitchen, so my mother was a full 
time housewife; sometimes selling tomatoes at home but not going to the market.  
Women had no chance of doing what they think they can do, especially maybe going far 
away to do their business, they were not allowed.22 
BanaMutale (39, domestic worker, never married). 
 
These narratives indicate multiple influences.  Some women grew up assuming men would 
provide for them.  Others sought their own incomes but were constrained by prevalent 
gender stereotypes, whereby men’s status and pride was contingent on household provision.  
Further, men’s economic opportunities largely enabled them to fulfil their normative role of 
breadwinner.  This echoes findings on rural Western Kenya in the 1970s and 1980s, where 
men gained authority through their status and breadwinners.  For women also,‘[t]rading 
carried a stigma of poverty and women who could avoid it prided themselves on not having 
to “sit in the market’’’ (Francis, 2002:175). 
 
Another reason for men’s reluctance to support their wives’ employment was their 
knowledge of sexual harassment in the workplace (Glazer Schuster, 1979:114).  Many 
husbands were also concerned about women’s independence through labour force 
participation, in terms of physical mobility, finances and consequent threats to power 
balances at home.  Given these countervailing concerns, husbands often refused to allow 
their wives’ employment (see also Munachonga, 1989:150).  Some husbands further tried to 
dominate their wives through closely spacing births and strictly controlling their own income 
(ibid:151).   
 
A letter to the editor of the Zambian Daily Mail (23/09/1984) provides an example of social 
resistance: ‘We employ women at the expense of men.  Is it not a fact that men are by nature 
bread winners?  I’m sure we need not be reminded of the women’s rightful place because it is 
a well known fact that her place is in the kitchen so to say’.  The writer, Mr Sakala, further 
called for an end to female employment and for men to be placed ‘in all positions held by 
women’ (quoted in Geisler, 1987:61).  While this letter does not provide evidence of the 
extent of social resistance to women’s employment, it nonetheless indicates some of the 
social sanctions women faced from some quarters when they failed to conform to 
prescriptive stereotypes. 
 
Based on his ethnographic study of Kitwe in the late 1980s, Ferguson (1999:194) observed 
that, 
 
With little access to employment, and formidable obstacles in the “informal sector”, a 
woman’s ability to live in town at all might depend on her ability to form a relation with 
a husband or lover.  Housing on the Copperbelt is normally allocated to men, often by 
virtue of their status as employees...  And even if a woman did manage to find housing 
on her own, she would have a very difficult time earning enough money to support 
herself. 
 
Similarly, many of my participants initially described their mothers and wives as previously 
being ‘housewives’.  However, this characterisation may have been biased by stereotypes of 
the time.  Participants often subsequently mentioned their home-based enterprises, e.g. 
                                                        
22 Similarly BanaMutale observes, ‘But this time everyone can go and do the same thing’.  The reasons for these changes will be explored in 
Chapter 4. 
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selling tomatoes.  Even if productive, women’s home-based work rarely appears to have been 
recognised or appreciated.  Furthermore, such income-generating activities generally paled 
in monetary significance to men’s waged labour.   
 
The following pages will document the consequences of these gender divisions of labour in 
the early decades of independence.  While Rasing (2001) contends that Copperbelt 
housewives derived status and autonomy from their control of the domestic sphere, no such 
prestige was evident in my interviews.  As exemplified in Matthew’s life history, participants 
tended to describe women as being historically preoccupied with ‘small issues’, relating to 
their roles as housewives, relying on men (who alone were ‘strong’) to solve more important 
issues, through political engagement.  Mike (42, onion wholesaler) maintained that, 
 
It’s not possible for a housewife to know many things because her intelligence hasn’t 
been awakened in many things.  She’s not found with many people, she doesn’t have a 
head that knows how to stay with many people ...  Even travelling long distances, she 
doesn’t have much knowledge, she doesn’t know how people travel, how they stay with 
people in the market, so she doesn’t have knowledge [translated].v 
 
Because unpaid care work was devalued, many former housewives explained that they 
previously thought themselves less intelligent than men and so would follow their 
suggestions in community politics and at family funerals, e.g. regarding burial arrangements 
and asset redistribution.  Gender divisions of labour thus appear to have perpetuated gender 
status beliefs.   
 
Economic dependency ensured that many women both feared losing their husbands and also 
staying with them, often enduring violence (Glazer Schuster, 1979:126-130).  The earlier 
ethnographies cited often attributed gender status inequalities to women’s weak fall-back 
position.  However, my own participants (whose experience of social change enabled them to 
identify binding constraints in previous decades) differed.  They stressed that besides being 
unable to bargain for equality, housewives also tended to regard physical abuse as ‘normal’.  
Their social isolation inhibited their exposure to alternative ways of living and opportunities 
for collective reflection.  Some explained this point with reference to a Bemba proverb: ‘a 
child who doesn’t travel praises their mother’s cooking’ (translated).  This is exemplified in 
the following conversation with Gloria (66, a divorced caterpillar trader).  She narrated that 
her jealous husband would question her movements and did not want her to look clean, so as 
to prevent other men from being attracted to her.  Sometimes he went off for a month at a 
time, leaving little money for her to survive upon.   
 
Gloria: My husband used to beat me.  If he came from wandering and you ask him what 
he was up to then he would beat you... [I didn’t tell anyone] It’s a secret of the house, 
you can’t say anything...  I used to pray about the suffering so that he might change...  I 
didn’t have any friends, I just stayed at home...  
Alice: What did you think about your husband’s behaviour? 
Gloria: We were oppressed, you perceive it to be normal, but it’s not good [translated].vi 
 
BanaJessy (39, married female market trader): We used to think you pass through 
sufferings alone. 
Alice: Why?   
BanaJessy: Back then we had not yet started to be found with many different people at 
the market [translated].vii 
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A letter from a ‘worried wife’ in Lusaka to the Zambia Daily Mail expressed similar effects of 
social isolation.  Having complained that her husband did not reciprocate her efforts to 
please him, she asked, ‘Am I the only housewife undergoing this treatment or are we many?’ 
(Geisler, 1987:64).  Additionally, one newspaper article on kitchen-parties (where women 
gather to give kitchen goods to a prospective bride) quotes a woman as saying, ‘My husband 
never takes me out.  I am expected to stay at home year after year while he enjoys himself.  
What do you expect me to do?’.  As Geisler (ibid) notes, these written statements are likely to 
reflect the concerns of elite housewives.  While such women may have accrued some social 
status and enjoyed the leisure of not having to work, being a housewife also seems to have 
led to social isolation and unhappiness.  Moreover, isolation may have impeded women from 
identifying structural obstacles: not knowing that they were ‘many’ may have led women to 
think it was a personal problem, rather than an outcome of the gender structure, which 
appears to have cut across class lines. 
 
While some women did engage in trade, the cultural stereotype that only men could be 
economically self-sufficient meant that female traders were often suspected of resorting to 
alternative means of support.  This was evident in some participants’ life histories as well as 
earlier ethnographies.  For instance, interviewed female traders repeatedly stressed that ‘we 
are not prostitutes’ (Schuster, 1982:116-117,120).  This pre-emptive defence indicates their 
cultural expectations – their presumptions and related anxieties about how others perceived 
them.   
 
Some educated urban women occupied prestigious positions and became financially 
independent (see also Glazer Schuster 1979:22,115 on Lusaka).  My participants suggested 
that such dual-earner households tended to observe more egalitarian relationships, 
providing inspirational role models for their children.  However, their lone encroachments 
into male-dominated domains do not appear to have undermined gender stereotypes in 
society more broadly.  A number of my male and female participants recalled that they used 
to regard such women as ‘prostitutes’.  Given the paucity of women in employment, people 
often lacked evidence of their aptitude and so assumed that they were only there as a result 
of sexual favours, not merit.  Also, many female employees did face sexual harassment, so 
their work lives may have involved some (unwelcomed) sexual activity (Glazer Schuster, 
1979:70).   
 
Besides limited exposure to women demonstrating their equal competence, this gender 
stereotype may have persisted due to countervailing interests.  First, feeling threatened by 
their husbands’ female colleagues, housewives may have sought to undermine working 
women’s respectability through accusations of inappropriate conduct.  Second, seeing a 
woman performing the same job as themselves countered gender status beliefs and bruised 
men’s egos (Glazer Schuster, 1979:74).  Men may have consoled themselves by denying that 
their female colleagues had advanced by virtue of merit.  Thus, male co-workers and 
housewives may have purposively used this terminology (‘prostitutes’) to shame women 
whose actions countered their interests.  Also, there may have been an interaction between 
interests and exposure (as discussed in Chapter 1).23  For example, men may have been blind 
                                                        
23 Ridgeway (1997:222-223) argues that people’s ‘self-interest makes them more cognitively resistant to disconfirming information’ of their 
stereotypes. 
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to disconfirming evidence of their gender stereotypes if their self-esteem was rooted in the 
belief that they were superior to female colleagues.   
 
Limited first-hand evidence of women’s aptitude in male-dominated domains led people to 
doubt and resist their attempted incursions into politics.  Being unaccustomed to female 
leaders, many regarded it as inappropriate.  Strong outspoken women were often beaten, 
chastised or at least reprimanded by their embarrassed kin – cognisant of cultural 
expectations.  By witnessing others being treated according to stereotypical beliefs, people 
learnt what kind of behaviour was necessary to avoid social sanction.   
 
Many husbands felt that they were supposed to be the household head and so were 
uncomfortable with their wives entering politics.  Furthermore, with little first-hand 
evidence of women’s efficacy in politics it was often assumed that they only ascended 
through sexual favours and were hence labelled ‘prostitutes’ – by men and women alike  (see 
also Geisler 2004:191).  Geisler (1995:567-568) noted, ‘[t]hose who transgress such 
prescriptions are disrespected, derided, ridiculed, slandered and demoralised by colleagues, 
and receive little electoral support from their parties’.  Many female politicians reportedly 
experienced marital problems and instability (Ferguson et al 19959,13-14).  The few women 
that did successfully become parliamentarians in the early 1990s were mostly divorced or 
single (61%) (ibid:9).24  
 
Notwithstanding these demand-side constraints, male participants primarily stressed 
supply-side causes of women’s paucity in politics.  They insisted that women in the 1970s 
and 1980s tended to follow men’s endeavours rather than initiating their own political 
activities: they rarely put themselves forward (tabaleipelesha).  Women’s ‘passivity’ was 
attributed to them being largely unaccustomed to speaking out for themselves, so lacking the 
requisite sense of self-efficacy.  Mike (42, a grassroots political activist and onion wholesaler) 
commented: 
 
Women used to say “Only a man can do it, only a man can do it, only a man can do it” 
[translated].viii 
 
For demand and supply-side reasons, the paucity of women in prestigious positions appears 
to have been self-perpetuating.  There was little disconfirming evidence of internalised 
gender stereotypes or cultural expectations.  During the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, women 
accounted for only 3-8% of elected MPs (ZARD and SADC, 2005:25).  As shown by Figures 
3.3 and 3.4, there were no female Cabinet members between 1978 and 1988.  In the latter 
two graphs, lighter colours indicate earlier periods. 
                                                        
24 Other authors also point to this discrimination and hostility (from families, voters and parliamentary colleagues alike) as an obstacle to 
women’s political participation (Ferguson et al,1995; Geisler, 2004; Kimberly and Ferguson, 1995:12; Schylter, 1999:118; 2009:30).  However, 
they do not explain it by reference to limited evidence of women’s efficacy.  Perhaps, it is only with exposure to experiential evidence of (many) 
women in leadership that my participants were able to explain converse historical trends.  Earlier studies did not detect the importance of limited 
exposure, since they lacked the contemporary counter-factual of women in leadership.  In this way, the present can inform our understanding of 
history, just as history informs our understanding of the present. 
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Figure 3.2: Percentage female of elected members of parliament since 1964  
Source: Singogo et al, 2009:26 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Party leadership, numbers 
Source: CSO, 1991:62 
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Figure 3.4: Party leadership, proportion female, 1972, 1978, 1982 and 1988 
Source: CSO, 1991:62 
 
Women’s paucity in socially valued domains seems to have reproduced gender status 
inequalities.  Gender divisions of labour also appear to have fostered misogyny.  Many 
women were resented by men, as Ferguson (1999:194,196-198) recounts his observations of 
Kitwe in the late 1980s: 
 
With both earning power and the control of housing so overwhelmingly concentrated in 
the hands of men, women’s economic strategies were necessarily largely focused on 
ways of gaining access to male-controlled resources… Workers thus have increasing 
perceived themselves to be struggling to survive economically, all the while surrounded 
by a sea of grasping, ever-needy, mostly female dependants...  A political economy of 
misogyny thus begins to become visible: with shrinking real wages, besieged from all 
sides with demands, workers felt panicky and taken advantage of by what could 
sometimes seem like greedy women who did not understand or care about their 
problems.  And no one, in their view, was more to blame, or had worse motives, than 
their own wives and/or girlfriends. 
 
Such hatred seems to have been exacerbated by the physical consequences of gender 
divisions of labour, which created male-only discursive enclaves in which women were 
portrayed as problematic sexual objects.  Men’s misogyny was ‘extreme and unremitting’ 
(Ferguson, 1999:188).   
 
These stereotypes of women were not only articulated and reproduced by men.  Economic 
dependency upon husbands also turned housewives against unmarried women – repeating 
the colonial trend.  In the early decades of independence, married women’s anger was 
primarily directed at their husbands’ female drinking partners, rather than their husbands 
(Glazer, 1997:152).  National discourse (newspapers, popular songs, the Women’s League 
and politicians) similarly tended to blame independent unmarried women for moral and 
economic decay.  With their make-up, mini-skirts and wigs, these ‘prostitutes’ supposedly 
tempted men away from their wives and familial provision, resulting in unstable marriages, 
child-neglect, abortion and teenage pregnancies (Geisler, 2004:92-95; Glazer Schuster, 1979; 
Longwe and Clarke, 1990).  Unaccompanied women’s movements were restricted from the 
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early 1970s and periodically thereafter by bans and police harassment.  To promote morality, 
re-establish traditional values and ensure submission to husbands as well as older women, 
calls were made for a revival of pre-marital counselling (Geisler, 2004:95-97; Glazer 
Schuster, 1979:148–153; Hansen, 1997:112-113; Longwe, 1985). 
 
3.5 Traditional rituals and teachings 
 
It has been argued that gender status inequalities partly resulted from gender divisions of 
labour.  An alternative hypothesis emphasises the influence of ‘tradition’.  One way in which 
these beliefs have been passed down, across generations, is through premarital initiation.25  
Many of my own participants attributed women’s endurance (ukushipikisha) within abusive, 
hierarchical marriages and their described proclivity to passively follow others’ directives 
without considering, articulating or following their own desires during the early decades of 
Independence to these teachings.   
 
Icisungu instructions seem unchanged, as maintained by elderly women and evident in the 
similarities between my own experience of icisungu and that depicted by Richards (1995).26 
As noted elsewhere (Geisler, 2000:66-67; Schlyter, 1999:106; Rasing, 2001:146,153), 
Zambian initiation ceremonies tend to promote gender status inequalities within marriage.  
Banacimbusa (traditional counsellor) BanaNkonde (55) prescribed as follows: 
 
You must make yourself pliable.  The man is the head of the house, one must follow 
what he says, so that you live within marriage, because if you leave you will find exactly 
the same thing [i.e. men are all the same; the grass is not greener on the other side].  
Don’t leave, you must stay...  A woman has the right to speak but not to use strong 
words; she must be calm when explaining...  If he refuses you must follow.  If the man 
scolds, the woman must return to the ground [both figuratively and literally, by 
kneeling]...  Through this way of speaking you will live harmoniously [translated].ix 
 
                                                        
25 This was most famously documented by Audrey Richards (1995), drawing on research in 1931-1933.  More recently, Rasing (2001) found that 
initiation was widespread, at least among her participants (Catholic women with formal jobs in Mufulira, a Copperbelt town).  Participants to my 
own research similarly seemed to take it as given.  Only one woman declared that she would not take her daughter to a traditional counsellor.  
Other research differs however.  Rural participants to Moore and Vaughan’s Zambian study (1994:171) maintained that icisungu is uncommon 
and were reluctant to detail their own initiation.  But their efforts to downplay its prevalence may be symptomatic of their unwillingness to discuss 
the topic.  In Mozambique, Signe Arnfred (2011:174) similarly broached difficulties when trying to interview young initiates: ‘it was a very 
awkward scene... not a word passed their lips’.  Such obstacles may account for why Audrey Richards (1995:63) did not interview the banacisungu 
participants of the ceremony.   
26 I was invited to participate as a nacisungu (initiate and would-be Bemba bride) by a banacimbusa (traditional counsellor) presiding over the 
initiation of two betrothed, heavily pregnant sisters living nearby in our low-income compound.  The banacimbusa (my host’s closest female 
friend) was keen for me to learn.  So I joined in the training and rituals, as a would-be Bemba bride.  I am unaware of other outsiders being invited 
to participate in this ceremony. 
Our initiation consisted of a month’s private training and then an overnight event to show the sisters’ readiness for marriage to their female 
in-laws and gathered married women (of all ages).  The training detailed conjugal obligations, just as Richards previously documented (1995:140).  
There were also similarities in symbolic behaviour in the overnight event: we banacisungu were veiled by a large cloth as we crawled into the 
room of assembled married women.  We later used our mouths to grab domestic emblems (e.g. a cooking stick); and underwent a series of 
physically excruciating, arduous challenges, embodying the prescription of fighting for one’s marriage (see also Richards, 1995:64,73,79,107,193).   
However, in contrast to Richards’ descriptions (in which dances were not a major component and mostly comic), sexual dancing was a central 
part of the overnight event (see also Kapungwe, 2003:45-48).  This may indicate the increased perceived importance of securing one’s husband’s 
attention through his sexual satisfaction.  Different individual women took turns to demonstrate their prowess, so that we banacisungu might 
learn the secrets of marriage and gain status by joining a new community of married women.  However, this variation in activities does not detract 
from my central point that the taught message appears to have remained constant over the twentieth century. 
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Participants suggested that these teachings encouraged women to passively follow others’ 
directives, without considering their own desires.  This was first pointed to me by Sophia 
(the director of a NGO providing legal and psycho-social support to survivors of gender-
based violence).  I also observed it myself.  When narrating their courtship and marriage, 
some women explained changes by reference to their husbands’ and families’ preferences 
and decisions, rather than their own.  When I voiced my observation that they seemed to be 
following what their husbands wanted, they often referred to their banacimbusa’s 
instructions.   
 
Traditional teachings were also said to have quietened women’s voices within marriage.  
Suzie (55, a market trader selling dried sardines) attributed the shyness of earlier 
generations of women to icisungu: 
 
If you go into marriage they gave you rules of the marriage, ‘You should be scared of 
your husband, you obey/listen to what he says [translated].x 
 
The normative weight of banacimbusa’s instructions may have been augmented by urban 
housewives’ social isolation, which limited their awareness of alternative, possibly more 
enjoyable ways of living.27  The dearth of opportunities for collective reflection for those that 
did not congregate in the public sphere may also account for historically limited social 
support for abused women.   
 
Even if urban housewives did reject gender status beliefs, their ability to renegotiate conjugal 
relations may have been constrained by their limited exit options.  Indeed, even though the 
instructions appear similar across history, women’s compliance seems to have varied across 
time with individuals’ differing levels of resources.  Recall that in an earlier context of 
economic interdependence and matrilineal support, Richards (1940:94) noted, ‘there seems 
to be every kind of contradiction between the norm [i.e. patriarchal teachings] and the actual 
behaviour’.  Despite being taught to submit, women’s autonomy was historically enabled by 
the prevailing patterns of resource access.  It was only with women’s increased economic 
dependency on their husbands that the latter were able to achieve their interest in gender 
status inequalities.28  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has illustrated that gender relations can change rapidly with shifting patterns of 
resource access.  Demographic circumstances in the early colonial period enabled women to 
bargain for better treatment because their consequent scarcity value allowed them to access 
resources through men without being dependent upon a particular man.  Subsequently, 
however, women’s access to resources (in the form of multiple potential partners who might 
support them) waned: urban sex ratios evened up over time, monogamy became a 
                                                        
27 The consequences of women coming together through labour-force participation is explored in Chapter 4. 
28 For example, my fellow nacisungu, Cecilia (23), asked my opinion of the instruction that we should never refuse to have sex with our 
husbands.  I paused in reflection.  She volunteered that she did not think it was right, but added that it would be necessary to prevent his 
infidelity, since there were many women, especially those without work, eager to take her place (see also Muvandi et al, 2000 for similar findings 
in urban and rural Ndola, in the Copperbelt).  This competition for men is partly due to women’s continued difficulties in obtaining decent work.  
Similarly in Tanzania, young women’s desperation to secure a husband in a context of economic crisis led to a rise in female genital cutting, 
contrary to their mothers’ wishes and historically successful state policies (Nypan, 1991). 
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prescriptive cultural stereotype and women’s direct access to income (through employment) 
remained limited.   
 
Christian-colonial stereotypes prescribing gender divisions of labour became entrenched due 
to a combination of macro-level factors.  They were first buttressed by colonial labour market 
policies and legislative changes.  Zambian aspirations for middle-class status also 
incentivised many to emulate European settlers.  These class markers were increasingly 
copied because they were perceived and promoted as fashionable displays of modernity.  
Desire for social respect and upward mobility thus motivated compliance with gender 
divisions of labour.  Further, given patterns of resource access, the typical man could achieve 
social status as sole breadwinner without sacrificing economic security.  Hence many denied 
their wives’ employment.   
 
Confined to the home, urban housewives (both working-class and elite) were often socially 
isolated, not exposed to alternative ways of living.  Being economically dependent on their 
husbands limited their capacity to renegotiate conjugal relations.  Together with the 
devalorisation of their unpaid care work, women’s consequent inexperience in the public 
sphere gave others little reason to value their advice.  With limited first-hand evidence of 
women demonstrating equal competence in prestigious socio-economic domains, people 
tended to stereotype men as leaders.  These factors, in conjunction with cultural 
expectations, made it more advantageous for women to comply with the patriarchal 
messages promoted during initiation rituals.  These rituals alone do not account for the 
behavioural change that occurred over the past century, since they have not been 
significantly modified.   
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4. Paid Work in a Context of Economic Insecurity  
 
This chapter makes the case that four trends are occurring in the contemporary period (c. 
1990-2011): female labour force participation is increasing; more women are entering male-
dominated occupations; economic security is worsening; and gender stereotypes (relating to 
competence and status) are weakening.   
 
Section 4.1 suggests that worsening economic security (a change in patterns of resource 
access) was a key trigger of increased female labour force participation and women’s 
incursions into stereotypically masculine occupations.  This dynamic can be conceptualised 
as a shift in interests: worsening economic security increased the economic cost of 
compliance with cultural expectations concerning the male breadwinner and female 
housewife model.  Subsequent chapters will consider whether worsening economic security 
was sufficient for increased flexibility in gender divisions of labour or whether it was only 
jointly sufficient.  It may have operated in tandem with some people’s prior rejection of 
gender stereotypes, resulting from their formative experiences or their exposure to gender 
sensitisation (explored in Chapters 5 and 6 respectively).  Exploring these different 
hypotheses enables us to understand the interplay between interests, exposure, internalised 
beliefs, cultural expectations and shifting patterns of resource access.   
 
Section 4.2 explores if and how increased flexibility in gender divisions of labour has affected 
gender stereotypes and status beliefs – the assumption that men are not only more suited to 
but also more deserving of roles of authority, as well as associated esteem, respect and 
deference.   
 
The section begins by examining participants’ accounts of the consequences of increasing 
flexibility in gender divisions of labour in terms of women’s self-perceptions as well as their 
social relationships with others, at home, in neighbourhoods and workplaces.  Collective 
reflection and exposure to women demonstrating their equal ability to assume roles 
historically dominated by men seems to provide disconfirming evidence of individuals’ 
gender stereotypes and associated status beliefs, in some respects.  Because working women 
are increasingly regarded as innovative and knowledgeable, many see it as advantageous to 
heed their advice.  Furthermore, by gathering together, sharing their experiences and views 
of gender atypical experiences, people working in the public sphere appear to be collectively 
dismantling gender stereotypes.  Cumulatively, this evidence points to the interplay between 
interests and exposure, underscoring the primacy of the latter in eroding gender status 
inequalities. 
 
I then interrogate the claim that gender status inequalities have weakened.  Earlier studies 
(undertaken in the 1990s) provide conflicting evidence on how Zambian family relations 
have been affected by increased female labour force participation.  Although divergent 
findings could simply reflect the different time periods in which research was undertaken, it 
still raises questions about my participants’ narratives of weakening gender status 
inequalities.  In response, I examine the reliability of their testimonies and highlight the 
limits to posited growing egalitarianism, as evident in the prevalence of intimate partner 
violence and men’s limited share of unpaid care work.  This section also offers explanations 
for the persistence of these intra-household status inequalities, highlighting interactions 
between interests and exposure. 
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While Section 4.2 largely focuses gender status inequalities in the domestic domain (as 
affected by growing flexibility in gender divisions of labour), Section 4.3 focuses on public 
roles of authority, as well as associated esteem, respect and deference.  It examines how 
increased flexibility in gender divisions of labour (i.e. women’s growing share of remunerated 
work and male-dominated occupations) has affected the demand for and also supply of 
female leaders.   
 
4.1 Growing flexibility in gender divisions of labour and worsening economic 
security 
 
Increasing female labour force participation 
 
Census data points to a recent increase in female labour force participation.  From 1980 to 
2000, the proportion of urban Copperbelt women who are employed increased from 13% to 
21% (as illustrated Figure 4.1).  Meanwhile, the proportion of the male adult population that 
is employed has decreased over time (ibid).   
 
 
Figure 4.1 Proportion of adult population (over 12 years) employed, urban 
Copperbelt, 1980, 1990 and 2000 
Source: CSO, 1994b:55-57; CSO, 2004a:66 
 
Figure 4.1 does not show the proportion of urban Copperbelt men and women in 
employment in 2010, since this data has not yet been published.  Descriptive tables for the 
2010 Census only include statistics for the Copperbelt as a whole, not urban areas thereof 
(which comprise 81 percent of the total Copperbelt population, CSO, 2012a:2).  These 
statistics are represented in Figure 4.2, which shows rising female employment in the 
Copperbelt. 
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Figure 4.2: Proportion of adult population (over 12 years) in employment, 
Copperbelt, 1990, 2000 and 2010 
Source: CSO, 2004a:66, 2012a:216 
 
The definition used by all these censuses is that ‘[t]he employed population includes all 
persons who work for remuneration in the form of wages, salaries, commissions or pay in 
kind; operate their own businesses without employing others, and; work in a family business 
or farm without pay or profit (CSO, 1994b:161, 2003:76, 2012b:35).  This shared 
categorisation excludes the following: ‘unemployed and seeking work’, ‘not seeking work but 
available for work’, ‘full-time housewife/homemaker’, ‘full-time student’, ‘not available for 
work for other reasons’ (CSO, 1994b:161).  The distinction between ‘unpaid family workers’ 
and ‘housewives or homemakers’ is that the former category are presumed to be involved in 
an income-generating family enterprise but not getting paid themselves. 
 
However, Benería (1981) and Rakodi (1988:497,501) critique this conceptualisation of 
economic activity as considering only those goods and services exchanged in the market.  
Data derived from this definition will arguably underestimate the size of the labour force in 
areas where non-market production is prevalent, as well as the number of workers engaged 
in such activities.  It will thus under-report women’s work in less economically developed 
countries, such as Zambia. 
 
Small-scale urban agriculture is one example of a non-remunerated productive activity to 
which low-income urban Zambian women have heavily contributed.  Drawing on surveys 
from the late 1970s in the Copperbelt and Lusaka, Rakodi (1988:511) suggests that it ‘makes 
a significant contribution to domestic consumption for between a quarter and a half of low-
income area residents, for at least a few months from about February to May each year, [but] 
is unimportant as an income-generating activity’.  By omitting such labour in their 
definitions of economic activity, Zambian censuses are likely to have underestimated 
women’s productive activities.  Moreover, as Benería (1981:17) argues more broadly, such 
categorisations ‘reinforce ideological biases related to the undervaluation of women’s work’. 
 
This argument provides reason not to interpret Figures 4.1 and 4.2 as providing full 
representations of Copperbelt women’s productive activities.  But while census data does not 
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show all the work undertaken by women (or men), it does indicate that urban Copperbelt 
women are increasingly undertaking work that is typically recognised and valued by 
Zambians (i.e. market-orientated activities).  It remains an open question, however, whether 
women’s status is enhanced by undertaking such work. 
 
But Benería (1981) then raises two further concerns: census data may not even track market-
orientated activities.  By categorising workers according to their ‘main occupation’, censuses 
are likely to overlook homemakers who undertake some market-orientated activities in 
addition to their domestic responsibilities.  Additionally, if it is ‘considered prestigious to 
keep women from participating in non-household production [then] when asked whether 
women do so both men and women tend to reply negatively even if this is not the case’ 
(ibid:14).  This seemed to be the case in my own research: some participants initially 
described their mothers as ‘just housewives’, though subsequently revealed that they had 
traded from home.  One example of this comes from BanaMutale (39, domestic worker): ‘my 
mother was a full time housewife, sometimes selling tomatoes at home but not going to the 
market’.  I did not ask how her work was described to census enumerators; they may have 
been told that she was economically inactive.   
 
What matters for current purposes – in ascertaining the extent to which female labour force 
participation has changed over time – is not whether women’s remunerated work is 
recognised but whether the degree to which it is recognised has changed over time.  If there 
has been any change in the perceptions of enumerators and/ or survey respondents then 
rising female labour force participation would be ‘in part a statistical artefact’, as suggested 
by Elson (1999:614).  On the one hand, as will be elaborated upon in this chapter, there does 
seem to be greater appreciation of women’s remunerated activity, since it has become 
increasingly vital to household survival.  Yet certain types of work continue to be privileged.  
The word ‘incito’ (literally translated as ‘work’) is generally used to refer to waged 
employment, not self-employment.   
 
While it is possible that women’s labour force participation in earlier decades was under-
reported, my participants did universally maintain that female labour force participation had 
increased significantly.  A number of female market traders said that they personally were 
previously housewives (like their mothers) and denied earlier involvement in income-
generating activities.  Furthermore, this chapter will argue that any change in the recognition 
of women’s paid work is partly due to a critical mass of women now being in employment, in 
contrast to earlier times.  If this is the case then increased recognition of female employment 
would not be a case of exaggerated reporting but rather a reflection of the observed 
phenomena. 
 
In summary, when interpreting census data on female labour force participation it is 
important to recognise that it excludes non-marketised productive activities (such as small-
scale urban agriculture) and may under-report some under-valued remunerated activities 
(such as non-waged employment).  It is difficult to ascertain the extent to which census data 
is accurate.  However, the general trend depicted in the graphs above was corroborated by all 
participants, who maintained that female labour force participation had significantly 
increased.   
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Occupational desegregation  
 
Alongside increased female labour force participation, there appears to have been another 
contemporary trend, namely increasing occupational desegregation across the socio-
economic spectrum in the Copperbelt.  By occupational desegregation, I mean that women 
are increasingly entering occupations historically dominated by men. 
 
Skilled manual work was historically the preserve of working class men, while the 
professions were monopolised by middle class men.  For both economic groups, gender 
divisions of labour appear to be waning.  Zambian censuses do not include a category for 
‘skilled manual work’ but Zambia’s Demographic and Health Surveys do, providing 
statistically representative data for the Copperbelt though not urban areas in particular.  In 
the Copperbelt, the proportion of employed women working in skilled manual occupations 
more than doubled between 2001 and 2007, from 3.5% to 7.9% (CSO et al, 2003a:38; CSO et 
al, 2009:44).  This data purports to include the informal economy.  Typical jobs include 
carpenters, construction workers and electricians.  The percentage of Copperbelt women 
employed in professional and technical occupations also increased between 2001 and 2007, 
from 7.7% to 12.4% (see graph below).  Meanwhile, the proportion of employed men in these 
occupations grew by a lesser extent (CSO et al, 2003a:38; CSO et al, 2009:44).   
 
Census data similarly indicates that an increasing proportion of urban Copperbelt women in 
all occupations, save clerical work and sales (see Figure 4.3; where a lighter shade is used for 
earlier decades).  The proportion of women in production and related work doubled between 
1980 and 2000, though still remains low.   
 
 
Figure 4.3: Proportion of women in occupations, urban Copperbelt, 1980, 1990 
and 2000 
Source: CSO, 1994b:64-65; 2003:73. 
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Figure 4.3 only goes up to the year 2000, since census statistics for urban areas of the 
Copperbelt have not yet been published.  We only have access to sex-disaggregated 2010 
Census data for urban areas of Zambia.  Also, this data cannot be used to compare trends in 
manual work since definitions of these categories have changed over time.  But we can still 
chart urban trends in non-manual occupations, where women’s share seems to be growing 
(see Figure 4.4).  While urban data is not necessarily representative of urban areas of the 
Copperbelt, the two graphs do display similarities: women’s share of professional, technical, 
administrative and managerial jobs rose between 1990 and 2000, while the proportion of 
women undertaking clerical work dipped during this period. 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Proportion of women in non-manual occupations, urban Zambia, 
1990, 2000 and 2010 
Source: CSO, 2003:85, 2012a228 
 
Figures 4.3 and 4.4 indicate occupational desegregation, though not to the same degree as 
emphasised by my participants.  There are several potential reasons for this discrepancy.  
First, some of this data is not stated: in 2010, 7% of women who declared that they were 
employed did not also state their occupation (CSO, 2012a:228).  Thus it is possible that 
contemporary flexibility in gender divisions of labour slightly varies from the picture 
presented in the graphs above.   
 
Second, my interviews were conducted in 2010 and 2011 – a decade after the most recent 
sex-disaggregated Census data for the Copperbelt.  The increase in flexibility in gender 
divisions of labour reported by participants may have largely occurred in the intervening 
period.  My qualitative research provides reason to expect that more recent data will point to 
greater occupational desegregation.   
 
Third, Census data does not disaggregate by sex within occupational categories: it does not 
tell us the extent of horizontal or vertical desegregation within professional and technical 
work, for example.  Nor does it inform us about the degree to which the jobs now performed 
by women are stereotyped as masculine.  In summary, statistics point to a partial change in 
occupational sex segregation, but it is possible (though not proven) that this data might 
understate the extent of flexibility in gender divisions of paid labour.   
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Sex-disaggregated data on industries can help shed more light on labour market trends.  
Census data for urban areas in general is depicted in Figure 4.5.  This graph shows that with 
increasing female labour force participation, most women find employment in industries that 
already have a large proportion of women.  These industries include trade, restaurants and 
hotels; finance; as well as community and personal services (which includes health, 
education, government administration and domestic service).  While a smaller proportion 
turns to stereotypically masculine industries, the female share of mining and electricity 
supply is shown as increasing over time.  Since the vast majority of Zambian mines are in the 
Copperbelt (Matenga, 2010), this urban statistic likely reflects Copperbelt trends.  There is 
also a sizeable female share of the new category, ‘Information and Communication’.  
  
 
Figure 4.5: Proportion of women in various industries, urban Zambia, 2000 
and 2010 
Source: CSO, 2003:88, 2012a:225 
 
Besides charting the proportion of women employed in each industry, we can also observe 
the changing distribution of female employment across industries, where 100% represents 
the total number of women in employment in any one year.  Figure 4.6 is statistically 
representative of urban areas in Zambia, not the Copperbelt in particular.  Though Kitwe is 
much larger than most other urban areas in Zambia, this difference may not be relevant.  The 
most recent available Copperbelt census data (displayed in Figure 4.7) indicates similarities 
at the turn of the century: urban/Copperbelt women were predominantly employed in three 
key sectors, namely trade, community services and agriculture.  Given similarity at one point 
in time, the diachronic trend depicted in Figure 4.6 may be indicative of Copperbelt 
dynamics.   
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Figure 4.6: Percentage distribution of employed women (over 12 years) by 
industry, urban Zambia 
Source: CSO, 1993:81, 1994a:70, 1999:98, 2004b:95, 2005:72 
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Figure 4.7 Distribution of the usually working population by industry and sex, 
urban Copperbelt, 200029 
Source: CSO, 2004a:77 
 
Figure 4.6 suggests that the proportion of employed women employed in community and 
social services decreased over the past two decades, as they largely turned to trade and 
agriculture.  Note also the recent declining percentage of women employed in manufacturing.  
This could be interpreted as demonstrating that there has been little flexibility in gender 
divisions of labour.  This said, the data is ambiguous, given the high proportion of ‘not stated’ 
responses for 1991 and 2010. 
 
Further, this data reveals neither horizontal nor vertical occupational segregation within 
industries.  It does not tell us what particular jobs women have been doing.  Historically 
there may have been a higher share of women in manufacturing but my participants 
suggested that this was largely in support roles.  Similarly, the data does not account for the 
size and profitability of women’s enterprises in ‘trade’, nor their positions within community 
and social services (which includes domestic service, education, health and government 
administration). 
 
This section ends by recapping key statistics, while bearing in mind the above-noted caveats.  
From 1980 to 2000, the proportion of urban Copperbelt women who are employed increased 
from 13% to 21%.  By 2010, 30% of Copperbelt women were employed.  As female labour 
force participation has risen, most women have joined sectors that already have a large 
proportion of women (e.g. trade, finance, and community services).  Alongside such 
continuity, occupations have become less vertically segregated by sex.  For example, the 
percentage of Copperbelt women employed in professional and technical occupations 
increased between 2001 and 2007, from 7.7% to 12.4% − a greater increase than that of men.  
Further, between 1990 and 2010, in urban areas of Zambia, the proportion of managers who 
were female increased from 12% to 29%.  Horizontal occupational sex segregation also 
appears to be declining.  In the Copperbelt, the proportion of employed women working in 
                                                        
29 By ‘usually working’, the Census refers to those that were working in the 12 months prior to the census night. 
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skilled manual occupations more than doubled between 2001 and 2007, from 3.5% to 7.9%.  
The proportion of Copperbelt women in production and related work also doubled between 
1980 and 2000.  Data for urban areas similarly points to a rising female share of 
stereotypically masculine industries, such as mining and electricity.  Since the vast majority 
of mines are in the Copperbelt, this urban statistic likely reflects Copperbelt trends.  In 
summary, horizontal and vertical sex segregation appears to be declining, with growing 
female labour force participation. 
 
Worsening economic security 
 
A third contemporary trend is that perceived economic security has worsened in the 
Copperbelt over the past thirty years.  By the early 1990s, both real per capita consumption 
and GDP had plummeted, to one third of what they had been fifteen years earlier in Zambia 
(McCulloch et al, 2001; World Bank, 1994b:4; illustrated in Figure 4.8).  This was partly due 
to the fall in copper prices (see Figure 4.9).  Although the Government maintained 
consumption levels by increasing borrowing, it did not improve productivity (McCulloch et 
al, 2011).  Zambia thus became heavily indebted.   
 
Government turned to the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and introduced a four 
year Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in 1983.  This involved trade liberalisation, 
interest rate liberalisation, the removal of price controls, reduced government expenditure 
(on food and fertiliser subsidies) and public sector contraction (Kalinda and Floro, 1992:11; 
Situmbeko and Zulu, 2004:21-22).  During the 1980s, living costs increased rapidly while 
formal employment and real earnings fell (Kalinda and Floro, 1992:29; World Bank, 
1994a:15-18).  In light of popular resistance, the Government temporarily abandoned the 
World Bank’s liberalisation reforms.  However, a subsequent donor aid-freeze pushed 
heavily-indebted Zambia to return to the IFIs and resume restructuring (Kalinda and Floro, 
1992:13-15; Situmbeko and Zulu, 2004:22). 
   
Figure 4.8: GDP per capita, levels and annual growth rates 
Source: World Bank (2007:45, Figure 2.9). 
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Figure 4.9 World copper prices, $/mt, real 2005$, 1960-2012 
Source: World Bank (2013) 
 
The 1990s were characterised by widespread retrenchments, as infant industries were 
crippled by trade liberalisation (Situmbeko and Zulu, 2004:8).  Employment in 
manufacturing and mining greatly reduced during this decade (Bigsten and Mkenda, 2001; 
CSO, 2003:86; as depicted in Figure 4.10, where lighter shades indicate earlier periods).  
Between 1978 and 2003, employment in mining (a central industry in the Copperbelt) fell 
from 66,000 to 20,000 (Matenga, 2010:2).  The declining numbers of those employed in 
‘community’ reflects public sector cuts.  Many retrenched workers turned to agriculture – as 
documented by Ferguson (1999), drawing on ethnographic research undertaken in Kitwe in 
the late 1980s. 
 
 
Figure 4.10: Distribution of usually working population (12 years and over) by 
industry, Copperbelt Province, 1980, 1990 and 2000 
Source: CSO, 1994b:67, 2004a:75 
 
Formal jobs not only reduced in number but also in remuneration over the 1980s, 1990s and 
2000s.  Formal sector wages decreased significantly, especially in mining and manufacturing 
(Moser and Holland, 1997:36; World Bank, 1994a:15,143).  By 2006, only 45% of miners 
were found to be on permanent, pensionable contracts; the remainder had been shifted on to 
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three month contracts on a lower wage, without former fringe benefits or job security (Fraser 
and Lungu, 2007:21).  Thus even though the copper price rebounded after 2003, 
employment therein remains insecure. 
 
Many men turned to the informal economy to replace formal employment or to supplement 
declining wages within it.  Between 1998 and 2010, the proportion of economically active 
Copperbelt men who were employed in the informal economy increased from 47% to 54% 
(CSO, 2005:76; 2011c:120).  Accordingly, the informal economy grew by 6% per annum in 
the late 1980s (World Bank, 1994b:8).  In the early decades of independence, infant mortality 
had halved (from 147 deaths per 1,000 live births in 1969 to 79 in 1977).  Families’ 
subsequent financial hardship is reflected in major reversals in child health.  Infant mortality 
increased to 107 in 1987-91.  Child stunting and wasting were also higher in 1990 than they 
had been in 1970 (McCulloch et al, 2001:3). 
 
Decline continued during the 1990s (see Figure 4.8).  During this decade in Zambia, the 
compound annual growth of employment and GDP registered at 3.8% and 0.8% respectively 
(Sparreboom and Albee, 2011:34).  In the next decade (2000-2009) the compound annual 
growth rate of employment and GDP registered at 2.0% and 5.4% (ibid).  The growth in GDP 
partly reflects a boom in world copper prices between 2003 and 2007 (see Figure 4.9). 
 
Employment creation was halted and reversed by the global financial crisis.  In July 2008 
copper prices plummeted from a record high of US$8,985 to US$2,811 per metric tonne in 
December 2008 (Musokotwane, 2009:3).  The Mine Safety Department in Kitwe recorded 
that 7,324 (out of 32,636) persons directly employed by mining companies had lost 
employment between June 2008 and May 2009 (Matenga, 2010:4).  Further job losses were 
endured by 11,915 (out of 30,515) persons employed by contracted companies (ibid:4).  By 
2010, unemployment in the Copperbelt registered at 28.3% (CSO, 2011c:102-103).  National 
youth unemployment (20-24) had risen to 59% (CSO, 2011c:111).30   
 
Further social consequences can be seen in Figure 4.11.  This graph illustrates another 
component of worsening economic security: plummeting life expectancy, which partly stems 
from the HIV/AIDS pandemic.  Although the Government’s introduction of free Anti-
Retroviral Drugs has extended lives (accounting for the sharp increase in life expectancy 
from 2005), families cannot rely on breadwinners to survive middle age and are thus 
financially at risk.  The illness and death of a productive adult is frequently identified as a 
major negative shock to the welfare of urban households (World Bank, 2007:131).  Many of 
my participants explicitly and openly referred to this risk, as discussed in the next section. 
 
While Figure 4.11 also indicates improvements in education and gross national income (GNI) 
per capita, this has not directly translated into greater economic security.  Many low-income 
parents complained that they had laboured to educate their children yet still they had not 
found employment. 
 
                                                        
30 I include nationwide data on youth unemployment in urban areas here, since there is no recent age-disaggregated data on unemployment 
specifically in the Copperbelt.  While Kitwe’s size makes it different from the vast majority of urban areas in Zambia, there is still reason to think 
that nationwide data on youth unemployment can give an indicative picture for Kitwe because they share similar trends of overall unemployment 
(CSO, 2011c:111). 
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Figure 4.11: Trends in Zambia’s Human Development Index Component 
Indices, 1980-2010 
Source: UNDP (2012). 
 
The common contemporary perception of worsening economic security is encapsulated in 
the following conversation between community representatives of a low-income settlement, 
built adjacent to Kitwe’s industrial area where male residents were previously employed. 
 
David (Chairperson of the Residential Development Committee): In Chiluba’s term 
[Zambian President from 1991 to 2002] we experienced the selling of companies, now 
people in this community are just roaming down the streets.   
Helen (local politician): We trusted investors but they don’t pay taxes so they make the 
country poorer. 
David: Before [there was] not contract work, Zambians, now contract.  Now the people 
who are working are suffering more than those not working, compared to those selling, 
they come home, there’s no money, so they go to ka [‘ka’ is a belittling term] shylocks, 
100% interest. 
Helen: ZESCO cut power off, [the parastatal supplying electricity] disconnect you ‘cause 
you can’t pay. 
David: We’re squeezed, I’m telling you! 
Helen: When you wake up in the morning you don’t know where the money is coming 
from! [laughs]. 
 
This conversation speaks to the statistics outlined above: widespread unemployment, 
privatisation, tax avoidance by foreign companies, the casualisation of employment, 
increased indebtedness, disconnection from utilities and a general sense of economic 
insecurity.  This sharply contrasts with nostalgic accounts of the past, which emphasised 
men’s access to employment and better social security.  This perception of worsening 
economic security was pervasive amongst participants and by no means unique to my 
acquaintances in the low-income settlement in which I stayed. 
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Thus far three contemporary trends have been suggested: from the late 1980s to present 
there has been worsening economic security, increased female labour force participation and 
some occupational desegregation.  The next section will argue that these are not just 
correlated but also causally connected. 
 
The relationship between worsening economic security and increased female 
labour force participation 
 
This section explores the relationship between perceptions of worsening economic security 
and increased female labour force participation.  This section sets out evidence indicating 
that the former is a key cause of the latter and then considers how best to understand this 
causal relationship, in terms of the concepts articulated in Chapter 1. 
 
All participants describing personal accounts of female labour market entry maintained that 
husbands conceded to their wives’ requests to join the labour market as life became 
financially intolerable.  BanaMwimba’s account below is fairly representative of recorded life 
histories, from men and women alike: 
 
Alice: Who wanted you to start your trade? 
BanaMwimba: It’s me myself.  My husband was refusing, he was jealous. 
Alice: So how did you come here? 
BanaMwimba: He came to see we started to suffer [in 1994], that’s when he said, ‘Go 
ahead and sell’ [giving her capital to this end].  We’ve accessed water ourselves, illegally! 
[she chuckles] [translated].xi 
 
Despite worsening economic security BaShiMwimba (her husband, a truck driver) was 
initially obstinate.  He only relented after five months of living without electricity, having cut 
meat and fish from their diet, eating just mushrooms and kapenta [small dried sardines, one 
of the cheapest foodstuffs].  BanaMwimba started selling kapenta at Kitwe’s central market 
only sometime after her husband became unemployed.  Matthew’s life history (detailed in 
Chapter 2) provides a similar narrative: his wife suggested that she should start selling some 
time after he lost formal employment at the mines and his inadequate profits from self-
employment in the market repeatedly triggered disputes. 
 
Besides men’s loss of formal employment, many women (from across the socio-economic and 
generational spectrum) openly referred to the possibility of their husbands’ deaths.  Labour 
market entry was often explained in recognition of this risk, which increased over the 1990s 
with plummeting life expectancy (as illustrated in Figure 4.11). 
 
BanaMwila (working as part of a collective house-building scheme, while her chronically 
unwell husband remains at home): This time, it’s difficult, it’s tough...  This time it’s not 
good to sit at home.  This time be clever!  A woman should not just sit at home.  A 
woman should also be working.  The husband is working, his wife is also working, just 
in case work finishes, or the husband dies.  But if you’re just sitting, what will you do? 
BanaChemba (a co-worker and widow, also in her mid 50s): Nothing. 
BanaMwila: Nothing [translated].xii 
 
A woman should not just sit; she should go help her beloved so that things will be easy if 
he dies [translated].xiii 
BanaMwamba (40, married, sells onions in the central market), 
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‘Just sitting’ is a common way of describing homemakers and the unemployed; it means to be 
idle and unproductive.  It is indicative of the low status of unpaid care work and shall be 
returned to later in this chapter. 
 
Thus, worsening economic security (in the form of men’s job loss or anticipation of their 
death) was identified by middle-aged women and men as a rationale for their own or their 
wives’ labour market entry.  Interviewed young women also referred to these risks.  Having 
observed the perils of financial dependence and been encouraged by their parents, they 
almost universally expressed aspirations to be in employment.  When asked whether they 
would prefer a job, a husband or a baby, the overwhelming majority chose the first option; I 
only ever heard one exception to this rule.  Often, when describing hopes for the future, 
young women talked about the kinds of jobs they would like – some did not even mention 
marriage unless prompted.  These desires are illustrated by the following comments, drawn 
from different interviews. 
 
I wanted to be independent, not to be lazy, to give up but to deal with things by myself, 
with my own strength...  I came to see that things are difficult...  There’s no dad and no 
mum, so I came to see that if I just sit then I’ll ruin myself, so I should work hard and 
look to my future...  I don’t look at the man, I have a boyfriend, even if he hasn’t given 
me anything, me I don’t even care, all I care is I work extra hard... whether he’s there or 
he’s not there...  I have to do what I want to do...  Even if I marry, I don’t want to rush 
into marriage but to work hard like a man, not just to sit. 
Annette (24, trainee soldier, supporting her grandmother and chronically ill brother). 
 
I also want to be independent...  What if the husband dies?  Like the way my father died, 
if my mum wasn’t strong, what would she even start from? − concerning sending us to 
school.  As in you learn to be independent so that if anything happens to your husband 
you still go on, you’re still strong...  My mother is working so hard to sponsor me to 
school, that inspires me to work hard that I should do great things for her, not that I 
should be depending on a husband. 
Jurita (17, fatherless girl, whose mother works as a chef in England to support her 
education at an elite private school). 
 
Experience is a good teacher.  So when you experience that kind of life whereby your 
dad who was a breadwinner dies, you try and think, ‘Ok, if my mum had the way of 
providing for us, we couldn’t suffer like this, so maybe I will try and make a difference.  I 
will also do something for my family, as well as my husband, so at the end of the day 
we’re going to balance up.  Even when he’s not there, I’ll be able to provide for the 
family’.  I think experience is a good teacher. 
Chimwemwe (21, currently working as a decorator so she can fund her continued study 
of Law.  Her mother, BanaMayuka, provided for the family through market trading 
while her husband was unemployed for seven years – see life history).   
 
Comments such as these indicate that people’s experiences of the pitfalls of dependence on a 
single male wage have been pivotal in transforming aspirations.  This said, the reliability of 
these self-presentations may be questioned.  It is possible that their behaviour does not 
reflect their professed aspirations for independence.  However, these three individuals did 
seem especially committed to economic advancement.  When interviewed, Annette’s 
grandmother took great pride in telling me that Annette has long been the breadwinner for 
their family, notwithstanding her youth.  (Though it remains possible that she has been 
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financially supported by boyfriends).  Jurita’s determination to progress in education and 
secure gainful employment is reflected in her consistently high grades and concentration in 
class – something I observed while at her school.  Chimwemwe’s gender atypical career 
choice (lawyer) and type of piece-work is also telling.   
 
Notwithstanding these efforts to triangulate their accounts, they (and other young women 
who gave similar narratives) may have overstated their aversion to economic dependency in 
order to be seen to comply with contemporary social condemnation of this.  But even if just a 
mere façade, such self-presentation would also be evidence of a change in cultural 
expectations.  It indicates that women increasingly wish to present themselves as striving for 
economic independence.  This contrasts with previous decades.   
 
From the above narratives, one might infer that flexibility in gender divisions of labour was 
previously impeded by a supply-side constraint: women themselves did not desire 
employment because of their self-perceptions and internalised gender stereotypes.  However, 
further discussions indicate the additional importance of a shift in cultural expectations.   
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, many men previously secured respect by demonstrating their 
ability to provide for their families single-handedly and so refused their wives’ labour force 
participation.  By adhering to these cultural expectations they led others to presume that 
such practices were normal and deviance would be sanctioned.  Worsening economic 
security has increased the economic costs of compliance with these cultural expectations.  
Due to perceived economic necessity, people have increasingly sacrificed the social benefits 
accrued by adherence to earlier prescriptive stereotypes.  This shift in interests appears to be 
a major factor accounting for men’s increased proclivity to cede to their wives’ suggestions 
that they should seek employment.  The ensuing rise in female labour force participation 
resulted in widespread contradictions between gender stereotypes and practice.   
 
Gender stereotypes appear to have weakened: women now accrue more status through paid 
work in the public sphere than being a housewife.  Their economic activity is increasingly 
welcomed.  Repeated exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of labour and widespread 
recognition of economic insecurity seems to have led to a shift in widely-held prescriptive 
gender stereotypes, now endorsing mutual support between spouses.  This ideal was stressed 
by the vast majority of men and women, from across the socio-economic and generational 
spectrum.  To provide evidential support for this shift, I include testimonies from those 
describing how people are judged in the Copperbelt and also others making such 
judgements: 
  
A long time ago women weren’t selling, the reason being that their husbands were 
refusing them, not wanting to be made shy in front of his friends, as if, ‘I don’t keep you 
well’.  That’s how they were a long time ago but now this time things have reversed.  
This time husbands long to have a woman who is selling...  People are jealous of us 
traders because we help our families.  They say, ‘They’re strong, they live well, they eat, 
and the reason is because their wives are strong in selling’ [translated].xiv 
BanaDavid (45, married, sells tomatoes in the central market). 
 
I like women who work, so that she’s working and I’m working, we’re both helping each 
other, we’re solving problems [translated].xv 
Stephen (26, unmarried mechanic, working at an informal road-side garage). 
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This time, men say ‘You know I have to marry someone who is doing something’ [partly 
translated].xvi 
Helen (politician in a low-income settlement, see life history). 
 
Women have many problems.  The economy of today is very difficult.  A woman should 
work hard to help her spouse [translated].xvii  
Mary (55, sells kapenta, her husband is intermittently employed as a driving instructor, 
formerly retrenched). 
 
A woman should help her beloved at home...  I’m strong, I do business, I manage 
everything that I want.  I safeguard love at home, I have money, ‘Come, we share’.  We 
pay for the children’s school fees, it’s better we sit down on the ground, we understand 
each other, we work out how to solve problems... This time a woman should be working 
hard, not just sitting.  If you just sit at home then what will you eat?  [translated].xviii  
BanaMwamba (40, sells onions wholesale, thus often travels across Southern Africa, 
while her husband manages the home front). 
 
BanaDavid asserts that prescriptive stereotypes have changed: husbands are now proud of 
wives that trade at the market.  While this account might be biased by BanaDavid’s possible 
desire to present herself as socially respected, it was consistent with accounts from men, 
included above.  Indeed, it was very rare for young men (be they school or university 
students, working or unemployed) to express a desire for a partner who was ‘just a 
housewife’ (disparagingly put).  A broad range of participants made the normative claim that 
women should be in paid employment, given economic insecurity.  See also the disparaging 
reference to ‘just sitting’ in the last quote – consistent with a broader trend. 
 
In line with theories that emphasise the power of widely-held gender beliefs in interactional 
contexts, this shift in evaluative criteria appears to be tremendously significant, given the 
importance of securing social respect in Zambia.  Since female labour force participation no 
longer contravenes widely-held gender stereotypes, there are no associated social costs of 
shame or disapprobation (even for husbands).  Instead, as the quotes above suggest, women 
workers are increasingly appreciated.  This may have factored in Annette’s, Jurita’s and 
Chimwemwe’s decisions to pursue employment, even though they did not mention it 
explicitly.   
 
Importantly, I have proposed different explanations about different temporal stages of socio-
economic change: worsening economic security (a change in patterns of resource access) 
appears to have shifted interests, triggering increased flexibility in gender divisions of paid 
labour, despite countervailing cultural expectations.  But the latter obstacle appears to have 
weakened over time, with repeated exposure to information that contradicts gender 
stereotypes.   
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The relationship between worsening economic security and occupational 
desegregation 
  
Having set out evidence suggesting that worsening economic security has triggered increased 
female labour force participation, this section now examines whether it has also caused 
occupational desegregation.   
 
On the one hand, it is possible that parents with finite resources, struggling with precarious 
employment, now have less spare resources to fund their daughters’ education so prioritise 
that of their sons.  If worsening economic security has jeopardised girls’ education, it might 
then impede occupational desegregation, though not female labour force participation in 
general.  Education is not a barrier to all occupations (exceptions include small-scale 
trading), but employment has become more competitive and employers increasingly demand 
qualifications (CSO, 2003:90).  Educational achievements are also closely correlated with 
employment status and earnings in Zambia (CSO, 2005:102; CSO et al 2009:41; Nielsen, 
2000). 
 
However, notwithstanding their declining access to resources, interviewed parents expressed 
desires for their daughters to become educated and work, not just to marry – as was 
previously the cultural expectation (as discussed in Chapter 3).  Quantitative data provides 
further evidence of this shift.  In the Copperbelt, gender parity in reported school attendance 
in the Copperbelt is roughly equal until age 16-18, where it falls to 63% of girls compared 
with 73% of boys (CSO, 2005:36).  In response to the statement ‘A university education is 
more important for a boy than for a girl’, 39% of sampled Zambians expressed disagreement 
while a further 36% strongly disagreed (World Values Survey, 2013).  The proportion of 
respondents who strongly disagreed was slightly higher persons aged over 50 (40%).  There 
are no obvious differences between subjective social class or occupations (ibid).  This data 
sharply contrasts with historical ethnographies and participants’ recollections of earlier 
decades: recall Gloria’s claim that girls were ‘not counted’ (see Chapter 3).  Given that older 
persons now appear particularly supportive of girls’ education yet were not so in earlier 
decades, there appears to have been a rapid change in gender beliefs, within a generational 
cohort.  This is consistent with my own interviews. 
 
Stated concerns for female education seem partly motivated by parents’ concern for their 
daughters’ well-being as well as their own hopes for reciprocated support in old age.  
Worsening economic security and the loss of pensionable formal employment underscores 
the importance of intergenerational support.  Participants often maintained that it is women 
who help elderly parents.  Helen (with broad knowledge of the low-income compound of 
which she is the twice-elected representative – see life history) summarised an increasingly 
common contemporary view: 
 
These days female support the parents more than the male; they have the heart for the 
family.  I think the female are doing much better than the male. 
 
Worsening economic security seems to have catalysed a positive feedback loop between 
parental encouragement of girls’ education and employment, female employment and then 
daughters’ support of their parents.   Parents also seem increasingly inclined to support their 
daughters’ aspirations for stereotypically masculine occupations due to the greater 
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availability and higher wages of such work, as well as a background context of economic 
insecurity.  These benefits were also commonly referred to by young women pursuing 
stereotypically masculine occupations.  Even if out of formal employment, mechanics may 
still be able to find piece-work.  Meanwhile, tailoring (an occupation historically popular with 
women) seems to have become less attractive, since it is difficult to compete with the influx 
of extremely cheap, imported second-hand clothes.  When visiting a government-subsidised 
vocational training institute I noted that far more women were studying ‘Power-electrical’ 
than ‘Tailoring’.   
 
Rose (a 42 year old divorced explosives engineer, whose life history is detailed in Chapter 2) 
explained, 
 
As a woman you have to think twice about your future.  If you just think about what 
women can do you can’t do anything...  I don’t depend on men...  Many people want 
work.  Now work, when it’s available, you enter anything that is seen, even men’s work 
[spoken in both Bemba and English, the Bemba is translated and the English is quoted 
verbatim, so this extract is partly translated].xix 
 
Recall that because Rose (a single mother) was desperate to provide for her family, she found 
work clearing the bush for mine expansion.  With an eye on promotion she has successfully 
trained as a dump truck driver and explosives engineer.  Note her expressed disdain for 
gender stereotypes about the kind of work women should do.  We might explain this by 
reference to a shift in interests.  Given financial hardship, she (and many other women) 
seemed less inclined to prioritise accruing the social benefits gained from compliance with 
cultural expectations (about what women are capable of or what they should do).   
 
Furthermore, because other people are cognisant of common difficulties they seem less 
inclined to penalise gender atypical behaviour if it appears to further incomes.  Even if an 
occupation was historically regarded as an inappropriate performance of gender, it is 
increasingly permitted because that woman is perceived as trying to support her family.  ‘I 
think, in the economy as it stands, no job is for women and no job is for men...  Everyone can 
do it’, commented Mwelwa (30, married, middle class supplier of contract labour to the 
mines and church deacon, whom I was living with at the time).31  
 
However, even though worsening economic security has triggered a shift in interests, not all 
prescriptive stereotypes have relaxed.  Some forms of work are deemed inappropriate for 
women because they require behaviour that is not respectable.  Sex workers themselves are 
still vilified; sympathy is limited.  Also, when sitting on a bus waiting for it to fill with 
passengers before travelling, it is common to be approached by men selling sweets, biscuits, 
drinks, phone credit, or cheap watches.  While women also trade these same items, they sit at 
kiosks and wait for customers to come to them.  Only ‘prostitutes’ call out to strangers; 
respectable women should not.  Concerns about female sexuality evidently persist.  Only 
once did I see a young woman walking up and down at a bus station selling talk time to 
                                                        
31 However, expressed support does not necessary reflect a change in practices.  For instance, even though Mwelwa voiced support for flexibility 
in gender divisions of labour it is notable that he has still not recruited any women to work on a contract basis as manual labourers in the mines.  
When poor female relatives visited our house they were given some ‘mealie meal’ (the staple flour), but when men begged Mwelwa was more likely 
to find them work.   
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waiting travellers.  She was not chastised or reprimanded in any way, nor was she as vocal or 
as assertive as typical male vendors.  Instead she stood quietly amongst us, clearly 
advertising.  She was exceptional, however.  Worsening economic security does not appear to 
have catalysed a shift in all gender divisions of labour, nor acceptance thereof.   
 
Thus far this chapter has suggested that occupational desegregation was triggered by a 
change in interests (i.e. financial hardship led some families to prioritise the financial gains 
accrued by women undertaking stereotypically masculine occupations, even though this 
deviated from cultural expectations).  Once started, this trend has enhanced exposure to 
women in non-stereotypical roles.  For instance, growing numbers of young women are 
enrolling in vocational training institutions, where girls often compete favourably with their 
male counterparts.  Here, teachers as well as students (both male and female) at vocational 
training centres painted a picture of mutual support and enthusiasm, especially when a 
confident woman has demonstrated competence equal to that of male peers.  They 
corroborated the account provided below from one male auto-mechanics teacher at a Local 
Government subsidised centre in a low-income settlement:  
 
The teasing goes on for a week, they joke, then they forget, usually when they learn they 
see a girl in the forefront, they see they are eager to learn.  A male would fail to run the 
engine; a female would run the engine...  Those [young women] that come to do power 
electrical or automotive there’s just that element of confidence, they seem like they can 
stand up to anyone or anything or any challenge they come across.  Especially when 
you’re doing practicals, one on one, after they’ve gotten some stamina and a lot of 
competition, you disturb an engine, you ask her to rectify.  She just has to do it.  And a 
male fool is waiting outside.  So she just has to push herself to run the engine.  And 
when they go out, depending on the opportunities, they will make it.  Even if you have 
one girl in class there’s still competition.  She really wants to make the boys run for their 
money.   
 
Exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of labour appears to foster acceptance thereof.  
This may indicate a change in internalised gender stereotypes about women’s competence.  
Alternatively it may signify a shift in cultural expectations.  In light of expressed approval 
from teachers and classmates, people revise their presumptions about how others will 
respond to flexibility in gender divisions of labour.  Since these two analytical concepts 
(internalised beliefs and cultural expectations) can both account for the observed 
phenomena, we cannot ascertain their relative significance in this particular instance.  Also, 
the explanatory power of these concepts is not mutually exclusive.  With sufficient 
disconfirming evidence of their internalised gender stereotypes, some people now regard 
women as equally competent.  They seem less prone to ridicule or question women’s 
incursions into gender atypical occupations – i.e. less inclined to enforce prescriptive 
stereotypes.  This in turn affects others’ cultural expectations, about how they will be treated.  
Either way, growing exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of labour seems to generate a 
positive feedback loop initially triggered by a shift in interests.   
 
Changing attitudes at workplaces are highlighted in the following conversation, in the office 
of the Treasurer of the Mineworkers’ Union of Zambia.  Following a lengthy, general 
discussion of the state of union politics (in order to develop rapport), I asked what they 
thought of women doing men’s work. 
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Daniel (Union Chairperson of Mine A): A long time ago they used to say to a woman 
found with men doing men’s work, ‘You don’t understand, prostitute’.  But this time 
they accept, she’s not a prostitute.  There’s no problem.  We’ve all agreed, both women 
and men. 
Kupela (Union Chairperson of Mine B): The work culture is sound, you give them 
respect, they respect you...  Generally today there’s a change.  They’re very confident. 
Daniel: Things done by a man can also be done by a woman. 
Kupela: In the past companies only took in a few women, to see if they can work...  
Companies came to find that ‘Yes, women can do men’s work’...  Performance was there, 
discipline was there...  At the workplace there will always be that friction but women will 
always stand their positions and they will forge ahead [partly translated]. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the reference to ‘prostitute’ refers to historical gender stereotypes.  
Given the paucity of women in employment, particularly in skilled manual work, people 
often lacked evidence of their aptitude and so assumed that they were only there as a result 
of sexual favours, not merit.  Nowadays, however, the term ‘prostitute’ is far less commonly 
used to refer to women in gender atypical domains.32  Gender stereotypes seem to have 
weakened: fewer people assume that women are necessarily less competent in skilled manual 
work.  With the appropriate certificates attesting to their qualifications, many accept their 
equal place.   
 
However, greater egalitarianism should not be automatically inferred from the above 
conversation.  The branch chairpersons may have sought to exaggerate the extent of mutual 
respect, equality and harmony amongst the workers they represent.  They may have wanted 
to give a positive portrayal of their mines, not only to me as an outsider but also to each other 
and the national leader present.  Maybe they desired to illustrate their compliance with the 
prescriptions to which they had been exposed in gender sensitisation workshops (discussed 
in Chapter 6).  Furthermore, given their elevated positions, they may also have been unaware 
of the extent of male resentment and sexual harassment on the shop floor.   
 
While these interpretations might be valid, it would still be a notable indication of social 
change if these union leaders regarded references to gender equality rhetoric as a way of 
presenting themselves positively to colleagues.  Also, because I recognised these possibilities 
for bias, I triangulated their account by interviewing male and female miners, employed in 
different capacities.  These focus group and life histories indicated that although attitudes 
have broadly shifted, resistance remains in some quarters.  Several male miners denied that 
women could or should work underground.  Further, some women miners reported 
difficulties with colleagues. 
 
We might expect to find particular opposition to occupational desegregation from 
unemployed men, seeking to protect their privileged access to the labour market (as 
discussed in Chapter 1).  Indeed, some unemployed young men do try to discourage women 
from undertaking stereotypically masculine jobs, in the hope of finding employment 
themselves.  This chimes with interest-based explanations of attitudes towards flexibility in 
gender divisions of labour.   
 
Daisy (mechanic): In the past people were saying, ‘You should stop doing men’s work, 
you should stop because it’s men’s work’. 
                                                        
32 Though critical comments in response to online news items about female politicians often refer to them as ‘ihule’ (prostitute). 
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Alice: Who said this? 
Daisy: Men, young men, they want me to be sweeping [doing unpaid domestic work at 
home instead].  It’s just jealousy...  Because they wanted me to stop...  Maybe when I go 
out of work, maybe they think they can replace there, maybe that’s what they think.  
Bush mechanics – he knows how to repair but he didn’t go to school. 
Alice: Does it affect you? 
Daisy: No no no [partly translated].xx 
 
Anne (machinist at the mine): We are competing with men, in our culture it is new to 
them to work with women.  To our superiors they have confidence in us but to our 
colleagues they feel challenged, or want to intimidate. 
Sophie (lab analyst): Work mates think abanakashi [women] are favoured 
Alice: Do many have a problem?  [translated].   
Sophie: Banono fye [just a few], most are friendly and very helpful.   
 
Exchanges such as these suggest that some (but not all) men, both in and out of work, 
perceive women as threatening their prospects of employment, progression and promotion.  
Although employed women like Daisy denied that they are discouraged in this way, it is 
possible that they might have downplayed or might not have been consciously aware of the 
extent to which they are affected by such comments.  Moreover, others might be.  However, 
Sophie does not portray all men as difficult. 
 
In summary, it has been proposed that worsening economic security (a change in patterns of 
resource access) has been a major trigger of flexibility in gender divisions of paid labour, by 
shifting interests and then, through increased exposure to flexibility, weakening internalised 
gender stereotypes and cultural expectations.  Alternative hypotheses are explored in 
Chapters 5 and 6. 
 
4.2 The consequences of greater flexibility in gender divisions of labour on 
women’s self-perceptions and social relations 
 
I now turn to examine the consequences of growing flexibility in gender divisions of labour.  
To enable comparison with previous studies in Zambia and more generally, this section 
focuses on relations with household members, neighbours and co-workers. The further topic 
of political participation is left for Section 4.3.   
 
This section has been structured in a way that reflects the cumulative effects of flexibility in 
gender divisions of labour. It begins by examining the consequences of an individual woman 
assuming the stereotypically masculine activity of income-generation.  As has been the case 
historically, a woman’s paid work seems to increase women’s financial autonomy.  While 
personally significant, increased access to resources does not seem sufficient to weaken other 
people’s gender stereotypes, by which a woman is commonly evaluated.   
 
Having examined the impacts of an individual woman’s increased access to resources, this 
section then explores how society-wide flexibility in gender divisions of paid labour has 
affected gender beliefs.  Exposure to and association with a critical mass of women 
demonstrating equal ability to perform work that was previously presumed to be beyond 
their capabilities and has high status because it is associated with men seem to erode some 
(but not all) gender stereotypes and associated status beliefs.  Additionally, by gathering 
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together and sharing their experiences, those who now recognise women’s equal competence 
gain more confidence in their views.  These social circles then collectively develop, articulate 
and enforce more egalitarian beliefs.   
 
This section ends by interrogating the proposition that gender status beliefs have weakened: 
it examines contradictory findings from earlier decades; the questionable reliability of my 
participants’ narratives; as well as data on gender-based violence and unpaid care work. 
 
Greater financial autonomy 
 
The first effect of a woman’s labour force participation, as emphasised by many women and 
their observant children, is her enhanced financial autonomy.  However, an independent 
income does not seem sufficient to shift her cultural expectations or others’ gender status 
beliefs − the assumption that men are more suited to and deserving of roles of authority, as 
well as associated esteem, respect and deference. 
 
A woman’s labour force participation appears to increase her financial autonomy, in two 
ways.  First, it allows divorced and widowed women to maintain their own households rather 
than remarry.  This finding is consistent with the wider literature.  Research undertaken in 
the Dominican Republic suggests that employment has enabled some women to be less 
tolerant of and thus evade unsatisfactory relationships (Safa, 1999).  Likewise, in Honduras, 
women’s access to productive work enables the formation and survival of female-headed 
households.  This is partly because employed women are more likely to perceive themselves 
as being able survive independently (Bradshaw, 1995).  Quantitative research in Mozambique 
similarly finds that women are more likely to be divorced or separated if they live in an area 
with a high or growing demand for female labour (Oya and Sender, 2009; see also Chant, 
1997 for similar findings in Mexico).   
 
Many interviewed female heads of households stressed the relative freedom of this living 
arrangement.  Despite the emotional tolls induced by sole responsibility for household 
financial provision (later discussed), they claimed to have more time for socialising, 
employment and politics.  Indeed, without husbands to care for or be controlled by, divorced 
and single women constituted the majority (61%) of female parliamentarians in the early 
1990s (Ferguson et al, 1995:9). 
 
Another effect of female household headship that is not contingent upon a broader shift in 
gender beliefs is that it reduces the risk of violence from an intimate partner, according to the 
2007 Zambia Demographic and Health Survey.  Of those who have ever experienced physical 
or sexual violence, 19.2% of divorced or separated women (in contrast to 11.8% of married 
women) reported no recent physical or sexual violence from their current or most recent 
partners.  Similarly, of those who have ever experienced emotional violence, 17.2% of 
divorced or separated women (in contrast to only 3.6% of married women) reported no 
recent emotional violence from their current or most recent partner (CSO et al, 2009:290).  
This data seems to support the above argument to some extent: financial autonomy enables 
women to maintain their own homes, where they enjoy greater freedoms in some respects.   
 
However cautious interpretation is still required.  First, these are Zambian-wide trends, so 
may not reflect differences on the Copperbelt.  Second, even if ex-married women are less 
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likely to report such abuse, they still appear to be at a very high risk.  Indeed, the vast 
majority of divorced and separated women report recent emotional, physical or sexual 
violence; heading one’s own household only seems to offer marginal protection for women.  
Munalula (1998:258) similarly found that separated women are vulnerable to aggression 
from ex-partners.  This is one example of how the effects of an individual woman’s increased 
access to resources may be tempered by other people’s gender beliefs. 
 
Second, within male-headed households, financial autonomy often enables married women 
to provide for themselves and their children without being dependent on a husband’s good 
graces.  By contrast, housewives are often said to be bullied by their husbands who use their 
financial dependence to maintain power and control, such as by withholding funds.  
Descriptions of contemporary housewives are similar to those of previous generations, as 
illustrated by the following conversations: 
 
If you don’t work, if you don’t do anything, it’s not easy to stand on your own.  Because 
even if you say something, maybe he[’ll] shout at you, he’ll slap you and chase you.  Who 
are you?  You don’t work, you don’t do business, you’re just a housewife, so it’s not easy. 
Beatrice (18, school student – she would often regale and reflect upon such stories from 
our low-income compound). 
 
BanaNelson (40, breadwinner since her husband lost his job): A long time ago it was 
men who worked, so they controlled women. 
Alice: Now women sell there’s a difference? 
BanaNelson: Yes, men don’t control very much.  Those who don’t sell are oppressed by 
their husbands, in everything, it’s when they beg.  Those who sell have freedom at home. 
Alice: Explain how you understand the term ‘oppressed’. 
BanaNelson: That’s the culture in Africa.  We don’t have the right to do what we want, to 
make decisions.  I want to go to a kitchen party, he doesn’t agree. 
Alice: When did you feel oppressed? 
BanaNelson: A long time ago, when I hadn’t started selling. 
Alice: Nowadays? 
BanaNelson: There’s nothing like that [translated].xxi 
 
Mary (48, married market trader): When a man is working and a woman is not working 
there’s a problem at the house...  She’ll be following what he says because she doesn’t 
work... 
Lucy (46, married market trader):... She knows that it is her husband who 
keeps/provides for her; she must obey what he says... 
BanaHilda (52, widowed market trader): Those women agree to all the rules of men 
because they don’t work.  Women who don’t sell or work don’t have peace or freedom in 
their homes... 
BanaMwimba (41): She can’t make decisions in anything or to speak about what she 
thinks. 
Alice: Can women who don’t sell give advice for household planning? 
BanaHilda: There’s nothing like that, it’s just the man. 
BanaMbewe: Because he’s the one that has money [translated].xxii 
  
BanaMayuka (market trader, see life history): Housewives are oppressed very much 
[translated].xxiii 
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These conversations highlight the perceived chasm between marriages in which women do 
and do not undertake paid work (as also observed by Muvandi et al, 2000; WLSA, 1997:122-
123 with regards to Zambia).  In the above dialogues (echoing additional interviews and my 
own observations of domestic life in various homes), BanaNelson and Lucy suggest that this 
difference is partly due to housewvies’ and employed women’s differing levels of income.  
While economically active women can independently procure small items (such as food and 
clothing), financially dependent homemakers often need to beg or be deferential in order to 
secure continued support.  Because they monopolise access to income, husbands of 
homemakers are arguably thus more able to enact their gender status beliefs.  Their greater 
access to resources enables them to enforce their interest in gender status inequality.   
 
However, Beatrice offers a slightly different explanation of this difference (see quote above).  
In answering her rhetorical question – ‘Who are you?’ – she hints at an argument she 
elaborated upon in subsequent interviews: housewives have a lower status.  According to 
Beatrice, it is not that husbands of financially independent women are less able to enforce 
gender status beliefs but rather that they do not want to, because they are more inclined to 
perceive their wives as equals.  However, this effect does not appear to have been entailed by 
a woman’s labour force participation.  Historically, in decades predating increased flexibility 
in gender divisions of labour, participants suggested that women’s paid work only enhanced 
ability to buy small items independently while gender status beliefs persisted.  As discussed 
in Chapter 3, changes in individual’s access to resources do not appear to foster a major 
change in cultural expectations, by which they are evaluated.  Without a change in widely-
held gender beliefs about what kind of conduct is acceptable then divorced women remain 
stigmatised and vulnerable to abuse, for instance. 
 
The remainder of this chapter argues that gender relations are not only influenced by an 
individual woman’s access to resources but also by society-wide gender divisions of labour, 
which shape gender beliefs.  This argument begins by drawing on working women’s own 
accounts, which are subsequently triangulated with the narratives of neighbours, family 
members and co-workers.  Besides corroborating evidence presented, the aim of this 
structure is to demonstrate the cumulative nature of the observed consequences of flexibility 
in gender divisions of labour. 
 
Women’s self-perceptions 
 
Right across the socio-economic spectrum, working women expressed great pride in their 
financial achievements.  They explained that their self-esteem has grown as they have 
independently endeavoured, accumulated, invested and financially provided for their 
families.   
 
Many former housewives explained that they previously thought themselves less intelligent 
than men and so would follow their suggestions (in community politics and at family 
funerals, e.g. regarding burial arrangements and asset redistribution).  However, with 
realisation of their own business acumen and capacity to perform the highly important role 
of financial provider in a time of comparative economic scarcity, many working women 
insisted that they have ceased to underrate themselves.  This focus on self-perceptions (how 
women regard themselves) thus provides a further layer of explanation of the alleged 
difference between homemakers and employed women. 
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These changes appear to have occurred as a result of two key features of flexibility in gender 
divisions of labour: association and exposure to demonstrations of equal competence.  This 
section on self-perceptions also considers the particular impact of different occupations.  
  
Association 
 
Some former housewives underscored the importance of social interactions in the public 
sphere through labour force participation.  Economic hardship has pushed women traders to 
associate with a range of people, overcome shyness and stand their ground in conflictual 
situations.  By managing a business, liaising with wholesalers and learning how to maintain 
customers, women, from across the generational and socio-economic spectrum, have 
developed new skills and become accustomed to, and thereby confident in, associating with a 
broad range of people.   
 
By gathering together at the market, journeying across provinces and national borders, 
female traders often interact with a wide range of people, beyond the comparatively narrow 
social sphere in which they used to remain.  In these new social spaces, women develop 
friendships, discuss dilemmas and debate different solutions – as was apparent from my own 
observations and interviews.  They learn about alternative ways of doing business, engaging 
in politics and managing family life.  Market women commonly inspire, advise and 
encourage each other.  By sharing with and learning from a vast range of people in this urban 
environment, women working in the public sphere build up their knowledge about the world 
and their confidence to comment about it.  The expansion of social networks and increased 
access to information, on the part of working women, can be conceptualised as a change in 
patterns of resource access. 
 
Similarly in Serene District, Central Province, Seur (1992) found that successful female 
farmers assisted each other in many ways: exchanging loans, price information and farming 
advice.  By gathering with pioneering commercially-orientated women, others learnt from 
their example.  They noted the practical ways by which they could advance themselves 
economically, the benefits of an independent income (increased ability to invest in one’s 
enterprise, as well as buy goods for oneself and one’s children) and also that as women they 
need not rely on men to perform traditional male tasks, such as the stumping and clearing of 
land.  In the 1980s, this led to increasing proportion of women cultivating hybrid maize 
(Seur, 1992:241-242,258-262,296). 
 
Besides sharing practical advice for business development, market women also (rather more 
subversively) reflect upon prevailing gender inequalities.  This seemed to affect their gender 
beliefs (as distinct from the impact of greater resource access).  Former housewives explained 
that they used to regard gender-based violence as ‘normal’ (as discussed in Chapter 3).  Some 
maintained that they used to be privately critical of this practice yet presumed that everyone 
else thought it permissible.  By collectively developing a safe space to articulate alternative 
beliefs, these women learnt that their concerns are shared more widely.  Such external 
validation seems to enhance women’s confidence in their own views and lead them to expect 
a more sympathetic response from others, thereby fostering a shift in cultural expectations.   
 
Additionally, I often observed market women collectively commending women undertaking 
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masculine occupations.  This likely affected women’s cultural expectations for themselves 
and also for their daughters: mothers might become more likely to encourage gender atypical 
careers if they believe that such pursuits would be respected.   
 
In summary, the consequences of association through paid work appear to be that: (i) women 
gain practical information about how to increase their incomes; (ii) their self-perceptions 
change because they feel more knowledgeable; (iii) through familiarity they become more 
confident in social interactions – less easily cowed; and (iv) by collectively dismantling 
gender stereotypes they learn that others share their gender egalitarian beliefs.  This last 
effect leads to a revision of cultural expectations.  These findings are illustrated below, with a 
selection of quotes from across the class spectrum. 
 
That woman from Ndola is impressive.  She spoke; most new MPs don’t speak for two 
years.  She must be doing business; those who do business have learnt not to be 
intimidated. 
Rebecca (47, Government Minister – whom I stayed with for a fortnight in Lusaka, 
privately commenting about a new MP, who I also stayed with for a fortnight and 
observed in Parliament.  She did indeed become entrepreneurial upon widowhood).   
 
Alice: What gave you the confidence to think you could do it? 
Anita (42, politician): I used to sell... chibuku [beer]...  I used to handle those foolish 
people, drunkards, then I can handle others.   
 
BanaMayuka (41, a leader in a market association, who supported her family while her 
husband was unemployed for 7 years; see life history): I’ve moved up and down, to 
Botswana and South Africa for business, buying DVDs and radios, and going to 
Siavonga to buy kapenta (dried sardines).  I’ve seen different people.  Those who stay in 
one place don’t know how others are staying.  You can learn from others, see how others 
stay.  When you are learning from people it can give you confidence...  And when you go 
to other places and they’re happy with you it can bring you confidence... 
Alice: Are you scared when speaking with men? 
BanaMayuka: No, we’re not scared. 
Alice: How did you develop your confidence? 
BanaMayuka: By being found with men all the time [partly translated]. 
 
[Previously] we weren’t wise, we weren’t moving up and down.  Only if people come 
here, selling in town, can they be getting so much intelligence, not just staying at home, 
you can’t have intelligence [translated]. 
Nancy (41, a divorced rice seller and leader in a market branch of PF [the Patriotic 
Front], explains why her female neighbours in the village did not develop big 
businesses). 
 
I have confidence.  I’ve learnt many things.  I used to discuss with different people about 
how they started business and about how they prosper with their businesses.  We 
created many friendships and I learnt about their trades...  ‘A child who doesn’t travel 
praises their mother’s cooking’ [Bemba proverb].  If I think about the home I can’t 
possibly know about what my friends are doing.  It was difficult before, we [previous 
generations of Zambian women] weren’t free [translated].xxiv 
Helen (middle-aged politician in a low-income settlement, who used to import blankets 
and DVDs from Botswana – see life history for further details). 
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BanaBecca (36, formerly a housewife then became a hairdresser before selling at the 
market): I started to learn about different ways of living.  Customers were coming with 
different stories.  I picked some things.  I started to put them into practice. 
Alice: Like what? 
BanaBecca: Discussing [things with my husband]. 
Alice: Did you want to discuss before you had a salon? 
BanaBecca: I was extremely keen but I didn’t have a place to start from.  I just had 
thoughts.  You just keep quiet minus saying anything.  I was seeing that people going 
through problems were overcoming them by discussing them.  So I myself wanted to 
discuss things - it’s the way to solve problems.  Before I had started associating with 
many people, like when I was just trading from home, I didn’t know how people lived... 
Before I was living like a slave. 
Alice: In what way? 
BanaBecca: Like a person without a right to talk about the problems that they’re going 
through...  At first I was thinking that things were fine but then [when I had my salon], I 
started to be awakened...  We started to change, slowly slowly [translated].xxv 
 
BanaRuth (35, widowed market trader): I have gained confidence since I started 
[selling], because if I sell my children are not hungry, they go to school and are dressed.  
They have a place to sleep.  I’ve really built up my confidence in myself. 
Alice: What do you mean by saying that you’ve built up your confidence? 
BanaRuth: I have confidence in doing everything, to discuss with people, to talk with 
people, because it’s people who build us, it’s they who show us good ideas.  Previously, 
when I was living with my husband, I had trust in him.  It was him who was keeping 
me... if you remain at home, you’re alone, you do housework.  But if you come here to 
the market, you speak with many different people... 
Alice: Previously you didn’t discuss things with people? 
BanaRuth: No, just discussing with a few people [translated].xxvi 
 
These narratives were triangulated by speaking to other family members who attested to a 
behavioural change, which they partly attributed to association.  Their perspectives will be 
discussed in the next sub-section.  Note however that association in later life does not always 
transform gendered self-perceptions, gender beliefs and behaviour (as discussed in Chapter 5 
on formative experiences).   
 
While my participants emphasised the importance of exposure through paid work in the 
public domain, it seems likely that any form of association with diverse groups could 
similarly broaden horizons.  In rural Serenje district, women from urban areas in general are 
similarly portrayed as more innovative, due to their exposure to alternative practices.  Rural 
women who had returned from prolonged stays in Copperbelt towns reported that they had 
gained knowledge and experience of cultivating non-traditional crops (e.g. hybrid maize and 
runner beans) in nearby farms and gardens.  Meanwhile, rural women were said to follow 
traditional agricultural methods automatically (Seur, 1992:260,302).  This hints at the 
importance of living in an urban context, rather than paid work in the public sphere 
specifically. 
 
To test the importance of association through paid work in the public sphere (as opposed to 
urban living more generally), I also interviewed urban housewives and home-based traders.  
In contrast to the central market traders, these two groups often appeared to have very 
limited social circles and opportunities to learn about alternative ways of doing or being (as 
has been the case historically, see Chapter 3).  This seems to be partly because many 
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housewives, both now and historically, have been reluctant to socialise in their compounds, 
fearing gossip and slander.  Jealousy appears to be rife amongst the economically insecure 
and unemployed in a context of constrained advancement (as also observed in other urban 
areas of Zambia: Hansen, 1997:107; Parsons, 2010:141).  Accordingly, many housewives 
prefer to confine themselves to a few close friends.  Another reason for limited mobility is the 
volume of unpaid care work for which they are held responsible.   
 
Furthermore, even if housewives do socialise in their compounds, they generally only met 
similar women, rather than those with gender atypical experiences.  As discussed in Chapter 
6 on participatory gender sensitisation as well as the next section on exposure, association 
alone does not seem sufficient for a change in gender beliefs.  It seems most transformation 
when discussants can reflect upon their exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of labour. 
 
BanaNancy identified some of the consequences of limited social circles when explaining why 
she defers to her husband, a miner.  That she introduced this topic herself signifies its 
perceived importance.  BanaNancy is 27, she sells vegetables and small packets of mealie 
meal to neighbours in her low-income settlement, too poor to afford the 25kg or 50kg sacks.  
However, she does so irregularly – only when there is sufficient surplus from her husband’s 
salary.  She sometimes goes to church, gathers with a local group of women and is visited by 
female neighbours who also trade from home.  Being stuck in the compound, she believes 
that her social circle is relatively small and that her knowledge is accordingly limited. 
 
BanaNancy: My husband is busy with things, he’s working.  That is knowledge.  So we 
can’t possibly be equal in intelligence...  There’s women [that] have knowledge like [a] 
man...  Where you stay, with BanaSibeso [a politician], the same as like a man! They are 
meeting different people, they get knowledge...  Just staying at home, ahh, the whole 
day, you’re just cooking ifishimu [caterpillars – the dish we often cooked together], can 
you have a knowledge?  No...  
Alice: Do you be want to be like a man? 
BanaNancy: Yah, to know everything [partly translated].xxvii 
 
Many other home-based traders, housewives, former housewives, as well as their husbands 
and children, similarly explained that they defer to their husbands in decision-making 
because they lack the opportunities to learn about the world and thereby develop ideas as 
well as confidence in their chosen convictions.  This contrasts with the earlier explanation of 
homemakers’ and traders’ differing degrees of voice and autonomy within the household, 
which emphasised their countervailing interests.  Perhaps economic dependency makes 
homemakers reluctant to contest claims made by the breadwinner.  Deference might be used 
tactically, to ensure on-going support; appearances of it do not necessarily reflect 
internalised gender status beliefs.  This alternative interpretation will be further considered 
in the next sub-section which draws on different evidence: other people’s explanations of 
why they came to value women’s advice. 
 
Exposure to public demonstrations of equal competence 
 
A further way in which women’s self-perceptions are affected by flexibility in gender 
divisions of labour is by exposure to other women acquiring money, skills and knowledge.  
This commonly occurs in markets and other workplaces outside the home.  This enables 
comparative assessments of men and women.  By interacting in the market and sharing 
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experiences, people not only realise women’s equal capacity to provide financially for their 
families but also the prevalence of the new reality of women’s financial significance.  Many 
people have thus come to realise women’s equal capacity to earn money, which often has 
implications for gender status beliefs – implicit in Susan’s account below: 
 
Susan (45, divorced, single mother of eight, including one foster child, fruit wholesaler 
and leader in market branch of the Patriotic Front (PF), then in opposition): I’m better 
than men, three-quarters of them, I’m better than them...  I can beat them...  I’ve 
compared myself with them.  Men fail... to do this work...  They just beg, they drink 
beer. 
BanaMwamba: Very many [translated].xxviii 
 
In further conversations Susan narrated that seeing her business thrive and exceed men’s 
had led her to reject stereotypes about women being less competent and less worthy of 
status.  From her bold interjections in political gatherings it was also evident that she does 
not revere men or defer to their judgement. 
 
Popular recognition of women’s new-found roles seems to affect employed women’s 
descriptive stereotypes of women in general.  To recall, in the colonial and early post-colonial 
period inter-female aggression was reinforced by widespread economic and psychological 
dependence on husbands, as well as spatial segregation through being ‘stuck at home’ (see 
Chapter 3).  Now, however, working women commonly identify as a group and, moreover, 
express great pride in that collective identity – as exemplified in the following conversation 
with BanaChola.  She is 43, sells dried sardines in the central market and heads the women’s 
wing of a local branch of the Patriotic Front.  Her husband has been unemployed for 6 years.  
BanaChola told me that she commenced trading while still at school; her younger siblings 
looked up to her to provide since their stepmother was very cruel and frequently denied them 
food.  BanaChola’s father (a miner) instructed her to marry but she was reluctant, wary of 
doing so without her own money, for she had seen that such women often suffered.  At age 17 
she started trading millet; subsequently she smuggled goods to accumulate capital.  Back 
then, far fewer people were selling so it was more profitable.  Yet, notwithstanding her own 
economic activity, BanaChola still used to revere men, thinking they were more intelligent. 
 
BanaChola: But in today’s generation things have changed.  Women have more 
intelligence than men. 
Alice: Why? 
BanaChola: Things have reversed here in Zambia. 
Alice: In what way have they reversed? 
BanaChola: It’s women who are keeping men and children, and paying school fees...  
Women have pushed themselves forward [translated].xxix 
 
To support her argument that women are outnumbering men in the struggle to provide for 
their families, BanaChola added that in the bus to the border town of Nakonde (where she 
buys produce for resale) there will be only four or five men out of 68 passengers.  Her 
account suggests that gender stereotypes are not only influenced by one’s own activities but 
also society-wide gender divisions of labour.  Seeing a critical mass of women performing the 
socially valorised role of household financial provision seems to have changed her 
perceptions about women’s importance.  Even though she had always been working herself, 
it seems that she only adopted a more egalitarian outlook when a critical mass of other 
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women became breadwinners.  This broader shift may have been particularly significant 
because it also chimes with her personal circumstances: her husband lost employment in 
2005.  Note also the importance of mobility and paid work in the public sphere in exposing 
her to other ‘strong’ women.  Had she traded in the small market of her low-income peri-
urban settlement (where I noted more entrenched gender stereotypes), it seems unlikely that 
she would have been exposed to disconfirming evidence.   
 
The critical experience of exposure, discussed above, is not a feature of all paid work.  The 
consequences of female labour force participation on women’s self-perceptions appear to 
vary by occupation, as discussed below. 
 
Occupational desegregation and women’s self-perceptions 
 
This section points to occupational variation in how female labour force participation affects 
women’s self-perceptions. 
 
Unlike market traders, domestic workers have few such opportunities to learn from others, 
share their problems or strategise for career development.  Instead they must adhere to their 
madams’ instructions in solitude.  Several participants attributed domestic workers’ 
comparative reserve in social fora (such as in Bible study or funerals) to the nature of their 
work, namely isolated and deferential.  Thus it does not seem to be income generation alone 
which has been pivotal but also the nature of particular forms of work (see also Kabeer, 
2001; Kabeer et al, 2011a; Kantor, 2003, on the limitations of home-based work in the 
United Kingdom, Bangladesh and India).   
 
As one might expect, there also appear to be significant consequences of women undertaking 
high status occupations.  Geisler (1995:553-554) found that young professional Zambian 
women have ceased to define themselves solely as wives and mothers.  Furthermore, they no 
longer rely on their husband for self-esteem.   
 
In my own research, women from across the class spectrum commonly expressed pride and a 
sense of equality in doing the same work as men.  These workers often remarked that 
wearing protective clothing (in the mines, factories and garages) brings self-esteem as it 
symbolises their ability to undertake relatively high status work, which was historically 
reserved for men.  Such pride is reflected in the following conversation with Bwalya (24, 
metallurgist, whom I lived with for several weeks): 
 
It [a hard hat] gives you status: you’re all the same, wearing overalls, and people admire 
you.  ‘You [a male co-worker] are wearing one, I’m wearing one’.  It sort of puts you on a 
par with all the people working there.  It makes you feel equal with everyone...  In these 
towns, as a woman, when anyone sees you wearing safety boots, they really respect you, 
because it means you’re working...  [At work] the respect is the same with everyone...  If 
a woman wears a hard hat it gives everyone the idea she’s doing men’s work, something 
extremely challenging...  You feel nice yourself.  You get a lot of confidence, moving 
around. 
 
The social meaning of a job does not seem reducible to remuneration.  Formal employment 
in the mines has long been a source of status in the Copperbelt (Ferguson, 1999; Larmer, 
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2007).33  Miners have historically been respected for undertaking the arduous work that is 
essential to the country’s economic prosperity.  Besides its economic history, mining is 
further privileged because it performed by men and thus reflects their higher social status 
(see also Grimshaw and Rubery, 2007:21 on the valorisation of masculine occupations more 
generally).  Blue overalls symbolise working-class masculinity – some retrenched miners 
even wear them when trading in the market as if to retain their old identities, asserting that 
they are still men.  By wearing the same uniform, women like Bwalya and Rose (whose life 
history is recounted in Chapter 2) feel that they are ‘on a par’ with men, denying difference, 
physically rejecting gender stereotypes in their own case.  These clothes also endow women 
with prestige, by conveying  that they are undertaking an occupation that is heavily valorised, 
interlinked to the social construction of ‘the Copperbelt’ and equated with masculinity (which 
is also privileged).   
 
Wearing overalls also enables women to signal that they are economically active.  But there 
appears to be more going on here than just demonstrating gainful employment.  As seems to 
be the case globally, stereotypically feminine professions are often regarded as undemanding 
extensions of women’s natural abilities and are rarely valued to the same extent as men’s 
occupations.  Instead these jobs often reflect women’s lower status (see also Adams and 
Nelson, 2009; England et al, 1994; England et al, 2000).  Even if female teachers, secretaries 
or nurses demonstrate their equal ability to earn money, their equal competence in other 
masculine (valorised) domains is often doubted.  To explore the impact of occupational 
desegregation I asked women employed in different occupations to share their gender beliefs.  
Those employed in stereotypically masculine domains more commonly eschewed gender 
stereotypes.   
 
However, this data does not reveal the impact of different occupations, since their views may 
be a cause rather than a consequence of their occupational choice.  A more reliable guide to 
the impact of desegregation is to learn from others’ perceptions of these jobs.  Accordingly, 
subsequent sub-sections (commencing on page 120) explore how occupational desegregation 
has affected other people’s gender descriptive and prescriptive stereotypes.  But before 
turning to others’ account, the next sub-section notes the stresses felt by women who have 
assumed (shared or sole) responsibility for household financial provision. 
 
The stresses of responsibility for household financial provision 
 
While flexibility of gender divisions of labour can enhance women’s perceptions of 
themselves, it also has ill-effects in this context of economic insecurity.  Many women find 
their newfound role of responsibility for household finances extremely stressful.  Similarly in 
Rwanda, female heads of households stressed the difficulties of bearing sole responsibility 
for household financial provision, as well as balancing work and domestic duties (Burnet, 
2012:198).  These sources of emotional ill-health were also emphasised by employed women 
in urban areas of Mexico and the Philippines (Chant, 1996).  Some Zambian women claimed 
that financial responsibility leads to ‘BP’ – high blood pressure. 
 
Several women used the term ‘ukutitikishiwa’ (which usually refers to domestic patriarchal 
                                                        
33 This occupational identity seems even more important than hierarchical position, in some respects.  For example, a senior mine manager may 
introduce him/herself primarily as a ‘miner’, rather than as a ‘manager’.  Similar pride was also evinced in accounts of working in related 
industries. 
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oppression) to describe their feelings of struggling alone: 
 
BanaChola (43, market trader): Women are thinking all day, the brain is disturbed, 
because of all the problems... Women shouldn’t have to work, to sell, instead they 
should be found at home, sweeping and looking after children.  Historically they didn’t 
have a problem, they weren’t suffering.  Those who were working were men...   
Alice: Were women oppressed? 
BanaChola: Yes, they didn’t have rights at home, everything was the man.  They didn’t 
agree to anything the woman said.   
Alice: They didn’t make decisions together? 
BanaChola: No, they didn’t have powers.  Everything: ‘Yes, yes, yes’.  Because men were 
managing everything at home.  If he chases me, I’m going where?  There’s nowhere to 
go to. 
Alice: Do you think that earlier generations of women were happier than women of 
today? 
BanaChola: They were happier than those of today. 
Alice: Even though they didn’t have power, they were happy? 
BanaChola: Yes, even though they didn’t have power, they were happy. 
Alice: I’m confused. 
BanaChola: [in English] Happy is better than power...  We don’t feel happy.  Our work is 
men’s [translated].xxx  [We are then joined by a mutual friend, BanaMayuka, who 
dissented, like all the other people I spoke to about this].   
 
BanaChola’s life has become particularly difficult; she feels that she has been struggling alone 
(managing finances single-handedly) since her husband’s retrenchment, while he has 
become thin, withdrawn and depressed.  She continued, 
 
But we’re suffering.  In my opinion, I’ve come to be oppressed because I’ve turned into a 
man.  I’ve started to do men’s work...  [My husband] he’s given up, the problem is that 
he doesn’t have work, he doesn’t have money.  His thoughts have become 
overwhelming.  He has a disturbed mind.  He’s given up [translated].xxxi 
 
BanaChola’s testimonies highlight how flexibility in gender divisions of labour, as well as 
associated gains in autonomy and participation in household decision-making, are not 
always perceived as net gains by women in a context of economic insecurity.  Helen (a 
politician in a low-income settlement, with a very egalitarian conjugal relationship – see life 
history) provided a nuanced appraisal of dynamics, noting caveats to progress in one respect 
with recognition of difficulties in another: 
 
Women, abatitikishiwa [who are oppressed], they are very few.  Women now they have 
come out.  But [when a woman is] alone, planning for everything, it’s really tough and 
difficult...  Responsibility is overwhelming...  Whatever we are planning it’s only you, 
not a man, so it’s not easy.  When you’re planning for something you have to be both, a 
male and a female, not one headed...  Ah, it’s really bad [partly translated].xxxii 
 
One of my Copperbelt hosts, BanaMulenga (a bank employee), died at the age of 39, shortly 
after a doctor warned her to take more rest, a year after my fieldwork.  She had been single-
handedly providing for her family after her husband lost employment during the global 
economic crisis.  However, low-income women’s experiences of stress may be due to 
confounding factors such as poverty and national economic policies, as has been suggested of 
Lusaka (Aidoo and Harpham, 2001:211).   
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It might be contended that women were better off as housewives in previous generations, 
when they were not under any such pressure to provide for their families.  But this claim was 
rejected by the vast majority of female participants.  Without data on subjective well-being, 
both now and historically, it seems impossible to ascertain the validity of their accounts.  One 
way of triangulating the positive self-portrayals detailed above is to listen to other people’s 
perspectives about female labour force participation.  The next section of this chapter seeks 
to ascertain whether working women’s testimonies about increased social respect are shared 
more widely.   
 
Women’s social relationships 
 
Labour force participation seems to have affected how such women are perceived and treated 
by others: spouses, natal families, society at large, co-workers and colleagues in political 
organisations.  Women who have become increasingly financially important to their families 
appear to be widely recognised and appreciated as such.  Furthermore, having learnt about 
different ways of living, women working in the public sphere are more commonly regarded 
(by themselves and others) as knowledgeable, with valuable ideas.  These accounts were 
given both by employed women and also third-party observers: their families, neighbours 
and co-workers. 
 
Women’s status in marriage 
 
This chapter has claimed that there is a significant difference between the marriages of 
homemakers and employed women.  Two explanations have been offered thus far.  One 
relates to interests: it posits that economic dependency increases both women’s interest in 
deference and men’s ability to enforce their interest in gender status inequalities.  Another 
explanation for the difference between homemakers and employed women concerns 
women’s self-perceptions, such as beliefs about their own intelligence.  Former homemakers, 
who had joined the market, universally pointed to a third consequence of labour force 
participation, namely that they had become more respected.  Their husbands previously 
underrated them but now appreciate their efforts and value their financial contributions – as 
claimed below: 
 
BanaBecca (36, market trader, sells dried sardines): In short we began to discuss...  At 
the beginning it was difficult, he [my husband] was too proud to recognise women’s 
rights...  But now he’s different...  He saw that my efforts bring progress.  At the end he 
started to change...  We help each other provide for the family at home and to provide 
for ourselves in the future...  [The previous situation, of me being a housewife] made 
him conceited, thinking there’s nothing I can do [translated].xxxiii 
 
BanaMwimba (41, market trader, sells dried sardines): Before, if I spoke, he couldn’t 
hear me...  I didn’t underrate my own thoughts.  It’s just men who are difficult...  [But he 
came to think,] ‘Therefore this young woman has great intelligence.  We’ll be able to 
take care of each other’.  He used to think there was nothing I could do [translated].xxxiv 
 
Here BanaBecca and BanaMwimba emphasise that their participation in decision-making 
was not impeded by their own self-perceptions (i.e. BanaMwimba did not underrate herself) 
but rather by their husband’s perceptions of them.  In further interviews, both suggested that 
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their husbands had previously regarded them as less intelligent and so side-lined them when 
making decisions.  BaShiBecca and BaShiMwimba came to perceive and treat their wives 
differently upon seeing them undertaking socially valued roles.  These conjugal changes can 
be interpreted as evidence of the importance of exposure to women demonstrating their 
equal competence.  It can also be read as an instance of shifting interests: BaShiBecca and 
BaShiMwimba only listened to their wives when first-hand evidence led them to think that 
doing so would be advantageous.  BaShiBecca, for instance, spoke of the knowledge his wife 
gains from the market and the crucial role she plays in household survival.  Clearly exposure 
and interests are interconnected; the point is not to deny the salience of either but to identify 
which is primary.  Also note BanaBecca’s reference to insambu sha banamayo (translated as 
‘women’s rights’) – this hints at another influence besides flexibility in gender divisions of 
labour, namely gender sensitisation – discussed in Chapter 6. 
  
BanaChola’s story (further detailed in the life history section) provides another example of 
conjugal transformation.  Upon her husband’s retrenchment, BanaChola sought to build a 
house.  Her husband disagreed, wanting to return to the village instead.  However, when he 
saw the bricks built up to window level he realised that his wife was cunning, determined and 
hard-working.  He promptly obtained a loan and gave her money to complete the project.  
From that day forth, he gave her much greater respect and was keener to hear her thoughts.  
BanaChola had always been a market trader, never a housewife, but it was only when her 
husband realised her relative financial importance and ingenuity (upon his job loss) that 
their relationship became more egalitarian.  It could be argued that this account cannot be 
conceptualised as a shift in exposure, since BaShiChola had long been exposed to his wife 
earning money.  However, by seeing that she was half way through building a house (an 
impressive feat in Kitwe, given capital requirements) did provide new information about her 
capabilities, or rather it provided glaring, visual evidence of her accomplishments.  He had 
previously perceived her income as supplementary and not crucial to household survival.  
But then, at a time when he was despairing, losing hope, BanaChola demonstrated her ability 
to provide a solution, single-handedly. 
 
Other women reported that when their husbands saw them fighting to provide for the family, 
their husbands became more encouraged and committed to familial provision, so reduced 
spending money outside the house (e.g. on girlfriends or alcohol).  The picture presented by 
married market traders was universally one of greater respect and appreciation, from their 
husbands during recent economic hardship.   
 
Market traders also spoke of a society-wide shift in how employed women are perceived.  
They attributed this change in gender stereotypes to women’s demonstration of their equal 
ability to make valuable financial and intellectual contributions.  Traders suggested that 
because working women are no longer dismissed as less competent, their status has 
improved, such that they have gained influence.   
 
Gloria (66, chairwoman of local PF branch, caterpillar trader, formerly a housewife, now 
divorced, living in a single room in an informal settlement): A long time ago they 
underrated us, saying, ‘A woman can’t do anything’...  When they knew that we women 
can also work that’s when people stopped underestimating us [she proceeds to tell me of 
a woman who drives a bus from Kitwe to Dar es Salaam] [translated].xxxv 
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Alice: I want to know why people have started to let women make decisions at funerals. 
BanaMwimba (41, market trader, married): Because they’ve seen that women have 
intelligence. 
Alice: They did not previously think that women had intelligence? 
BanaMwimba: Long ago they did not count women. 
Alice: When did they start to count them? 
BanaMwimba: 2000s. 
Alice: These days, do they count all women or just those who have trades? 
BanaMwimba: Very much those who have trades, not really those who don’t have trades 
[translated].xxxvi 
 
The most important thing that has yielded fruits is that they have realised that we are 
equal partners in development and would like to work together with them. 
Hilary (44, widowed market trader, selling oranges, and leader in local branch of PF). 
 
These statements that working women have gained status can be interpreted as a change in 
these women’s cultural expectations – how they think they will be perceived and treated by 
others.  The speakers present themselves as thinking that other people are now less inclined 
to hold gender status beliefs – the stereotype that women are less suited to prestigious 
positions and less deserving of esteem, respect and deference.   
 
Even if employed women say they are now more respected, it is possible that these cultural 
expectations about other people’s gender status beliefs are incorrect or exaggerated.  Indeed, 
their testimonies do overlook continued gender status inequalities, such as in relation to care 
work (discussed later).  However, even if their expectations are incorrect they may still be 
significant: the converse belief that others doubt women’s competence can become self-
fulfilling, thwarting not only self-perceptions (i.e. confidence) but also actual performance 
(as documented in Ridgeway, 2011; and Steele, 2011, drawing on research from more 
economically developed countries).   
 
Given that working women’s cultural expectations were possibly inaccurate, it is important to 
triangulate their accounts with other people’s perceptions and explanations of social change.  
This further evidence suggests that women’s cultural expectations of greater status are 
largely valid.  Men’s accounts generally echoed those of their wives, sisters and co-workers; 
though in some cases different influences were identified as pivotal.  Most husbands of 
women who became important financial contributors explained that they used to underrate 
their wife, believing there was nothing of which she was capable.  However, since their wife 
started contributing financially, they increasingly solicited her opinions, in recognition of her 
efforts and knowledge gained through association in the public sphere.  Relationships thus 
seem to change as women’s capabilities and confidence are developed and demonstrated, 
such that men come to see it as advantageous to listen to their spouses.  This data suggests 
that such exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of labour is a primary cause of the 
contemporary erosion of gender status beliefs. 
 
Alternatively one might attribute change in conjugal relations to improvements in working 
women’s fall-back position.  Interest-based explanations of gender inequality might posit 
that men purposively take advantage of wives who are economically dependent upon them 
because they believe that their wives cannot leave.  Thus once a woman is economically 
independent, her husband may be motivated to treat her better, in order to prevent her 
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departure.  To recall, this is what seems to have occurred in the early colonial period, as 
women’s paucity in urban areas gave them scarcity value. 
 
This interest-based explanation of men’s behaviour assumes that husbands of working 
women believe that the latter will terminate the relationship if they do not become more 
respectful and embrace more egalitarian practices.  But in the contemporary period such exit 
seems rare: some interviewed women who were financially independent had endured years 
of unhappy marriages.  For example, BanaMulenga (38, a bank employee) was reluctant to 
divorce, for fear of gossip and concern about her children’s well-being.  She still resented and 
did not love her husband, with whom she rarely spent time.  However, worries about her 
children’s separation from their father far outweighed her dissatisfaction with the nature of 
her own conjugal relationship.  Statistically representative data from the World Values 
Survey (2013) suggest that such concerns are widespread.  In 2007, 74% of surveyed 
Zambians agreed with the statement that ‘a child needs a home with both a father and a 
mother to grow up happily’.  BanaMulenga, like other unhappy wives, also expressed 
concerns about stigma.  This deterrent was also noted in earlier qualitative and quantitative 
research in a low-income area of Lusaka, where Moser and Holland (1997:60) observed that 
‘For women, the stigma of single parenthood – and its association with prostitution – means 
that women try to remain married whenever possible’.  (Note Moser and Holland’s reference 
to ‘prostitution’ – a perennial concern). 
 
Income generation does not appear to have significantly improved women’s fall-back 
position.  Although they can maintain households independently upon widowhood, the 
voluntary formation of such households seems relatively rare.  While working women’s 
access to resource have improved, cultural expectations about how one will be perceived and 
treated upon divorce seem to constrain the desirability of exit.   
 
Furthermore, my data does not indicate that husbands perceive their relationships as having 
become more precarious.  Male participants did not voice concerns about women instigating 
separation, for example.  The proposition that men are now extrinsically motivated to behave 
in a more egalitarian way is not consistent with the data to which I have access.  Pathways 
towards conjugal equality in Kitwe seemed to be more about exposure to women performing 
socially valued roles in a context of worsening economic security.  A term commonly used by 
men and women alike to describe recent changes was ukwafwana (helping each other).  This 
reflects a contemporary sense of mutual support, appreciation and understanding.   
 
In the following narrative, Matthew (47, whose life history is detailed in Chapter 2) explains 
how his marriage changed as a result of flexibility in gender divisions of labour, in a context 
of economic insecurity.  Matthew used to be formally employed in the mines but was 
retrenched and so turned to trading vegetables in the market.  Business was unreliable and 
risky.  At first his spouse, a housewife, was frustrated; she did not understand why he 
brought so little money home.  Equally exasperated, he beat her.  As life became more 
difficult, they sold household assets and rented a smaller house.  At this stage his wife started 
trading at home; from Matthew’s perspective this is how she came to understand and 
empathise with his business-related difficulties: 
 
We were able to cater for all sorts of major problems so for that reason quarrelling came 
out because now we are able to understand each other.  When I say ‘I don’t have’ she’d 
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understand my position because now she’s on the ground [also involved in business]...  
At times also she gets also the same problems which I get... so we are able to understand 
each other. 
 
Matthew’s wife also became more engaged in household decision-making as her mind 
‘broadened’ (his term) and she became more active in developing solutions to pressing 
household problems.  In Matthew’s opinion she was previously reliant upon him, for ideas 
and financial support.  Other men, accustomed to women as housewives, similarly described 
their wives and women in general as ‘passive’ and ‘dormant’, sometimes even as 
‘incompetent’ and ‘ignorant’ (translated).  While women may neither share these appraisals 
nor invoke this same explanation to account for their limited participation in decision-
making, it is nonetheless vital to take on board men’s perceptions of women in order to 
understand changing gender relations.  To this end, Matthew’s narrative illustrates how a 
wife’s status may increase if she is perceived as knowledgeable and shares financial struggles, 
through flexibility in gender divisions of labour.  This points to the importance of exposure 
(rather than interests).  First-hand evidence of a woman performing a socially valued role 
also seemed to change his internalised gender beliefs, relating to competence and status.   
 
I emphasise internalised gender beliefs here, rather than cultural expectations, because 
Matthew continually referred to his wife’s contributions rather than observers’ judgements.  
That said, the latter may have also featured. 
 
Working women’s status in natal families 
 
As women enter the labour force, many are supporting their natal families.  As people have 
become increasingly reliant upon and accustomed to such flexibility in gender divisions of 
responsibility, female breadwinning appears to have exerted a greater effect on gender status 
beliefs.  Historically, in the 1970s and 1980s, even if a daughter was contributing financially, 
her father might still refuse her participation in decision-making.  Participants suggested 
that people previously tended to underrate all women, regardless of their individual 
characteristics or contributions.  However, in the contemporary period, women who are 
breadwinners for their natal families maintain that their siblings and parents bestow them 
with great respect upon recognition of their financial importance.  ‘She helps the natal family 
like a man’, BanaMuyunda (39, mushroom trader and grassroots political activist) said of her 
sister, BanaFlo, a mine dump truck driver and single parent.  Accordingly, when visiting, she 
‘gets a lot of respect, they receive her very well’, with the slaughter of a chicken or even a 
goat.  ‘A person who helps the family is respected, loved and blessed’ (translated),xxxvii 
maintained BanaMuyunda. 
 
The gender neutral terminology (‘a person who helps…’) used by BanaMayunda reflects a 
broader trend: people are increasingly appraised on their performance rather than 
automatically ascribed a status because of their sex.  This is not to suggest that gender status 
beliefs have disappeared.  On the contrary, BanaMayunda’s unemployed brother begrudges 
the lack of respect he receives in comparison.  He feels entitled to preferential treatment and 
is disgruntled that it is not honoured.  For the rest of his family, however, financial provision 
rather than sex category appears to have become the primary determinant of status.  
Furthermore, because of the importance of financial provision, other prescriptions have been 
overlooked.  BanaFlo (BanaMayunda’s sister) has secured approval even though she is a 
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single mother.  Historically this contravention of widely-held prescriptive gender stereotypes 
would have led to shame and disapprobation, but this concern seems to have been 
overshadowed.   
 
Working women’s status in the public sphere 
 
Women who have ascended to the comparatively high status roles historically undertaken by 
men have increasingly come to be treated as men’s equals, in many respects.  This perceptual 
change is often conveyed by women being labelled as, or likened to, men by others and 
themselves alike, in virtue of their self-reliance, will power, perseverance, intelligence and 
financial role at home – stereotypically male attributes in Zambia.  Recall the above quote 
where BanaChola (a market trader and breadwinner) says, ‘I’ve turned into a man’.  Notably, 
this metaphor was only ever used to describe women who performed stereotypically 
masculine roles, such as working for money, being a breadwinner, a household head or 
political leader.  We might interpret this as people using familiar labels to make sense of the 
dramatic ruptures to their gender beliefs.  On the other hand, it does imply continued 
commitment to gender stereotypes: if an individual woman demonstrates possession of 
masculine attributes then she (alone) ascends the social hierarchy to become an honorary 
man, while all other women remain devalued.  Instead of seeing flexibility in gender divisions 
of labour as disconfirming evidence of their assumptions about the lesser competence of the 
typical woman, some people (and this was generally men) labelled such exceptions ‘men’.   
 
While some people maintain gender stereotypes, many appear to have eschewed earlier 
assumptions, especially with first-hand exposure of flexibility in gender divisions of labour.  
For example, while not all women gain the respect of being a breadwinner (unlike 
BanaMayunda’s sister), there is increasingly (though not universally) a sense that any woman 
can, in theory, undertake such a role.  Men from across the socio-economic and generational 
spectrum maintained that their views have changed as women have shown themselves to be 
important financial providers.  This is echoed in the following conversation: 
 
Scott (42, divorced, onion wholesaler, leader in market branch of PF): I used to think 
‘It’s just a woman’.  Women of that time were regarded as people who can’t do the things 
that men do...  We were keeping them. 
[A man comes along, through the corridor where we sit in the market, among bags of 
onions.  He is middle aged and wears work overalls.  He overhears our conversation and 
interjects]: They didn’t do anything but this time they’re active, they’re more than you a 
man, ‘cause everything they’re in forefront and they’re sharp than we!  This time, me I 
cannot compete with a woman. 
Scott: No. 
[unknown man]: I’m very very far. 
Scott: Very far. 
[unknown man, speaks with passion]: They are sharp, and everything comes, they are 
the first priority, not we.  We are nothing this time, we are only under the people feeding 
us, that’s only what I’ve observed myself.  [unknown man goes on his way] 
 
Scott [on another occasion]: There’s nothing that women can fail in doing, it’s them who 
are working very hard these days.  There’s nothing that can intimidate them and no 
reason to doubt women, that they might fail, we have confidence these days [partly 
translated]. 
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It is difficult to ascertain this anonymous man’s intentions.  While I spent many days 
chatting with Scott and his contemporaries, this passer-by was unknown to both of us.  Why 
did he want to share his opinion with strangers?  Of what was he seeking to persuade us?  
One possible reason for his intervention may be that the unfolding erosion of gender 
divisions of labour is a topic of popular interest: many people have observed this form of 
social change and want to express their opinion about what is happening.  It commonly 
elicits social commentary, just like party politics.  Opportunities for reflection were thus 
often welcomed and even seized without invitation – as in the case above.  Thus while it is 
difficult to determine the validity of his testimony, it might instead by viewed as 
demonstrating the perceived significance of flexibility in gender divisions of labour.   
 
Taken literally, as a sweeping claim that there is ‘nothing that women can fail in doing’, 
Scott’s account sounds hyperbolic.  Instead I understood him as speaking in relative terms, 
rebutting historical gender stereotypes about women’s lesser competence.  These beliefs were 
reflected in Scott’s interactions with female contemporaries in the market associations and 
political party, as well as their accounts, which I observed and solicited in order to 
triangulate his narrative. 
 
Similar sentiments were expressed in an essay that I commissioned.  John, a 22 year old 
mature student, was funding his secondary education through piece-work and church 
sponsorship, while he lived with several other male orphans in a delapidated single room in a 
very low-income settlement, with no electricity but communal access to water.  He wrote, 
 
Women should be respected because they are also helping people...  In homes where 
women have no husbands they fight in all whys [ways] to look for basic needs of there 
[their] children and there are some houses where a husband does not work, it is the 
responsibility of the wife to look for food.  So that she feed the family.   
 
John’s female neighbours provide for their families through employment as domestic 
workers, knitting children’s jerseys and reselling charcoal.  Although these are hardly 
prestigious positions, they seem significant for John, who explicitly championed gender 
equality in class discussions on the topic. 
 
This shift in sentiments was also evident amongst the cosmopolitan, youthful middle class in 
internet fora.  For instance, on the same day that it interviewed the Minister of Labour, 
Radio Phoenix (one of the largest private radio stations in Zambia) updated its Facebook 
status to say, ‘Respect to all single mothers.  Thanks for being strong… May God Almighty 
keep on blessing you all for your courage’.  Nineteen online comments were posted within 
the hour.  Many of the tributes mentioned single mothers’ strength and perseverance in a 
context of economic hardship.  While we cannot make inferences beyond this public 
discourse (i.e. about attitudes and behaviour), two points seem noteworthy.  First, single 
mothers are being praised.  Second, single mothers are being lauded for taking on a 
stereotypically masculine role and related characteristics (e.g. being ‘strong’).   
 
This appears to fit with a general pattern of women gaining respect for undertaking the 
valorised jobs of men – in this case, household headship – in difficult circumstances.  The 
prevalence of women heads of households who are successfully educating their children was 
a commonly cited source of pride for many women.  Previously, it was widely assumed (even 
amongst working women) that female heads of households could not be financially self-
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sufficient other than through seeking male support and were thus labelled ‘prostitutes’.  They 
were widely perceived as promiscuous, ‘stealing’ other people’s husbands (as also observed 
by Moser and Holland, 1997:60 in relation to low-income areas of Lusaka).  However, this 
stereotype appears to have weakened somewhat under the weight of a critical mass of 
women providing disconfirming evidence.  This is not to deny the stigma attached to single-
parenthood or to say that it is entirely reducible to women’s presumed economic dependence 
on men.  Rather, the intention here is to note a small degree of change, which appears due to 
growing exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of labour. 
 
The impact of occupational desegregation on descriptive and prescriptive 
gender stereotypes 
 
The impact of female labour force participation on observers’ gender stereotypes appears to 
vary by occupation.  Women commonly voiced great pride in seeing other women 
undertaking work historically dominated by men, taking this as evidence of the equal 
potential capabilities of their sex.  Having long been told that they were different and 
incapable of certain, privileged tasks, women now visibly rejoice in perceived proof of their 
equality:  
 
Alice: Tell me what you like to see women doing. 
BanaMwimba (41, market trader): Leading, working hard, employed in men’s jobs, 
repairing cars, sweeping in the road, employed at the mine, driving trucks – those 
things make me very proud [translated].xxxviii  [BanaMwimba’s face lights up with pride 
as she proceeds to tell me about two of her friends, who work as electricians].   
 
People’s perceptions often vary with their exposure.  Those with female neighbours or 
relatives undertaking jobs historically done by men universally maintained that such women 
are greatly respected.  Many people declared being immensely proud of and impressed by 
these strong Zambian women, fighting to support their families.  While some people have not 
seen many women undertaking stereotypically masculine occupations or other gender 
atypical roles like household financial provision and remain sceptical about the possibility of 
such flexibility in gender divisions of labour, those that have personally witnessed them tend 
to profess support.  Exposure thus appears to provide disconfirming evidence of descriptive 
stereotypes about women’s lesser competence, though other stereotypes may remain. 
 
Many participants appeared impressed by women undertaking stereotypically masculine 
occupations, as indicated by the quotes overleaf.  This sentiment, combined with apparent 
surprise (rather than concern, anxiety or hostility), suggests that participants previously 
presumed that women were incapable of such work and hence discouraged flexibility in 
gender divisions of labour.  Their seemingly positive reactions indicated that they now 
welcome such incursions, having seen women demonstrate their competence.  This lends 
credence to testimonies about earlier periods: when people lacked exposure to flexibility in 
gender divisions of labour they tended to ridicule and resist the abstract idea of women 
entering male-dominated domains.   
 
Comments from observers also enhance the plausibility of earlier cited claims made by 
women in stereotypically masculine occupations.  The latter might have been inclined to 
overstate the extent to which they are respected by others, in order to present themselves as 
upstanding members of their communities.  Onlookers’ narratives indicate that gender 
120 
 
stereotypes are eroded by the sight of women demonstrating their equal competence in 
activities commonly considered too challenging for women (e.g. driving Caterpillar trucks, 
auto-mechanics and house-building).   
 
If a woman can drive that big bulldoze in the open pit of Nchanga mine, your fellow 
womens [sic] are now handling these big big wheels, the Caterpillars, and in the first 
place, it was amazing to see a girl like you jumping on the big wheels, going into the 
open pit.  The first time it was amazing!  You see a woman, clad in overalls and a hard 
hat, she’s underground! 
Charles (46, trade unionist, speaking at his office in Kitwe). 
 
We praise them, we help each other. 
Solomon (38, married miner, commenting on women who drive dump trucks at 
Nchanga mine) [translated].xxxix 
 
Samuel (24, studying auto-mechanics, from a family in which boys are forbidden to do 
domestic work): We came together and saw her [Daisy] lying down under the motorcar 
and I said, ‘I’m very surprised’, ‘Have you ever seen a girl in a garage?’, ‘No, this is my 
first time’.  I was impressed, very very impressed...  She even started teaching us.  She 
has confidence in working and talking.  Customers are surprised, they are so 
impressed...  She is extremely strong.  She has inspired me very much when it comes to 
the way she works...  She does everything in the house but she’s not married.  I used to 
think that a woman who lived by herself can’t possibly live well like in the way Daisy 
does...   
Owen (25, studying auto-mechanics): The reason that made me have confidence in 
other women is that I’ve seen Daisy repairing cars at the garage, working hard, 
providing for her young ones and taking them to school, doing men’s work.  Living 
without a man – that’s also important...  As for Daisy, she can just be married just ‘cause 
she wants to not to, not the fact that she needs help.  She’s able to live on her own Daisy 
is just  like other women, we all have five senses, but other women underrate themselves 
[partly translated].xl 
 
Samuel and Owen’s account seems to signal a shift in internalised gender stereotypes rather 
than cultural expectations.  From Daisy’s demonstration of equal competence, they explicitly 
inferred that other women are similarly competent by virtue of physical similarities.  A 
revision of cultural expectations would presumably require seeing many people supporting 
women’s incursions into stereotypically masculine domains.  It seems unlikely that they 
might have inferred from one employer’s support for a female mechanic that all would be 
similarly welcoming.  Their testimony does not indicate a change in cultural expectations. 
 
By saying that ‘we help each other’ (tulafwana), Solomon is not referring to any direct, 
personal assistance that he derives from fellow female miners.  Rather, he interprets their 
efforts as contributing to broader national development in a time of great difficulty.  This 
echoes a broader discourse: flexibility in gender divisions of labour is regarded as collectively 
advantageous, as worsening economic security has shifted interests.  This background 
context is further discussed below. 
 
When does flexibility in gender divisions of labour weaken gender status 
beliefs? 
 
One counter-example to this claim about the transformative effects of women’s incursions 
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into stereotypically masculine occupations is the case of domestic work.  This job was 
previously the preserve of men, due to European concerns about African women’s sexuality 
(Hansen, 1989).  But by 2001, only 8% of employed men compared to 27% of employed 
women were engaged in domestic service in the Copperbelt (CSO et al, 2003:38).  However, 
this historically male-dominated livelihood does not provide women with respect or status.  
This is partly because the job never was high-ranking to begin with.  In their survey of 
educated young men in Lusaka, Mitchell and Epstein (1959) found that ‘domestic servants’ 
were accorded one of the lowest rankings for occupational prestige.  Even more lowly ranked 
was the position of ‘garden boy’ – a job for adult men (ibid).  My impression is that these two 
jobs are now perceived as equally low ranking.  Historically, people gained prestige through 
living, dancing and dressing like Europeans (Mitchell, 1956).  In this context, domestic 
workers may have accrued status from privileged access to insider information about 
European lifestyles (concerning fashion, ballroom dancing, interior design and manners) as 
well as receipt of hand-me-down clothing (as suggested by Hansen, 1989:77,163-165).  
Dressed in their Sunday best, a domestic servant and clerk would have been 
indistinguishable in the colonial period (ibid:217).  But these benefits no longer obtain.   
 
The case of domestic work implies that women do not gain respect from undertaking men’s 
low status work.  But this inference would seem incorrect: a number of participants stressed 
the importance of seeing women perform other poorly paid or even unpaid, low status 
stereotypically masculine activities.  For example, positive sentiments were expressed at the 
sight of women clearing drains, with picks and shovels (stereotypically masculine labour) in 
our low-income compound.  My host, a politician, had specifically employed women for this 
task on account of their perceived reliability and hard-work.  Interviewed passers-by were 
visibly impressed by these ‘strong’ women, fighting for their families.  They still appeared to 
be greatly admired for their fortitude and were visibly proud of their own strength – smiling, 
standing tall with their tools and inviting me to photograph them.   
 
Many people previously presumed that jobs such as slashing the grass and digging ditches for 
drainage were beyond women’s capacity.  Exposure to them undertaking this work appears to 
provide disconfirming evidence of their gender stereotypes.  By contrast, it seems unlikely 
that people ever thought women were incapable of paid care work, since women have long 
been undertaking the very same tasks (e.g. childcare, cooking and cleaning), albeit without 
remuneration.  As stated above, men predominated in this occupation due to white 
employers’ concerns about African women’s sexuality.  While male domestic servants in the 
colonial era did learn new skills – such as how to prepare European food – by the time 
women entered en masse the industry had been ‘deskilled’ (Hansen, 1989:247,259).  Hence 
by receiving payment for domestic work, women entrants to the occupation did not gain an 
opportunity to demonstrate skills that were previously in doubt.  It seems that women gain 
status when they demonstrate their capacity to perform a role that was historically 
dominated by men, which (i) is valorised because of men’s higher status; and (ii) embodies 
stereotypes about gender differences – such that women’s demonstrable success in this 
occupation provides disconfirming evidence of those stereotypes.   
 
This explanation is somewhat complicated by the fact that some women undertake multiple 
gendered roles, which are perceived in different ways by different people.  For example, 
female domestic workers and market traders do not demonstrate an ability to undertake an 
occupation that is esteemed.  However, those domestic workers and traders who are 
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important financial contributors to their families do show that they can provide (just like 
men), and by virtue of performing this socially valued role they are often revered as ‘strong’ 
by their low-income neighbours.   
 
But to only emphasise individual women’s lone encroachments into male domains without 
mentioning socio-economic context would seem too narrow.  Two further issues featured 
heavily in participants’ accounts: (a) a critical mass of incursions; and (b) a background 
context of economic insecurity.  These will be discussed in turn. 
 
First, occasional, sporadic sightings do not seem sufficient to weaken assumptions about 
women’s competence or status.  Instead such women are referred to as honorary men, 
presumed to be ‘prostitutes’ or seen as rudely assertive (by contravening widely-held gender 
stereotypes).  As discussed in Chapter 1, research in social psychology suggests that gender 
beliefs track but lag behind increasing flexibility in gender divisions of labour.  This may be 
because stereotypes influence the interpretation of information, such that contradictory 
cases are dismissed as exceptional and not perceived as disproving presumptions about the 
traits of the typical man or woman.   
 
Participants who had come to eschew prior gender beliefs generally emphasised the 
importance of prolonged exposure to multiple sightings of flexibility in gender divisions of 
labour.  This has more commonly occurred in recent years, with a critical mass of women 
now undertaking gender atypical work.  When evasions of gender stereotypes are 
widespread, they are less commonly overlooked or dismissed as exceptional and more often 
seen as disconfirming evidence of those stereotypes.   
 
A critical mass of incursions into stereotypically masculine domains is also essential for 
collective reflection – which many participants identified as significant.  This process of 
sharing and learning from others’ experiences of flexibility in gender divisions of labour 
(described in the above section on association) can only occur when a number of people have 
been exposed to this phenomenon.  Thirty years ago a woman undertaking a stereotypically 
masculine job, such as a car mechanic, ‘would have been laughed at’, claimed BaShiMayuka 
(a miner, whose wife’s life history is detailed in Chapter 2).  Accordingly, people at that time 
may not have anticipated a sympathetic reception to an initiated discussion on this.  Before 
increased flexibility in gender divisions of labour, people may have presumed that others 
were not exposed and so would be less receptive to and supportive of such discourses.  
However, times have changed as conveyed below.  The following is an extract from a lunch 
break discussion amongst female co-workers at a co-operative house-building scheme.  For 
the past couple of years they have made weekly financial contributions, received training and 
built two room houses together – with the People’s Process on Housing and Poverty in 
Zambia (allied with Homeless International and Slum Dwellers International). 
 
BanaCarola (54, married, home-based trader): A woman should work, she can build...  A 
woman can dig foundations...  But people were laughing, saying, ‘What are you doing 
over there?  You’re just playing’.  But this time, now that we’ve built, they praise us, ‘Oh, 
what you’re doing is very sensible’... 
BanaBwembya (53, widow, market trader): Our neighbours give us great respect...  
Those that have seen how we work praise us saying, ‘You women are working on a big 
job, it’s brilliant’.  They tell their friends, ‘Those women people are strong, they’re 
working very hard’...  Those who know have agreed we’re working very hard.  And... they 
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feel shy about the way they underestimated and laughed at us before...  If I passed them 
they would say, ‘She’s suffering’, but these days it’s, ‘My goodness, how you’ve worked!’ 
They understand us [translated].xli 
 
As BanaCarola explains, they were once ridiculed for attempting to encroach into the 
traditionally male domain of house-building.  According to her testimony, their neighbours 
previously presumed that only men could build houses, so derided the abstract idea of 
flexibility in gender divisions of labour.  Without prior exposure to women demonstrating 
their ability to undertake this stereotypically masculine role, the neighbours thought that 
such women would be wasting their time and so discouraged them.  By publicly expressing 
these gender stereotypes about presumed female incompetence, the neighbours apparently 
deterred other women.  BanaCarola, co-workers and the NGO project manager informed me 
that others, with insufficient self-belief and social support, felt foolish for even trying and so 
gave up, believing the gender atypical task to be impossible.  However, once the neighbours 
had seen that women can indeed build houses they then expressed admiration.  Many have 
even requested to join the scheme.   
 
Seeing a large number of women building their own houses appears to have provided 
sufficient disconfirming evidence of the gender stereotype that this job can be done by men.  
By collectively reflecting on the benefits of women undertaking this kind of work, some 
communities have agreed upon its social importance.  Now, instead of mocking or pitying 
these widows, they applaud them as champions.  Prescriptive stereotypes have shifted: no 
longer do members of this community regard house-building as inappropriate for women.  
Here we see a close connection between beliefs about what women should do and of what 
they are presumed to be capable.  But the broader point here is that perceptions of an 
individual woman’s employment status or economic activity seem affected by the extent of 
flexibility in the society as a whole.  This critical mass of incursions seems to provide 
disconfirming evidence of gender beliefs. 
 
A second point about background context concerns the economy.  Macro-level circumstances 
increased the financial costs of compliance with cultural expectations, motivating a trade-off.  
Even if men and their families secured social respect by adhering to the prescriptive 
stereotype of male breadwinner and female housewife, many families in the 1990s did not 
regard this social reward as outweighing associated economic costs.  Historically, by contrast, 
gender divisions of labour were made realisable by macro-economic circumstances and 
government policies.  The economic incentive to flout these cultural expectations was thus 
significantly lesser for previous generations.  While some women did express private critique 
and resentment, just as some women did seek employment historically, they often faced 
resistance from their families and employers, who did not regard flexibility in gender 
divisions of labour as in their interests. 
 
Now, however, because of pervasive difficulties, people increasingly applaud ‘strong’ women 
who fight to support their families or physically build their own homes.  Those who occupied 
positions of relative power thus found it less desirable for women to specialise in unpaid 
reproductive work.  In the 1990s, people traded the social benefits of conformity with the 
male breadwinner model for the economic benefits of multiple income-generating strategies.  
Furthermore, in the contemporary period, the social cost of undertaking stereotypically 
masculine economic roles is reduced, as people increasingly champion such incursions – as 
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discussed in the next section.  This reveals the interplay between changing patterns of 
resource access and gender stereotypes.  Compliance (and evaluation in accordance) with 
gender stereotypes depends in part on the associated costs, which may change with macro-
economic circumstances.  When those in positions of relative power no longer perceived 
conformity with gender stereotypes as advantageous, when their interests changed, they 
ceased to sanction those who evade them. 
 
Has flexibility in gender divisions of labour really enhanced women’s status? 
 
So far it has been suggested that greater flexibility in gender divisions of labour (both in 
terms of remunerated activities and also occupational desegregation) has weakened 
internalised gender stereotypes (relating to competence and status) as well as cultural 
expectations.  This section interrogates this claim, exploring the possible reasons for 
apparent discrepancy with earlier studies in Zambia, which found that flexibility in gender 
divisions of labour did not undermine gender status beliefs.  This section also triangulates 
participants’ narratives by examining evidence indicating continuity in gender status 
inequalities.   
 
In previous decades, even when women had made substantial economic contributions to the 
household, these were largely regarded as supplementary.  For example, in the absence of a 
father, low-income male youths in Lusaka tended to present themselves as household head.  
Meanwhile their mothers, who supported them financially, commonly referred to a lack of 
filial respect (Schlyter, 1999:83).  Similarly, in relation to inter-generational transfers, earlier 
studies have noted that although daughters tend to support their parents, these remittances 
were not publicly recognised.  Instead men were commonly stereotyped as providers 
(Kamwengo, 2007:101; Schlyter, 1999:79, 2007:117,129).   
 
Even though some low-income urban women in Lusaka were said to contest widely-held 
gender stereotypes – regarding themselves as persons of legal majority and claiming joint 
ownership of matrimonial property – their husbands tended to see themselves as sole 
owners of matrimonial property and their wives as dependents (Schlyter, 1999:10).  Male 
ownership of self-built housing was often presumed and enforced, notwithstanding female 
in/direct contributions to construction, maintenance and improvements (Hansen, 1997:137; 
Munalula, 1998:248).  Even if a woman acquired a house through waged employment, their 
ownership was disputed by their husbands who claimed the fruits of their labours (Larsson 
and Schlyter, 1993:79). 
 
Previous studies also suggest that flexibility in gender divisions of labour resulted in 
anxieties – it not only failed to improve women’s situation but even made it worse, in some 
respects.  Drawing on research in Mufulira (a Copperbelt town), Rasing (2001:102,106) 
noted that divergence from male breadwinner and female homemaker ideal sometimes 
created tensions: a husband might complain about his wife’s lack of respect for domestic 
hierarchy and neglect of domestic responsibilities, such as food preparation.34  For their part, 
women bemoaned men’s infidelity, alcohol abuse, unaccountability, violence and lack of 
responsibility for the family.  Interviewed young men in Lusaka also condemned women’s 
failure to adhere to prescriptive stereotypes about appropriate conduct:  
 
                                                        
34 Curiously, I never heard this complaint, only rumours of others who suffered from this problem. 
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“Women are cheeky and do not behave.  Wives are disobedient and provoke their 
husbands because they earn their own money” (quoted in Schlyter, 1998:305-307).35 
 
Schlyter (1999:94-95) further reports that one interviewed group of young men maintained 
that if a wife did not show respect to her husband then he would be justified in beating her 
(see also Munalula, 1998:251 on spousal homicides). These findings, from an earlier period, 
are consistent with Hansen’s (1996:103) argument that, 
 
[T]he declining economy, which has turned many women into important contributors to 
household welfare in the face of men’s shrinking incomes from wage employment, has 
aggravated the built-in tensions in the conjugal domain without transforming rights and 
claims in a manner that rewards women for their work efforts in their own right. 
 
This conclusion raises questions about my claim that greater flexibility in gender divisions of 
labour has weakened gender status inequalities and related beliefs.  However, Hansen’s 
portrayal is actually consistent with my participants’ narratives of earlier times: they denied 
that the surge in female labour force participation had changed gender status inequalities 
instantaneously.  Their gendered self-perceptions, stereotypes and cultural expectations only 
transformed gradually.  Recall BanaBecca’s narrative that even when she had a make-shift 
hairdressing salon in her front yard she was still just a ‘slave… [but] we started to change, 
slowly slowly’ [translated literally; in Bemba repetition adds emphasis].  Likewise, 
BanaMwamba (quoted above) started selling onions in 1998 but denied this made much 
difference to her self-esteem or regard from others in the first couple of years.  Similarly, 
BanaMwimba started selling dried sardines in the early 1990s, but claimed that women only 
started participating in family discussions at funerals a decade later.  My hypothesis is that if 
Karen Tranberg Hansen and Ann Schlyter now repeated their earlier research then they 
would find that labour force participation has improved women’s status.   
 
This data from earlier studies and my participants’ life histories suggests that gender status 
inequalities are only indirectly related to women’s access to resources.  For even when low-
income women in Lusaka and Kitwe became breadwinners in the 1990s, they were not 
always respected as such.  As discussed in Chapter 2, my sample of market traders appeared 
just as poor as those described in earlier studies.  In Kitwe it seems that with prolonged 
exposure to multiple contradictions of gender stereotypes, as well as collective reflection 
upon these shared experiences, people have become less inclined to assume that women are 
necessarily less competent and less deserving of status than men.   
 
This idea that with prolonged exposure people eventually appreciate women’s economic 
contributions is also explicit in Seur’s (1992:257-262) research in rural Serenje (Central 
Province, Zambia).  Here, envy and hostility towards successful female entrepreneurs were 
most prevalent in the early years of their encroachment into the male domain of cash crop 
farming.  Apparently unable to comprehend the success of commercially-orientated female 
farmers, some jealous others accused them of sorcery – implicitly denying that they had 
                                                        
35 By contrast, I found that although stories still circulate about wives becoming ‘difficult’ upon earning their own money these were generally just 
fears and rumours, warning women against becoming too proud.  It was rare for someone to give an actual example of such dissatisfaction.  The 
few cases of women scolding their spouses were sometimes sympathetically attributed to women’s frustration at their husband’s lack of 
employment, rather than a desire to boast about their own.   
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succeeded by virtue of their own merit.  Over time, however, the female pioneers were 
increasingly admired and asked for advice.   
 
Seur’s and my own findings seem consistent with research from social psychology, 
suggesting that gender beliefs lag behind but nonetheless track changes in material practices.  
Deploying the concept of ‘confirmation bias’, Ridgeway (2011) argues that people’s gender 
stereotypes may blind them to disconfirming evidence and thereby endure for some time, 
despite a shift in practices.  Drawing on a range of quantitative methodologies (experimental, 
surveys and meta-analytical) and cross-cultural data (Australia, Brazil, Chile, Germany, 
India and the United States), Eagly and Diekman (2012:432) similarly argue that ‘vanguard 
group members who ﬁrst enter new social roles do not produce much change in their group 
stereotype but can leave vestiges of positivity that pave the way for further role access for 
their group.  As a critical mass of individuals succeeds in entering non-traditional social 
roles, they eventually change the stereotype of their group’. For example, when asked to 
describe the characteristics of men and women in the past (1950s), present, and future 
(2050), respondents in Brazil, Chile and the United States of America portrayed men as 
more agentic than women, but maintained that this gap had declined over time and would 
continue to do so – reflecting women’s growing share of stereotypically masculine roles 
(Eagly and Diekman, 2000).   
 
Eagly and Diekman’s emphasis on exposure to a critical mass of women in stereotypically 
masculine domains seems consistent with Seur’s and my qualitative findings from Central 
Province and the Copperbelt respectively.  But Seur (1992) also underscores the importance 
of interests.  He notes that many husbands became supportive because they realised the 
financial advantage of their wives having additional income, which reduced their own 
burden.  Seur’s and my Zambian findings suggests that support for flexibility in gender 
divisions of labour is not just contingent upon exposure to disconfirming evidence of gender 
stereotypes but also depends upon whether flexibility is perceived as desirable, given the 
institutional context.  Seur’s and Diekman and Eagly’s (2000) findings are not necessary 
contradictory here, since the latter focuses on stereotypes (i.e. beliefs) rather than proclivity 
to support flexibility in gender divisions of labour (i.e. desires). 
 
In Serenje, prolonged exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of labour not only seems to 
have provided disconfirming evidence of gender stereotypes about competence but also 
status.  For example, women are increasingly participating in funeral discussions, concerning 
burial arrangements and asset redistribution.  Historically, only men were regarded as 
having sufficient esteem and influence to govern these socially important affairs.  Mudala 
Chisenga, a research assistant contributing to Seur’s (1992:322) fieldwork, further explained: 
 
In the past, there were certain separations: this type of work was for men, that type of 
work was only done by women.  But nowadays people feel that most jobs can be done by 
men and women.  That’s why you find these discussions, this struggle between men and 
women.  But here in Nchimishi women have become equal to men.  Because whatever a 
man can do, even a woman is doing it.  Many women are even much better than men, 
like for instance in farming.  This has changed the way men and women think of each 
other. 
 
Seur’s (1992) and Diekman and Eagly’s (2000) findings that beliefs can change with 
prolonged exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of labour seem to enhance the 
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plausibility of my participants’ suggestion that there was previously little appreciation of 
women’s work but that this has changed over time.  An alternative hypothesis is discussed in 
Chapter 6: gender status beliefs may have recently waned due to exposure to egalitarian 
discourses.  While either explanation may account for the apparent discrepancy between my 
findings and earlier studies of female labour force participation in urban Zambia, the extent 
of attitudinal shifts posited by a number of my participants still merits further interrogation.  
The following sections critically examine the reliability of my qualitative data.  It also 
highlights the persistence of gender status beliefs, which is apparent from prevalent gender-
based violence as well as inequitable distribution of unpaid care work. 
 
Did my participants exaggerate the extent of gender equality? 
 
Earlier findings from Hansen (1996) and Schlyter (1999) underscore the need for cautious 
interpretation of the data I collected.  Participants might have exaggerated the extent of 
gender equality, for the following three reasons: (i) to present themselves as content or at 
least emphasise the positive aspects of their lives; (ii) to portray themselves as adhering to 
cultural expectations; (iii) to feign agreement with egalitarian gender beliefs that they might 
have assumed I held.  These possible desires, which would have biased the data, are 
considered in turn.  I further consider the possibility that their stated beliefs were not 
reflected in practice. 
 
Perhaps female participants exaggerated the extent to which they are respected by others, in 
order to present an idealised version of their lives.  By exaggerating the pro tanto benefits of 
the contemporary erosion of gender divisions of labour they may have sought to make the 
best of a bad situation (i.e. worsening economic security).  It is also possible that former 
housewives and their daughters previously derived (now forgotten) pleasure and satisfaction 
from being at home with their children, free from the stressful burden of responsibility for 
household financial provision.  These considerations provide reason for cautious 
interpretation of the data presented above.  On the other hand, almost all participants gave 
nostalgic narratives of the economic security enjoyed during the Kaunda era (1964-1991) and 
contrasted this with contemporary hardship.  This does not support the claim that 
participants appeared optimistic about the present or sought to present themselves as 
content.   
 
Furthermore, this idea of positive self-presentations does not account for the tendency of 
people in general (husbands, children, siblings, co-workers, neighbours and voters) to talk 
positively of other women.  Recall Matthew’s life history: like those of other men, it indicates 
that women’s reports of equality are not just positive self-presentations.  On the other hand, 
both women and men may have exaggerated their commitment to gender equality in order to 
portray themselves as observing a socially sanctioned normative ideal – seeing this as ‘the 
right answer’, perhaps.  Yet this does not seem entirely plausible since participants were 
aware of other prescriptions, including patriarchal readings of the Bible, which were freely 
cited by those who explicitly rejected equality.  Furthermore, this critique seems self-
defeating: it presupposes that people’s cultural expectations have radically changed, in 
favour of gender equality, and it is exactly this claim that many participants were making.   
 
Another possibility is that some participants feigned egalitarian beliefs in an attempt to 
impress or please me.  They might have assumed that I would appreciate such statements – 
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perhaps because such discourses were promoted by white, Western donors or because I may 
unknowingly, inadvertently and unintentionally signalled enthusiasm for particular 
responses.  But this notion of feigned compliance does not seem entirely plausible, for four 
reasons.  First, in narrating their life histories, participants seemed keen to tell me their 
stories about ‘Zambia’/ ‘Africa’.  A big part of why they appeared to enjoy our discussions was 
that they were talking about their own lives.  Second, in the course of these discussions, 
participants often expressed views contrary to my own: extolling marriage, child-bearing, 
heteronormativity and devaluing women’s unpaid care work.  A number of men did not shy 
from divulging that they publicly presented household decisions and purchases as their own 
or joint, even if they were financed or initiated by their wives.  Third, when I did mention 
some aspects of my own life, after participants had been interviewed repeatedly and already 
narrated their life histories, they were often surprised that I live with my partner without 
being married.  While younger women often expressed support for this practice, older 
women were generally more conservative.  They did not appear to feign enthusiasm or 
present agreement in the hope of pleasing me.  Similarly, many repeatedly urged me to have 
a child – even those to whom I had divulged my disinterest in mothering.  They still sought to 
persuade me to share their priorities.  Fourth, in other discussions, not relating to gender, 
participants rarely appeared to hold back from dissenting.  In summary, the idea that they 
sought to present agreement does not seem consistent with my observations of our 
interactions. 
 
Furthermore, the idea that participants sought to exaggerate their observance of egalitarian 
practices for the sake of complying with cultural expectations or impressing me does not 
seem compatible with their depictions of earlier status inequalities – i.e. self-incrimination.  
Men, like Matthew for example, volunteered that they used to beat their wives.   
 
However, even if some people’s gender beliefs really have changed, these might not always 
have been enacted.  This discrepancy was sometimes identified by participants themselves.  
Sometimes I discovered inconsistencies in participants’ accounts.  For instance, in our 
interview, Helen (the elected representative of a low-income area, whose life history is 
detailed in Chapter 2) stressed the importance of gender equality in political representation 
and chorused a slogan of gender equality, ‘50:50’.  She then proudly volunteered that her 17 
year old son shares domestic jobs around the house, such as washing up.  But I never once 
saw him do so in all my months of subsequently living with them.  Mulwila was only ever at 
home to eat meals and sleep.  He occasionally helped his father to water the vegetables in the 
mornings (a stereotypically masculine chore) but was otherwise absent.  My impression is 
that Helen has come to see shared care work as the logical extension of her quest for equal 
representation in public decision-making (to which she is ardently committed).  However, 
she has not endeavoured to implement this at home because is too busy trading and 
campaigning for political change, so too exhausted for this domestic struggle.  Therefore 
Helen expressed her support for flexibility in gender divisions of care labour even though she 
has not been able to achieve it at home.   
 
Similarly, BanaRuth (a widow and former housewife) claimed that she had become more 
confident and assertive since she had joined the market.  But this statement was not always 
reflected in her behaviour.  For example, she once appealed to a nearby male trader to shoo a 
drunken man who was bothering us.  Other women who had long traded were more vocal 
and agentic, personally dealing with such matters.  These apparent discrepancies between 
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narratives and practices highlight the importance of triangulation through observation.  
Since I did not observe all participants’ lives, their claims need to be interpreted cautiously.  
They may only reflect a change in beliefs or aspirations (in Helen’s case) or partial gains (for 
BanaRuth).  This possibility notwithstanding, we can still note changes in expressed beliefs.   
 
What evidence is there of continuity in gender status beliefs? 
 
This section draws on additional sources and different kinds of data in order to triangulate 
participants’ accounts about an erosion of gender status beliefs.  The prevalence of intimate 
partner violence and inequitable distribution of unpaid care work indicate persistent 
commitment to gender status beliefs. 
 
Gender-based violence 
 
The evidence presented above lends plausibility to the hypothesis that gender status beliefs 
are weakened by prolonged exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of labour (in a context 
where such practices are widespread and financially important, given worsening economic 
security).  If this is the case then we might expect prolonged exposure to be negatively 
associated with manifestations of those status beliefs, such as gender-based violence.  Earlier 
research on reports of spousal homicide found that ‘many cases involved direct challenges to 
male privilege or authority, or failure by the woman to fulfil her expected gender role…  The 
women appear to have died because they did not do what was expected of good wives or 
female family members in the Zambian context’ (Rude, 1999:19).  Ridgeway (1997:122, 
2011:81) similarly argues that persons with gender status beliefs lead them to regard 
women’s deviant, assertive behaviour as illegitimate.  These two accounts suggest that 
gender-based violence in Zambia is commonly triggered by women contradicting men’s 
gender status beliefs.  If this is the case and if gender status beliefs are weakened by exposure 
to flexibility in gender divisions of labour (as has been suggested), then violence and 
exposure to flexibility should be negatively associated.   
 
Zambia’s Demographic Health Survey provides data on married women’s reports of violence 
as well as independent variables.  The closest proxy for prolonged exposure is women’s work 
status: whether they are employed or not, then paid in cash, in kind or not at all.  This 
indicator is not ideal since it does not tell us two things my Zambian participants identified 
as critical, namely the duration of employment and whether it is common for women in the 
respondent’s locality to share that work status.  Although participants did emphasise a 
difference between economically active and inactive women, they did not suggest that there 
was an immediate change, so this particular indicator might be biased by recent labour 
market entrants.  Kishor and Johnson (2004:44-45) find no statistically significant 
association between these two variables.  On the one hand, this evidence neither confirms 
nor contradicts my hypothesis that prolonged exposure to flexibility weakens gender status 
beliefs.  However, it does suggest there has not been a backlash against women’s 
encroachment into male domains.  Evidence of backlash would suggest that gender beliefs 
lag behind a change in material circumstances, as found in Kenya (Silberschmidt, 1999; 
discussed in Chapter 1). 
 
Even if such studies do not clarify the association between prolonged exposure to flexibility 
and intimate partner violence (IPV), evidence of endemic violence does indicate a distinctly 
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partial erosion of gender status beliefs.  69% of female Copperbelt respondents to the 2007 
Demographic and Health Survey reported prior experience of emotional, physical or sexual 
violence.  This figure greatly exceeds the national average of 54.2% (CSO et al, 2009:287).  
Furthermore, of women who have ever experienced emotional violence, women in the 
Copperbelt are most likely to report exposure to violence in the last 12 months (CSO et al, 
2009:290).  These high reporting rates would appear to reflect a persistent, contemporary 
problem, not just something endured in earlier decades.   
 
The prevalence of IPV could reflect widespread hostility to women’s non-compliance with 
gender stereotypes, about the kind of labour they should perform and the deferential, 
feminine ways in which they ought to behave – as suggested by Rude (1999).  Men could be 
attempting to assert their mastery.  However, the quantitative data to which I have access 
does not enable me to test this association.  Furthermore, no participant explicitly attributed 
their or others’ experience of violence to women’s increasing share of stereotypically 
masculine economic roles. 
 
Another explanation of IPV points not to women’s but to men’s behaviour, principally their 
inability to express their masculine identity through being breadwinners.  Perhaps there has 
been a violent response to flexibility in gender divisions of labour, not primarily because 
women are undertaking masculine roles but because men are unable to do so.  Indeed, 
household tensions often seemed to result from the stresses induced by men’s loss of secure 
employment, as well as the attendant drop in living standards, economic security status and 
self-respect.  Many men, from across the socio-economic spectrum, suffered during the 
global economic crisis.  Several wealthy suppliers to the mines experienced a sudden reversal 
of fortunes as their bank loans were called in and companies folded.  Some workers who were 
retrenched during structural adjustment became depressed after years of waiting for 
promised investors, no longer wasted their time looking for jobs.  Friends and family 
members sometimes attribute their deaths to depression and suicide.  As explained by 
Matthew and BanaMayuka (whose life histories are detailed in Chapter 2): 
 
The situation was very terrible, very terrible.  It was like we were somewhere, now you 
are come into a deep down situation, if you are not very careful you can even develop 
some sickness, like high blood pressure.  It’s very difficult.  It took me a bit of time to 
settle down to that level, but nowadays I’m accustomed, I’ve got no option. 
Matthew 
 
When men are not going for work they develop icifukushi [frustration]. 
BanaMayuka  
 
Earlier research in Lusaka likewise found that ‘[m]any of the unemployed boys felt the stress 
of not being able to contribute as expected, and thereby not gaining the respect they desired’ 
(Schlyter, 1998:303).  Muvandi et al (2000) similarly note that, ‘Married men in Zambia 
ideally see themselves as the breadwinners for the nuclear family.  At the same time, support 
to kin is still an important aspect of local values.  It is not only a social obligation but also a 
means for men to achieve status.  Our research reveals that problems for men in terms of 
living up to socio-economic expectations, especially in the present difficult economic 
circumstances’. 
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Some men with icifukushi (the Bemba term for angst and pent-up frustration) turn to 
alcohol, which sometimes results in household conflict and violence (as observed by other 
studies in Zambia: Hossain and Green, 2011; Moser and Holland, 1997:69; Muvandi et al, 
2000).  Alcohol consumption might partly explain the discrepancy between Copperbelt 
men’s expressed attitudes towards gender-based violence and women’s reports of it.  The 
proportion of Copperbelt men endorsing at least one of the specified justifications for wife 
beating was below the national average, at 46.3% (CSO et al, 2009:265).  Yet, as we recall, 
the reported prevalence of violence is highest in the Copperbelt.  This implies that a number 
of men who are violent towards their intimate partners also declare this unjust.  This 
apparent discrepancy might be alcohol related.  So, the prevalence of IPV does not 
necessarily reflect persistent gender status beliefs, it may be partly due to intoxication and 
men’s icifukushi with their own economic situation.   
 
Such tensions are not universal, however.  Many women have prevented conflict by putting 
extra effort into emotionally supporting their husbands through economic insecurity and 
turbulence, as they are often advised to do at church.  A woman may try to help her 
unemployed husband adjust to a loss of social status by calling him ‘household head’, even 
though their relationship may appear like an egalitarian partnership (as also found by 
Muvandi et al, 2000; Silberschmidt, 1992:248).   
 
In summary, qualitative research suggests that intimate partner violence is commonly 
triggered by women’s non-compliance with gender status beliefs.  The prevalence of IPV 
indicates that such beliefs persist, notwithstanding flexibility in gender divisions of labour.  
This said, the data is not conclusive: there may be additional influences (such as alcohol and 
economic frustration, rather than status beliefs).  Furthermore, IPV does not appear to be 
associated with a woman’s economic activity. 
 
In order to further interrogate the foregoing hypothesis (that exposure to flexibility in gender 
divisions of labour has contributed towards an erosion of gender stereotypes concerning 
competence and status), the next section explores another domain in which gender status 
beliefs seem to persist. 
 
Unpaid Care Work 
 
While appreciation of women’s financial contributions and advice seemed increasingly 
widespread, participants generally maintained that men rarely shared domestic work (incito 
sha banakashi - women’s work).  Moser and Holland (1997:63) similarly found that men’s 
share of domestic work did not with increased female labour force participation in Chawama, 
a low-income area of Lusaka.  In 1992, their random sample of those undertaking productive 
work (i.e. for cash or kind, producing for the market or subsistence) found that such men 
and women averaged 50 hours a week.  However, women worked more hours in total due to 
their far larger share of unpaid reproductive activities (13 to 16 hours a week on average, 
compared to men’s five hours or fewer).  Furthermore, women in full-time employment 
devoted no fewer houses to unpaid domestic labour than those in part-time employment 
(ibid:64).   
 
This section explores some possible interpretations of asymmetric, unidirectional increased 
flexibility in gender divisions of labour, drawing on the concepts introduced in Chapter 1: 
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interests, exposure, internalised gender beliefs, cultural expectations and also patterns of 
resource access.  A further, overarching aim here is to ascertain whether seemingly 
entrenched gender divisions of care work provide evidence that gender status beliefs have 
not weakened in all respects. 
 
Before discussing the reasons for the distribution of unpaid care work it first essential to 
understand how it is perceived by Copperbelt residents.  As discussed in Chapter 3, unpaid 
care was widely portrayed as less prestigious than remunerated activities in the public 
sphere.  Participants suggested that while women’s financial contributions to a household 
were appreciated and enhanced their social status, their domestic work (e.g. washing-up and 
childcare) tended to be overlooked and taken for granted.  Homemakers who only performed 
this form of labour were commonly referred to as ‘doing nothing’, ‘just sitting’ or as focusing 
on ‘small issues’.  Additionally, there appeared to be an association between attitudes 
towards distribution of unpaid care work and gender status beliefs.  For example, when a 
class of 14-15 year olds in a low-income compound discussed gender equality (as part of a 
Civics lesson), one boy explained that his future wife should sweep in order to show respect 
to him as household head.  This claim was loudly rejected by the girls sitting at the front of 
the class, who called for ‘50:50’ in marriage.  The girls who sought marital equality regarded 
shared care work as a component of this: they challenged the boy who considered women’s 
care work to be a display of due deference. 
 
In contrast to my own interpretations of the available data on care work (also discussed in 
Chapter 4), Rasing (2001) portrays domestic work as a source of female power.  However, 
little evidence is presented in support of this claim.  One of her informants in Mufulira (a 
Copperbelt town) apparently insisted on cleaning her husbands’ clothes.  Rasing (ibid:107) 
adds that ‘if her husband did the housework, he would be interfering in the female domain, 
and would consequently attack her authority’.  It is not clear how Rasing came to this 
interpretation, no reference is made to sentiments or terminology expressed or implied by 
participants.  Rasing (ibid:233) subsequently claims that ‘through it [cooking] a woman 
achieves power or authority over her husband’.  Again, since detail is not elaborated upon, it 
is unclear why Raising interprets domestic work as a source of female power, or what kind of 
power is alleged.  Moreover, I saw no evidence of this claim in my own research, quite the 
reverse in fact.  For example, at one government school I observed for three weeks, the staff 
social involved a football competition between male teachers, after which female teachers 
served food they had prepared.  I did not hear any man expressing appreciation for this 
service.  The division of labour was not questioned in public fora – save by one young female 
trainee teacher who spoke out during the planning meeting.  Thus based on the evidence to 
which I have access, it does not seem plausible that women commonly gain some kind of 
power through domestic work – though may still be true.   
 
If we understand unpaid care work (in the Copperbelt) as a display of deference to the male 
household head, in compliance with gender status beliefs, then continued, society-wide 
gender division of this labour suggests that women have not gained much status.  Even if 
stereotypes about women’s competence have changed they still remain responsible for care 
work, which is largely unappreciated.  This could be interpreted as suggesting that status 
beliefs are not reducible to assumptions about differential competence.  Another possibility 
is that women have gained status but only in some domains.  A husband and wife may regard 
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each other’s ideas as equally valuable and so jointly contribute to household decision-
making, yet gender beliefs may become salient in the context of care work.   
 
Here it is important to distinguish between beliefs and performances of gender.  Women’s 
internalised gender status beliefs should not be inferred from their behavioural compliance 
with this cultural expectation.  Some women (young and old) privately criticised the 
unfairness of gender divisions of care work.  This suggests that they did not believe that the 
asymmetry was justified by gender status beliefs.  Thus gender divisions of care work do not 
necessarily provide evidence of internalised gender status beliefs. 
 
Unpaid care work is not only an expression of gender status beliefs, it is also a stereotypically 
feminine activity.  Indeed it is commonly labelled ‘incito sha banakashi’ (women’s work).  
Prescriptive gender stereotypes mandate that this labour should be performed by women.  
Ridgeway (2011) suggests that gender beliefs are more salient in the home than the 
workplace.  Because households are largely based around a heterosexual union of two 
different sexes, people’s gender beliefs are more likely to be activated in this environment.  
Relatedly, the social institution of the family is widely regarded as a gendered context.  
Accordingly, when in this environment, people become particularly inclined to sex-categorise 
on another and to adhere to gender beliefs.  Meanwhile, in workplaces gender is said to be 
less salient.  This seems plausible, though difficult to interrogate empirically.   
 
Another reason why unpaid care work continues to be stereotyped as women’s work may be 
that it is largely performed behind closed doors.  While the sight of a female electrician often 
inspires young women to follow suit, the small numbers of men who do help out inside the 
home remain largely hidden from view.  Discouraging cultural expectations thus persist: 
many continue to think that men’s undertaking such work is ‘not normal’ (meaning neither 
common nor appropriate).  This may explain why women who privately expressed 
resentment appeared resigned to accept their fate, for they had no evidence to suggest that 
this tradition was likely to change. 
 
The importance of exposure to such incursions is highlighted by recent rural immigrants to 
Kitwe, who explained that their husbands had started to help out occasionally since they saw 
other men doing so in town.  In the following dialogue Chilando (41, selling tomatoes in the 
central city market, having left her village four months ago so that her children focus on 
education rather than marriage) explains why her husband started helping wash plates after 
three months of living in town:  
 
Chilando: They are very different, the village and town.  It is women who do all the work 
at the village.  Right here in town men cook and help with washing up, but that can’t 
possibly happen in the village!  He [my husband] helps me here.  They see women going 
to the market, we’re working, we come to the market, we become tired, they come so we 
can help each other. 
Alice: Does he have friends who wash plates? 
Chilando: Many. 
Alice: Did you used to get tired before [in the village]? 
Chilando: We used to get tired but they didn’t feel mercy...  Because the rules in the 
village are very tough, they’ll be laughing at you.  Here he’s found his friends helping 
their wives.  Things are very different in the village. 
Alice: Does he often wash plates? 
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Chilando: Only sometimes... 
Alice: Not every day? 
Chilando: No, because he’s working [he makes flower pots] [translated].xlii 
 
Chilando maintains that her husband changed through exposure to other men performing 
care work.  We might interpret this as providing disconfirming evidence of his own, 
internalised gender stereotypes, in which case we would expect him to continue performing 
this work if he returned to the village.  By contrast, if behaviour is more influenced by 
cultural expectations then we might expect Chilando’s husband to eschew care work upon 
return to the village in order to express his masculine identity and secure social approval.  
Perhaps men and women adhere to gender divisions of domestic labour in order to be 
positively evaluated by others, who are assumed to expect women to perform this work.  
While I do not know what happens when Chilando’s husband returns to the village, other 
evidence does underscore the salience of cultural expectations.  For example, Mr Zimba (a 
Civic Education and history teacher at a high school) explained,  
 
You know, I think I’m a very good cook but I’m not given the opportunity to cook...  If it 
went out that I enjoy cooking they would think it’s something wrong with my wife, she’s 
not looking after me.  She can even be forced out by my sisters, by our relatives.  They 
may not do it for as long as I suppose I’m alive, but generally that’s the nonsense that 
can happen.  Women’s roles are so pronounced and fixated; they’re rigid, no matter the 
education.   
 
Samuel and Owen (the interviewed young mechanics who expressed enthusiasm about a 
female co-worker, see discussion on page 121) similarly suggested that they could wash 
clothes or plates but raised concerns about what others would think of them.  Such self-
reports may be unreliable, however.  Perhaps these men did not really want to share 
domestic work and were just shirking personal responsibility for this gender division of 
labour.  This possibility underscores the importance of recording how people act in different 
social contexts.  For example, some women maintained that they only kneeled when serving 
food to their husbands in the presence of visitors but not when alone.  This discrepancy 
would seem due to cultural expectations rather than their own internalised gender beliefs.  
Similarly, Mwale (a 14 year old boy in a low-income compound) would only sweep inside (not 
outside) the house, so that he would not be seen or laughed at by his friends passing by.  
Since sweeping inside the house is not perceived as any different from sweeping outside, we 
cannot explain this behaviour by reference to Mwale’s internalised gender beliefs.  Instead it 
seems due to his concerns about other people’s appraisals of his behaviour.   
 
Besides gender stereotypes (which may be influenced by limited exposure), we might also 
explain gender divisions of unpaid care work by reference to structural factors such as 
marriage markets, which shape interests.  Recall that during the 1930s, male rural-urban 
migration gave Copperbelt women scarcity value, enhancing their ability to bargain for better 
treatment in intimate relations.  The situation has since reversed.  Many young men are 
unemployed and therefore delay marriage because they do not feel financially competent to 
provide for a household (see Hansen, 2008:221; Muvandi et al, 2000; also Figure 4.12; as 
well as Hunter, 2010 on South Africa).   
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[This image has been removed for copyright reasons].  
Figure 4.12: Marriage and the macro-economy 
Source: The Post, 2010 
 
Most of them they are not married because they’re scared, “If I got married what am I 
going to be giving my wife?”. 
Mark (middle-aged food supplier to prisons and hospitals, employs manual workers). 
  
There is a low supply of men seeking marriage.  However, the demand is high – on the part of 
women looking for marriage or boyfriends to provide financial support, in a context of their 
own unemployment and historically socialised dependence on men’s earnings.   
 
Intimate relationships can be extremely insecure because there is so much competition from 
other women, keen to find husbands and/or financial providers (see also Crehan, 1997:151 
for parallels with polygnous unions, in which women similarly compete for a man’s 
attention).  Thus although some women may have improved their marriages by labour force 
participation, their marriages remain threatened by other women’s unemployment.  This 
generates suspicion and divisions between married and unmarried women.  This animosity is 
not novel; it was also observed in Lusaka in earlier decades.  Glazer Schuster (1979:83,127) 
wrote that ‘single women… are hated and condemned for their immorality by married 
women…  Unmarried women “cause” men to neglect their wives’.   
 
In the contemporary Copperbelt context women are being advised, in women’s church 
groups especially, to redouble their efforts in unpaid reproductive work, making the home 
nice for the husband, so as to prevent his departure.  Thus, while men increasingly accept 
working women’s financial contributions and participation in household decision-making 
(because they see this as valuable), many wives are reluctant to push for a sharing of other 
gender roles for fear this will push men away.36,37 
 
The foregoing reference to interests relating to marriage markets suggests that men’s limited 
share of unpaid care work is not entirely due to internalised gender status beliefs.  Even if 
exposed to alternative practices, men and women might choose to continue with gender 
divisions of care labour because they have limited interest in pushing for a revision.  This 
aversion is likely compounded by concerns that others will condemn men’s performance of 
incito sha banakashi.  Evidence about what happens in different social contexts suggests that 
                                                        
36 Similarly in Rwanda, Schindler (2011:16) speculates that unmarried women’s particular adherence to traditional gender roles stems from the 
paucity of prospective partners, given unbalanced sex ratios in the aftermath of the genocide.   
37 Men’s reluctance to share unpaid reproductive work often seems to thwart women’s progression in paid employment.  With limited time 
available for study, social networking and longer working hours, women face difficulties in finding and also advancing in employment.  
Reproductive labour can also trigger loss of employment, such as following temporary leave to care for sick children.  While wealthier women can 
employ domestic workers to reduce these burdens, maternity leave remains a major issue for employers.  This concern was echoed in 
conversations with trade unionists and human resource personnel.  Also, it seems that while employers increasingly recognise women’s 
capabilities and qualifications to work, many remain reluctant to employ women because of asymmetric reproductive burdens, which seem 
reinforced by lopsided marriage markets - a function of worsening economic security.  Such concerns may partly account for the disparity in men 
and women’s earnings, which holds even in similar work (CSO, 2009; CSO et al, 2009:257; Kalinda and Floro, 1992:27; Nielsen, 2000; World 
Economic Forum, 2009).  Current policies for parental leave only reinforce this asymmetry.  At present Zambian law permits 5 days paternity 
leave and 12 weeks maternity leave after two years of continued service.  The financial burden is not shared collectively, through social insurance, 
but borne entirely by the employer.  This ensures a structural, financial incentive to discriminate against women (see also ILO, 2010:23; World 
Bank, 2011:231).   
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behaviour is shaped by cultural expectations (which vary according to context and prospects 
of external evaluation) rather than internalised beliefs (which presumably remain stable).   
 
To conclude this section, uneven distribution of unpaid care work and gender-based violence 
both suggest that status inequalities remain widespread.  Yet the available evidence does not 
appear sufficient to reject the foregoing hypothesis that flexibility in gender divisions of 
labour has at least enhanced women’s status in some domains.  Furthermore, the apparent 
discrepancy with earlier findings in Zambia may be attributed to the passage of time.   
 
Thus far this chapter has explored the consequences of increasing flexibility in gender 
divisions of labour on household and community relationships, in order to enable 
comparisons with previous, related studies in Zambia.  I now consider a different dimension 
of gender relations: political participation.  This is an important indication of gender status 
beliefs, which hold that men are more suited to positions of authority and more worthy of 
influence and esteem. 
 
4.3 The consequences of flexibility in gender divisions of labour on women’s 
political participation 
 
Female political participation appears to have increased significantly over recent decades.  
The proportion of female MPs doubled during the 1990s, for instance (as shown in Figure 
4.13). 
 
Figure 4.13: Proportion of female Members of Parliament, 1964-2013 
Source: Longwe, 2011; Singongo et al, 2009:26. 
 
Female political participation also appears to have increased at grassroots levels.  This claim 
is based on comparisons between contemporary data (from my interviews and observations, 
as well as 2007 World Values Survey data) and historical research.  As further elaborated 
upon in Chapter 3, Zambian women were often mistrusted and marginalised in party politics 
during the early decades of independence.  They were generally allocated the role of singing 
praises and dancing for male politicians at rallies (Geisler, 2004).  In the contemporary 
period, however, women no longer seem confined to playing a subordinate role.  For 
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example, the Kitwe central market branch of the Patriotic Front (a political party which won 
the national elections in 2011) was not established by men – who had been fearful of reprisals 
sponsored by the ruling party.  It was founded by four frustrated female market traders, who 
raised awareness and rallied support by beating drums.  Similarly, in the Mufulira 
(Copperbelt) market association, almost all leaders are women.  This is exceptionally high, 
however: the proportion of female leaders is more commonly between 10 and 30%.   Further 
evidence of rising support for female political participation comes from the 2007 World 
Values Survey.  In reply to the statement that ‘On the whole, men make better political 
leaders than women do’ Zambian responses were evenly split between agreement and 
disagreement.  Women were less likely to express agreement: only 13.6% said they strongly 
agreed, compared to 21.8% of men.  Participants’ life histories and historical ethnographies 
suggest that if this survey had been undertaken in earlier decades then far fewer respondents 
would have dissented from the gender stereotype expressed. 
 
Since half of the Zambian respondents to the World Values Survey expressed a preference for 
male leaders, change should not be overstated.  Indeed, women only account for 12.7% of 
parliamentarians (as illustrated in Figure 4.13).  The proportion of women in Local 
Government is similarly low: only 387 women were adopted by political parties to contest the 
2006 Local Government elections (thereby comprising 10.6% of the 4095 total candidates) 
(Singogo et al, 2009:26).  Also, the women who launched PF in the central market reported 
to a male party organiser and campaigned for a male MP (now Copperbelt Minister). 
 
Though gradual, female participation does seem to be increasing in Kitwe at least.  This 
suggests a transformation of gender status beliefs – that men are more deserving of esteem 
and influence.  The purpose of this section is to set out evidence suggesting that this is at 
least partly due to flexibility in gender divisions of paid labour in a context of economic 
insecurity.  Subsequent chapters will examine other possible causes.  Chapter 5 examines the 
hypothesis that support for female political participation was not shifted by socio-economic 
change but instead remained stable over the life course, as shaped by certain formative 
experiences.  Chapter 6 considers an alternative explanation, namely the impact of exposure 
to egalitarian discourses.   
 
Supply-side changes 
 
When explaining their decisions to become politically active, market women frequently 
referred to worsening economic security.  Many expressed deep frustration that even after 
struggling to pay for their children’s education they still cannot find employment.  In an 
attempt to galvanise change, many women joined the political opposition (the Patriotic 
Front, PF), as leaders at grassroots levels.  (Subsequent to my fieldwork, PF won power in the 
national elections of September 2011).  BanaMayunda (39, leader in a market branch of PF, 
selling mushrooms) echoed sentiments expressed more widely: 
 
We stood in politics in order to change the Government, which is not governing well...  
[My children] they are just farming [she explains that they have not found jobs and she 
cannot afford to put them through college]...  The industries are ruined, there’s 
nothing...  This time we’ve wised up.  These days it’s 50:50 [men and women] 
[translated].xliii 
 
Feeling that no one was fighting for them was another cited motivation for women’s entry 
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into politics as grassroots campaigners.  Many expressed confidence in the PF party leader, 
Michael Sata, having seen how he had worked in Government.  Elected female 
representatives (councillors and Members of Parliament) expressed similar frustration with 
current development and spoke about wanting to speak for others.  Some women have 
similarly engaged in union politics, ostensibly motivated by dissatisfaction with low wages 
and injustice.38 
 
However, even if those women who are politically active stressed the initial influence of 
economic insecurity (a shift in interests), there appears to be additional factors at play.  For 
example, the vast majority of such women also undertook paid work in the public sphere, 
through which they had gained self-esteem and learnt about politics.  All interviewed female 
market traders who were politically active had grown up with gender status beliefs, assuming 
men were more suited to prestigious positions of leadership.  Their gendered self-perceptions 
and stereotypes only shifted when they started selling (as discussed earlier in this chapter). 
 
However, undertaking stereotypically masculine work has not enhanced all women’s 
proclivity to stand as leaders (of market, religious or political organisations).  Accordingly, 
some remain shy when talking with a large group of people.  Some doubt their capacity to 
undertake leadership roles or refrain due to cultural expectations of limited support.  For 
instance, the market women who launched the Patriotic Front (PF) in Chisokone (Kitwe’s 
central market) were initially hesitant to put themselves forward as central leaders (e.g. 
chairperson), seeing these roles as more appropriate for men.  Even when trading, they 
presumed that men were naturally better leaders, so deferred.  However, through experience, 
trial and error, they now consider themselves to be more capable than current leadership, 
whom they plan to challenge in the next elections.  Their gender status beliefs appear to have 
developed gradually, with ‘political apprenticeship’ (a term developed in Cornwall and Goetz, 
2005; see also Nazneen and Tasneem, 2010; Tadroz, 2011) and were not entirely shifted by 
flexibility in gender divisions of paid labour. 
 
Furthermore, although female political activists stressed the influence of worsening 
economic security, others responded in different ways to this same set of macro-level 
circumstances.  Some women are reluctant to enter trade and student union politics for fear 
of being suspended or fired  both of which are real possibilities.  Additionally, present 
political leadership and economic dissatisfaction have made some men and women 
apathetic.  Others are interested in national politics but feel constrained by poverty, so 
prioritise income-generation over political meetings.  The decision to respond to economic 
insecurity through political activism also seemed affected by formative experiences (Chapter 
5) and exposure to egalitarian discourses (discussed in Chapter 6), not entailed by structural 
economic circumstances. 
 
 
  
                                                        
38 Mikell (1995:409) draws a similar link between economic decline and African women’s political participation, arguing that women have 
increasingly put themselves forward, believing that their ‘performance can be no worse between that of male politicians… [who oversaw] economic 
collapses, military coups, civil wars, refugee crises, feminisation of poverty, and structural adjustment programs’.  While frustration with previous 
leaders was evident in my participants’ accounts, female activists tended to focus on the economic conditions, rather than lay the blame at 
masculinity or men.  This is characteristic of limited gender antagonism more generally. 
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Demand-side changes 
 
Even if flexibility in gender divisions of labour in a context of economic insecurity has 
increased the supply of women candidates, this cannot provide a full account of their rising 
political participation.  Note, for instance, Opuku-Mensah’s (2000:189) observation that 
‘[a]lthough the number of women standing for election in Zambia increased from 14 in 1991 
to 61 in 1996, their presence in Parliament only increased from 7 to 15’.  To explain why 
female political participation rose in the subsequent period we also need to account for 
increasing demand.   
 
In order to mitigate economic adversity, many women have developed the very 
characteristics that people look for in a leader.  These include being with others and 
understanding their concerns; having the confidence to speak for others; strength and 
endurance through adversity; as well as empathy and compassion.  Another quality that 
Copperbelt residents commonly look for in a leader is financial support for their individual 
(rather than collective) needs, such as funeral or hospital costs.  Women (and men) leaders 
(particularly market association leaders, councillors and MPs, though not political party 
organisers or trade union leaders) commonly attributed their popularity to their financial 
support of others.  It is only as a result of flexibility in gender divisions of labour that women 
have been able to fulfil this role.   
 
Echoing a shift in attitudes more generally, people seem to increasingly (though not 
universally) focus on the capabilities of a person, rather than their sex.  This view was 
maintained by voters, elected representatives, as well as those on political party selection 
panels (both at district and national levels) – as follows.   
 
Jacob (45, a leader in the Kitwe branch of PF and on the selection panel for aspiring 
MPs and councillors): What people want is a person who has been there with them on 
the ground, who understands their needs their aspirations, who can articulate issues.  If 
it is a man or a woman people will accept. 
Alice: Does gender matter? 
Jacob: No no no. 
Alice: Has that changed? 
Jacob: It’s so big I can’t even explain...  It has changed tremendously, we have a good 
number of women who are councillors, and we have received a lot of willingness from 
women who want to stand as councillors.  I’ve told them, you go on the ground. 
 
BanaHilda (52, widowed market trader): When choosing a person to be a leader, we 
should look at how they are; we don’t look thinking ‘It’s a woman’.  No, we just look at 
how they are strong.  If it’s their gift then they may lead well and men will praise.  That’s 
all. 
Alice: So these days people don’t think ‘It’s just a woman’? 
BanaHilda: No.  Long ago women didn’t focus their energies on leading, but they’ve 
seen that there’s no one to speak for them.  They should have a person to speak for them 
[translated].xliv 
 
The men haven’t performed well.  What people want is change: whether it’s a woman or 
a man, that doesn’t matter, they want someone who can deliver, so now they want to try 
more women.   
Anita (politician). 
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These statements indicate a shift in gender beliefs.  However, given the paucity of women in 
elected political positions, the above denials of gender discrimination seem unreliable.  
Participants may have purposefully overstated their case.  Alternatively, they may be 
unaware of unconscious bias affecting performance evaluations: men may be seen as more 
competent or their particular skills may be more valued – in line with gender stereotypes (as 
also discussed in Ridgeway and Correll, 2004:518).  Given this scope for inaccuracy, these 
comments cannot be counted as evidence of lack of bias.   
 
While many people denied gender discrimination, others stated an explicit preference for 
more women representatives.  This shift in demand seems largely due to flexibility in gender 
divisions of labour.  For example, people have seen how many women have remained 
resilient in the struggle to provide for their children.  Meanwhile, some people feel that men 
are longer fulfilling their normative roles of providers – either at a personal or national level, 
since they have presided over worsening economic security.  Having been disappointed by 
men, many people (voters as well as union and party political leaders) noted a shift in 
sentiments to ‘let’s try a woman’ (see also Mikell, 1995:409, who suggests this as a reason 
why African women have increasing put themselves forward as leaders).  In some quarters 
there is a growing expectation that a woman leader would better fulfil the quasi-parental role 
of leadership.   
 
While women workers and financial providers were often praised by virtue of their masculine 
attributes (e.g. for being ‘strong’), accolades for female politicians often made reference to 
their stereotypically feminine and maternal qualities.  For example, in the quotes below, 
BanaJessy refers to women’s ‘hearts of mercy’.  Meanwhile, Belinda suggests that people 
have faith in women because they will not desert voters just as a mother will not desert her 
children.  These sentiments were expressed more broadly: men are sometimes portrayed as 
irresponsible (spending on alcohol and girlfriends) whereas working mothers are imagined 
to be self-sacrificing, struggling for their children.  Research in Latin America and Sub-
Saharan Africa similarly suggests that motherhood is often used as an effective political 
identity (Chant with Craske, 2003; Steady, 2011; Tripp et al, 2009).  In the Copperbelt, 
stereotypical representations of motherhood seem to have changed, due to their increasing 
flexibility in gender divisions of labour in a context of economic insecurity.  This said, 
masculine stereotypes were not entirely absent: promotional flyers for female candidates 
often also presented them as the ‘iron lady’, i.e. as ‘strong’, firm and unyielding. 
 
Further, by gathering in the market, female traders have come to a shared physical space, 
where they often realise common interests and develop a positive gender identity (see also 
earlier section on association).  These themes are discussed below. 
 
Alice: What do you think about women leaders? 
BanaJessy (39, market trader, former housewife): They are going to the front.  They 
have hearts of mercy, because they’ve seen the problems we women pass through and 
how we suffer to bring up children. 
Alice: Long ago, could you vote for a woman leader? 
BanaJessy: We used not to consider supporting a woman leader. 
Alice: You didn’t know that other women experienced the same sufferings as you? 
BanaJessy: We used to think you passed through sufferings alone. 
Alice: Why?  You associate with many people in the market. 
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BanaJessy: That was before we associated with many people in the market [i.e. when we 
were housewives] [translated].xlv 
 
BanaNkandu (34, married market trader, former housewife): They [women leaders] see 
the suffering that we pass through. 
BanaBecca (36, married market trader, former housewife): It’s the very same, she 
passes through our sufferings...  
BanaNkandu: Men have been ruling over us very much.  Men use us.  So for the 
elections we want women...  In the past we thought that women leaders couldn’t explain 
the truth...  We used to respect men so much, so much.  Long ago women were supposed 
to be alone, we didn’t associate with other people [translated].xlvi  
 
BanaRuth (35, widowed market trader, former housewife): We should have women 
leaders because it’s a woman who cares/provides for people, so a woman should not 
suffer...  In leadership there should be men and women so that they share intelligence, 
they should discuss together...  We want to have many women leaders.  We want to 
remove ourselves from being in men’s hands [i.e. depending on men]...  We don’t want 
to hear the intelligence of men alone; we want to listen to the intelligence of women...  
They [men] wrong us.  A woman herself knows what we want because she goes through 
it...  Previously, I was new in the market, I didn’t know anything [explains that she 
previously voted for men]...  When you grow you start to see suffering, that’s when you 
may know what kind of leader is needed [translated].xlvii 
 
Alice: Was gender an issue when you were campaigning? 
Belinda (60, widow and Copperbelt MP): Yeah, it was an issue.  Since the constituency 
was created no woman has ever stood in that constituency...  People said, [corrects 
herself] men, not women, said, ‘Would a woman manage to run the constituency?’.  
Women themselves said, ‘We’ve voted for men too often’.  Women know women are 
mothers, ‘She will not desert us, a woman will never desert her children’...  People in 
general will support a person they know and trust.  I’ve worked in the constituency for 
over 30 years.  They know me, deep down, they know my background.  They know I’ve 
suffered with them, how I endured the suffering and came through it.  I held my head 
up.  I never gave up on my children - that’s very important...  
Alice: Did you make an issue of being a mother? 
Belinda: A mother never neglects her family, no matter what, she looks after everyone 
and that’s what I’m trying to do. 
Alice: Would you also advise others [women candidates] to stress this identity? 
Belinda: [nods]39 
Alice: Why has there been a change in attitudes towards electing women? 
Belinda: Society has looked at the women and seen women’s achievement in every area 
of society and that has given the impetus to support women. 
 
These sentiments were shared more widely.  Many other women expressed the belief that 
fellow women would empathise with them and speak on their behalf.  Market women in 
particular often wished there were more female candidates.  Some women argued that since 
women are undertaking men’s jobs in paid employment, there are evidently no gender 
differences and therefore women should also be undertaking men’s roles in the political 
sphere.  Flexibility in gender divisions of labour was thus perceived as disconfirming 
                                                        
39 On motherhood being an effective political identity in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa see Chant with Craske (2003), Steady (2011) and 
Tripp et al (2009).  See also Safa (1999:300) on paid work not diminishing ‘the centrality of motherhood for women’ in the Dominican Republic, 
but nonetheless enabling them to ‘challenge patriarchal values’. 
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evidence of gender stereotypes.  Women frequently showed great happiness in seeing other 
women at the forefront, as Members of Parliament, notwithstanding the socio-economic gulf 
between them.  By contrast, many women including BanaBecca and BanaNkandu had 
previously perceived women leaders and employees as ‘prostitutes’ – see Chapter 3. 
 
Men, as voters and political partners, also appear to be warming to women in politics.  Again, 
this shift seems related to flexibility in gender divisions of labour, which has provided 
disconfirming evidence of gender stereotypes relating to competence (as discussed in Section 
4.2).  While women generally used to be overlooked as political activists and leaders (since 
they were often presumed to lack requisite traits), they are increasingly (though not 
universally) seen as potentially capable.  Scott (42, an onion trader) grew up in rural areas, 
with a strict division in gender roles and spaces, but maintained that he changed his gender 
beliefs upon seeing women’s equal fortitude, as they came to the forefront, fighting for 
political change.  In the extract below he stresses the importance of ‘comparing’ – seeing that 
women can perform stereotypically masculine tasks just as well as men.  Previously he 
perceived women as unqualified: ‘fear[ful] and shy’.   
 
Alice: When talking with Zambians, some tell me that they have a difficulty in trusting 
women.  One person [from another political party] said that a woman could destroy a 
village [if permitted to lead]. 
Nancy: [laughs]  
Scott: No no, that’s a lie.  These days such thoughts will make the country retreat, 
where...?  Backwards.  This time we don’t have a ‘man’ and a ‘woman’, there’s equality in 
our association of PF because we’re all strong...  I’ve seen that it is women who are in the 
front, who are strong in everything they do...  We have confidence that women leaders 
can work harder than us men leaders because of the strength that women have these 
days...  A long time ago women had fear, they didn’t know the reason to stand nor what 
they should do in life.  These days they’ve awakened and know that there’s no work that 
men alone can do, we may even fail...  
Alice: How do you know women are strong? 
Scott: How we know is by comparing... seeing women who work really hard... without 
fear, because we’re with so many problems...  Today women themselves think, it’s them 
who are talking about removing repression in the market...  We came to see the strength 
of women, being strong and active...  We are tied to each other [i.e. united]...  
Alice: When did women start to become strong? 
Scott: Onwards from 2001, I gradually came to see a reduction in fear and shyness.  The 
way of living is so very difficult.  They saw for themselves, they understand the life they 
live in, they taught others... [translated].xlviii 
 
A similar account is offered by Matthew (47), Scott’s contemporary in their market 
association and political branch of PF (whose life history is provided in Chapter 2): 
 
A long time ago we were saying, ‘They [women] can’t do those things: properly 
providing for homes, properly providing for families and carefully looking after the 
country.  We didn’t know...  A long time ago women weren’t putting themselves forward 
to join associations and solving problems.  They focused on homes as housewives, and 
small issues...  So for that reason mens capitalised on that, in those days.  But now these 
days, upon the women seeing that these problems it’s not only the mens who can solve 
but also the womens, they stood up and come and fight so they can be opted inside and 
solve that particular problem as equals.  And these days you could find that some 
womens they are more stronger than mens...  Where there is harmony, where there is 
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unity, women they have to be there...  We started to realise that women have 
intelligence.  Therefore we have strength when they [women] have leadership positions 
[partly translated].xlix 
 
Matthew appears to devalue women’s domestic work and does not consider it as a ‘big’ issue, 
even though he professes to champion (aspects of) gender equality.  This seems to support 
the foregoing argument that women are increasingly valued by virtue of performing jobs that 
are valued due their association with men.  Hence the importance of this kind of flexibility in 
gender divisions of labour.   
 
Gender stereotypes appear to be weakening more broadly.  For example, when the idea of an 
unnamed PF woman candidate was floated in 2001, she was informed that people in local 
meetings in Kitwe responded negatively, generally saying ‘No, we want change and the only 
people who can bring change are men, because men are more stronger than women’.  
Accordingly, the woman candidate did not contest a seat to become an MP at that time.  
However, as stereotypes weakened, she was then elected to senior political positions.   
 
But not all attitudes have changed.  While women working with Matthew and Scott (above) 
maintained they felt respected as equal partners, women leaders in different associations 
grumbled about male counterparts.  When interviewed, these men expressed their doubts 
about women’s capabilities and were consequently reluctant for women to manage projects 
independently.  Evidently, growing flexibility in gender divisions of labour has not shifted all 
beliefs.  The next chapter discusses this case and explores the hypothesis that some people’s 
formative experiences have led them to internalise certain stereotypes, which then remain 
stable over the life course.   
   
Given others’ persistent stereotypes and resistance, some women shun politics in order to 
avoid expected insults and hostility, not because they regard themselves as less competent.  
They may assume that this behaviour will be judged inappropriate and so expect to be 
penalised for non-compliance with prescriptive gender stereotypes.  Given these deterrents, 
men’s monopoly of politics does not necessarily reveal women’s internalised gender status 
beliefs – that only men are worthy of influence, deference and esteem.  Even if they do 
participate in market association meetings, they may quieten when confronted with 
persistent male resistance to her initiatives, opting to preserve the peace and cordial relations 
with her colleagues (see BanaMayuka’s life history in Chapter 2).   
 
There are a number of additional explanations for women’s limited presence in parliament 
and local government that do not entail widespread gender stereotypes about leadership 
capabilities.  For example, political campaigning requires an investment of time, which some 
women find difficult to accommodate given their caring responsibilities.  Even if women do 
find someone to look after their children, prescriptive gender stereotypes may deter them 
from undertaking activities integral to political advancement.  For example, I observed that 
female leaders are sometimes negatively judged for socialising in a bar at the end of the day 
(networking and strategising with political colleagues), when they ought to be at home, 
looking after their families.  Even if others no longer proscribe female leadership, women 
may still be condemned for engaging in activities instrumental to this end goal.   
 
There are also institutional barriers to entry.  The intimidating nature of parliament and local 
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council chambers was stressed by women MPs and councillors, as well as observant clerks.  
Many also identified the English language requirement as a major obstacle.  Accordingly, 
some people (both men and women) remain quiet or are easily quietened.  But, as explained 
by experienced female politicians and their colleagues, others learn through political 
apprenticeship and become savvier over time, eventually proving themselves and thereby 
gaining upward mobility.  Another obstacle is the financial barrier to entry: expectations of 
hand-outs (e.g. cloth, cash and sugar) from politicians during campaign season may also 
make it more difficult for women to contest.  When seeking re-election, parliamentarians use 
the financial benefits of incumbency (such as sitting allowances for workshop attendance).  
Trying to match this is extremely costly.  This presents a particular impediment for women, 
given the cultural expectation of maternal altruism.  Expected to endeavour for their 
children, rather than gamble on their own advancement, women may feel less willing to 
pursue a political career.  These institutional barriers curb women’s political participation, 
thereby preventing popular exposure and the associated transformation in gender 
stereotypes.  These additional obstacles provide a further explanation of persistent obstacles 
to women’s political participation without invoking persistent gender status beliefs.  Thus, 
women’s paucity in politics may not reflect widely-held gender status beliefs. 
 
Without denying the paucity of women in politics or leadership, nor associated obstacles, 
support for female political participation is growing.  This seems partly because flexibility in 
gender divisions of labour has undermined gender stereotypes relating to status and 
competence, in turn shifting women’s cultural expectations. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has outlined four contemporary trends (occurring between c. 1990 and 2011): 
worsening economic security, two forms of growing flexibility in gender divisions of labour 
(increasing female labour force participation and occupational desegregation) as well as a 
weakening of gender stereotypes, relating to competence and status.   
 
This chapter has put forward the hypothesis that a change in patterns of resource access was 
the primary cause of growing flexibility in gender divisions of labour.  Worsening economic 
security has meant that men are generally less able to financially provide for their families 
single-handedly.  Many have thus forfeited the social respect historically secured by 
complying with cultural expectations in exchange for the economic advantages of female 
labour force participation.  Financial hardship also appears to have motivated women to seek 
occupations historically dominated by men.   
 
In terms of the consequences of increased flexibility in gender divisions of labour, this 
chapter has argued that although an independent income tends to enhance a woman’s 
financial autonomy it is not sufficient to undermine broader dimensions of gender status 
inequalities, at least not directly.  The evidence in support of this claim comes from 
participants’ narratives and earlier studies.  Both suggest that in the decades predating mass 
female labour force participation, women’s financial contributions were often unrecognised, 
at most regarded as merely supplementary’, and did not enhance their participation in 
household decision-making. 
 
It is only more recently, with prolonged exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of labour, 
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that gender status beliefs seem to have weakened, and this (rather than women’s increased 
acesss to resources directly) seems to account for the contemporary erosion of gender status 
inequalities.  A critical mass of women are now demonstrating their ability to undertake work 
that was previously presumed to be beyond their capabilities and has high status because it is 
associated with men.  Such performances are increasingly interpreted as disconfirming 
evidence of both internalised gender stereotypes and also cultural expectations about how 
others will respond to women’s incursions into male domains.   Demonstrations that ‘women 
can do what men can do’ appear to undermine the assumption of gender difference upon 
which gender status beliefs are predicated.  This effect did not occur in earlier decades, when, 
due to its paucity, information that contradicted gender stereotypes was more commonly 
disregarded as exceptional.   
 
Association through paid work in the public sphere also appears significant.  Hearing others 
reject gender stereotypes seems to enhance people’s confidence in the objective validity of 
this position and provide reason to revise cultural expectations.  This does not appear to be a 
necessary consequence of association, however: women’s associations in compounds 
(comprising homemakers or home-based traders, less exposed to flexibility in gender 
divisions of labour) generally promote gender stereotypes. 
 
Although growing flexibility in gender divisions of labour appears to have undermined some 
gender beliefs, gender status inequalities remain manifest, such as in terms of unpaid care 
work.  To some extent, this can be explained without denying that women have gained 
respect in other domains (e.g. household and community decision-making).  For example, 
unpaid care work is not only a display of status but also of gender.  Because the few cases of 
men sharing care work remain hidden from view, there is little public exposure to 
information that contradicts gender stereotypes and cultural expectations about who should 
perform this work.   
 
To interrogate the hypothesis put forward in this chapter (that a shift in patterns of resource 
access catalysed increased flexibility in gender divisions of labour, which then eroded gender 
stereotypes), the remainder of this thesis explores the extent to which increased flexibility 
was contingent upon some people’s prior rejections of gender stereotypes, due to their 
formative experiences (Chapter 5) or exposure to egalitarian discourses (Chapter 6).   
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5. Formative Experiences 
 
The previous chapter discussed the evidence supporting the hypothesis that worsening 
economic security has been the prime cause of growing flexibility in gender divisions of 
labour in Kitwe, which has in turn weakened gender stereotypes and associated status beliefs.  
The next two chapters explore the hypothesis that worsening economic security was not a 
sufficient condition for flexibility in gender divisions of labour but instead contingent upon 
some people’s prior rejection of gender stereotypes.  Their gender atypical responses to 
macro-economic change may have been shaped by earlier experiences.  Chapters 5 and 6 thus 
consider the extent to which growing flexibility in gender divisions of labour may have been a 
consequence (rather than a cause) of an erosion of gender beliefs. 
 
This chapter examines the significance of growing up in a woman-headed/financially-
supported household, flexibility in gender divisions of labour, exposure to role models and 
co-education.  With its focus on formative experiences, this chapter also evaluates the 
evidence in favour of the hypothesis that gender beliefs remain stable over the life course.  
This contrasts with the proposition considered in Chapters 3 and 4, that shifting patterns of 
resource access can rapidly change gender beliefs, i.e. within a generation.   
 
5.1 Women-headed/financially-supported households 
 
Maternal employment was often identified as significant by female participants undertaking 
gender atypical roles, especially those in historically male-dominated occupations.  This is 
actually consistent with part of the argument developed in Chapter 4: exposure to flexibility 
in gender divisions of labour (e.g. maternal employment) fosters a rejection of gender 
stereotypes.  But this finding contrasts with Chapter 4 because, in the case of middle-aged 
participants, whose mothers were employed before the contemporary period, it points to 
some further factor besides worsening economic security.  This section will discuss whether 
this recent shift in patterns of resource access was not sufficient for increased flexibility of 
gender divisions of labour but instead contingent upon the example provided by those small 
minority of mothers already in the labour market. 
 
Quantitative studies of more economically developed countries point to the intergenerational 
impact of maternal employment.  Sons of working mothers in Japan and the United States 
are more likely to reject traditional gender roles (Fernandez et al, 2004; Willets-Bloom and 
Nock, 1994).  In the United States, such sons generally spend more time on housework when 
married or cohabiting (Gupta, 2006).  Further, both men and women from female-headed 
households tend to express greater support for women’s economic and political participation 
(Kiecolt and Acock, 1988).  These findings suggest that adult’s beliefs and behaviour are 
influenced by their formative experiences of flexibility in gender divisions of labour in the 
home.  
 
Methodologically, I explored this topic in three ways: by asking participants to identify 
salient influences; comparing across conversations with participants whose female 
caregivers40 had independent incomes and those that did not; observing domestic practices 
                                                        
40 I am being deliberately vague about the identity of ‘female’ in this instance.  In a context of HIV/AIDS many Copperbelt residents grow up with 
their extended family.  One’s female caregiver is not necessarily one’s biological mother. 
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in different households.  For three months I stayed in a middle-class home where the mother 
was a housewife but otherwise lived with families where the mother worked.   
 
The vast majority of middle-aged female participants hailed from natal homes largely 
dependent on men’s earnings.  They tended to report that they had grown up with similar 
expectations.  Having grown up in a context of society-wide gender divisions of labour, they 
had little access to information that contradicted gender stereotypes of women as 
housewives, economically reliant on men’s wages.  Hence many narrated that they had not 
imagined alternatives to the domestic model with which they were familiar.  However, 
subsequent to their own labour force participation, many came to question gender 
stereotypes relating to competence and status (as discussed in Chapter 4).  Their gender 
beliefs were thus not fixed by their formative experiences but changed over the life course. 
 
Middle-aged sons of female homemakers tended to recall concerns about the idea of wives’ 
labour force participation, notwithstanding growing financial hardship.  Such men revealed 
that they were previously concerned about the consequences of female labour force 
participation, not knowing how it would affect their household relations or social respect.  
These anxieties were also expressed by unmarried sons of housewives, in addition to those 
whose wives had not joined the labour market.  They worried that gender status inequalities 
within the household might be undermined by female labour participation.  This could be an 
internalised gender status belief or it might reflect cultural expectations about how others 
might judge them if they failed to conform to prescriptive gender stereotypes.   
 
The absence of maternal employment may be more significant for men than women, in some 
respects.  Some middle-aged daughters of homemakers stated that they had wanted to start 
market trading but their husbands had previously forbidden it – as discussed in Chapters 3 
and 4.  This account was corroborated through my discussions with their husbands and other 
men.  Worsening economic security seemed to trigger a quick change in women’s 
aspirations.  The binding constraint here was not a supply-side issue of women’s self-
perceptions or limited ambitions but rather men’s concerns – outlined above.   
 
There was, however, some indication that homemakers’ own gender stereotypes led them to 
encourage gender divisions of labour, despite (or perhaps because of) worsening economic 
security.  Some participants suggested that homemakers were more likely than employed 
women to encourage their daughters to become economically reliant on male family 
members or boyfriends.  Although the vast majority of parents expressed hopes for their 
daughters’ education, some young people (especially those living in very low-income, peri-
urban areas) told stories of parents pressuring their daughters to engage in financially-
rewarding sexual relationships.  A wide range of studies in Zambia note the prevalence of 
young women seeking male financial support, attributing this to economic insecurity 
(Abrahamsen, 1997; Bajaj, 2009b; Hossain and McGregor, 2011:580; Human Rights Watch, 
2003; Kambou et al, 1998; Mwanangombe, 2012).  The impression I formed from my series 
of interviews was that this practice is more common among families where the female 
caregiver is not in paid employment.  People’s responses to the shift in patterns of resource 
access (in the form of worsening economic security) seemed shaped by their pre-existing 
gender beliefs, which were in turn influenced by natal household formation. 
 
Participants who grew up in a female financially-supported/headed home commonly 
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maintained that this experience had made them more supportive of such flexibility in gender 
divisions of labour (e.g. women’s income-generation).  Some young men expressed great 
pride in their mother’s economic endeavours.  Here we see an interaction between exposure 
and interests.  Maternal employment enabled sons to realise the economic benefits of female 
labour force participation.  Such men commonly regard female employment as in their 
interests and prioritise this kind of benefit rather than the social gain previously accrued 
from compliance with Christian-colonial prescriptive stereotypes.  Accordingly, they seemed 
more inclined to support such practices – in mirror opposite to sons of female homemakers.   
Additionally, maternal financial provision seems to endow daughters with the sense of self-
efficacy that they can undertake occupations historically dominated by men.  The vast 
majority of women making incursions into non-stereotypical terrain (whether in politics or 
employment) stressed that they were inspired by their mothers’ financial self-reliance, 
strength and confidence.41  Besides gendered self-perceptions, maternal employment also 
appears to affect descriptive stereotypes about women in general, as illustrated below.   
 
Being brought up by a single parent [who worked as a secretary for Zambia Railways] 
made me think women can do whatever men can do.  If she can raise four children on 
her own then I can do men’s work.  They can stand on their own, without men... or with 
men...  I’ve always grown up wanting to do men’s work… I wanted to challenge the men. 
Brenda (24, a married miner). 
 
Chalwe (24, an unemployed youth): [commenting on his brother’s characterisation of 
gender beliefs in his single-sex school] It’s almost everywhere, they say boys are more 
intelligent than girls.  People think like that, most guys, men, think like that.  That’s why 
we have more men than women in leadership, standing in front of crowds, talking to 
people and all that.  That’s why we’re left with this thing of saying ‘women can’t do this, 
women can’t do that’.  That’s why women are now fighting for gender equality, it’s 
because they’ve seen that most people have in their minds that men are better than 
women.  It’s not like that.  We’re actually equal, we’re equal. 
Alice: When did you start think men and women are equal? 
Chalwe: For me, my [divorced] mum has always been hard working, ever since I was 
young, she’s always moving up and down for us...  From that alone I see that women can 
make better leaders, can head homes, they can do a whole lot of things that men can do. 
Alice: Why do you think women in general can also do it? 
Chalwe: If she can, you can, a young girl can. 
 
Both Brenda and Chalwe consistently rejected gender stereotypes in my conversations with 
them.  They both chiefly attributed this to their mothers’ employment.   
 
However, given their youth, Brenda and Chalwe’s narratives may have been influenced by 
the contemporary context of worsening economic security.  Accordingly, they are not 
sufficient to undermine Chapter 4’s hypothesis that this shift in patterns of access to 
resources was sufficient to increase support for flexibility in gender divisions of labour.  In 
order to ascertain the extent which responses to worsening economic security were shaped 
by pre-existing egalitarian gender beliefs, as developed through particular formative 
                                                        
41 From my sample of life history interviews with women in gender atypical work, there was only one exception to this trend of maternal 
employment.  Judy (an accountant, elected councillor and orphan) had grown up with her older sister, ‘a full-time housewife’, who was married to 
an accountant.  Judy attributed her self-confidence and determination to three factors: early exposure to female neighbours employed as nurses, 
the nuns who encouraged her at the mission school (‘they made you feel you can do anything… you can walk on water’), the peer  influence of her 
school mates who all sought employment and also her subsequent participation in various associations.   
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experiences, we need to draw on interviews with older participants, whose experiences of 
maternal employment predated the contemporary trend of worsening economic security.  In 
my sample, the vast majority of middle-aged women who had eschewed gender stereotypes 
from their youth and undertaken gender atypical roles (in politics and employment) were 
daughters of women who were also employed.  Two examples are given below – both from 
assertive, bold and self-confident women.  Also recall Helen’s life history, presented in 
Chapter 2: she too stressed the influence of her mother’s employment as a market trader. 
 
My mother was a very strong woman, very courageous, oh my God. She inspired me. 
She did what the men were doing, men’s things, things women weren’t expected to do... 
Here is a woman driving a tractor, she buys a bus, she drives it herself. She was very 
daring, not scared of anyone, except God. [As a politician and businesswoman] she 
could face anyone: rich, poor, man, witch, priest. She was frank.  
Rebecca (Cabinet Minister). 
 
Sometimes us women we used to fear, [thinking] ‘I can’t stand in front of men and talk’. 
[But] when I was young I used to stay with my grandmother, who said, ‘What a man can 
do, a woman can do’... I don’t have to depend on a man; I have to depend on myself... I 
don’t feel shy when I’m talking... When I was growing I wasn’t growing with my father... 
I saw that my mother [a teacher] and grandmother [a market trader] were strong. The 
behaviour of parents is very important. 
Grace (40, trader and treasurer, overseeing the construction of the largest church in the 
Copperbelt). 
 
Although maternal employment often seems associated with the rejection of gender 
stereotypes, it does not always seem to undermine cultural expectations of discrimination 
from others.  For example, when her fellow female miners expressed dissatisfaction with 
male union leaders, Brenda cautioned them not to enter trade union politics.  Her concern 
stemmed not from her internalised gender beliefs about women’s lesser status or 
competence but rather her cultural expectation that female leaders are likely to be insulted 
by others.  Because of the penalties Brenda believes that women incur by encroaching upon 
this male-dominated terrain, she discouraged such pursuits.  The binding constraint to 
support for flexibility in gender divisions of labour may sometimes be cultural expectations, 
not internalised gender beliefs.  Though bear in mind that these concerns do seem to have 
waned somewhat in recent years, as discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
Women’s employment also seems to shape their children’s marital relations in later life, with 
respect to gender status equality.  This appears to be the result of three factors.  First, 
participants often said that they expected their own marriages to be like those of their 
parents.  Second, children of women in paid work commonly described their parents’ 
marriages as more egalitarian than those of housewives.  However, the extent of this 
difference may have increased over time.  Before the 1990s, when female labour force 
participation went against widely-held gender stereotypes in Kitwe, it tended to enhance 
financial autonomy but not respect or appreciation.  Yet with growing social acceptance of 
female employment, in a context of worsening economic security, it appears to have become 
more strongly associated with greater marital equality.  Third, children of working women 
more commonly expressed aspirations for  equality within marriage and referenced their 
parents as role models.   
 
Meanwhile, participants accustomed to women having a lower status often expressed and 
enacted gender status beliefs.  Even when such husbands reluctantly agreed to their wives’ 
labour force participation, upon worsening economic security, they still expected to be 
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respected as household heads.  They sought the same esteem, influence and also deference 
from others that their fathers had enjoyed.  While working women often try to oblige by 
communicating with their husbands in a respectful way and waking up very early to 
undertake domestic work, some sons of housewives still expressed dissatisfaction.  For 
example, my hosts in a low-income compound said of our neighbour that ‘he used to insult 
her [his wife], “you’re busy selling, you’re not doing duties for me at home”’.  Some working 
wives also portrayed their husbands as jealous, posing multiple questions about their 
whereabouts if they returned late home from work.  However, notwithstanding initial 
resistance, a number of men did come to reject their earlier beliefs as a result of prolonged 
exposure to labour force participation (see Chapter 4 and Matthew’s life history in Chapter 
2).  
 
If dual-earner households are also more egalitarian then perhaps the critical influence here 
is not maternal employment but parental support for equality, which is then adopted by their 
children.  While the relationship between parents does seem important, my evidence base 
does not include cases in which marital equality preceded female employment.  Hence this 
specific claim cannot be tested here.  However, the next chapter examines the impact of 
exposure to egalitarian discourses in the form of gender sensitisation. 
 
In summary, children of housewives, with typically limited first-hand exposure to female 
competence in socially valued tasks, tended to grow up espousing gender status beliefs.  
However, formative experiences do not appear to determine beliefs over the life course: 
many did come to support flexibility in gender divisions of labour upon worsening economic 
security and further reject gender stereotypes as a result of prolonged exposure to flexibility 
in gender divisions of labour.  But this shift was not universal: gender stereotypes often 
seemed entrenched, especially amongst sons of houswives.   
 
Meanwhile, maternal employment appears to erode commitment to gender stereotypes and 
associated status beliefs, which seems to affect the pursuit and support of gender atypical 
activities in one’s formative years.  Most participants who had trained for masculine jobs had 
done so in their youth (obtaining a certificate in auto-mechanics after school, for example).  
This training in turn appears contingent upon their rejection of relevant gender beliefs, 
which was often attributed to maternal employment.   
 
Thus while Chapter 4 posited that a shift in patterns of resource access was itself sufficient 
for both increased female labour force participation and occupational desegregation, the 
latter often appears to have been contingent upon maternal employment.  However, this is 
not to deny the impact of worsening economic security: due to men’s loss of secure 
employment, women’s income-generation is increasingly recognised and appreciated (not 
merely dismissed as supplementary’).  Also consistent with Chapter 4 is the mechanism 
identified as conducive to gender status equality, namely exposure to flexibility in gender 
divisions of labour.  
 
5.2 Gender divisions of unremunerated labour in the home 
 
In the Copperbelt, unpaid reproductive work has a low status: it shows respect to the 
household head and, unlike financial contributions, is rarely recognised as important work.  
Women’s performance of it demonstrates adherence to gender status beliefs.  Because 
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gender divisions of care work seem so loaded with meaning, sharing such tasks in one’s 
formative years appear to affect gender beliefs more broadly. 
 
Some people undertaking or supporting non-stereotypical gender roles (in the home, 
employment or politics) referred to their early experiences of sharing reproductive work with 
their brothers and sisters.  Participants who grew up in homes where parents did not treat 
male and female children significantly differently and where girls were not expected to serve 
their brothers commonly said that they grew up believing that there was no difference 
between the sexes.  They rejected gender stereotypes.  Men who performed domestic work 
from a young age and saw their fathers doing so also seemed keener to continue doing so 
when married.  This section will discuss the causes and effects of flexibility in gender 
divisions of reproductive work in formative years. 
 
Boys’ performance of reproductive work is usually at the behest of their parents.  The most 
common justification for shared reproductive work is that it enables young men to be self-
reliant as bachelors.  Boys are also more likely to undertake reproductive work when they are 
the numerical majority.  For example, Chezo (47, a bold trade unionist leader at national level 
whom I interviewed on multiple occasions) explained that she was the only girl amongst 
seven siblings, so her parents taught her brothers to cook and wash.  Although they 
demonstrated concern for their daughter in this respect, Chezo did not recall them voicing 
any egalitarian beliefs.  Her father worked for Zambia Railways and her mother was at first a 
nurse but later a ‘full time housewife’.  Market trader BanaMwimba’s children also share jobs 
equally since there is only one girl.  Her husband, when unemployed, would also sweep.  He 
had become accustomed to this by growing up without sisters.  By contrast, when girls 
outnumber boys their parents generally see less need for flexibility in gender divisions of 
labour, since the girls share work among themselves, thereby reducing the individual burden.   
 
Occasionally, demand comes from children themselves.  Some more assertive girls demand a 
rota to ensure equity.  However, children’s desires for renegotiations are not always voiced or 
accepted.  Girls rarely complain or push for change when their household status is insecure, 
such as if they are adopted members of the extended family or if the breadwinner is their 
step-parent.  Even in their natal families, some young people are silent, knowing that 
breaking with these prescriptive gender stereotypes is likely to be resisted by their parents.  
Children are generally the least powerful members of their families and hence have limited 
capacity to renegotiate arrangements.   
 
Men sharing reproductive work in their formative years commonly identified three effects.  
First, because such men did not associate this activity with one sex category alone, they 
seemed less inclined to regard it as an expression of femininity.  Second, by undertaking this 
work some men came to regard it as enjoyable: they took pride in their cooking, their 
cleanliness and capacity to wash white shirts.  Third, parental instructions to share this low 
status work with their sisters appeared to be interpreted as indicating that girls are not lower 
in status.  Such sons commonly endorsed egalitarian beliefs.  For example, Hamadudu (a 29 
year old Art teacher) previously shared domestic duties when living with his brothers.  
Having become accustomed to performing this work it does not seem alien to him.  He now 
often puts his young daughter to bed and washes his wife’s nursing uniform, especially when 
she works night shifts – I observed this while staying with them. 
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Drawing on life histories with Zambian men whom he previously taught as boys at school, 
Simpson (2005:574-575,580) further points to the long-term implications of their exposure 
to paternal performances of ‘women’s work’: 
 
Men recalled that decisions about work tended to rest with their fathers.  Any departure 
from what were generally judged appropriate duties for men and women was signalled 
by a father’s willingness to perform ‘womanly’ tasks such as cleaning the home, cooking 
and washing dishes.  A father’s willingness to engage in ‘women’s work’ appeared to 
have had an impact upon those men who saw this and who, in their turn as husbands 
and fathers, took at least some share in indoor household jobs and childcare.  They were 
also the ones – the minority – who expressed a desire for at least a measure of equality 
between husband and wife in their marriage. 
 
Simpson’s findings are consistent with my own.  Whether undertaken by fathers or boys 
themselves, male performance of domestic work seems to undermine attachment to gender 
stereotypes and associated status beliefs.   
 
Women who had shared reproductive work with brothers in their youth likely benefitted 
from a reduced workload.  However, they more commonly emphasised their consequent 
change in stereotypes and related status beliefs.  Chezo (47, who shared slashing grass and 
cooking with her brothers) explained: 
 
We worked together, we were equal: we didn’t appear different as males and females 
[translated].l 
 
Such women recalled that they did not grow up expecting to serve men, but rather work with 
them as equals.  Flexibility in gender divisions of unpaid care work not only seems to affect 
internalised gender beliefs but also cultural expectations.  As discussed in Chapter 4, some 
working women declared that they had come to regard women’s sole responsibility for care 
work as unfair.  Yet, with limited exposure to men performing this task, they still thought it 
inevitable.  By contrast, women who had grown up sharing such tasks commonly expressed 
greater optimism in the possibility of widespread social change.  Their formative experience 
of flexibility in gender divisions of labour seems to have provided information about other 
people’s gender beliefs and the kinds of behaviour they will deem appropriate for men and 
women.  This also applies to other kinds of formative experiences: maternal employment 
may provide information about others’ reactions to such flexibility in gender divisions of 
labour. 
 
In conclusion, comparisons between participants point to an association between early 
exposure to shared care work, a disavowal of gender stereotypes and support for flexibility in 
gender divisions of labour.  Further, interviewed participants pointed to a causal connection 
between these three issues.  For instance, women undertaking gender atypical occupations 
referred to the influence of sharing care work with brothers.  This suggests that worsening 
economic security was not a sufficient cause of occupational desegregation.  Rather, the 
female vanguards who initially pursued male-dominated occupations already disavowed 
gender stereotypes.   
 
However, my data does not necessarily reveal the importance of this experience occurring 
during one’s formative experience per se, it may just be indicative of any such exposure.  
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Because it is performed indoors, exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of domestic 
labour generally occurs in one’s own natal home.  Such exposure happens to occur during 
one’s formative years.  Furthermore, although those not exposed to flexibility in gender 
divisions of domestic labour were often resistant to such practices, some did change through 
exposure to egalitarian discourses – as discussed in Chapter 6. 
 
Another significant point of note is that individual cases of shared care work appear unlikely 
to have affected widely-held gender stereotypes.  First, such practices were historically (and 
indeed remain) uncommon.  Given the historical construction of gender divisions of labour 
detailed in Chapter 4, only a small minority of male and female participants shared 
reproductive work in their youth.  Second, the few households that do share housework do 
not act as inspirational role models, for they are largely unseen.  The privacy of housework 
constrains popular exposure to this kind of flexibility in gender divisions of labour (as 
discussed in Chapter 4).  That said, those who do share care work in their youth 
subsequently influence others through their more public practices, such as by undertaking or 
supporting gender atypical activities.   
 
Also, notwithstanding their formative experiences of shared care work, individuals’ 
egalitarian aspirations were sometimes constrained by macro-level circumstances.  The 
lopsided marriage market created by worsening economic security may curb women’s scope 
to negotiate conjugal assistance (see Chapter 4).   
 
5.3 Role models beyond the home 
 
An additional way in which participants’ formative experiences seemed to influence their 
gender beliefs and support for flexibility in gender divisions of labour was through exposure 
to women beyond the home successfully undertaking occupations historically dominated by 
men.  Such role models seem to provide disconfirming evidence of gender stereotypes 
relating to competence and status.  
 
These findings are consistent with research from Northeastern USA.  Dasgupta and Asgari 
(2004) found that new students of single-sex and co-educational colleges expressed similar 
gender stereotypes when they started tertiary education but diverged one year later.  The 
authors’ quantitative analysis suggests that this divergence was primarily due to more 
frequent exposure to female faculty in the women’s college.  When controlling for exposure 
to female faculty, the sex composition of the student body (i.e. whether the college was 
single-sex or co-educational) did not exert a significant effect upon gender stereotypes.  
What was important was their exposure to female role models.   
 
Asgari et al (2010) further examined interactions with the perceived quality of professorial 
support on gendered self-perceptions (rather than beliefs about women in general).  Having 
controlled baseline data from the same American colleges, they found a subsequent 
association between the frequency of contact with female professors (which was also 
perceived to be of high quality) and a female student’s proclivity to associate herself with 
leadership traits.  By contrast, female students who had high quality contact with male 
professors were more likely to associate themselves with supportive traits.  Young women’s 
frequent and high quality contact with female (though not male) professors was also 
associated with more ambitions career aspirations.  This research indicates that exposure to 
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role models can affect women’s self-perceptions and their gender stereotypes.  This effect 
appears to be strengthened with greater personal connections.  This quantitative study raises 
questions about why this association occurs, as well as whether prolonged exposure to role 
models in middle-age can exert a similar effect, or whether there is something particularly 
significant about formative experiences.   
 
Before discussing how Zambian people’s attitudes and behaviour are affected by their early 
exposure to role models demonstrating equal abilities, it is first important to understand 
converse experiences.  The paucity of women in various occupational and political roles was 
sometimes cited (by men and women alike) as evidence of their lesser aptitude.  Growing up, 
seeing only men in leadership and employment, many people doubted women’s capabilities 
in these realms and were thus reluctant to risk giving women opportunities.  Women 
themselves similarly explained that they had not pursued male-dominated occupations 
because they doubted they could undertake these roles.  The absence of role models seemed 
to affect their gendered self-perceptions, i.e. their sense of self-efficacy.  In this way, gender 
beliefs, gender divisions of labour and a paucity of role models seem mutually reinforcing.   
 
I once attended a Copperbelt provincial market association meeting at the Civic Centre in 
Mufulira town.  The auditorium was decorated with portraits of current Mufulira city 
councillors.  Two market association leaders whom I had repeatedly interviewed pointed out 
to me that there were only three pictures of women out of 26 councillors.  Alan (37) 
commented, ‘Women are few therefore their intelligence is small.  The ratio is very bad.  It’s 
an example of how the intelligence of men is different from that of women’ (translated).li   
 
Even when exposed to women performing stereotypically masculine roles, men like Alan did 
not seem to interpret this as disconfirming evidence of their stereotypes.  For example, in 
response to Alan’s doubts about women leaders, I mentioned the widely-lauded, female-
dominated Mufulira market association.  Alan was quick to deny that this threatened his 
gender stereotypes.  He pointed to the Mufulira association’s occasional recourse to male 
leadership at a national level.  He also dismissed female ministers and Chief Executive 
Officers as evidence of women’s equal competence, since they are under patriarchal 
guardianship.   
 
We can explain the behaviour of Alan and many others like him with reference to 
confirmation bias: existing stereotypes affect the way that experiences are interpreted and 
contradictory information may be disregarded (as discussed in Chapters 1 and 4).  Growing 
up in a nearby township, he appeared to have become accustomed to gender status 
inequalities both at home and in society more widely.  His mother was a home-based trader, 
always deferring to his father.  He seems to have interpreted new information in a way that is 
consistent with the gender stereotypes he developed through his formative experiences.  As a 
result of these descriptive gender stereotypes about competence and status he appears 
committed to prescriptive stereotypes, believing that women should not be given important 
responsibilities.  Alan’s attitudes are reflected in his behaviour: he resists women leaders’ 
independent management of market affairs and doubts their effectiveness (much to the 
women’s infuriation, as detailed in BanaMayuka’s life history in Chapter 2). 
  
Similarly, during a lesson on gender equality at a government boys’ school, most students 
responded with incredulity at the teacher’s suggestion of a female mechanic.  They quickly 
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rejected it as evidence of equality and insisted that male workers and garage owners would 
always be on site, sometimes having to assist the female mechanic.  In these ways, 
participants accustomed to men’s monopoly over decision-making, leadership and 
employment often expressed scepticism about women’s capabilities and resisted their 
incursions into these fields (see Chapter 3 for historical parallels).   
 
Having outlined what happens in the absence of early exposure to women undertaking incito 
sha baume (men’s work), I now detail what happens when people do have such evidence 
during their formative years.  Cited avenues of early exposure to role models included rural-
urban and international migration (to countries where flexibility in gender divisions of labour 
is more widespread), media access, neighbourhoods as well as employment.  Since cases of 
first-hand exposure have already been discussed (in Chapter 4), it is now worth briefly 
outlining an example of media exposure. 
 
During a discussion with six women miners, all cited their parents’ stress on the 
inspirational example of Professor Nkandu Luo – a household name in Zambia and former 
Minister of Health.  Anne (an industrial machinist) added, ‘Every time Nkandu Luo was on 
TV my father was saying, “One of you should be like her!”.  That woman has been a role 
model to most of us women in Zambia, not really to become a medical doctor [like her, a 
former lecturer in immunology] but to be financially independent’.  Such statements point to 
the significance of early exposure to a high-profile woman in a male-dominated domain.  
However, as discussed in Chapter 3, not all women in earlier decades perceived such 
frontrunners as disconfirming evidence of their gender stereotypes.  The female miners’ 
particular interpretations may stem from being with others who praise that person – thereby 
shifting cultural expectations, by signalling their acceptance of flexibility in gender divisions 
of labour.  Their cultural expectations may also have changed by seeing that the President 
himself trusted a woman with responsibility for the Ministry of Health, a high-profile and 
prestigious position.   
 
Participants with prolonged exposure to role models in their formative years tended to claim 
that they grew up eschewing gender stereotypes.  This often seemed to have exerted a 
significant long-term impact, affecting young women’s education and employment choices.  
For example, those inspired by electricians scaling poles can opt to pursue the relevant 
qualifications, whereas older women with financial responsibilities often feel less able to do 
so.  BanaMwimba (a married market trader) was thrilled to see other women working as 
electricians, but when asked whether she might follow suit she told me that it was too late.  
Eschewing gender stereotypes in one’s formative years (such as a result of exposure to role 
models) thus seems to make it more likely that one will undertake the training necessary for 
stereotypically masculine occupations.   
 
However, not all male-dominated activities require prior training.  Exceptions include 
supporting a family financially, entering politics at grassroots levels and ‘unskilled’ manual 
labour (such as cutting grass, breaking stones and digging drainage).  Take Charity, for 
instance: she is a 30 year old widow, living in a low-income settlement.  She previously 
traded at the market but was unable to make sufficient profit to support her child and 
economically inactive parents.  When Charity and her friend Sophie (another former trader) 
heard that a road building company opened and was recruiting both men and women, they 
were encouraged to apply.  Charity commented, ‘I used to think that ‘I can’t do it’, but I saw 
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that things were difficult, so I came to work’ [translated].lii  Participants who had undertaken 
masculine occupations that only required on the job training commonly emphasised a shift 
in interests, triggered by financial hardship.   
 
This section has presented evidence indicating the importance of early exposure to role 
models.  To this extent, it has provided some reason to qualify the argument put forward in 
Chapter 4, that a shift in patterns of resource access was sufficient for both increased female 
labour force participation and occupational desegregation.  The latter, especially in terms of 
stereotypically masculine roles that require prior qualifications, often seems to have been 
fostered by women’s early exposure to role models.  However, the significance of historic 
exposure to role models should not be overstated.  Given gender divisions of labour in the 
decades before the contemporary period of worsening economic security, there was then 
little opportunity for exposure to such role models.  Moreover, due to their paucity, they were 
not always interpreted as disconfirming evidence of gender stereotypes.   
 
5.4 Co-education 
 
One experience identified by many participants as integral to their support for flexibility in 
gender divisions of labour was co-education.  Learning with the opposite sex category had led 
them to revise earlier assumptions of gender difference.  Interviewed co-educated students 
more often questioned gender stereotypes.  However, the impact of schooling on beliefs, 
aspirations and their actualisation is also tempered by domestic upbringing, educational 
management and labour market possibilities, which vary over time with changing macro-
economic context.  Accordingly, not all co-educated students come to pursue or support 
flexibility in gender divisions of labour.42  
 
By contrast, quantitative research in other parts of Sub-Saharan Africa suggests that single-
sex schooling may be more conducive to gender equality.  Surveyed single-sex educated girls 
in Nigeria more commonly disavowed gender stereotypes about Mathematical abilities and in 
Malawi they expressed higher educational aspirations (Lee and Lockheed, 1990; Mbilizi, 
2010).  But as the authors note these may reflect characteristics of the schools (more female 
teachers) and their homes (more middle class).43  Research on two elite boarding schools in 
Uganda (one co-educational and one single-sex) similarly finds that girls in the latter exhibit 
higher levels of self-efficacy and performance in Mathematics (Picho and Stephens, 2012).  
But again, as the authors recognise, the apparent differences between the two schools may 
stem from other contextual features, besides sex composition of students (such as staff make-
up, ideologies and pedagogies).   
 
Ethnographic research in twelve rural, peri-urban and urban junior secondary co-educational 
schools in Botswana and Ghana reveals multiple manifestations of gender status inequalities: 
boys commonly assume positions of authority, dominate physical spaces, intimidate girls in 
class discussions and refrain from routine feminine cleaning in order to avoid ridicule 
(Dunne, 2007).  However, such observations do not provide conclusive evidence in favour of 
single-sex education, at least not without comparative data or narratives from students.  For 
single-sex educated men and women may also adhere to gender status inequalities when out 
                                                        
4242 School and place names have been changed to preserve participants’ anonymity. 
43 Note that studies in more economically developed countries find that the alleged benefits of single-sex education tend to disappear when such 
background variables are controlled for (Harker, 2000; Robinson and Smithers, 1999; Smithers and Collings, 1982). 
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of school.  Furthermore, even if co-educated pupils do conform to gender stereotypes in this 
context, it remains possible that their co-educational experiences lead them to privately reject 
the notion that boys are more competent than girls.  The aim of this section is thus to explore 
the sex composition of schools in relation to the life course as a whole and with respect to 
flexibility in gender divisions of labour. 
 
Bajaj (2009a) has narrated how Umutende school (a low-cost, single-sex private institution 
in Zambia’s Copperbelt Province) has sought to promote gender equality.  Here male and 
female students are segregated in different campuses so as to provide a space for young 
women to ‘develop confidence, speak up and take leadership roles’ as put by one of the 
school’s founders (ibid:490).  Each campus is staffed by teachers of the same sex in order to 
provide role models and reduce the risk of teacher-student sexual relationships.  Morning 
assemblies at each campus promote social justice, including women’s rights and gender 
equality.  Girls lead songs, drum, make announcements and participate in role-plays.  Rather 
than hire cleaners, all students are regularly required to clean the school.  Because entire 
classes perform these tasks together, new male students adjust quickly despite initial 
resistance to performing ‘women’s work’.  Many also start doing so at home.  When surveyed, 
Umutende students were more likely than those at a nearby government school to label wife-
beating, rape and early/forced marriage as human rights violations. 
 
But the causal dynamics are unclear, as Bajaj registers.  Was it the institutional commitment 
to equality, role models, gender sensitisation, shared gender roles or single-sex spaces that 
proved pivotal?  The exact effects are equally hazy.  What happens when students graduate 
from this sanctuary?  Neither students’ nor graduates’ reflections are included.  Also, it is 
misleading to suggest that local government schools have cleaners; my own research suggests 
this is unheard of in Copperbelt schools, given restrictive budgets.  To understand the 
importance of school sex composition, it is useful to listen to people’s own, comparative 
evaluations.  This issue is important since the Zambian government has promoted gender 
segregation in Mathematics and Science (Mitchell et al, 1999:420; Mumba, 2002). 
 
The following discussion explores how single-sex and co-educational experience influence 
two dispositions broadly identified as integral to support for flexibility in gender divisions of 
labour: being accustomed to working with the opposite sex and perceiving men and women 
as equally competent.  This concerns both individual’s gender beliefs and also their cultural 
expectations, by which they anticipate to be evaluated.   
 
School sex composition and working with the opposite sex 
 
Many girls in Kitwe have little opportunity to socialise in their home communities and 
interact with unrelated boys after school.  Their freedom of movement is limited by domestic 
burdens (as also noted by Nkonkomalimba and Duffy, 2010:32, drawing on research in 
Zambia).  This physical separation from boys appears to be amplified by single-sex 
education.  Interviewed single-sex educated girls tended to express particular shyness about 
interacting with boys, since they were not accustomed to this. 
 
Likewise, older single-sex educated women often recalled difficulties in adapting to working 
with men in higher education and employment.  They felt embarrassed, timid or easily 
intimidated.  Perceiving guys as ‘freaks’, Civil Engineering student Chilufya (24) was initially 
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‘anti-social’.  She studied only with women because she felt too shy to admit to men that she 
did not understand certain issues.  Although her trade unionist mother had provided a 
powerful role model – leading Chilufya to believe that she could become a civil engineer – 
exposure to other people’s success does not seem lessen the importance of personal 
experience of learning and working with men.  This section will assess the particular effect of 
co-education in this regard. 
 
Those who moved to co-education from single-sex schools during their formative years 
explained that they soon became comfortable interacting with unrelated boys.  Although the 
transition often led to temporary difficulties  such as being ‘obsessed with the mirror’ or 
feeling discomfort when seated next to boys  the vast majority soon saw their male 
classmates as ‘brothers’.  The following narratives from women educated at both types of 
school echo a general trend, which held across the socio-economic and generational 
spectrum: 
 
I used to have that phobia of guys.  When I used to see a boy I used to think he’d want 
something from me but when we used to mingle [in co-education] I used to see them as 
brothers...  It seems these boys are here to help me not for other things. 
Ruth (19, trainee teacher, visibly relaxed and jovial with male colleagues, first educated 
at a single-sex school before moving to co-education). 
 
When you’re in a girls’ set-up I think you don’t really get to know the other side...  
Single-sex school may give girls that confidence but what happens when she goes out 
into the world?  Co-education is the answer; it makes you to be a fighter...  I was in 
debate club with boys, we could win...  It helped me move a step further...  There are so 
many at a big school but you compete, leadership starts from when you are young. 
Sophia (regional director of a women’s rights organisation, educated in co-educational 
government schools). 
Alice: How did you feel working with men [at the mines, where she was a secretary] 
having just come from an all girls’ school? 
Belinda (Copperbelt MP): Because of the previous experience at [Chamboli] [a co-
educational school],44 it wasn’t bad. 
Alice: Do you think that experience at [Chamboli] made a difference in your life? 
Belinda: Yes, a lot of difference, it strengthened us; it gave us an insight into the 
opposite sex and how to deal with them. 
Alice: You don’t think you would have got that experience just from living in [the 
Copperbelt]? 
Belinda: No, because when you’re growing up, during that time, you’re told, ‘Girls take 
this line and boys take that line’, and you knew that when you grew up as a woman you 
got married and there were only certain jobs you could do... 
Alice: How did [Chamboli] make a difference? 
Belinda: Because we were given chores to do in a mixed group, we did projects with 
boys, there was no separation, we worked as a group, not looking at who is a boy, who is 
a girl... so that helped a lot, and we felt free!  to sit with a boy and chat... to look at each 
other beyond sex.  Co-education is the best because it opens up your mind, whereas if 
you go into a girls’ school you come out with the perception that a boy is something to 
fear and a boy can only befriend if he wants to sleep with you...  But when you are in co-
education you can know very well that you can have a boy as a friend and not have 
                                                        
44 School and place names have been changed to preserve participants’ anonymity. 
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anything to do with sex, he’s just a friend and you learn more from each other, and 
compete with them.  Co-education is the best.   
 
It [co-education] gives girls exposure - to run with guys, it helps them to compete at the 
level of guys, it helps them to run in life as fast as guys...  I think the only way to fight for 
gender equality is to have girls and guys mixing at school. 
Lucia (23, student unionist studying Telecommunications, from a poor family and 
government school, receiving financial support from government and her church). 
 
These narratives imply that through their experiences of co-education these women came to 
reject stereotypes of men as being more intelligent, higher in status, and only interested in 
women for intimate relations.  By competing with boys and thereby learning that they could 
perform equally well, Sophia and Lucia suggested that they came to see themselves as 
equally competent.  Belinda’s account is also notable for it suggests that she came to perceive 
herself and her peers in a less dichotomous way: instead of difference she saw commonality.  
This was a consequence of being treated in the same way at school, being given the same 
tasks.  However, this is not universal across co-educational schools – as will be discussed at 
the end of this section.  Additionally, Ruth’s narrative implies that her cultural expectations 
changed: she started to anticipate that men would want to work with her, rather than request 
intimate relations.  This shift in expectations may have affected her interactions with men. 
 
These particular interpretations of co-education may have been affected by other influences.  
For example, Sophia, Lucia and Ruth all had at least one family member who encouraged 
them to excel in school.  This may have strengthened their commitment and sense of 
entitlement to education, thereby hardening their resolve and determination to stand up to 
patriarchal bullying.  Given that their positive accounts may not be representative of co-
educational experiences more broadly but instead reflect their particular home 
environments, it is important to ascertain the pervasiveness and significance of male 
intimidation in co-educational schools. 
 
Like Dunne (2007), I observed that boys sometimes tried to undermine girls in co-
educational classes.  On one occasion at the elite school, a girl stood up to give a presentation 
and some boys at the back of the class tried to derail her confidence.  They laughed and 
called out, ‘Are you nervous?!’.  She scowled in their direction and continued, outwardly 
unperturbed.  The boys were reprimanded by their teacher, weary of their attempts to 
disrupt class for their own amusement.  Discussing this incident after class, the girls 
suggested that dealing with these outbursts made them able to defeat any such attempts to 
unnerve them. 
 
This strength and optimistic narrative may have been exaggerated or possibly unique to this 
social group, who appeared emboldened by the support of their like-minded female peers.  
Also, their parents’ financial investment in their schooling may have made them feel entitled 
to education.  That said, such resistance was also demonstrated in a government school in a 
low-income compound.  When one schoolboy suggested that girls should perform domestic 
work to show respect to the (male) household head he was shouted down by vocal female 
detractors, sitting at the front of the class.  The above account from elite students is also 
consistent with the aforementioned poorer, older participants who maintained that co-
education had prepared them for adult life, where men often attempt to intimidate women.   
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Even if co-education was identified as beneficial in this respect, perhaps single-sex schooling 
would have been even more advantageous, especially for those without supportive friends 
and families.  Male intimidation might thwart their self-esteem, participation and 
performance in school.  This concern is important, though was not obviously the most 
significant obstacle to girls’ participation in class.  For example, students at one government 
school I observed were often inaudible due to the noise from unsupervised neighbouring 
classes.  Other prevalent obstacles included teacher absenteeism, large class sizes and limited 
resources (as further discussed in Das et al, 2007; GCE, 2004; UNDP, 2011:21).   
 
Another, related concern about co-education is sexual violence.  This impedes girls’ 
participation and performance in school, possibly resulting in an unwanted pregnancy and 
drop-out (Morrell, 2000).  In a recent survey of eight schools in Lusaka and Chongwe 
Districts, Zambia, 16.9% of girls expressed feeling at risk of sexual harassment or violence; 
23.4% identified male students as those they were most afraid of in this respect, followed by 
male teachers (18.3%).  The remainder either mentioned other adults at the school or did not 
answer (Topp et al, 2011).  Of more recently interviewed females in Lusaka Province, 48% 
reported that they had personally experienced sexual violence or harassment from a student 
and 66% reported knowledge of a classmate’s experience of the same (WLSA et al, 
2012:18).45  These reports could be read as strengthening the case for single-sex education, 
where girls might at least learn in safety, as Morrell (2000) suggests for South Africa.  
 
However, several points should be noted.  To begin with, violence is not an inevitable feature 
of co-educational schools.  What seemed most critical in influencing the prevalence of 
gender-based violence within school was the response from management.  This varied 
considerably among schools.  Such diversity indicates the possibility of developing co-
educational schools.   
 
Moreover, single-sex education does not necessarily secure safety or prevent bullying from 
female peers (as shown by research in Durban, South Africa: Bhana and Pillay, 2011).  Nor 
would single-sex education protect girls from corporal punishment or sexual violence from 
adults, which my participants and some other studies identify as by far the most common 
source of violence in Zambian and also Malawian schools (CERT, 2008; Topp et al, 2011; 
though WLSA et al, 2012 find higher reporting of sexual violence from students than 
teachers).  In Zambia, male teachers are just as commonly found in single-sex as in co-
educational state schools.  Young women also stressed that most violence from peers 
generally occurs in the context of intimate relations, which are generally outside school. 
 
In summary, the data to which I have access does not support the hypothesis that single-sex 
education guarantees girls’ protection from (adult) male violence nor ensures their class 
participation and self-confidence.  Moreover, without the opportunity to mix with boys in 
school, girls may feel anxious and apprehensive about mixed sex environments.  
Additionally, as shown below, co-education may be uniquely valuable, by enabling exposure 
to disconfirming evidence of gender stereotypes.  
 
  
                                                        
45 Though note that the sex of the perpetrator is unstated, it could be female. 
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School sex composition and descriptive gender stereotypes 
 
Single-sex education seems associated with endorsement of gender stereotypes, particularly 
amongst male students in my sample.  In essays and conversations on gender differences, 
the vast majority of single-sex educated men insisted that women are less intelligent.  
Likewise in Nigeria and Malawi, boys from single-sex schools have been found to hold more 
sexist views (Lee and Lockheed, 1990; Mbilizi, 2010:235-236).   
 
Before turning to the ways in which school sex composition affects beliefs about women 
doing ‘men’s work’, let us first consider potential impact on attitudes towards ‘women’s 
work’.  Ethnographic research conducted in urban, peri-urban and rural co-educational 
schools in Botswana and Ghana found that boys who swept the classrooms were ridiculed by 
their peers – male and female alike (Dunne, 2007:505).  Through being socially sanctioned 
for contravening prescriptive stereotypes, boys may have developed such cultural 
expectations and therefore been extrinsically motivated to distance themselves from 
stereotypically feminine activities.  Alternatively, they may have internalised the prescriptive 
stereotype that only girls should clean.  
 
However, at Umutende school in the Copperbelt, separately educated boys quickly became 
accustomed to routinely cleaning classrooms (Bajaj, 2009a).  I likewise observed that boys 
routinely swept in single-sex schools.  One might think that undertaking stereotypically 
female labour in the classroom would affect boys’ beliefs about how it should be shared at 
home.  Yet when asked about their present or expected divisions of domestic labour, these 
boys generally asserted that girls should be caring for them.   
 
This may seem incongruous with Section 5.2, which suggested that sharing domestic labour 
at home often led boys to become accustomed to this.  They often gained pride in this work 
and ceased to see it as incito sha banakashi (women’s work).  However, in a large single-sex 
class an individual boy will only be mandated to sweep occasionally, so it is not as routine as 
doing the dishes every day.  Additionally, unlike more creative aspects of home-based care 
work such as cooking, there seemed to be little scope for enjoyment in sweeping classrooms.  
Most importantly, male performance of a menial job in single-sex contexts does not weaken 
gender status beliefs.  To recall, sweeping is a low status activity, to be performed by the 
person with the lowest status.  If boys only perform this work when no girls are around then 
this does not challenge the presumption that if girls were present then they should perform 
the work.   
 
School sex composition also seemed to affect gender beliefs about women undertaking 
stereotypically masculine work.  Boys in single-sex education more commonly portrayed girls 
as potential sexual partners rather than intellectual equals or potential co-workers.  They 
tended to see male-female interactions as exclusively sexual.  For example, during my stay 
with their family, single-sex educated Musenge (24) and his brother Luo (17) suggested that 
their contemporaries at school saw girls as ‘meat’.  Fights sometimes break out between 
nearby boys’ schools, over presumed rights of sexual access to girls at the adjacent school.  
‘Nkana Boys [school] own 75% shares in Betty [the neighbouring girls’ school]’, wrote three 
male students in their joint essay on single-sex education.  They further detailed that girls at 
Betty Kaunda School are less intelligent and talk nonsense, since they are only interested in 
their physical appearance.   
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Having endorsed these stereotypes, these three single-sex educated young men elaborated 
that they would never ask their wives for advice.  They might listen but would presume 
themselves to know the ideal solution.  Two of the three also expressed scepticism about 
women leaders.  Nsenga (18) was somewhat resistant to his peers’ stereotypes: he questioned 
these by reference to his more egalitarian home environment (he labelled his mother, a 
nurse, ‘household head’).  For the most part, however, perceiving women as sexual partners, 
but not intellectual equals, seemed particularly pervasive among men from single-sex 
schools.  Although some single-sex educated male students were aware that girls had scored 
the highest national marks for their grades, they dismissed them as unusual.  They tended to 
champion sexist stereotypes and disregard contradicting information.   
 
Bear in mind that this data only suggests that school sex composition affects young people’s 
gender beliefs, it does not tell us whether such views endure over the life course.  Another 
limitation of these interviews with students is that they do not reveal how co-education 
affected gender beliefs in previous decades, before increased flexibility in gender divisions of 
labour.  Hence the necessity of drawing on conversations with older male participants. 
 
Some of those who had acquired gender stereotypes appeared to retain them in adulthood, 
disregarding contradictory information.  A minority of single-sex educated men recalled 
being surprised and happy when they discovered in higher education that women are 
intelligent.  However, other men ‘did not change, they were still looking at girls to be inferior 
to them...  They were stubborn to change and accept that we are all equal’, commented 
Hamadudu (29, a co-educated champion of gender equality, now Art teacher, discussing his 
peers from different schools).  ‘Nkana Boys is a boys’ school, the way they see girls it’s 
different from the way boys from [co-educational] Mulenga High School see girls.  They have 
different perceptions’, explained Musenge (24, an unemployed male, whose family I stayed 
with).  Some women identified single-sex educated men as particularly hostile towards 
women who excelled in higher education, employment and politics: 
 
This is why even in institutions some men don’t accept when they are given a woman as 
a senior member of staff, ‘cause it’s embedded in them that they’re superior than 
women, and these characters are those that have never had that exposure with women 
in a classroom level, from Form 1 to secondary school.  Even at university, if they are 
there, they will look upon women as an object, which is wrong. 
Belinda (co-educated MP, who I stayed with for several weeks). 
 
If true, this indicates confirmation bias: through single-sex education, boys develop gender 
stereotypes, presume girls to be less intelligent and subsequently interpret information so 
that it fits with this assumption.   
 
School sex composition was also said to affect the gender beliefs of female students.  Single-
sex educated Bwalya (24, a female metallurgist, from an egalitarian, female-headed 
household) described her former classmates as having ‘an inferiority complex, in thinking 
guys are more intelligent than them’.  This view was widely shared.  Such presumptions 
sometimes seemed to permit acceptance of gender status inequalities.  BanaBecca (36, from 
a single-sex school, who only recently started participating in household decision-making) 
recalled, ‘Even though I had intelligence, I was thinking that men were better than me, not 
knowing that I myself was better than others’ (translated).liii  Without the opportunity to 
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compare her performance with that of boys and then being socially isolated as a homemaker, 
BanaBecca had little exposure to disconfirming evidence of widely-held gender stereotypes.  
She continued to endorse such presumptions until she started trading at the market and saw 
a broad range of women undertaking the socially valued role of household financial provider.  
The gender beliefs that she developed through single-sex education were thus undermined 
through exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of labour in later life. 
 
When co-educated people were asked about academic abilities, the vast majority maintained 
that sex category made little difference to performance.  While a minority of co-educated 
boys mentioned earlier discomfort of being beaten by girls (since this unsettled prevailing 
stereotypes), unease waned over time.  We might explain this belated acceptance in co-
education and dismissal of isolated examples of female achievement from single-sex 
educated boys by positing that gender stereotypes only wane with a critical mass of 
disconfirming evidence, such as prolonged exposure to girls’ displays of equal competence.    
 
Co-education does not only appear associated with more egalitarian beliefs, it was also 
volunteered as a key influence by many male champions of gender equality.  Prolonged daily 
exposure in their formative years to girls’ equal competence seemed to provide sufficient 
disconfirming evidence of gender stereotypes: 
 
Women can do what men can do, if it has to do with the use of the intellect... just to 
think and apply your knowledge...  I think they can...  I’ve always thought like that 
‘cause I’ve always been exposed to women doing things that men can do, intellectually.  
I’ve always been in co-education, so I’ve always assumed that we’re at school to do the 
same things. 
Roy (26, studying civil engineering). 
 
Hamadudu (29, a male Art teacher and a champion of gender equality): Through co-
educational school...  I saw that girls can do what boys can do.  It changed me in a way; I 
started looking at boys and girls as the same.  I used to look at them as people who are 
unable but after knowing that they can compete with me, we are only different in sex, I 
started giving them respect.  It changed me in the way I was perceiving them. 
 
Hamadudu was financially supported by his sister (a nurse) and he performed unpaid care 
work as a youth but it was co-education that he stressed most vociferously in our repeated 
interviews.  Many co-educated girls and women similarly emphasised the catalytic effect of 
exposure to equal competence in education.  Namatamma (15, Grade 9, consistently number 
one in class and aspiring to become a medical doctor) explained: 
 
When we were in Grade 6 we were actually separated, there was a girls’ class and a 
males’ class so I used to think ‘Wow, maybe the males do better than I did’...  When we 
got to Grade 7... I had to find out that I can even come top of the class then I thought 
‘OK, then I can even do better than males!’.  My attitude just like changed, I was like 
‘OK, I can do anything!’...  I realised that, OK if I can beat them in certain subjects then I 
can also be a leader then I can do anything that boys can do! 
 
Namatamma is from a very poor family (she shares a very small single room, in a crumbling 
mud cabin with her mother, a divorced domestic worker, as well as her cousins), but her 
emphasis upon realising equal capabilities through co-education was echoed across the 
socio-economic and generational spectrum, as indicated below: 
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Before I went [to a co-educational school] I thought boys could do better in certain 
subjects, that hindered me from studying very hard, until I realised that I can also do 
better...  In the mid-term test I was the highest.  I just had to brush it out.46  So it was 
interesting for me. 
Ruth (19, trainee teacher, from a low-income settlement). 
 
When you’ve seen that you’ve beaten them, you like it, there’s no difference.  The mind 
is just the same. 
Chezo (47, occupational health professional and trade unionist at national level, her 
daughter, Chilufya, studies Civil Engineering). 
 
From beating boys at school I realised I could also do men’s work. 
Sophie (26, laboratory analyst at the mine). 
 
As illustrated in the quotes above, a number of participants voluntarily identified co-
education as a major influence when narrating their life histories, without my prior mention 
of this topic.  Some (but not all) maintained that through learning together they came to 
disavow gender stereotypes differences between men and women.  However, their particular 
interpretation of co-educational experiences may have been due to some additional cause, 
such as gender sensitisation.  Even if co-education can reveal the similarities of the sexes by 
enabling comparative evaluations, it may have only been as a result of exposure to 
egalitarian discourses that students began to think in these terms.  This particular possibility 
will be further discussed in the next chapter, though for now I note two points.  First, older 
participants such as Sophie and Chezo claimed that they were not taught about gender and 
equal rights while in school, so denied that gender sensitisation had affected them when 
growing up.  (Though it remains possible that their recollections of co-education had been 
influenced by subsequent exposure to egalitarian discourses).  Second, participants from 
single-sex schools tended to present markedly different views.  Third, pupils who had 
attended both kinds of schools (like Ruth and Belinda) or were previously sex segregated 
within co-educational institutions (like Namatamma) reiterated the impact of the transition 
to co-education. 
 
This emphasis on co-education is not intended to be exhaustive.  Clearly, there are many 
other ways by which young people may come to revise their gender beliefs.  This may also 
occur in the home, growing up with siblings of the opposite sex category.  However, it is 
worth noting that the majority of those who claimed to have rejected stereotypes in their 
youth strongly emphasised the role of co-education, identifying it as more important than 
these other contexts.  There are a number of reasons why co-education may have been 
viewed as more important.  Girls and boys are often assigned gender-specific domestic roles 
to perform – exceptions were a definite minority.  Accordingly, they tend not to undertake 
the same task and realise equal capabilities.  Moreover, what appears most significant about 
co-education is not just girls’ demonstration of similarity but rather girls’ demonstration of 
similarity in a socially valued domain (i.e. education), thereby challenging gender status 
beliefs.   
 
                                                        
46 Within the context of this conversation I interpreted this metaphorical phrase to mean something along the lines of, ‘I just had to overcome my 
earlier self-doubt and strive to fulfil my potential’. 
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The limitations of co-education 
 
Co-education did not seem to be a prerequisite for people’s support for flexibility in gender 
divisions of labour.  Some women who attended single-sex education maintained that they 
grew up in homes without gender divisions of labour or gender status inequalities.  
Accordingly, they already eschewed the gender stereotypes that others came to question 
through co-education.  Also, even if most single-sex educated participants grew up endorsing 
gender stereotypes, this did not determine their attitudes or behaviour in later life, as evident 
in the case of BanaBecca.  The data presented above only indicates the importance of 
repeated opportunities to compare men and women’s displays of competence in the same, 
socially valued domain, not that this necessarily has to occur in one’s formative years.  
 
Meanwhile, co-education only seems to undermine gender stereotypes in synergy with other 
factors.  Experiences of schooling are tempered by domestic upbringing, educational 
management and labour market possibilities.  While many interpreted equal performance at 
school as disconfirming evidence of all gender stereotypes and denied differences between 
the sexes, others still doubted that women could undertake gender atypical activities.  This 
may have been because they lacked exposure to egalitarian discourses or flexibility in gender 
divisions of labour, due to pervasive occupational segregation (CSO et al, 2009:44).  For 
example, although co-educated Joanna (26) felt that she performed just as well as the boys at 
school and wanted to be an electrician, she doubted this possibility until she had seen a 
woman electrician working up a pylon and was encouraged by her older, supportive brother.  
Having saved up funds by trading second-hand clothing (salaula) at the central market, she 
is now enrolled at a vocational training college. 
 
Some co-educated participants with little exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of labour 
in other domains (e.g. children of homemakers and/or from rural areas) dismissed girls’ 
academic performance, attributing it to the easy nature of the subjects in which they 
succeeded.  They gave more prestige to stereotypically masculine subjects.  We might explain 
this with reference to their commitment to gender stereotypes, which led them to overlook 
contradictory information.  
 
Also, some girls struggle to perform as well as boys and do not provide disconfirming 
evidence of gender stereotypes.  Informants often attributed this to their heavy burden of 
domestic chores.  Girls’ education may also be constrained by sexual harassment and 
violence, leading to absenteeism – as found by research in Lusaka Province (WLSA et al, 
2012).  Then teachers with stereotypical beliefs may explicitly tell girls that they are less 
competent in Mathematics and Science (as found by WLSA et al, 2012).  These obstacles may 
inhibit girls’ academic performance, thereby affecting girls’ self-perceptions and confirming 
others’ gender stereotypes. 
 
Academic performance also appears to be influenced by expectations of future livelihoods.  
Some (though certainly not all) middle-aged women narrated that in earlier decades, 
predating the contemporary rise in female labour force participation, they did not envisage 
being employed and so were less interested in education.  Many market traders, for instance, 
recalled and regretted formerly being ‘too playful’.  However, in the context of greater 
economic insecurity they are now much more supportive of their daughters’ education and 
labour force aspirations.  Co-education does not then invariably produce the same 
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experiences and gender beliefs irrespective of the broader socio-economic context but 
interacts with students’, teachers’ and parents’ expectations. 
 
School management seemed significant in shaping co-educational experience.  For example, 
I encountered teachers from both co-educational and single-sex schools discouraging girls 
from pursuing atypical subjects (e.g. Woodwork) (Nkonkomalimba and Duffy, 2010; WLSA 
et al, 2012 also observed this phenomena in Zambian schools). Much depends on the gender 
beliefs of the teacher, which may be more or less sexist in either type of schooling.  In Kitwe, 
the allocation of gendered tasks (such as digging pits, sweeping classrooms and student 
leadership) varied with management’s ethos rather than school sex composition.  Referring 
back to Bajaj (2009a), it may be Umutende’s staff’s disavowal of gender stereotypes rather 
than sex segregated campuses that explains pupils’ more egalitarian beliefs.  Recruiting more 
female Mathematics and Science teachers (in both co-educational and single-sex schools) 
might challenge gender stereotypes held by faculty and students alike.  This has been called 
for by both pupils and Engineering lecturers in Zambia (Lusambo et al, 2002:12; 
Nkonkomalimba and Duffy, 2010:36). 
 
Another limitation of co-education concerns economic obstacles.  While co-education’s 
influence on gendered self-perceptions and stereotypes was stressed by participants from 
across the socio-economic spectrum, their behaviour and labour market prospects were often 
shaped by household finances.  Many young people lack access to decent education and 
employment.  Even if enrolled, students’ education, self-efficacy and employment prospects 
are constrained by teacher absenteeism, non-participatory teaching, large class sizes and 
limited resources in government and low-cost private schools.   
 
Notwithstanding these limitations and mediating factors, co-education in the Copperbelt 
seems associated with the rejection of gender stereotypes in early life.  Through learning 
together, some participants realised and became accustomed to equal academic 
performance, which further affected their gender status beliefs.  The implication of this 
section is that early and prolonged exposure to female competence in a socially valued 
domain (i.e. education) appears to make people more inclined to eschew gender stereotypes 
and thereby support flexibility in gender divisions of labour. 
 
Conclusion  
 
To recall, Chapter 4 presented evidence indicating that worsening economic security 
increased female labour force participation and occupational desegregation by increasing the 
economic cost of compliance with widely-held gender stereotypes that prescribed male 
breadwinners and female housewives.  In this chapter, it has been suggested that although 
worsening economic security was a primary driver of both forms of growing flexibility in 
gender divisions of labour, additional factors seem relevant, particularly in the case of 
occupational desegregation.  
 
Women who had pursued and trained for masculine occupations emphasised their earlier 
belief in equal competence.  Commonly-cited formative experiences providing disconfirming 
evidence of gender stereotypes included maternal employment, flexibility in gender divisions 
of domestic work, role models in the public sphere and co-education.  With the exception of 
co-education, these are all examples of exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of labour – 
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a mechanism identified as significant in Chapter 4.  Co-education is not entirely different 
however, since it is also a way in which young people gain evidence of women’s competence 
in a socially valued domain, i.e. education.   
 
The more often a young person has these kinds of formative experiences the greater their 
apparent tendency to interpret them as disconfirming evidence of gender beliefs.  
Information that contradicts gender stereotypes and cultural expectations is less commonly 
dismissed as exceptional if it is multiple.  For Bwalya (24), having a strong, financially 
independent mother (who has raised her children single-handedly, since widowhood), as 
well as sharing reproductive work and household decision-making, has led her to believe that 
no job or position is reserved for men alone.  Given her strengths in Mathematics and 
Sciences in school, she saw it as logical to pursue Metallurgy, even though this is a male-
dominated profession.  Her mother encouraged her interest by introducing her to a friend, 
who was a female engineer.   
 
The importance of early exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of labour was not only 
identified by female participants in male-dominated domains but was also notable for its 
absence in the life histories of participants who had grown up espousing gender stereotypes 
about women’s lesser competence.  For the latter group, a change in interests appears to 
have been a sufficient condition for increased female employment but not occupational 
desegregation.  Worsening economic security pushed women into employment, but their 
choice of occupation seems influenced by whether they were previously exposed to flexibility 
in gender divisions of labour, which provided disconfirming evidence of gender stereotypes.  
This distinction contrasts with the hypothesis posited in Chapter 4. 
 
Formative experiences appear to be significant for several reasons.  First, participants often 
interpreted subsequent experiences in ways consistent with their existing pre-conceptions.  
As a result, some people (such as Alan, discussed in this chapter) seemed cognitively 
resistant to disconfirming evidence of their gender stereotypes.  Second, men who had 
internalised gender status beliefs seemed to feel entitled to preferential, deferential 
treatment.  This belief seemed to lead people to react aggressively to women who did not 
demonstrate sufficient respect, such as by appearing too assertive.  However, as discussed in 
Chapter 4, prolonged exposure to women performing a socially valued role in a time of 
financial hardship does seem to weaken gender status beliefs in some cases. 
 
The apparent instability of gender beliefs over the life course raises the question of whether 
certain formative experiences only appear significant because they are cases of prolonged 
exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of labour or because they occur at a certain period 
in the life course.  One reason to think that formative experiences do matter is that decisions 
girls made in their youth often had long-term implications.  Girls espousing stereotypes 
about appropriately feminine activities may shun gender atypical subjects at school as well as 
related occupations.  Although women may subsequently revise their beliefs, they may lack 
the resources to retrain for a new occupation.  The evidence thus suggests that gender beliefs 
are not necessarily stable over the life course but that formative experiences are nonetheless 
significant. 
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6. Exposure to Discourses of Equality 
 
This chapter evaluates evidence in favour of an alternative hypothesis, namely that popular 
exposure to egalitarian discourses has weakened gender stereotypes, relating to both 
competence and status, and thereby fostered flexibility in gender divisions of labour.  I 
consider the possibility that worsening economic security was not in itself sufficient to 
trigger increased female labour force participation or occupational desegregation, without 
this prior disavowal of stereotypes as a result of gender sensitisation.  Furthermore, it is only 
because of gender sensitisation that flexibility in gender divisions of labour is increasingly 
interpreted as disconfirming evidence of gender status beliefs.  These hypotheses reverse the 
direction of causation posited in Chapter 4, crudely that macro-economic change catalysed 
flexibility in gender divisions of labour, which weakened gender stereotypes about 
competence and status. 
 
Gender sensitisation has become increasingly pervasive 
 
One reason for having some (initial) confidence in these hypotheses is that gender 
sensitisation has become increasingly pervasive in Zambia.  This is evident from five types of 
data: my conversations with participants, Government and NGO statements, budget 
allocations, the school curriculum, as well as qualitative and quantitative studies.  This 
evidence is outlined below.   
 
First, many participants had been exposed to gender sensitisation.  ‘They’ve really been 
sensitising’, commented Sophie (26, laboratory analyst at a mine).  Bemba interviews were 
sometimes peppered with the English language term ‘gender’ – presumably learnt through 
sensitisation.  Some explicitly identified sensitisation as a significant influence; others did 
not but still portrayed it as widespread.  For example, boys at a single-sex government school 
often mentioned in their commissioned essays on whether gender equality is possible in 
Zambia: 
 
A lot of women are being educated on their rights and duties as citizens, many non-
governmental organisations have been fighting and are still advocating for equal rights 
and opportunities for both men and women.   
 
Nowadays people have learnt the Importance of Gender Equality on sexism.  And a 
number of women have learnt and teach about this issue.  Long time in Zambia before 
the introduction of this policy, men were regarded to be the strongest in terms of doing 
jobs and quick thinker[s] in marking [making] plans. 
 
Besides schools, participants had also heard about gender equality through media broadcasts 
and community outreach.  If they did not initiate the topic then I would ask whether they 
had heard of phrases commonly used in sensitisation: ‘gender’, ‘insambu sha banamayo’ 
(women’s rights), ‘50:50’.  Only six participants expressed no knowledge of (or seemed 
confused about these terms).47  The remainder of my participants, the vast majority, 
                                                        
47 The six participants that appeared unfamiliar with this terminology included Gloria (an elderly leader in a branch of PF, selling caterpillars in 
an informal settlement); one extremely poor widow (trading from home, without a radio or other access to media broadcasts on gender equality); 
another elderly widow (a market trader who suggested gender meant women forming groups to rear chickens); and two married market traders 
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confidently articulated the meaning of ‘gender equality’ and related terms.  This suggests 
that they had been exposed to gender sensitisation.  This said, since my sample is not 
statistically representative it may not provide an accurate portrayal of popular exposure to 
gender sensitisation.  For example, since I met most participants in public places (such as 
schools, markets, political and community associations, social gatherings as well as gender 
trainings), my data may be less representative of more socially isolated people, such as the 
elderly, disabled and chronically ill. 
 
Sensitisation is sometimes used by Zambian policy-makers seeking to promote behavioural 
change.  For example, the Minister of Gender’s statement to the 2013 United Nations 
Commission on the Status of Women outlined the Government’s ‘awareness raising 
programmes to the general public… [comprising] community mobilisation, engagement of 
men as change agents, involvement and sensitisation of religious and traditional leaders, 
including local council and other opinion leaders’ (UN, 2013:3).  This expressed commitment 
to sensitisation is backed up with financial support.  The Joint Gender Support Programme 
(JGSP) (half funded by Government)48 had a budget of $11 million for 2009-2011.  Among 
other initiatives, this included $1.6 million to sensitise civil servants on the importance of 
gender equality and how this might be promoted in their policies and programmes (UNDP, 
2008:36).  The JGSP also allocates funding to sensitise the general public: $80,000 per 
annum for two major annual events: International Women’s Day and 16 Days of Gender 
Activism (UNDP, 2008:36-39).   
 
A number of prominent Non-Governmental Organisations also prioritise gender 
sensitisation – as indicated by their strategic plans.  For example, ActionAid (2013:1) profiles 
its local partner, the Young Women’s Christian Association (YWCA) as ‘promoting gender 
equity and equality through strategies which include advocacy, sensitisation, capacity-
building and community mobilisation’.  This is consistent with my own observations of 
YWCA’s activities and is also evident from the NGO’s Copperbelt director’s (Jurita Mutale’s) 
frequent use of radio and newspapers to advocate for female leaders in the run up to the 2011 
national elections.  Newspaper headlines surmising her efforts include: ‘YWCA urges 
massive women participation in elections’ and ‘Participate in political decisions at all levels, 
YWCA urges women’ (The Post, 2011a, 2011b).  In the latter Jurita Mutale is reported to have 
‘urged women to elevate themselves from thinking that their job ended at dancing and 
singing praises for men, but aim at rubbing shoulders with them within the corridors of 
power. Mutale also encouraged political parties to level the playing field and create an 
enabling environment for intelligent and wise women to participate in the country's political 
affairs’. 
 
During my fieldwork, before the 2011 national elections, I observed similar calls for female 
political participation by the Women for Change, Women and Law Development in Southern 
Africa as well as the Zambian National Women’s Lobby.  The latter recently launched a 
Copperbelt project entitled ‘Women in Governance: Strengthening the Women in the 
Community for Equal Participation in Governance’.  It aims to increase the number of 
elected female councillors.  To this end, it chiefly comprises awareness-raising and 
                                                                                                                                                                            
who both denied knowing the meaning of key terms yet still expressed egalitarian beliefs.  One 26 year male mechanic did vaguely recall studying 
the topic in Civics but had since forgotten the content.   
48 Half the total budget of $11 million was to be provided by the Zambian Government, other donors being the United Nations, Government of 
Norway, Ireland, and Netherlands. 
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community advocacy, through engaging female councillors, men’s networks, political parties, 
as well as traditional and church leaders (ZNWL, 2012). 
 
The prevalence of gender sensitisation is also evident from the strategic plans of other 
Zambian NGOs.  For instance, the Forum for African Women Educationalists identifies 
community advocacy as a central objective in their strategic plans for 2002-2006 and 2008-
2012.  They stress the importance of ‘building public awareness and consensus on the social 
and economic advantages of girls’ education through advocacy’.  This priority is reflected in 
budget allocation: 28% to community and policy advocacy on girls’ education (FAWE, 
2008:12).   
 
These forms of gender sensitisation are generally inclusive of both men and women.  
Interviewed gender facilitators explained that they previously created ‘women only, secure 
spaces’ for reflection but now regard men’s inclusion as essential for social change.  This is 
consistent with Wendoh and Wallace’s (2006:74) earlier finding that men are included in 
many gender trainings in Zambia (though less so in Rwanda, The Gambia and Uganda).   
 
Almost all sessions I observed commenced by distinguishing between ‘sex roles’ and ‘gender 
roles’.  Participants would then discuss a main topic.  One central message of gender 
sensitisation has been that ‘women can do what men can do’ (translated).  This phrase is 
used to refer to education, employment, as well as participation in decision-making in the 
home and politics.  Sensitisation also extols the notion that ‘men can do what women can 
do’, i.e. unpaid care work.  It thus appears that gender sensitisation is both widespread and 
also aimed at achieving the outcomes that I observed in my own primary research (i.e. the 
weakening of gender stereotypes).  This gives reason to think that it might partly account for 
my empirical findings.   
 
In addition, there has been a concerted campaign against gender-based violence, entitled ‘A 
Safer Zambia’ (ASAZA).  This programme commenced in 2008.  Funded by USAID and the 
European Union, it is implemented in seven districts, including Kitwe.  Activities include 
‘training men as advocates and agents of change; conducting sensitisation for community 
leaders/traditional leaders; holding community conversations around GBV… national and 
community radio programs with GBV and gender themes; air and print public service 
announcements; and use of international events for GBV educational activities’ (USAID, 
2010:34).  One of ASAZA’s two objectives is the ‘improvement in gender equitable attitudes 
and behaviours among men and women’ (USAID, 2010:7).  The training manual then begins 
by discussing the social construction of ‘gender divisions of labour’.  It states that ‘female 
gender roles include care of children, household cook, household washing, passenger, 
subsistence farmer, teacher, typist and male gender roles include: discipline of children, 
wage employment, cook, household repairing, driver, commercial farmer, head teacher, 
clerk, soldier’ (CARE International Zambia, 2008:9).  Their examples of stereotypically 
masculine work are consistent with my own, described in Chapter 4 (including wage 
employment as well as specific occupations and activities).  Since the ASAZA campaign was 
on-going in Kitwe around the time I conducted my fieldwork, focusing on stereotyped gender 
divisions of labour and associated status beliefs, there is reason to think it might have 
influenced my empirical findings. 
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Programme evaluations suggest that gender sensitisation has been widespread.  For 
example, by March 2010 (when I started my fieldwork), ASAZA had trained 1479 community 
leaders, 38 parliamentarians, 1260 youths and 40 communities in seven districts in Zambia.  
The rationale for targeting community leaders (such as members of Resident Development 
Associations and Local Government Councillors) is that these are the influential people 
commonly resolving disputes.  Training them on gender is thus envisaged to have a broader 
effect.  A further 15 ‘Men’s Networks’ had been formed – including one in Kitwe.  These are 
likewise intended to persuade their peers (USAID, 2010:32).  Furthermore, a national, 
population-based survey conducted for Family Health International found that 45% of urban 
youths (aged 15-24) had participated in peer education (which often comprises gender 
sensitisation).  This proportion was far higher for urban youths that had attended secondary 
school (83%).  A small, though not insignificant, proportion of Zambian youths (12%) 
reported that they had been exposed to peer education more than ten times in the past six 
months (Svenson et al, 2008:30-31).   
 
Besides direct, face-to-face contact, organisations also use media – to which access is 
widespread.  27% of Copperbelt women read a newspaper, 56% watch television and 74% 
listen to the radio at least once a week.  The rates for men are higher: 37%, 60% and 79% 
respectively (CSO et al, 2009:39-40).  A USAID programme evaluation cites a further study 
claiming that 73% of surveyed respondents in the ASAZA intervention districts had had 
recently seen or heard messages relating to GBV (USAID, 2010:3).  Since the ASAZA GBV 
sensitisation is not only widespread but also addresses the gender stereotypes and associated 
status beliefs, it seems plausible that it might have influenced my empirical findings.   
 
Gender sensitisation is also institutionalised in the school curriculum and has been so for 
well over a decade.  This longevity provides further reason to have some initial confidence in 
the hypotheses framing this chapter.  All secondary students are taught and examined on the 
social construction of gender divisions of labour as part of ‘Civics’.  The Civics programme 
was developed in 1995 and by 1997 932 teachers had received seven days of training (Bratton 
et al, 1999:809).  For Grades 8-9, Civics topics include gender equality, political changes in 
Zambia, democratic governance, political parties, human rights, conflict, economic policies, 
the labour market, trade, as well as regional and international organisations.  The chapter on 
gender encourages students to reflect upon the social construction of gender roles and 
responsibilities, as well as the laws and customs that discriminate against women.  Also 
discussed are the means to promote women’s socio-economic participation: education, 
microcredit and sensitisation.  Additionally, it mentions women’s rights organisations (see 
Nalwamba et al, 1997:25-27).   
 
Older students (in Grades 11-12) can opt to further explore these issues in ‘Civic Education’.  
This subject incorporates the judiciary, media, HIV/AIDS, and goes into more detail on 
gender equality, which is defined as men and women being ‘free to develop their personal 
abilities without limitations set by stereotyped rigid gender roles and prejudices’ (page 82 of 
the textbook).49  The chapter on gender explores sources of socialisation (such as the family 
and media), as well as the time burdens of women farmers, inheritance law and the women’s 
movement.  There is a range of case studies to reflect upon, projects to complete and 
                                                        
49 I am unable to provide a full reference for the textbook since I was only able to access a partial photocopy. 
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questions to answer.  A further chapter on ‘social challenges’ discusses gender-based 
violence.   
 
Earlier qualitative research undertaken in Zambia gives yet further reason to believe that a 
wide range of people have been exposed to egalitarian discourses: 
 
Villagers, leaders and key informants had learned key gender concepts through 
government and/or NGO activities; the term ‘gender’ is ubiquitous across Africa now 
(Wendoh and Wallace, 2006:71). 
 
During my 2002 ﬁeldwork, the topic of gender… was omnipresent in the talk in 
government ofﬁces, among civil servants, and in NGO organisations and the media 
(Simpson, 2007:185).50 
 
In summary, my own research together with further qualitative and quantitative studies, 
organisations’ strategic plans, budgets, training manuals and the school curriculum suggest 
that a broad range of people have been exposed to egalitarian discourses.  Given its 
prevalence there is reason to think that gender sensitisation might partly account for two of 
the contemporary trends detailed in Chapter 4: greater flexibility in gender divisions of 
labour and support for gender equality.  It is hypothesised that these have occurred because 
sensitisation catalysed a disavowal of gender stereotypes.   
 
Research questions relating to gender sensitisation 
 
As discussed, the main aim of this chapter is to ascertain the extent to which exposure to 
egalitarian discourses accounts for the weakening of gender beliefs and growing flexibility in 
gender divisions of labour.  The strongest hypothesis here is that gender sensitisation has 
undermined gender beliefs, thereby fostering flexibility in gender divisions of labour.  A 
weaker version of this hypothesis posits that gender sensitisation has contributed to the 
positive feedback loop, initially triggered by worsening economic security and increased 
female labour force participation.   
 
This chapter also explores what counts as disconfirming evidence of gender beliefs – whether 
exposure to egalitarian discourses has similar effects to exposure to flexibility in gender 
divisions of labour.  The remainder of the chapter is divided into two sections, which 
respectively marshal evidence for and against the hypotheses, examining why gender 
sensitisation appears to have been transformative in some but not all cases.   
 
Evidence supporting the hypotheses that sensitisation partly or primarily 
accounts for the erosion of gender beliefs 
 
This section presents evidence in support of the hypotheses by showing that gender 
sensitisation can enable people to rethink their internalised gender status beliefs, provide a 
                                                        
50 Note that ‘gender’, in the Zambian context is often used as a synonym for ‘gender sensitisation’.  For example, Matthew (a market trader) once 
commented, ‘Gender, it encourages us to know the importance of a woman in society’.  ‘Gender’ is also used to mean ‘gender equality’: in their 
essays on whether gender equality is possible in Zambia, two male students wrote that ‘Gender means “roles that can be performed by both 
sexes”’.   
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useful conceptual framework, enhance confidence in pre-existing egalitarian beliefs and also 
foster a revision of cultural expectations.   
 
Gender sensitisation can enable a revision of internalised gender beliefs 
 
Some women described their experiences of gender sensitisation as ‘awakening’ (ukwiluka).  
Such participants appeared to have previously internalised gender status beliefs, without 
questioning them or conceiving of an alternative.  They had previously not considered 
themselves entitled to greater status and associated practices.  Exposure to abstract ideas of 
gender equality then broadened their horizons: they came to imagine another way of doing 
things, which they sought to enact despite initial resistance from their husbands.  This 
suggests that sensitisation can be effective, by enabling individuals to rethink their taken-for-
granted assumptions. 
 
BanaChileshe (41, market trader) resolutely maintained that her labour force participation 
was triggered by worsening economic security.  However, it was radio messages on women’s 
rights that gave her confidence that she was entitled to raise her voice in household decision-
making.  She further explained that her self-esteem had grown as she saw she had the 
strength to work hard and provide for her children.  Meanwhile her husband came to respect 
and value her opinions more, as he appreciated the fruits of her labour, learnt about 
women’s rights and, importantly, realised that his wife knew her rights.  As a cumulative 
result of these experiences their relationship slowly changed.  She no longer kneels down to 
serve him food or calls him ‘my father’ – a salutation which many women and children use to 
show respect.   
 
BanaBecca (36) similarly explained that her marriage has been affected by a range of 
influences.  By trading in the market she supported her family and also learnt about 
alternative solutions to problems.  In these ways she gradually acquired self-confidence as 
well as respect and appreciation at home.  Joint decision-making was further encouraged by 
gender sensitisation: 
 
BanaBecca: Historically you just follow [your husband’s decisions], good or bad...  We 
didn’t have the right to speak, a man is the head.  You must follow what he decides...  
We weren’t thinking that it was bad.  We just perceived everything as fine, because we 
hadn’t awoken...  It [gender sensitisation] came twice on the radio...  They were saying 
that people should change and improve from the past way of living...  At first it was 
difficult for him to follow women’s rights, he had pride...  But now he’s different.   
Alice: Why has he changed? 
BanaBecca: Passing through the lessons and my deeds.  Passing through what I’m 
doing, he sees there’s progress in the things I’ve done...  [Whereas, previously, when I 
was a housewife,] he was proud, thinking there’s nothing I can do] [translated].liv  
 
BanaChileshe and BanaBecca further indicated that exposure to egalitarian discourses had 
led their husbands to reflect upon the normative implications of their recent shift in gender 
divisions of labour.  Their husbands gave this same account when separately interviewed.  
However, they also downplayed the significance of gender sensitisation, relative to other 
influences.  They emphasised that association through labour force participation had 
enhanced their self-esteem and exposed them to inspirational figures and new ideas.  Hence 
sensitisation was not the sole reason that they became less deferential to men and disavowed 
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gender status beliefs.  BanaChileshe and BanaBecca further maintained that if they had not 
been performing a socially valued role then their husbands (even if sensitised) not have 
respected them more.   
 
But this is only a speculation (based on their estimation of counter-factuals) and should be 
considered as such.  We cannot ascertain the extent to which sensitisation has contributed to 
the weakening of gender stereotypes and increased flexibility in gender divisions of labour 
without comparing different circumstances.  Accordingly, this chapter later explores what 
happens when someone is exposed to gender sensitisation but not flexibility in gender 
divisions of labour.   
 
For the meanwhile, the data presented above suggests that exposure to abstract ideas of 
equality can enable individuals to rethink their gender beliefs.   
 
Gender sensitisation can provide a helpful conceptual framework 
 
Some participants explained that although they were convinced of equal capabilities by 
seeing women mechanics and leaders, gender sensitisation provided a helpful framework by 
which they subsequently made sense of atypical sightings.  For example, three male 
participants explained that although they had previously dismissed Civics lessons, they later 
recalled this taught content in order to comprehend their sightings of women repairing cars 
and cutting grass.  Without hearing calls for equality or learning about the conceptual 
distinction between ‘sex’ and ‘gender’, exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of labour 
may have been less easily understood, for it might not have cohered with existing cognitive 
frameworks.   
 
Gender sensitisation can strengthen pre-existing beliefs 
 
By enabling people to learn that their beliefs are shared by socially respected figures and 
institutions, gender sensitisation was often said to provide external validation and 
legitimisation of pre-existing concerns and ambitions.  For example, a number of female 
participants maintained that although their interest in gender atypical occupations had 
preceded their exposure to gender sensitisation, it had enhanced their resolve by 
communicating broader acceptance.51  They were encouraged to hear others affirm their view 
that women are just as capable as men: 
 
It makes you respect yourself more; it really solidified the whole equality thing for me. 
Bwalya (24, metallurgist), commenting on a GAD NGO’s visit to her school. 
 
I was even happy, we should work together; gender encouraged me.  No more men can 
challenge me.  Already I had that spirit but when they brought gender I became really 
confident. 
Rose (42, an explosives engineer and pastor, see life history). 
 
                                                        
51 Some people also viewed gender sensitisation as legitimising their existing concerns about gender-based violence.  Claudia (30, unemployed), 
who was previously in an abusive relationship, has a sense that something is wrong with current arrangements and is keen to learn about ‘gender’, 
in order to hear authoritative voices opposing what goes on.  Housewives, who did not mix with others in the market, often stressed the 
importance of learning that they were not suffering alone.   
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It really touches my heart and it keeps me strong.   
Annette (24 trainee soldier) further detailed that gender rhetoric reinforces her existing 
momentum to push herself forward (ukwisunka – a common phrase used by pioneering 
women).   
 
Some men, already persuaded by their own experiences, were likewise encouraged by gender 
sensitisation.  For example, Matthew (47, market trader) enjoys an understanding conjugal 
relationship, much enhanced by his wife’s labour force participation (see life history in 
Chapter 2).  Given his experience, Matthew had already accepted that women can perform 
‘men’s work’, so radio discussions on this had little additional impact.  However, he was 
strongly affected by messages that ‘men can do what women can do’ (translated).  These 
enabled him to think that others accepted men undertaking domestic labour – ‘it’s normal’, 
he said repeatedly.  In Kitwe, ‘normal’ is often used as a synonym for ‘socially acceptable’: 
believing that one is following accepted practices matters, while doing something atypical 
raises questions.  Gender sensitisation thus seem to have the potential to normalise the 
sharing of reproductive work, showing this is common, and thereby overcoming its physical 
privacy, which prohibits popular awareness of men helping out in this way (as discussed in 
Chapter 4).   
 
Official government statements on gender equality were sometimes seen as providing 
higher-level authorisation of women undertaking atypical gender roles in employment and 
homes.  For example, Rose (42) reported that ‘Nchanga mine started employing women 
when Mr Musenge, the open pit manager, said to management, “[t]here is gender, can we try 
women?”’.  While reviews of gender mainstreaming might critique the Government for 
merely paying lip-service to gender equality (see Jennings and Nkonkomalimba, 2011; 
Longwe, 1997; Rakodi, 2005; ZARD, 1994), it seems that such discourses can still prove 
influential.  Respected texts were also referenced: several participants referred to scriptural 
support for equality.   
 
This data suggests that one is more likely to pursue gender atypical activities when this is 
endorsed by others.  We might interpret this as indicative of the importance of cultural 
expectations: others’ disavowal of stereotypes shifts listeners’ expectations about the kinds of 
behaviour that are likely to be praised and condemned.  This explanation is plausible but it 
cannot provide a full account of all instances in which people reported increased resolve to 
deviate from gender stereotypes as a result of sensitisation.  Some participants who 
reportedly found sensitisation encouraging had been exposed to this by persons outside their 
social circles (via radio or visiting NGOs), i.e. not those who would routinely assess their 
behaviour.  It is not obvious how such sensitisation would have shifted their cultural 
expectations.  Though perhaps public radio broadcasts, an institutionalised school 
curriculum that includes gender equality as well as government tolerance of NGOs going into 
schools to promote gender equality do shift cultural expectations, as people come to think 
that the state will oppose discrimination.  I never heard this connection made explicitly, 
though note Rose’s perception of state support. 
 
Alternatively, the internalised gender beliefs theory might explain this phenomenon by 
saying that one is likely to become more confident in the objective validity of one’s beliefs 
upon learning that they are also upheld by respected others.  When the speaker was 
perceived as believing in the ideas they presented it gave the listeners confidence that they 
were not alone in their egalitarian beliefs.  Whereas in contexts where the vast majority of 
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other people are perceived as adhering to gender status beliefs, people may not be confident 
in their own egalitarian beliefs.     
 
Both the idea of internalised gender beliefs and cultural expectations would seem to have 
different empirical predictions and the former account seems to provide a fuller explanation 
of the observed phenomena.  This question will be later returned in discussion of what 
happens when someone becomes exposed to the abstract idea of equality yet is not provided 
with evidence that anyone else (not even the teacher) actually believes in it.   
 
Participatory gender sensitisation can enable debate and reflection 
 
If association and collective reflection are significant, in the ways described in Chapter 4, 
then we might expect the same of participatory gender sensitisation.  Indeed, my evidence 
suggests that participatory gender sensitisation can be significant in three ways: increasing 
exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of labour; facilitating debate and triggering critical 
reflection upon one’s own beliefs; and enabling a change in cultural expectations.   
 
First, participatory gender sensitisation can enable exposure to flexibility in gender divisions 
of labour, as people learn from those who have broken with cultural expectations.  While not 
everyone has witnessed gender atypical activities, their experiences can be shared by coming 
together.  For example, at a gender workshop for youths in a peri-urban settlement, an 
extremely misogynist discussion on gender differences was interrupted by 17 year old 
Joshua’s contribution, 
 
My father has been dead for three years.  My mother is keeping us nicely...  She’s been 
fighting for us.  I’m in Grade 10.   
 
This testimony was referred back to by the workshop facilitator and youths as disconfirming 
evidence of their gender stereotypes. 
 
In urban Kitwe (unlike the peri-urban settlement above), people are increasingly aware of 
women’s economic contributions but still often presume that the typical woman is less 
competent or less deserving of status than the typical man.  Such persons appear attached to 
gender stereotypes.  In this context participatory gender sensitisation can play an important 
role in enabling people to reflect on the fairness of gender-differentiated rewards.  If 
managed in a way that creates a safe space for attendants to articulate, share and explore 
their ideas and experiences then gender egalitarian discourses often emerge.  Belinda (MP, 
previously chairperson of a GAD NGO) was trained by the International Labour Organisation 
to facilitate gender sensitisation workshops (see manual: Bauer et al, 2008).  She recounted 
the sessions, 
 
One man will get up, ‘Me, I even wash plates in my house...  The other man will say ‘But 
that is a woman’s job’.  They start arguing amongst themselves...  We sit right at the 
back; we sit amongst them and listen to them... [Some workshop participants may know 
that women are miners] but it’s like it doesn’t carry much value, they’ve seen it but it 
hasn’t been absorbed...  They need to talk about it.  And when they come out of that 
workshop they’re changed people, they’ll tell you, ‘Even women can go and they are 
doing work underground now, and women are electricians, they are tractor drivers, they 
are bus drivers...  A woman can do the same job as a man!...’  So we’re building them. 
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Here Belinda implies that exposure to flexibility in gender divisions may not be sufficient for 
a rejection of widely-held gender stereotypes about differences in competence.  As discussed 
in previous chapters, confirmation bias may blind people to disconfirming evidence of their 
gender beliefs.  But instead of dismissing sightings of women miners as exceptional and 
retaining the presumption that women are incompetent in this domain, participatory 
sensitisation can enable people to question the validity of their internalised stereotypes, as 
well as their taken-for-granted gender status beliefs.   
 
Besides critique, polarised debates also enable the formation of solidarities.  For example, a 
female councillor explained that there was a large Local Government workshop on gender-
based violence in 2010.  The men blamed violence on women’s ‘bad behaviour’, but such 
assertions were challenged by the women present.  She recalled being emboldened by this 
demonstration of collective strength, as the female councillors vociferously objected to 
patriarchal accounts. 
 
We can also explain the importance of participatory gender sensitisation with reference to 
cultural expectations.  As indicated by Belinda, dialogue has the potential to overcome the 
privacy of domestic work, enabling exposure to what others do.  If some people voice their 
support for flexibility in gender divisions of labour, others may revise their cultural 
expectations.  Participants may become more resolved to enact their beliefs because they 
have learnt that others in their community are unlikely to sanction them for doing so.  Both 
theories appear able to provide plausible accounts of the phenomena; they may both be 
valid.   
 
While not all participants had engaged in participatory gender sensitisation, it is possible 
that such modes of teaching might have contributed towards growing respect and 
appreciation of women, especially since they have targeted influential persons responsible 
for dealing with local disputes. 
 
Two claims have been made thus far.  First, gender sensitisation is widespread.  Second, 
gender sensitisation seems better able to erode gender stereotypes when: it enables people 
exposed to flexibility in gender divisions of labour to reflect on their normative implications; 
it enhances confidence in the objective validity of gender egalitarian beliefs, through the 
knowledge that they are shared by others; and it creates a safe, social space to collectively 
dismantle widely-held stereotypes and establish an alternative consensus.  In order to 
ascertain the validity of the foregoing hypotheses we need to discover whether these are 
necessary conditions for effective gender sensitisation and if so, whether these conditions are 
commonly met, i.e. the prevalence of effective sensitisation.  Bear in mind that thus far this 
chapter has only discussed how sensitisation impacts beliefs, not behaviour.   
 
A further, albeit speculative, reason for confidence in the hypotheses is that quantitative data 
suggests only a moderate degree of occupational desegregation.  Yet participants constantly 
reiterated that there had been a major change.  This discrepancy may be due to a shift in how 
women’s work is perceived.  It may only be as a result of gender sensitisation that people 
have increasingly recognised evidence that disconfirms their stereotypes.  Additionally, 
perhaps people are now more cognisant and appreciative of women’s work, due to a change 
in perceptions (owing to sensitisation).  Perhaps exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of 
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labour cannot provide disconfirming evidence of gender status beliefs, since that is arguably 
a value judgement (not an empirical observation) about the esteem, respect and deference to 
which a person is entitled, by virtue of their membership of a sex category.   
 
Recent popular exposure to egalitarian discourses may account for the discrepancy between 
my and earlier findings on female labour force participation in urban Zambia.  This contrasts 
with the explanation put forward in Chapter 4, namely that gender beliefs have lagged 
behind a shift in material practices because their erosion requires prolonged exposure to 
flexibility in gender divisions of labour.   
 
The remainder of this chapter explores what happens when those exposed to gender 
sensitisation are not also exposed to flexibility in gender divisions of labour; when they do 
not think that anyone really believes in the ideas presented to them; and when there is little 
opportunity to collectively reflect upon widely-held gender stereotypes.   
 
Reasons to doubt the hypotheses 
 
The mode of sensitisation is generally problematic 
 
Notwithstanding occasional cases of ‘best practice’, gender sensitisation is commonly 
jeopardised by four pedagogical problems. 
 
First, Civics teachers may contradict class content, either verbally or behaviourally.  For 
example, Victoria (24, a trainee nurse) detailed that her Civics teacher ‘believed that some 
gender roles should have been sex roles, like cooking or whatever, he’s like, “No, men 
shouldn’t do that, me, my wife always cooks for me.  I’m never seen in the kitchen.”’ Despite 
being trained to teach the Civics syllabus, teachers may maintain gender stereotypes and not 
present the curriculum as correct.   
 
Some teachers may follow the curriculum in terms of information provision but openly 
contradict these lessons through their own behaviour.  One marked hypocrisy is corporal 
punishment, which is pervasive in state schools despite its illegality (as also observed by 
Topp et al, 2011).  Teachers at the government boys’ school I attended routinely carried 
metre length cuts of hose pipes.  Violence was a constant threat.  This may have reinforced 
the perceived acceptability of physical aggression.  One Civics teacher at another government 
school paused from writing about human rights on the blackboard to beat the noisy, 
unsupervised class next door.  The children protested, ‘Madam, corporal punishment, isn’t it 
a violation of children’s rights?’  She replied, ‘You children, you don’t listen, so we just have 
to use a whip for you to listen’.  When interviewed about corporal punishment many pupils 
(aged 14-15) at this school made little mention of rights, even though they had been formally 
educated on the topic.  They did not appear to take their rights seriously.  A pupil from 
another government school and survivor of sexual violence, Julie (15), similarly told me that 
they are taught about rights, but know they are ‘not real’.  Christopher, a male teacher, 
likewise commented, ‘in government schools… the teachers will be busy talking about these 
rights but they will easily beat.  They will even tell them, “Go and tell whoever you want to 
tell”, so they [the pupils] will end up wondering do we really have the human rights or is it 
just something that’s on paper?”’.  By contrast, beatings are rare at elite private schools, 
where aggrieved, assertive parents are quick to complain.   
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Besides nominally condemning violence, Civics classes also teach that boys can perform care 
work (incito sha banakashi).  Some participants said that their teachers had insisted on boys 
sweeping classrooms, as is also the case in Umutende school (Bajaj, 2009a).  But this 
experience was not universal.  Nine months after observing their Civics classes on gender, I 
spoke to Mercy (15, from a low-income compound).  She maintained that the lessons had 
made no difference to gender divisions of labour in school: ‘The boys are refusing to sweep, 
saying it’s girls’ work’.  No teacher had intervened to create a rota – again, students could 
have perceived this as signalling that taught content was ‘not real’.   
 
Government and NGO gender facilitators undertaking community outreach are sometimes 
equally sceptical of taught content (as also observed by Wendoh and Wallace, 2006:59-61,91-
93, drawing on their research in Zambia, Rwanda, The Gambia and Uganda). 
 
Second, all-important opportunities for critical reflection and debate appear infrequent.  
Many participants detailed that when they ‘learnt’ about gender (either in school or in 
workshops for community representatives) it was just note-taking without debate.  Likewise 
in South Africa, primary school lessons on gender and sexuality are said to have ‘included a 
good deal of repetition, rhetorical questioning and intermittent teacher-learning interaction.  
But for long stretches the children were not directly drawn in, other than to chorus a 
response’ (Morrell et al, 2009:101).  Such forms of gender sensitisation may result from the 
assumption that exposure to abstract messages of equality is sufficient to change internalised 
gender beliefs, and thereby foster behavioural change.   
 
Although a range of participatory exercises are included in the Civic Education textbook 
these are rarely used by teachers more acquainted with rote-learning.  Other school lessons I 
observed were similarly taught in this didactic fashion.  Although there are teacher trainings 
for Civics and Civic Education, interviewed staff from different schools claimed that their 
head teacher would go in order to profit from ‘out of pocket expenses’.  If very few teachers 
have been trained on participatory teaching methods it then seems unlikely that Civics 
lessons routinely facilitate critical reflection and debate.   
 
Pedagogical impediments also include limited contact hours and resources, which constrain 
learning more broadly.  The Civics Education teacher at a government school I observed only 
had one copy of the textbook, and that was a photocopy, to which students lacked access.  
This was a major problem when the teacher was absent for several months without a 
substitute.  On one day he sent a boy to write up notes on a board but the students were 
otherwise left to their own devices.  With teacher absenteeism endemic in Zambia (Das et al, 
2007), it seems unlikely that many teachers have sufficient time for participatory 
discussions.  The prevalence of information provision was evident from my own observations 
and conversations with former students as well as teachers.   
 
In summary, gender sensitisation in Kitwe generally seems to take the form of rote learning: 
it tends to expose participants to the abstract ideas of gender equality and flexibility in 
gender divisions of labour but rarely provides reason to think those beliefs are shared by 
others.  However, this data does not disprove the hypothesis that gender sensitisation has 
played some role in changing beliefs and practices.  These observations should not matter if 
the binding constraint to a disavowal of gender stereotypes is just that these are taken for 
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granted due to lack of exposure to such ideas.  In order to answer these questions, I asked 
participants about their experiences of gender sensitisation. 
 
Participants who described their teachers as lacking the time, teaching skills and/or 
inclination to engage students in critical reflection and debate about gender inequalities 
tended to recall that they perceived the subject as unimportant.  They thought they only 
needed to repeat the ‘correct’ information in the exam, not reflect upon its implications for 
their own lives. 
 
The gender topic wasn’t like any other topic, like laws, high court, magistrate and all 
that.  It wasn’t taken seriously at all...  I guess the teachers didn’t think it was vital for us 
to know about it.  There are topics where a teacher says, ‘You need to know about this, 
it’s important’.  For them they took it we were supposed to have that knowledge for 
exams only and after the exams forget about it. 
Chalwe (24, unemployed man). 
 
We learnt that gender roles both can do, this is in working, thinking capacity, 
leadership.  But sex roles only one sex can do.  Most of the people were serious just for 
the sake of passing exams.  But when it came to the practical situation people they 
insisted that girls can’t do some jobs  like working at a bus station...  At that time we 
really believed that gender [equality] wasn’t a real thing.  We thought a woman can’t 
manage most of the works...  Most of the people were serious just for the sake of passing 
exams. 
Owen (25, trainee mechanic). 
 
I didn’t concentrate much on gender, I thought we just had to write [the exam], that’s all 
[translated].lv 
David (23, fuel station attendant). 
 
Such participants not only stated that they previously regarded the Civics lesson as 
unconvincing, they also had trouble recalling taught content.  Since they had not retained 
knowledge on the social construction of gender divisions of labour and status inequalities, it 
does not seem very plausible that the dissemination of this information had impacted on 
their lives.  Though it is possible they had forgotten or not consciously aware of the ways in 
which they were affected.   
 
Another common form of gender sensitisation is peer education.  In Anti-AIDS clubs (a 
government-mandated, weekly peer education programme in all schools), for example, the 
focus is on information provision.  The peer educators are trained in participatory 
pedagogies and do attempt to enliven classes by asking questions and using songs.  However, 
in huge classes of 70 students, the inaudible students quickly become bored.  Few even 
attempt to listen; some chat to their friends, nap or dwell on the pain of recent corporal 
punishment.  As Annette (24, a trainee soldier, though previously a peer educator in 
schools), commented, ‘They don’t concentrate, they just joke, as if it’s play’ [translated].lvi 
  
This data suggests that there are several cardinal aspects often missing from gender 
sensitisation in Zambia.  First, it does not always provide evidence that others reject gender 
stereotypes: teachers may be unenthusiastic about or openly contradict taught content.  
Second, critical reflection and debate is commonly substituted by didactic information 
provision.  As a result, contemporary modes of sensitisation rarely enable the collective 
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interrogation of gender stereotypes, nor provide evidence that egalitarian beliefs are broadly 
shared.  Accordingly, it seldom gives reason to change one’s cultural expectations or become 
more confident in one’s own egalitarian beliefs.   
 
My evidence seems to count against the strong hypothesis that gender sensitisation explains 
the contemporary weakening of gender stereotypes and increasing flexibility in gender 
divisions or labour.  Gender sensitisation in schools is also jeopardised by the existing 
institutional problems thwarting education more generally.  These include didactic 
information provision rather than critical reflection, large class sizes, teacher absenteeism 
and limited resources (e.g. textbooks).  These structural problems help us understand why 
the vast majority of participants downplayed the influence of gender sensitisation, as shown 
in the next section. 
 
Disavowals of gender stereotypes seem contingent upon exposure to 
flexibility in gender divisions of labour 
 
People’s receptivity to gender sensitisation seems shaped by their personal experiences of 
sex-differentiated practices, by which they judged and made sense of abstract rhetoric.  This 
section presents four types of evidence to support this view.  It first makes comparisons 
across participants and finds that those exposed to flexibility in gender divisions of labour 
seemed more accepting of gender sensitisation.  Second, it draws on life histories to suggest 
that first-hand evidence of women’s competence in male-dominated domains temporally 
preceded acceptance of abstract messages.  Third, it compares different forms of 
sensitisation, showcasing the significance of disconfirming evidence (as opposed to 
discursive rejections) of gender stereotypes.  Fourth, it compares responses to different 
gender terminology and finds most approval for that which chimes with local experiences.  
This data seems to count against the hypothesis that gender beliefs changed due to gender 
sensitisation and before growing flexibility in gender divisions of labour. 
Comparisons between participants 
 
The first part of this section makes comparisons across participants.  Those accustomed to 
gender divisions of labour seemed resistant to egalitarian discourses.  For example, with 
limited exposure to female leaders, some interviewed women were dismissive of NGO 
messages on ‘50:50 in decision-making’.  They expressed doubts about women’s competence 
in politics, adding that they had not seen much evidence of this.  BanaMayuka similarly 
recalled, ‘other women underrate themselves, saying “No, a woman can’t rule”, they were 
refusing.  “It’s not possible, we can’t lead.  Yes we can work, but we cannot possibly lead”’ 
[translated].lvii  Only by their contemporaries in the market responding to these denials by 
sharing their own positive experiences of female leaders have these other women traders 
come to be more accepting of NGO messages that women could undertake prestigious 
leadership roles.  (This latter point underscores the importance of association through paid 
work in the public sphere).   
 
Similarly, when asked about the slogan ‘women can do what men can do’, many people who 
had studied Civics yet lacked exposure to such performances commonly denied its validity.  
In discussions about mining, for instance, some maintained that women lacked the strength 
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and endurance to go underground.  Others stressed the importance of protecting women – 
implicitly endorsing the stereotype that women are less capable than men.   
 
During a workshop in a peri-urban area the facilitator tried to persuade young adult 
participants that there are no set characteristics of men or women.  Kelvin (25, farm 
labourer) commented, ‘in urban areas women are working but not in this community’.  The 
young men insisted that women are weak and easy to convince since they will remain with an 
unfaithful boyfriend given limited financial alternatives.  Their experiences, shaped by 
patterns of resource access, gave them reason to doubt the abstract claims presented.  
Writing about Kitwe in the late 1980s, when women were largely economically dependent 
upon men, Ferguson (1999:186-196) similarly noted misogyny and distrust of women.   
 
Some participants had been exposed to flexibility in gender divisions of labour but remained 
attached to their stereotypes and sceptical of women’s abilities.  For such persons in trade 
unions and local government, gender sensitisation was widely said to make little impact.  
Although there has been a notable shift in social attitudes, it is by no means universal.  Some 
professional women, like Beth (38, trade unionist), complained about their colleagues: 
 
Here the problem is from peers in Lusaka, they said they wanted a man [for her senior 
position] yet they are trained in gender; they haven’t even tried you to see if you fail.  
They are aware: everyone has been talking about gender.   
 
Gender sensitisation does not appear to have resolved Beth’s cultural expectations: she 
anticipates that she will often be underrated and doubted by men.  This may adversely affect 
her self-esteem and performance. 
 
Despite being frequently invited to gender workshops, some male MPs seemed strongly 
committed to gender status beliefs.  I once attended a presentation at the National Assembly 
on gender-based violence.  I sat next to Mayaya (Copperbelt MP, now Minister).  He called 
over a Deputy Minister, inviting her to sit on his lap.  She refused.  After listening to a 
presentation detailing constraints impeding the Victim Support Unit and observing a 
cultural performance (about men and women working together), we watched a drama 
sketch.  A husband and wife are arguing: she wants to go to the market but he is prohibiting 
her from venturing outside.  The husband says, ‘What did the banacimbusa [traditional 
counsellor] tell you?  Where are you?’ She duly kneels to demonstrate subservience.  
Enthusiastic applause erupts from some male MPs in the audience, delighted at this show of 
deference, as a wife was put in her ‘proper place’.52  I discussed this event with several 
parliamentarians, including the aforementioned Deputy Minister: 
 
Alice: How many gender sensitisation workshops have there been for MPs? 
Lillian: I don’t know, many. 
Alice: Yet still men applaud at kneeling? 
Lillian: [sighs].   
 
Exposure to egalitarian discourse had not appeared to provide disconfirming evidence of 
their gender status beliefs; nor, for that matter, had exposure to female MPs. 
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Similarly in low-income communities, gender sensitisation often does not appear to dislodge 
cultural expectations.  Politician Anita Chulu explained that, ‘It’s important to tell women 
about their rights: when we go in communities I tell women about their roles.  I tell them to 
stand up and speak their voices out.  [But] they tell you, “We are coming from different 
homes”, they think their husbands are different, “they will never let us go into politics but we 
will always support you”.  They think it’s not possible for them; their husbands are already 
set in their ways.’  Many husbands were described and admitted to being jealous and keen to 
preserve gender status inequalities.  BanaMayuka (41, market trader) likewise insisted that, 
 
Such women know their rights... but their husbands are extremely difficult...  They don’t 
know how to use their rights because they’re scared of their husbands.  They don’t have 
freedom.  They listen to the radio and TV but their husbands don’t give them a green 
light.   
 
Here she was specifically referring to women whose husbands do not permit them to join the 
market; to recall Chapter 5, this chiefly comprises men not accustomed to flexibility in 
gender divisions of labour.  If receptivity to gender rhetoric varies with people’s experiences 
then sensitisation would not seem sufficient to radically change beliefs.  At best it may fortify 
existing views, through external validation.   
 
Note also that Anita Chulu and BanaMayuka portray certain low-income women as 
conforming to gender divisions of labour and status inequalities due to concerns about their 
husbands’ resistance, rather than their own internalised gender stereotypes.  
Comparisons over time 
 
As well as making comparisons between participants, we can also use life histories to see 
whether people find contemporary forms of gender sensitisation persuasive prior to their 
exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of labour.  Consistent with the data outlined above, 
participants routinely insisted that the latter was a necessary condition for a change in 
gender beliefs:  
 
At first we thought ‘Maybe it’s a joke, what is this now they’re talking about?’ [laughs] 
For us, we didn’t understand...  It’s just that seeing is believing, but now, after seeing 
what actually they were talking about, it’s now it’s when we came to realise.  At first we 
thought that the guy [the radio presenter] was joking. 
Matthew (47, market trader, selling vegetables, see life history). 
 
Those who speak about gender are just talking... [But when] we see a woman repairing 
electricals, we say ‘That woman is strong’.  Seeing is extremely important.  You see and 
then you can understand.  Because we don’t really understand radio messages, we just 
hear it.  But if you see that person fixing the electricals, you can really see it happening, 
then you have confidence [translated].lviii 
Nancy (41, market trader and political activist, selling rice). 
 
I see women cutting grass, that gave me confidence to think it’s not hard for them.  It’s a 
man’s job but anyone can do it...  I never believed it [gender equality] though I was 
doing Civics...  I started believing it when I saw that things are happening and they are 
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real, not just talking about it...  Right now I’m truly a believer.  Civics didn’t convince me 
but it got me thinking then I saw it for myself. 
Benjamin (17, an orphan living with his sisters). 
 
As indicated in the above narratives, exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of labour was 
commonly seen as proof of its possibility, unlike dubitable radio broadcasts.  Henry (30, a 
miner) likewise explained that he immediately concurred with messages about women’s 
equal capabilities because he had been single-handedly brought up by his mother, a market 
trader and grassroots politician.  He commented,  
 
See what is right; not that you follow it automatically but if it makes sense to you.   
 
Many participants who have undertaken or supported atypical gender activities strongly 
downplayed the importance of sensitisation programmes.  The vast majority emphasised the 
influence of worsening economic security, their own employment, exposure to role-models, 
co-education, informal discussions with their peers, as well as conjugal love and 
understanding.  In terms of school influences, for example, co-education was usually said to 
be more significant to gender beliefs than Civics or Civic Education. 
 
On the other hand, it is important to recognise that people may not necessarily be cognisant 
of the multiple direct and indirect influences on their beliefs and behaviour.  Even if gender 
sensitisation is often seen as relatively unimportant by participants, its egalitarian rhetoric 
may still have permeated popular dialogue and could be quietly influencing gender beliefs in 
ways that participants might not have been consciously aware.   
 
However, this possibility cannot provide a complete account of social change in the 
Copperbelt since many participants had successfully pursued gender atypical activities 
before they had been exposed to gender sensitisation.  For example, everyone in my focus 
group of women miners denied having heard of gender equality rhetoric when they started 
employment.  The only call for gender equality they recalled from that time came from the 
Zambian branch of the Forum of African Women Educationalists (FAWEZA), talking about 
the importance of girls’ education.  There were no school lessons or radio messages about 
women being able to perform ‘men’s work’ (such as mining).  Although the women miners 
granted that contemporary messages of equality are encouraging, they downplayed their 
influence.  Similarly, Judy (42) only heard about ‘gender’ once she had been elected a 
politician and then went to workshops.  Likewise, many women market traders (such as 
BanaChola) who had not heard of gender, or had only heard rumours of it encouraging 
divorce, professed to have non-hierarchical marriages, in terms of respect and decision-
making (though generally not sharing domestic work).  Since such cases predated exposure 
to gender sensitisation the latter could not have triggered their shift towards egalitarian 
beliefs and practices.   
 
While it is possible that they were only able to undertake gender atypical activities because 
others supported them because they had been sensitised this does not seem true in these 
specific cases.  For example, BaShiChola became more appreciative of his wife as she 
performed a socially valued role, fighting to provide for the family in a time of great financial 
hardship – he became unemployed and they were cut off from utilities for non-payment. 
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Comparisons across different forms of gender sensitisation 
 
We can also compare different forms of gender sensitisation, specifically that which includes 
and that which excludes exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of labour.  Here again 
there appears to be an association.  Drawing on her own experiences in rural areas of Central 
Province, BanaThomas (40, gender facilitator and political party activist) explained that only 
when women physically saw another woman using a treadle pump (a male-dominated 
technology) did they cease to presume that this activity was impossible for their sex category.  
Prior participatory gender sensitisation had not achieved this result.   
 
If you show them practically it can be done it gives them confidence.  It gave them the 
motivation, the self-esteem that what a man can do a woman can do.  If you just talk 
they will exit saying ‘balelanda fye’ [they’re just talking].  Some listened to the gender 
workshop, others said it’s just talk talk talk...  The idea that boys can wash dishes gave 
them food for thought...  But when the facilitators went away everything was forgotten.  
After the workshops nothing was done.   
 
Then we sat and thought, ‘Where did we go wrong?’ We tried to implement gender 
[sensitisation], helping to support group members.  We were meeting once a week.  We 
asked ‘What have you done?’ They gave excuses: ‘It was hard’, ‘the well is far’ et cetera, 
et cetera.  We said, ‘Why give such excuses when you can access a treadle pump or drip 
kit?’ I showed them how to use this.  We did the practicals with the Home Based Care 
group.  The women were scared to use treadle pumps, they thought it was tricky, but 
actually they found they could do it.  I did it first then they saw that if I could do it so 
could they.  She would say, ‘I think I can do this BanaThomas’.  I recommend that, it’s 
very very good...  
 
Now you’ve been here, you see it’s exactly the system: just telling people to do 
something, while people have been living like that for years, it’s difficult to change their 
mind-sets unless you really show them it can be done...  This time there are some 
women on ART [Antiretroviral Therapy], they harvest maize, they sell to FRA [the Food 
Reserve Agency, i.e. they are now ‘successful’, commercial farmers]. 
 
It seems that the women previously doubted themselves, thinking they were unable to 
undertake this form of incito sha baume.  First-hand evidence of another woman performing 
this task made them think it was possible for their sex category.  Research in India similarly 
points to the importance of pump demonstrations for women in increasing their use of this 
masculine technology (Prabhu, 1999).  This is consistent with the argument put forward in 
Chapter 4, that exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of labour enhances women’s sense 
of self-efficacy. 
 
Even if gender sensitisation has greatest impact when it provides disconfirming evidence of 
gender stereotypes, this is still only an isolated incident that may be quickly forgotten in the 
absence of sufficient exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of labour.  For example, 
Chikoti (25, accountancy student) recalled that his teacher took them outside to count the 
cars driven by men and women.  When asked to explain the high number of women driving 
cars, the boys assumed husbands had bought cars for their wives.  So the teacher brought in 
a successful woman in order to demonstrate the reality of flexibility in gender divisions of 
labour.  She narrated that she had bought her own car: 
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Alice: Do you think Civics changed people’s minds? 
Chikoti: It was a reality.  Most mothers at home they cook and clean, you don’t see them 
at the office, you see a woman come in, big nice car, you see it, it happens, it does 
change a lot, what you see is what you get.  Our Civics teacher was a very intelligent 
woman, she would think up solutions...  When we counted we came up with ideas that 
women are getting cars because of their husbands but then she brought in a woman 
who’d got a car for herself and it worked.  I’d call it ingenious. 
Alice: Do you think that lesson had any effect? 
Chikoti: It left an impression but couldn’t change anything for most people, most 
impressions they only last for a moment, so if you don’t see it every day it goes away, if 
there’s no one to back it up, if the head teacher is always a man. 
 
Here Chikoti attributes the impact of this sensitisation to the first-hand evidence of a 
woman’s ability to buy a car for herself.  This indicated women’s equal abilities in a respected 
domain.  But Chikoti maintains that its effects were short-lived.  At that time, Chikoti’s father 
had been the breadwinner while his mother stayed at home.  It was only upon his job loss 
that she setup a restaurant in the market.  He was also educated at a single-sex school.  As a 
result he had little evidence of women’s equal competence in socially valued domains, such 
as education, employment and household provision.  This form of gender sensitisation was 
soon forgotten because it was not ‘backed up’: Chikoti was accustomed to gender divisions of 
labour at home and had no chance to see girls’ equal competence at school.  His beliefs only 
changed upon co-educational higher education.   
Comparisons across different gender messages 
 
A fourth set of data indicating that gender sensitisation has little independent impact comes 
from comparisons of Zambians’ responses to different forms of rhetoric.  Earlier research in 
Zambia found that, ‘many communities had heard of gender, they had heard about the word 
but there was much confusion about its meaning.  For many it meant “gender balance” and 
50/50.  It was a numbers game, or a concept that meant women and men were the same.  
Neither made much sense to many interviewees’ (Wendoh and Wallace, 2006:75-76).  There 
was resistance to these egalitarian discourses as a ‘northern imposition’ (ibid:92).  This 
incomprehension and critique may have been because the abstract messages did not chime 
with local experiences.  Campbell and Cornish (2010:1570) likewise argue that ‘[o]ne reason 
for the disappointing outcomes of many [HIV/AIDS sensitisation] programmes is that they 
are conceived by external experts and imposed on communities in ‘‘top-down’’ ways.  As a 
result, they fail to resonate with the worldviews and perceived needs and interests of their 
target groupings, or to take adequate account of the complex social relations into which 
programmes are inserted’.   
 
In the Copperbelt, the phrase that ‘women can do what men can do’ appears to have become 
pervasive and popular – overheard in homes, schools and workplaces, as well as in the 
following conversations:  
 
Alice: Have you heard of ‘gender’? 
BanaJessy (39, market trader): Yes, [to her friend] how should I explain it? 
BanaBecca (36, market trader): Equality.  A woman can do men’s work and a man can 
do women’s work [translated].lix 
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NGOCC said, ‘Women, come, we should work, don’t depend on men alone.  We’re not 
different from men.  We’re just the same...  The work done by men can be done by a 
woman’ [translated].lx 
BanaMayuka (41, market trader), recounting gender sensitisation in the market. 
 
Our teacher said, ‘We must be encouraging women, to be pushing ourselves to do the 
work done by men so that men see that we women aren’t weak.  We can also do what 
they do’ [translated].lxi 
Chola (23, trainee mechanic). 
 
BanaMulenga (38, bank manager and breadwinner, whom I lived with): [NGOs] They’re 
campaigning for ‘equal rights’, I’m not sure what this means.  Some women have taken 
it to mean that if a man comes home at 01:00 then so should a woman.  I prefer the 
phrase, ‘Women can do what men can do.’53 
 
This phrase seems to have gained support because it encapsulates contemporary experiences 
of flexibility in gender divisions of labour.  Thus people are commonly able to make sense of 
it, in contrast to vague mentions of ‘gender’.  It is also perceived as communicating a 
positive, uplifting message to women about their equal potential to contribute to national 
development.  Furthermore, this contribution is valued in a time of worsening economic 
security.  It is not perceived as threatening men or patriarchy, yet the consequences of such 
flexibility are often quite radical, weakening gender status beliefs (as discussed in Chapter 4). 
 
It might be contended that the discursive repetition and behavioural enactment of ‘women 
can do what men can do’ signals the effectiveness of this message.  However, the apparent 
popularity of this phrase does not reflect the language frequently used by NGOs.  I observed 
a number of other terms being used in gender sensitisation activities (as did Wendoh and 
Wallace, 2006).  My data suggests that when gender sensitisation is limited to encouraging 
women’s economic activity then it is rarely resisted.54 
 
Alice: Did you talk with your husband when you went to NGOCC? 
BanaMayuka (41, market trader, see life history): He said, ‘You did very well’, he liked 
that I went.  He knows that his wife won’t have a problem if he’s not there or dies 
[translated].lxii  
 
BaShiMayuka, when separately interviewed, likewise commended his wife’s engagement in 
such activities.  Recall that she had single-handedly provided for the family while he was 
unemployed.   
 
By contrast, earlier discourses were found to be ‘accusatory’, alienating men who ‘felt that 
women were being set up to usurp male privilege’ (Wendoh and Wallace, 2006:73-75,81).  
This may have been because observed discourses chimed with neither local interests nor 
exposure.  Despite the prevalence of gender sensitisation addressing incito sha banakashi,55 
women’s care work remains devalued, even by those (like Matthew) who otherwise 
champion equality.   
                                                        
53 I was unsuccessful in my attempts to locate the source of the popular phrase (donors, government, local NGOs or the grassroots), but what 
matters is that this particular phrase took root because it chimed with popular experiences. 
54 Part of the reason that men generally do not object to the promotion of this message may be that it is rarely coupled with material support to 
women in Kitwe. 
55 This message is institutionalised in the school curriculum and equally prevalent in the vast majority of gender trainings. 
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Furthermore, many strongly condemned the notion that married men should do domestic 
work.  To recall data presented in Chapters 3, 4 and 5, few participants were exposed to such 
practices or saw it as desirable – given concerns about marital break-up.  Recently married 
Cecilia (23, unemployed, with whom I underwent traditional initiation) explained that 
although she learnt in Civics that men can do ‘women’s work’ and has asked her husband to 
help, he refuses.  She is unwilling to push him on this in case he ‘strays’ (translated).  
Similarly, one group of young women (student teachers, social workers and mechanics) 
explained that they would like their future husbands to help with domestic work but they 
have resigned to accept their likely non-participation, given widely-held gender stereotypes 
and worries about marriage break-up.   
 
Since mothers are traditionally blamed for their daughters’ divorce (especially in the event of 
their non-adherence to ‘tradition’), many mothers are equally opposed to gender messages 
on flexibility of gender divisions of reproductive work.  Nancy (41, a rice trader and political 
activist) explained that you should wash your husband’s clothes, polish his shoes and 
prepare his food.  She warned that if men start to cook ubwali (the staple dish) then, 
 
He’ll seek another woman and his family will agree...  They’ll say I didn’t teach my 
daughter...  Here in Zambia marriages finish.  If you don’t follow the rules, he’ll seek 
your friend.  Then your friend comes to work just as she was taught...  Gender should be 
understood as working together, not applied to homes, no...  There should only be 
gender equality in government and employment [translated].lxiii 
 
Nancy was exposed to gender sensitisation and maintained that she found it encouraging.  
Throughout our multiple interviews she always championed equality in the public sphere.  
However, given structural constraints, she did not think it advisable for any young married 
woman to seek flexibility in gender divisions of care work.  Moreover, she was particularly 
concerned of being held responsible for the ‘failings’ of any girls in her care.  Inter-
generational enforcement of gender status inequalities has also been observed by Geisler 
(2000:68-69), with regards to southern Zambia. 
 
Given these countervailing interests for women and their social support networks, 
sensitising people to the idea of men sharing unpaid care work rarely seems effective.  In the 
Copperbelt it seems that statements of gender equality are only accepted when they reflect 
past exposure and current interests.  The selective popularisation of particular gender 
messages suggests that particular statements of gender equality have become popular 
because of people’s experiences and priorities, rather than the reverse.  Evidence has been 
presented by making comparisons between participants, over time, across different forms of 
sensitisation and with regard to different messages. 
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Conclusion  
 
The purpose of this chapter was to ascertain whether flexibility in gender divisions of labour 
might have been a consequence (rather than cause) of an erosion of gender beliefs, owing to 
exposure to egalitarian discourses.  It also considered a weaker hypothesis: gender 
sensitisation has contributed to a positive feedback loop, initially triggered by worsening 
economic security and increased female labour force participation.   
 
The weaker hypothesis seems most plausible.  While exposure to egalitarian discourses 
seems significant in many instances, this often appears contingent upon additional exposure 
to flexibility in gender divisions of labour.  This was shown by four forms of comparisons: 
across participants, over their lives, between different abstract messages, as well as different 
forms of sensitisation.  Participants seemed most receptive to gender sensitisation when they 
were able to make sense of it through first-hand behavioural evidence of its veracity.  In 
Kitwe, experience of flexibility of gender divisions of labour seems particularly significant in 
this respect.  Others, without such exposure, tended to find gender sensitisation 
unconvincing.  Anthony Simpson (2007:185) likewise observed, ‘[t]he fortunate few 
retreated to hotels and game lodges for workshops on the topic of gender; many remained 
unconvinced of the possibility of change.  A senior civil servant explained to me that despite 
these efforts, in his view, things would remain the same, commenting, “Ah, Tony, you have 
stayed with us long enough.  You know what we African men are like!”’ (see also Wendoh and 
Wallace, 2006:75-76).   
 
While common forms of gender sensitisation in Zambia were rarely said to be independently 
persuasive, this is not to deny that it has exerted any impact at all.  Participants who had 
already rejected gender stereotypes often stated that gender sensitisation had encouraged 
their pursuit of gender atypical activities.  This primarily occurred when they saw or heard 
other people championing their views, either on the radio or in participatory sessions.  By 
contrast, abstract messages were often disregarded when delivered by those who did not also 
communicate their personal belief in the ideas presented. 
 
This suggests several things.  First, the motivation force of gender sensitisation seems 
contingent upon whether it shows that other people also believe in various dimensions of 
gender equality.  When school children say that rights are ‘not real’ because they are so often 
violated, we can interpret this either by reference to internalised beliefs or cultural 
expectations.  Both perspectives have the same empirical prediction and can provide an 
account of the phenomena.  On the one hand, we might argue that students are more likely 
to doubt the objective validity of the gender rhetoric if they think it is rejected by respected 
authorities.  On the other hand, seeing other people reject egalitarian beliefs may be 
important in shaping cultural expectations, about how behaviour will be evaluated by others.  
The significance of exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of labour can similarly be 
explained in both ways: it provides evidence of both women’s equal competence (thereby 
changing internalised beliefs) and also other people’s reactions (thereby altering cultural 
expectations). 
 
For the most part these theories have similar implications and seem difficult to distinguish 
empirically.  However, this chapter has presented evidence indicating reason to favour the 
internalist account.  For example, some participants were reportedly inspired, encouraged 
190 
 
and awakened by radio messages from those outside their social circles, i.e. not the persons 
who would hold them accountable to their sex category and penalise them for inappropriate 
performances of gender.  For some women (like BanaChileshe and BanaBecca cited) media 
broadcasts made them feel entitled to higher status, which they then pursued, despite initial 
resistance from their partners.  For those already believing in gender equality this gave them 
greater confidence in the objective validity of their view, but little reason to think they should 
expect less discrimination from others.  Interactional accounts could argue that when 
conveyed via state radio participants have reason to think government will oppose 
discrimination, but I never heard this connection made explicitly.   
 
However, even if some instances of effective gender sensitisation appear to be best explained 
by reference to internalised beliefs, cultural expectations still seem incredibly important.  We 
can use this concept to highlight the apparent interconnections between exposure and 
interests.  Common forms of gender sensitisation often seem ineffective because they shift 
neither exposure nor interests.  In terms of exposure it rarely provides reason to change 
cultural expectations about which behaviour is likely to be praised or condemned.  As a 
result, it does not change interests: if one desires social respect then without exposure to 
enacted flexibility in gender divisions of labour one should have little cause to think this 
interest will be satisfied by non-compliance with these gender stereotypes.   
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis has explored the causes and consequences of growing flexibility in gender 
divisions of labour in Kitwe, Zambia.  It has sought to investigate the causal relationship 
between four contemporary trends by drawing on the influences identified by participants 
through life histories and focus groups.  This data has been analysed within a theoretical 
framework that interprets sex-differentiated practices as resulting from a combination of 
internalised gender stereotypes, cultural expectations and patterns of resource access.  
Change and continuity in gender beliefs and practices have been examined using two key 
concepts, exposure and interests. 
 
The four contemporary Copperbelt trends investigated are as follows.  First, there has been 
worsening economic security over the past twenty years.  Quantitative data points to male 
job losses, declining remuneration and casualisation of employment, low life expectancy, the 
introduction of user fees for social services and an end to subsidies on consumer goods.  This 
shift in patterns of access to resources was also reiterated by the vast majority of participants 
and is consistent with earlier qualitative studies.  The next two trends are both elements of 
growing flexibility in gender divisions of labour: increasing female labour force participation 
and occupational desegregation.  These trends are apparent from labour market data as well 
as my own qualitative research.  Fourth, gender stereotypes (relating to both competence 
and status) appear to be weakening – as attested to by many participants and also evident 
from comparisons between my own observations, contemporary World Values Survey data 
and earlier ethnographies.  It is also manifest in rising female political participation, at local 
and national level.  However, this trend is not universal across persons or domains: 
persistent status inequalities are evident in the cases of care work and gender-based 
violence.  These four trends are correlated, occurring over the same twenty year time period.   
  
Through life histories and group discussions, participants identified a number of factors to 
account for the latter three changs (relating to gender beliefs and divisions of labour), in 
their own lives and society more broadly.  These include: financial hardship, gender 
sensitisation and seeing women performing stereotypically masculine roles (e.g. working for 
money, being a breadwinner, a household head or political leader of an association).  Some 
emphasised the significance of being exposed to such gender atypical activities in their 
formative years.  
 
This thesis has considered three different hypotheses to account for the three gender-related 
contemporary trends.  Chapter 4 put forward the explanation maintained by most 
participants, namely that worsening economic security (a change in patterns of resource 
access) had triggered increased female labour force participation, which in turn eroded 
gender beliefs.  Compliance with cultural expectations of gender divisions of labour became 
economically costly from the late 1980s as a result of worsening economic security.  Female 
employment (both generally and in male-dominated occupations) gained support because it 
was increasingly seen as advantageous.  Arguably, worsening economic security was thus a 
sufficient condition for flexibility in gender divisions of labour, both in terms of women 
entering paid work and stereotypically masculine occupations.   
 
Many participants maintained that women have gained social respect as well as influence in 
private and public fora as a consequence of greater flexibility in gender divisions of labour.  It 
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is now less commonly assumed that men are more suited to prestigious leadership positions 
or more deserving of deference.  This attitudinal shift is reflected in rising female political 
participation.  Yet despite the gradual erosion of gender status inequalities, some domains 
still appear marked by status inequalities.  Unpaid care work is a prime example.   
 
There are a number of ways we can account for persistent gender divisions in unpaid care 
work without positing that women’s status also remains low in public and private decision-
making.  Perhaps gender beliefs are particularly salient in the context of domestic work, as 
suggested by Ridgeway (2011).  Alternatively, the particular privacy of such labour may 
shield any such flexibility from public view, thereby impeding a change in cultural 
expectations and preventing positive feedback loops.  A further possibility is that lopsided 
marriage markets make working women anxious to push for a revision to care practices.  For 
these reasons, women’s predominant share of care work should not be used as an indicator 
of their low status generally.   
 
Paid work in the public sphere seems to increase women’s access to income and information.  
However, if this change had directly weakened gender status inequalities then earlier studies 
on female market traders should have observed similar outcomes.  Yet they did not.  
Research in the 1990s stressed that many poor female traders in Lusaka had become 
breadwinners but were rarely respected as such (Hansen, 1997; Munalula, 1998; Schlyter, 
1999).  By contrast, my own participants who traded in the market did emphasise waning 
gender status inequalities, even though they did not appear to be any wealthier than those 
described in these earlier ethnographies.  Without sufficient access to capital, many sold on 
someone else’s behalf, for which they were paid extremely low wages.  While other 
interviewees did invest in their own micro-enterprises, they stressed that profits had 
worsened over the past decade due to market saturation.  While an independent income may 
enhance a woman’s financial autonomy, it does not itself directly undermine gender status 
inequalities. 
 
Instead, flexibility in gender divisions of labour seems to have undermined gender status 
inequalities by providing disconfirming evidence of gender beliefs.  These beliefs appear to 
be weakening with prolonged exposure to a critical mass of women demonstrating their 
equal competence to undertake activities that they were previously presumed to be incapable 
and that are valorised because they were historically performed by men.  My evidence points 
to the significance of women undertaking tasks that embody stereotypes about gender 
differences, such that women’s demonstrable success provides disconfirming evidence of 
those stereotypes.  Because gender status beliefs rest on the assumption that there are 
differences between the sex categories, these status beliefs appear to be eroded when women 
undermine any kind of presumed difference, not just those relating to socially valued 
activities.  While prestigious positions do lend status to the individual actor, women’s 
encroachments into stereotypically masculine domains appear to have wider reaching 
consequences, undermining the assumptions of gender difference upon which gender status 
beliefs are predicated more generally.  This apparent importance of an occupation’s social 
construction indicates that gender status inequalities are primarily mediated by gender 
beliefs and only indirectly affected by resource access. 
 
The context of prolonged economic insecurity means that women’s economic contributions 
have become recognised as fundamental to household survival, not just supplementary – as 
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appears to have been the case in the early decades of independence.  The way that people 
perceive flexibility in gender divisions of labour appears to have changed as a result of men’s 
declining access to resources.  Given prolonged and pervasive difficulties, people increasingly 
applaud ‘strong’ women who fight to support their families or physically build their own 
homes.   
 
Association seems to augment the impact of exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of 
labour on gender status beliefs.  By hearing tales of women performing socially valued 
activities, people have become more exposed to disconfirming evidence of gender status 
beliefs.  Those already with egalitarian beliefs learn that such views are shared by others.  
This provides external validation of one’s own beliefs and also enables a shift in cultural 
expectations.  My study indicates the particular significance of association with those 
exposed to flexibility in gender divisions of labour.  Without such exposure, association does 
not seem so transformative: homemakers and home-based traders congregating in 
compounds generally discussed how to fulfil rather than challenge their cultural expectations 
of ideal domesticity.  Again, this underscores the particular significance of flexibility in 
gender divisions of labour. 
 
Besides making this particular point on gender beliefs, Chapter 4 also posits that gender 
relationships can change rapidly (within a generational cohort), as triggered by changing 
macro-level patterns of resource access.  This hypothesis is supported by the historical 
analysis presented in Chapter 3.  Women’s ability to bargain for better treatment in intimate 
relationships suddenly increased in the early colonial period as demographic circumstances 
gave them scarcity value in urban areas.  This enabled urban women to access resources 
through men without being dependent upon a particular man.  Women’s access to resources 
(in the form of multiple potential partners who might support them) subsequently waned, 
however: urban sex ratios evened up over time, monogamy became a prescriptive cultural 
stereotype and their direct access to income (through employment) remained limited.  With 
their wives more economically dependent upon them, husbands were better able to fulfil 
their perceived interest in gender status inequalities.   
 
Chapter 3 also gives credence to the argument made in Chapter 4 that gender divisions of 
labour are primarily contingent upon interests and thus endure for as long as they are seen 
as advantageous.  According to this line of reasoning, flexibility in gender divisions of labour 
rarely occurred in earlier decades because few regarded it as beneficial.  Men and women 
secured respect from compliance with cultural expectations; deviation risked social 
condemnation.  Men’s relatively secure access to employment minimised the economic risks 
of dependence on a single breadwinner.   
 
This argument implies that a binding constraint to increased flexibility in gender divisions of 
labour is interests, not internalised gender stereotypes about women’s competence.  
Financial hardship may lead people to regard flexibility as more advantageous and therefore 
trigger increased female labour force participation.  However, it does not in itself change 
presumptions about women’s ability to undertake stereotypically masculine occupations.  An 
obstacle to occupational desegregation may remain therefore.  Unlike most other women, 
those who pursued male-dominated activities (such as mining or mechanics) tended to 
already reject gender stereotypes about competence.  These participants often identified the 
influence of their early exposure to women performing socially valued roles, as well as their 
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exposure to egalitarian discourses.  This raises the possibility that flexibility in gender 
divisions of labour (both in terms of increased female labour force participation and 
occupational desegregation) was a consequence (not cause) of changes in gender beliefs.  The 
thesis considered these two alternative hypotheses.  Arguably, early exposure to women 
undertaking social valued roles and/or exposure to gender egalitarian discourses provided 
disconfirming evidence of gender beliefs and this catalysed growing flexibility in gender 
divisions of labour.  This may have occurred in conjunction with or independently of a wider 
shift in gender divisions of labour and worsening economic security – these comprise weaker 
and stronger versions of the hypotheses. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 5, my data suggest a correlation between early exposure to women 
demonstrating equal competence in a socially valued domain (e.g. in employment or 
education), disavowal of gender stereotypes and pursuit of male-dominated domains.  Such 
participants identified these formative experiences as key influences upon their beliefs and 
behavioural choices.  The vast majority of women making incursions into non-stereotypical 
terrain (whether in politics or employment) stressed that they were inspired by their 
mothers’ financial self-reliance, strength and confidence.  Seeing their mothers earning an 
independent income contradicted the male breadwinner stereotype.  Sons and daughters 
came to think that this was equally possible for all women.  Maternal employment also 
seemed to shape women’s self-perceptions: they gained confidence in their capacity to 
undertake occupations historically dominated by men. 
 
Some of those who grew up with egalitarian beliefs had formerly been exposed to boys 
undertaking unpaid care work.  Where domestic labour was thought of as low status work, 
male performance of this activity when females are also present undermines gender status 
beliefs.  It signals that girls do not have a lower status.  Though important for those with such 
childhoods, such experiences seem uncommon.   
  
Co-education was also emphasised by many male and female supporters of flexibility in 
gender divisions of labour.  They had come to revise earlier assumptions of gender difference 
by seeing male and female classmates perform similarly.  By contrast, interviewed single-sex 
educated male students tended to presume that girls and women are less competent.  Some 
were aware that girls had scored the highest national marks for their grades but dismissed 
them as unusual.  They appeared to disregard information that contradicted their 
stereotypes.  However, it is not being claimed that girls necessarily benefit from co-
education.  Their class participation and performance may be thwarted by male intimidation, 
harassment and violence.  The conclusion to draw from this is not support for a specific 
education policy but rather the broader point that early exposure to demonstrations of equal 
competence in a socially valued domain can undermine gender beliefs and foster support for 
flexibility in gender divisions of labour. 
 
Those not formerly exposed to women undertaking socially valued activities maintained that 
they grew up thinking that men were more intelligent and worthy of leadership roles.  
Further, they did not always appear to recognise contradictory information as disconfirming 
evidence of their gender status beliefs.  Instead they often maintained their stereotypes and 
labelled women who performed stereotypically masculine roles (e.g. working for money, 
being a breadwinner, a household head or political leader) as ‘honorary men’.   
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Notwithstanding these apparent differences, there are three reasons that count against the 
hypothesis put forward in Chapter 5 that growing flexibility in gender divisions of labour was 
caused by a prior disavowal of gender beliefs.  First, before society-wide flexibility, 
disconfirming evidence of gender beliefs was uncommon.  Second, partly due to their 
paucity, any such vanguards were more generally regarded as deviating from (rather than 
disconfirming evidence of) gender beliefs.  Third, while some in earlier decades became 
privately critical of gender stereotypes, they may still have eschewed male-dominated 
domains due to concerns about cultural expectations.  These three reasons will be discussed 
in turn. 
 
First, due to society-wide gender divisions of labour, the formative experiences that 
commonly provide disconfirming evidence of gender stereotypes about competence were 
historically less common.  Subsequent flexibility has increased their prevalence.  For 
instance, with lower rates of female labour force participation in earlier decades, it was 
uncommon to see women in gender atypical domains.   
 
Second, the impact of such exposure on gender status beliefs appears to have changed over 
the decades, shaped by wider socio-economic circumstances.  Before the late 1980s (when 
male access to employment was more secure), women’s earnings were often regarded as 
supplementary.  Female labour force participation tended to only enhance financial 
autonomy, rather than respect and appreciation.  Historically then, maternal employment 
less commonly provided disconfirming evidence of children’s gender status beliefs.   
 
Similarly, female vanguards in the public sphere (such as in employment and politics) did 
not always create a positive feedback loop; they were seldom regarded as ‘role models’.  
Without a critical mass of women demonstrating their equal competence in male-dominated 
domains, lone incursions were often perceived as deviating from (rather than providing 
disconfirming evidence of) gender stereotypes.  Furthermore, women typically had less 
opportunity to reflect upon these incursions, since many were socially isolated as 
homemakers.  For these two reasons, many onlookers assumed that women could neither be 
economically self-sufficient nor ascend to the highest echelons by their own merit.  Such 
vanguards were often referred to as ‘prostitutes’.  While there were always a small minority 
who eschewed gender stereotypes, in thought and practice, change did not beget major 
change in earlier decades.  Before worsening economic security and a critical mass of 
employed women, there appears to have been minimal change in gender beliefs.  This chimes 
with Risman et al’s (2012:19-20) comment about the importance of social context, rather 
than individual preferences or circumstances: 
 
Clearly change among individuals cannot happen in isolation from changes in 
expectations and institutions, nor is it a quick revolutionary strategy.  Individuals risk 
simply being labelled deviant instead of change agents. 
 
Third, certain formative experiences may have been interpreted as disconfirming evidence of 
internalised gender stereotypes but not cultural expectations.  Notwithstanding their 
idiosyncratic home environments, society-wide gender divisions of labour suggested that 
others still endorsed gender stereotypes.  In previous decades it was more socially acceptable 
to laugh at (rather than laud) a female mechanic.  This may have discouraged such pursuits, 
even on the part of those who had become privately critical of gender stereotypes.  Widely-
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held gender stereotypes only weakened much later on, after people had both seen and 
collectively reflected upon a critical mass of women in gender atypical domains.   
 
In summary, the rejection of gender stereotypes was historically uncommon and rarely 
created a positive feedback loop.  Rising female labour force participation seems more likely 
to have been due to worsening economic security than a disavowal of gender beliefs.  While 
men were historically stereotyped as breadwinners, this internalised gender belief does not 
appear to have been the binding constraint to change, for it endured despite rising female 
employment (as noted by earlier studies in Lusaka: Hansen, 1997; Schlyter, 1999).  However, 
unlike female labour force participation, occupational desegregation does appear to have 
been contingent upon a prior erosion of gender beliefs.  The initial female frontrunners of 
occupational desegregation attested to their prior critique of gender beliefs.  Maternal 
employment or co-education led them to question gender stereotypes about competence.  
This gave them the self-confidence to pursue stereotypically masculine occupations.  Now, 
due to a shift in socio-economic and interactional contexts, change can beget change: these 
frontrunners are now more commonly interpreted as role models, thereby catalysing a 
positive feedback loop.  Cultural expectations are changing as those exposed to flexibility in 
gender divisions of labour express support when gathered together in public fora.   
 
A third explanation of flexibility in gender divisions of labour emphasises popular exposure 
to egalitarian discourses.  The phrase ‘women can do what men can do’ is widely heard – in 
schools, markets, media, as well as workshops for civil society organisations and 
Government. The strong version of the hypothesis is that gender sensitisation has 
undermined gender beliefs, thereby causing flexibility in gender divisions of labour.  A 
weaker version posits that gender sensitisation has contributed to the positive feedback loop, 
initially triggered by worsening economic security and increased female labour force 
participation.  Chapter 4 noted the contrast between my and earlier findings on female 
labour force participation.  It suggested that gender beliefs have lagged behind a change in 
material practices because their erosion requires prolonged exposure to flexibility in gender 
divisions of labour.  However, the belated shift in gender beliefs could be due to increasing 
exposure to egalitarian discourses in the intervening period.  The aim of Chapter 6 was thus 
to ascertain the relative significance of exposure to egalitarian discourses.   
 
Notably, gender sensitisation, exposure to flexibility and association through paid work in 
the public sphere may be significant for the same reasons.  All three may increase people’s 
confidence in the objective validity of their beliefs in equal competence.  All three may shift 
expectations, through exposure to others endorsing flexibility in gender divisions of labour.  
This can occur discursively, in participatory sensitisation or other associations (e.g. through 
paid work in the public sphere). Alternatively, their support may be manifest in their 
behaviour (e.g. the employment of female mechanics).  By focusing on rhetoric rather than 
manifest practices, Chapter 6 sought to ascertain what counts as disconfirming evidence of 
gender stereotypes and cultural expectations. 
 
Conversations with participants as well as my own observations suggest that gender 
sensitisation, as practised in Kitwe, was seldom interpreted as disconfirming evidence of 
gender beliefs.  Rote learning (a common form of sensitisation) gave listeners little reason to 
revise cultural expectations: ‘rights are not real’ claimed the frequently beaten school 
children.  Furthermore, abstract rhetoric was rarely regarded as evidence of the objective 
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validity of claims made.  It was commonly disregarded by those not also exposed to flexibility 
in gender divisions of labour. Nor did rote learning provide a space for people to critically 
reflect on their gender beliefs.  Enacted gender atypical performances were far more 
commonly interpreted as disconfirming evidence of gender stereotypes.  This indicates the 
primary importance of flexibility in gender divisions of labour.   
 
The available evidence thus counts against the strong hypothesis that gender sensitisation 
independently undermined gender beliefs and in turn gave rise to greater flexibility in 
gender divisions of labour.  However, the weaker hypothesis remains credible.  Although few 
participants identified sensitisation as a primary cause of their rejection of gender 
stereotypes, many labelled it ‘encouraging’.  By enhancing confidence in pre-existing gender 
egalitarian beliefs, sensitisation may well have contributed to a positive feedback loop, 
initially triggered by worsening economic security and the subsequent increase in female 
labour force participation.   
 
Prolonged exposure to flexibility in gender divisions of labour, driven by worsening 
economic security, has weakened gender status inequalities in Kitwe because it has provided 
evidence of both women’s equal competence in socially valued domains (thereby 
undermining internalised gender stereotypes) and other people’s increasingly positive 
reactions (thereby altering cultural expectations).  The perceived significance of this 
contemporary shift is reflected in the Copperbelt mantra of gender equality, ‘abanakashi 
kuti babomba incito sha baume’ (women can do what men can do). 
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Annex 1: Details of participants 
 
Key: 
 
Adolescent: <20 
Youth: 21-30 
Middle-aged: 31-50 
Older person: >50 
  F: Female 
 M: Male 
 
  DLH: Detailed life histories 
C: I cohabited with them 
FG: Focus group 
TI: thematic interview, e.g. about Civic Education 
E: Student essay submitted and discussed 
 
 
 
Livelihood 
Group 
Livelihood Age Sex Marital 
status 
Household 
income 
level 
Type of 
research  
method 
Administrative 
support worker 
Local 
government 
clerk 
Youth F Unmarried Middle FG 
Administrative 
support worker 
Local 
government 
clerk 
Youth M Married Middle FG 
Administrative 
support worker 
Local 
government 
clerk 
Middle
-aged 
M Unmarried Middle FG 
Administrative 
support worker 
Local court 
recorder 
Middle
-aged 
F Married Low FG 
Administrative 
support worker 
Administrative 
role in 
company 
Youth M Unmarried Middle LH 
Administrative 
support worker 
Administrative 
role in 
company 
Youth M Unmarried Middle LH 
Administrative 
support worker 
Administrative 
role in 
company 
Youth M Non-marital 
relationship 
Middle RFG 
Counsellor Gender NGO 
worker 
Middle
-aged 
M Divorced Low FG 
Counsellor Gender NGO 
worker 
Older 
person  
M Married Low FG 
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Counsellor GBV 
counsellor 
Youth F Unmarried Low FG 
Counsellor GBV 
counsellor 
Youth F Unmarried Low FG 
Counsellor GBV 
counsellor 
Middle
-aged 
F Unmarried Middle FG 
Counsellor Traditional 
marriage 
counsellor 
Middle
-aged 
F Married Low FG 
Counsellor Gender NGO 
worker 
Youth F Non-marital 
relationship 
Middle LH 
Counsellor Traditional 
marriage 
counsellor 
Middle
-aged  
F Married Low RFG 
Domestic 
worker 
Domestic 
worker 
Middle
-aged 
F Married Low LH 
Domestic 
worker 
Domestic 
worker 
Middle
-aged 
F Married Low LH 
Domestic 
worker 
Domestic 
worker 
Middle
-aged 
F Married Low LH 
Domestic 
worker 
Domestic 
worker 
Middle
-aged 
F Divorced Low LH 
Health care 
worker 
Nurse Middle
-aged 
F Married Low FG 
Health care 
worker 
Nurse Youth F Non-marital 
relationship 
Middle FG 
Health care 
worker 
Nurse Youth F Unmarried Middle FG 
Health care 
worker 
Health care 
professional 
Middle
-aged 
F Married Middle FG 
Health care 
worker 
Health care 
professional 
Middle
-aged 
M Married Middle FG 
Health care 
worker 
Health care 
professional 
Middle
-aged 
M Married Middle FG 
Health care 
worker 
Nurse Youth F Non-marital 
relationship 
Middle FG, LH 
Health care 
worker 
Nurse Middle
-aged 
F Married Middle LH 
Health care 
worker 
Nurse Youth F Married Middle RFG, DLH, 
C 
Health care 
worker 
Health care 
professional, 
gender 
equality 
trainer 
Older 
person  
F Widowed Middle DLH,  FG 
Housewife Pastor's wife Middle
-aged 
F Married Low FG 
Housewife Housewife Middle
-aged 
F Married Low FG 
Housewife Housewife Middle
-aged 
F Married Low FG 
Housewife Housewife Middle
-aged 
F Married Low FG 
Housewife Housewife Middle
-aged 
F Married Low FG 
Housewife Housewife Older 
person  
F Married Low FG 
Housewife Housewife Middle
-aged 
F Married Middle FG 
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Housewife Housewife Older 
person  
F Married Middle FG 
Housewife Housewife Older 
person  
F Divorced Middle FG, LH, C 
Housewife Housewife Middle
-aged 
F Married Upper LH 
Housewife Housewife Youth F Married Low DLH 
Housewife Housewife Youth F Married Middle DLH, C 
Housewife Housewife Youth F Married Low TI 
Pastor Pastor Middle
-aged 
M Married Low FG 
Politician MP Middle
-aged 
M Married Upper FG 
Politician MP Middle
-aged 
M Married Upper FG 
Politician Councillor Middle
-aged 
M Married Low FG 
Politician Head of 
national 
market 
association 
Middle
-aged 
M Married Middle FG 
Politician Member of 
Parliament 
(MP) 
Middle
-aged 
F Married Low LH 
Politician MP Older 
person  
F Divorced Upper DLH, C 
Politician MP Middle
-aged 
M Married Upper DLH 
Politician Councillor Middle
-aged  
F Divorced Middle DLH, C 
Politician MP Older 
person  
F Divorced Upper DLH, RFG, 
C 
Politician Councillor Middle
-aged 
F Married Low DLH, RFG, 
C 
Politician MP Middle
-aged 
M Married Upper RTI 
Politician MP Middle
-aged 
M Married Upper RTI 
Politician MP Older 
person  
M Married Upper RTI 
Politician MP Middle
-aged 
M Married Middle TI 
Politician MP Middle
-aged 
F Married Upper TI 
Politician MP Middle
-aged 
F Divorced Upper TI 
Politician MP Middle
-aged 
F Married Upper TI 
Politician MP Older 
person  
M Married Upper TI 
Politician MP Older 
person  
F Married Upper TI 
Politician MP Older 
person  
M Married Upper TI 
Politician MP Older 
person  
M Married Upper TI 
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Professional/ 
managerial 
Manager, 
gender 
equality 
trainer 
Middle
-aged 
M Married Middle FG 
Professional/ 
managerial 
Manager Middle
-aged 
M Married Middle FG 
Professional/ 
managerial 
Manager Middle
-aged 
M Married Middle FG 
Professional/ 
managerial 
Manager Middle
-aged 
M Married Middle FG 
Professional/ 
managerial 
Senior staff at 
UN agency 
Older 
person  
F Married Upper FG 
Professional/ 
managerial 
Senior civil 
servant 
Middle
-aged 
F Married Middle FG 
Professional/ 
managerial 
Local court 
judge 
Older 
person  
M Married Middle FG 
Professional/ 
managerial 
Government 
social worker 
Middle
-aged 
F Married Low FG 
Professional/ 
managerial 
Government 
social worker 
Adoles
cent 
F Non-marital 
relationship 
Middle FG 
Professional/ 
managerial 
Accountant Youth F Non-marital 
relationship 
Middle FG 
Professional/ 
managerial 
Accountant Middle
-aged 
F Married Middle DLH 
Professional/ 
managerial 
Manager Middle
-aged 
F Divorced Middle FG, LH 
Professional/ 
managerial 
Lab analyst (at 
mine) 
Youth F Non-marital 
relationship 
Middle FG, LH 
Professional/ 
managerial 
Bank manager Middle
-aged 
F Married Upper FG, LH, C 
Professional/ 
managerial 
Manager Middle
-aged 
F Married Middle LH 
Professional/ 
managerial 
Senior staff at 
national 
gender NGO 
Middle
-aged 
M Unmarried Middle LH 
Professional/ 
managerial 
Senior civil 
servant 
Older 
person  
F Divorced Middle LH 
Professional/ 
managerial 
Manager Youth F Non-marital 
relationship 
Middle LH, C 
Professional/ 
managerial 
Senior staff at 
national 
gender NGO 
Middle
-aged 
F Divorced Low LH, C 
Professional/ 
managerial 
Accountant Youth M Unmarried Middle RFG 
Professional/ 
managerial 
Senior staff at 
UN agency 
Middle
-aged 
F Divorced Upper DLH, C 
Professional/ 
managerial 
Manager Middle
-aged 
F Married Upper DLH, RFG 
Professional/ 
managerial 
Town clerk Middle
-aged 
M Married Middle TI 
Professional/ 
managerial 
Head of major 
development 
partner 
Middle
-aged 
M Married Upper TI 
Professional/ 
managerial 
Senior staff at 
national 
gender NGO 
Middle
-aged 
F Divorced Middle TI 
Professional/ 
managerial 
Senior civil 
servant 
Middle
-aged 
M Unmarried Middle TI 
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Professional/ 
managerial 
Senior civil 
servant 
Middle
-aged 
M Married Upper TI 
Professional/ 
managerial 
Occupational 
hygenist 
(mining) 
Middle
-aged 
M Married Middle TI 
Professional/ 
managerial 
HR personnel 
in 
manufacturing 
company 
Middle
-aged 
M Unmarried Middle TI 
Professional/ 
managerial 
HR personnel 
in 
manufacturing 
company 
Middle
-aged 
M Married Middle TI 
Professional/ 
managerial 
HR personnel 
in 
manufacturing 
company 
Middle
-aged 
M Married Middle TI 
Service worker Receptionist Middle
-aged 
F Unmarried Low FG 
Service worker Police 
inspector 
Middle
-aged 
M Married Middle FG 
Service worker Peer educator Adoles
cent 
F Unmarried Low FG 
Service worker Peer educator Youth M Unmarried Low FG 
Service worker Fuel station 
attendant 
Youth F Unmarried Low LH 
Service worker Waitress Youth F Non-marital 
relationship 
Low DLH 
Service worker Waitress Older 
person 
M Married Low DLH, C,  FG 
Service worker Bus driver Middle
-aged 
M Married Low TI 
Skilled manual 
worker (not 
stereotypically 
masculine, e.g. 
hairdresser) 
Hairdresser Youth F Unmarried Low FG 
Skilled manual 
worker (not 
stereotypically 
masculine, e.g. 
hairdresser) 
Hairdresser Middle
-aged  
F Unassigned Low FG 
Skilled manual 
worker (not 
stereotypically 
masculine, e.g. 
hairdresser) 
Tailor Middle
-aged 
F Married Low FG 
Skilled manual 
worker (not 
stereotypically 
masculine, e.g. 
hairdresser) 
Hairdresser Middle
-aged 
F Divorced Low FG, LH 
Skilled manual 
worker (not 
stereotypically 
masculine, e.g. 
hairdresser) 
Nail technician Middle
-aged 
M Unmarried Middle LH 
226 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Skilled manual 
worker 
(stereotypically 
masculine, e.g. 
miner) 
Road worker Middle
-aged 
F Married Middle FG 
Skilled manual 
worker 
(stereotypically 
masculine, e.g. 
miner) 
Miner  Middle
-aged 
M Married Middle FG 
Skilled manual 
worker 
(stereotypically 
masculine, e.g. 
miner) 
Miner Older 
person  
M Married Low FG 
Skilled manual 
worker 
(stereotypically 
masculine, e.g. 
miner) 
Miner Middle
-aged 
M Married Middle FG 
Skilled manual 
worker 
(stereotypically 
masculine, e.g. 
miner) 
Miner Middle
-aged 
M Married Middle FG 
Skilled manual 
worker 
(stereotypically 
masculine, e.g. 
miner) 
Miner Middle
-aged 
M Married Middle FG 
Skilled manual 
worker 
(stereotypically 
masculine, e.g. 
miner) 
Mechanic Youth M Unmarried Low FG 
Skilled manual 
worker 
(stereotypically 
masculine, e.g. 
miner) 
Mechanic Youth M Unmarried Low FG 
Skilled manual 
worker 
(stereotypically 
masculine, e.g. 
miner) 
Mechanic Youth M Married Low FG 
Skilled manual 
worker 
(stereotypically 
masculine, e.g. 
miner) 
Factory worker Middle
-aged 
F Married Low DLH 
Skilled manual 
worker 
(stereotypically 
masculine, e.g. 
miner) 
Casual 
labourer 
Youth M Unmarried Low FG 
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Skilled manual 
worker 
(stereotypically 
masculine, e.g. 
miner) 
Casual 
labourer 
Youth M Unmarried Low FG 
Skilled manual 
worker 
(stereotypically 
masculine, e.g. 
miner) 
Casual 
labourer 
Middle
-aged 
M Married Low FG 
Skilled manual 
worker 
(stereotypically 
masculine, e.g. 
miner) 
Miner Middle
-aged 
M Married Low FG, LH 
Skilled manual 
worker 
(stereotypically 
masculine, e.g. 
miner) 
Mechanic (at a 
mine) 
Middle
-aged 
F Divorced Low DLH, LH 
Skilled manual 
worker 
(stereotypically 
masculine, e.g. 
miner) 
Machinist (at 
mine) 
Middle
-aged 
F Divorced Middle DLH, LH 
Skilled manual 
worker 
(stereotypically 
masculine, e.g. 
miner) 
Machinist (at 
mine) 
Middle
-aged 
F Divorced Middle DLH, LH 
Skilled manual 
worker 
(stereotypically 
masculine, e.g. 
miner) 
Electrician (at 
mine) 
Youth F Married Middle DLH, LH 
Skilled manual 
worker 
(stereotypically 
masculine, e.g. 
miner) 
Electrician Youth M Unmarried Middle FG, LH 
Skilled manual 
worker 
(stereotypically 
masculine, e.g. 
miner) 
Soldier Youth F Non-marital 
relationship 
Low DLH 
Skilled manual 
worker 
(stereotypically 
masculine, e.g. 
miner) 
Road worker Youth F Widowed Low DLH 
Skilled manual 
worker 
(stereotypically 
masculine, e.g. 
miner) 
Miner Youth M Unmarried Low LH 
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Skilled manual 
worker 
(stereotypically 
masculine, e.g. 
miner) 
Mechanic Youth M Unmarried Low LH 
Skilled manual 
worker 
(stereotypically 
masculine, e.g. 
miner) 
Mechanic Youth F Unmarried Low DLH 
Skilled manual 
worker 
(stereotypically 
masculine, e.g. 
miner) 
Electrician Youth F Unmarried Low DLH 
Skilled manual 
worker 
(stereotypically 
masculine, e.g. 
miner) 
Auto-electrical 
student 
Adoles
cent 
F Unmarried Middle LH 
Skilled manual 
worker 
(stereotypically 
masculine, e.g. 
miner) 
Auto-electrical 
student 
Youth M Unmarried Middle LH 
Skilled manual 
worker 
(stereotypically 
masculine, e.g. 
miner) 
Auto-electrical 
student 
Youth M Unmarried Middle LH 
Skilled manual 
worker 
(stereotypically 
masculine, e.g. 
miner) 
Casual 
labourer 
Youth M Unmarried Low RFG 
Skilled manual 
worker 
(stereotypically 
masculine, e.g. 
miner) 
Mechanic Youth M Unmarried Low RFG, LH 
Skilled manual 
worker 
(stereotypically 
masculine, e.g. 
miner) 
Miner Youth M Married Low RFG, DLH 
Skilled manual 
worker 
(stereotypically 
masculine, e.g. 
miner) 
Mechanic Youth F Unmarried Low RLG,  FG 
Skilled manual 
worker 
(stereotypically 
masculine, e.g. 
miner) 
Mechanic Youth  F Non-marital 
relationship 
Low DLH, C,  FG 
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Skilled manual 
worker 
(stereotypically 
masculine, e.g. 
miner) 
Mechanic Youth F Non-marital 
relationship 
Low DLH, C,  FG 
Skilled manual 
worker 
(stereotypically 
masculine, e.g. 
miner) 
Miner Middle
-aged 
M Divorced Low DLH,  FG 
Student Student at 
single-sex, 
state school 
Adoles
cent 
M Unmarried Middle FG, LH, C 
Student Student at co-
ed private 
school 
Adoles
cent 
F Unmarried Middle FG, DLH, C 
Student Student at 
university 
Youth M Unmarried Middle FG 
Student Student at 
single-sex, 
state school 
Middle
-aged 
F Married Middle FG 
Student Student at 
college 
Adoles
cent 
F Non-marital 
relationship 
Middle FG 
Student Student at co-
ed, elite school 
Adoles
cent 
F Unmarried Upper FG 
Student Student at co-
ed, elite school 
Adoles
cent 
F Unmarried Upper FG 
Student Student at co-
ed, elite school 
Adoles
cent 
F Unmarried Upper FG 
Student Student at co-
ed, elite school 
Adoles
cent 
F Unmarried Upper FG 
Student Student at co-
ed, elite school 
Adoles
cent 
F Unmarried Upper FG 
Student Student at co-
ed, elite school 
Adoles
cent 
F Unmarried Upper FG 
Student Student at co-
ed, elite school 
Adoles
cent 
M Unmarried Upper FG 
Student Student at co-
ed, elite school 
Adoles
cent 
M Unmarried Upper FG 
Student Student at co-
ed, elite school 
Adoles
cent 
F Non-marital 
relationship 
Upper FG 
Student Student at co-
ed, elite school 
Adoles
cent 
M Unmarried Upper FG 
Student Student at co-
ed, elite school 
Adoles
cent 
F Unmarried Upper FG 
Student Student at co-
ed, elite school 
Adoles
cent 
M Unmarried Upper FG 
Student Student at co-
ed state school 
Adoles
cent 
F Unmarried Low FG 
Student Student at co-
ed state school 
Adoles
cent 
F Unmarried Low FG 
Student Student at co-
ed state school 
Adoles
cent 
F Unmarried Low FG 
Student Student at co-
ed state school 
Adoles
cent 
F Unmarried Low FG 
Student Student at co-
ed state school 
Adoles
cent 
F Unmarried Low FG 
Student Student at co-
ed state school 
Adoles
cent 
F Non-marital 
relationship 
Middle FG 
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Student Student Adoles
cent 
M Unmarried Low FG 
Student Student at 
college 
Adoles
cent 
F Unmarried Middle FG, C 
Student Student at 
single-sex, 
state school 
Adoles
cent 
M Unmarried Low FG, E 
Student Student at 
single-sex, 
state school 
Adoles
cent 
M Unmarried Low FG, E 
Student Student at 
single-sex, 
state school 
Adoles
cent 
M Unmarried Low FG, E 
Student Student at 
single-sex, 
state school 
Adoles
cent 
M Unmarried Low FG, E 
Student Student at 
single-sex, 
state school 
Adoles
cent 
M Unmarried Low FG, E 
Student Student at 
single-sex, 
state school 
Adoles
cent 
M Unmarried Middle FG, E 
Student Student at 
single-sex, 
state school 
Adoles
cent 
M Unmarried Middle FG, E 
Student Student at 
college 
Adoles
cent 
F Non-marital 
relationship 
Middle FG, LH 
Student Student at 
college 
Youth F Unmarried Middle FG, LH 
Student Student at 
college 
Youth F Non-marital 
relationship 
Middle FG, LH 
Student Student at 
university 
Youth F Unmarried Low LH 
Student Student at 
university 
Youth F Non-marital 
relationship 
Low LH 
Student Student at 
university 
Youth F Non-marital 
relationship 
Middle LH 
Student Student at 
college 
Middle
-aged 
F Married Middle LH 
Student Student - civil 
engineering 
Youth F Unmarried Middle LH 
Student Student Youth F Non-marital 
relationship 
Middle LH 
Student Student at 
university 
Youth F Non-marital 
relationship 
Low LH, C 
Student Student at 
single-sex, 
state school 
Adoles
cent 
M Unmarried Low LH, C 
Student Student at 
single-sex, 
state school 
Adoles
cent 
F Unmarried Low LH,  FG 
Student Student at co-
ed state school 
Adoles
cent 
F Unmarried Low LH,  FG 
Student Student at co-
ed state school 
Adoles
cent 
F Unmarried Low LH,  FG 
Student Student at co-
ed state school 
Adoles
cent 
F Unmarried Low LH,  FG 
Student Student at co-
ed, elite school 
Adoles
cent 
F Unmarried Upper RFG 
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Student Student at co-
ed, elite school 
Adoles
cent 
F Unmarried Upper RFG 
Student Student at co-
ed, elite school 
Adoles
cent 
F Unmarried Upper RFG 
Student Student at co-
ed, elite school 
Adoles
cent 
M Unmarried Upper RFG 
Student Student at co-
ed, elite school 
Adoles
cent 
M Unmarried Upper RFG 
Student Student at co-
ed, elite school 
Adoles
cent 
F Non-marital 
relationship 
Upper RFG 
Student Student at co-
ed, elite school 
Adoles
cent 
M Unmarried Upper RFG 
Student Student at co-
ed, elite school 
Adoles
cent 
F Unmarried Upper RFG 
Student Student at co-
ed, elite school 
Adoles
cent 
M Non-marital 
relationship 
Upper RFG 
Student Student Adoles
cent 
F Unmarried Low RFG 
Student Student Adoles
cent 
F Unmarried Middle RFG, C 
Student Student at 
single-sex, 
state school 
Adoles
cent 
M Unmarried Low RFG, E 
Student Student at 
single-sex, 
state school 
Adoles
cent 
M Unmarried Low RFG, E 
Student Student at 
single-sex, 
state school 
Adoles
cent 
M Unmarried Low RFG, E 
Student Student at 
single-sex, 
state school 
Adoles
cent 
M Unmarried Low RFG, E 
Student Student at 
single-sex, 
state school 
Adoles
cent 
M Unmarried Low RFG, E 
Student Student at 
single-sex, 
state school 
Adoles
cent 
M Unmarried Low RFG, E 
Student Student at 
single-sex, 
state school 
Adoles
cent 
M Unmarried Low RFG, E 
Student Student at 
single-sex, 
state school 
Adoles
cent 
M Unmarried Low RFG, E 
Student Student at 
single-sex, 
state school 
Adoles
cent 
M Unmarried Low RFG, E 
Student Student at 
single-sex, 
state school 
Adoles
cent 
M Unmarried Low RFG, E 
Student Student at 
single-sex, 
state school 
Adoles
cent 
M Unmarried Low RFG, E 
Student Student at 
single-sex, 
state school 
Adoles
cent 
M Unmarried Low RFG, E 
Student Student at 
single-sex, 
state school 
Adoles
cent 
M Unmarried Low RFG, E 
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Student Student at 
single-sex, 
state school 
Adoles
cent 
M Unmarried Low RFG, E 
Student Student at 
single-sex, 
state school 
Adoles
cent 
M Unmarried Low RFG, E 
Student Student at 
single-sex, 
state school 
Adoles
cent 
M Unmarried Low RFG, E 
Student Student at 
single-sex, 
state school 
Adoles
cent 
M Unmarried Low RFG, E 
Student Student at 
single-sex, 
state school 
Adoles
cent 
M Unmarried Low RFG, E 
Student Student at 
single-sex, 
state school 
Adoles
cent 
M Unmarried Low RFG, E 
Student Student at 
single-sex, 
state school 
Youth M Unmarried Low RFG,  E 
Student Student at 
single-sex, 
state school 
Adoles
cent 
M Unmarried Middle RFG,  E 
Student Student at 
single-sex, 
state school 
Adoles
cent 
M Non-marital 
relationship 
Middle RFG,  E 
Student Student at 
single-sex, 
state school 
Adoles
cent 
M Unmarried Middle RFG,  E 
Student Student at 
single-sex, 
state school 
Adoles
cent 
M Unmarried Middle RFG,  E 
Student Student at 
single-sex, 
state school 
Adoles
cent 
M Unmarried Middle RFG,  E 
Student Student at 
university 
Youth M Non-marital 
relationship 
Middle RFG, DLH 
Student Student at 
university 
Youth F Unmarried Middle RFG, LH 
Student Student at co-
ed, elite school 
Adoles
cent 
F Unmarried Upper RFG, LH 
Student Student at co-
ed, elite school 
Adoles
cent 
F Unmarried Upper RFG, LH 
Student Student at co-
ed, elite school 
Adoles
cent 
F Unmarried Upper RFG, LH 
Student Student at co-
ed, elite school 
Adoles
cent 
F Unmarried Middle RFG, LH 
Student Student at co-
ed, elite school 
Adoles
cent 
F Unmarried Upper RFG, DLH 
Student Student at co-
ed, elite school 
Adoles
cent 
F Unmarried Upper RFG, DLH 
Student Student at co-
ed state school 
Adoles
cent 
F Unmarried Middle RFG, LH 
Student Student at co-
ed state school 
Adoles
cent 
F Unmarried Middle RFG, DLH, 
C 
Student Student at 
single-sex, 
state school 
Adoles
cent 
F Unmarried Low DLH 
233 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Student Student at 
college 
Youth F Unmarried Middle LH, C,  FG 
Student Student at 
college 
Youth F Unmarried Middle LH, C,  FG 
Student Student at 
college 
Youth F Unmarried Middle LH, C,  FG 
Teacher Teacher Middle
-aged 
F Married Middle FG, DLH 
Teacher Teacher - 
auto-
mechanics 
Middle
-aged 
M Married Middle FG 
Teacher Teacher Older 
person  
F Married Low FG 
Teacher Teacher Youth M Non-marital 
relationship 
Middle FG 
Teacher Teacher Youth M Non-marital 
relationship 
Middle FG 
Teacher Teacher Youth M Non-marital 
relationship 
Middle FG 
Teacher Teacher Middle
-aged 
F Separated Middle FG 
Teacher Teacher Middle
-aged 
F Married Middle FG 
Teacher Teacher Middle
-aged 
F Married Middle FG 
Teacher Teacher Middle
-aged 
M Married Middle FG 
Teacher Teacher Middle
-aged 
M Married Middle FG 
Teacher Teacher Middle
-aged 
M Married Middle FG 
Teacher Teacher Middle
-aged 
M Married Middle FG 
Teacher Teacher Middle
-aged 
M Unmarried Middle FG 
Teacher Teacher Middle
-aged 
F Married Middle FG 
Teacher Teacher Middle
-aged 
F Married Upper FG 
Teacher Auto-electrical 
teacher 
Youth F Married Middle FG 
Teacher Auto-electrical 
teacher 
Middle
-aged 
M Unmarried Middle FG 
Teacher Auto-electrical 
teacher 
Middle
-aged 
M Unmarried Middle FG 
Teacher Teacher Older 
person  
F Separated Low FG, LH 
Teacher Teacher Middle
-aged 
F Divorced Low LH 
Teacher Teacher Middle
-aged 
F Married Middle LH 
Teacher Teacher Youth F Married Middle RFG 
Teacher Teacher Youth M Non-marital 
relationship 
Middle RFG 
Teacher Teacher Middle
-aged 
F Married Middle RFG 
Teacher Teacher Middle
-aged 
F Married Middle RFG 
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Teacher Teacher Youth M Married Middle RFG, DLH, 
C 
Teacher Teacher Middle
-aged 
F Separated Low DLH 
Teacher Teacher Youth F Divorced Middle DLH 
Teacher Teacher Youth M Married Low TI 
Teacher Civics teacher Middle
-aged 
M Married Middle TI 
Trader Wealthy 
business 
person 
Youth F Unmarried Middle FG 
Trader Supplier to the 
mines 
Youth M Non-marital 
relationship 
Middle FG 
Trader Supplier to the 
mines 
Middle
-aged 
M Married Middle FG 
Trader Market trader 
& gender 
facilitator 
Older 
person  
M Married Low FG 
Trader Market trader Adoles
cent 
F Non-marital 
relationship 
Low FG 
Trader Market trader Adoles
cent 
F Unmarried Low FG 
Trader Market trader Youth F Married Low FG 
Trader Market trader Youth M Unmarried Low FG 
Trader Market trader Youth F Divorced Low FG 
Trader Market trader Middle
-aged 
M Married Low FG 
Trader Market trader Middle
-aged 
M Married Low FG 
Trader Market trader Middle
-aged 
M Married Low FG 
Trader Market trader Middle
-aged 
F Married Low FG 
Trader Market trader Middle
-aged 
M Married Low FG 
Trader Market trader Middle
-aged 
M Married Low FG 
Trader Market trader Middle
-aged 
M Married Low FG 
Trader Market trader Middle
-aged 
F Married Low FG 
Trader Market trader Middle
-aged 
F Unassigned Low FG 
Trader Market trader Middle
-aged 
M Married Low FG 
Trader Market trader Middle
-aged 
M Married Low FG 
Trader Market trader Middle
-aged 
M Married Low FG 
Trader Market trader Middle
-aged 
M Married Low FG 
Trader Market trader Middle
-aged 
F Married Low FG 
Trader Market trader Older 
person  
F Married Low FG 
Trader Market trader Older 
person  
F Married Low FG 
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Trader Market trader Older 
person  
F Married Middle FG 
Trader Home-based 
trader 
Older 
person 
F Widowed Low FG 
Trader Home-based 
trader 
Older 
person  
F Widowed Low FG 
Trader Home-based 
trader 
Older 
person  
F Married Low FG 
Trader Business 
person 
Middle
-aged 
F Married Low FG 
Trader Business 
person 
Older 
person  
M Married Low FG 
Trader Business 
person 
Middle
-aged 
M Married Middle FG 
Trader Business 
person 
Middle
-aged 
M Married Upper FG 
Trader Market trader Middle
-aged 
F Married Low FG, LH 
Trader Market trader Middle
-aged 
F Married Low FG, LH 
Trader Market trader Middle
-aged 
F Widowed Low LH 
Trader Market trader Middle
-aged 
F Married Low LH 
Trader Market trader Middle
-aged 
F Widowed Low LH 
Trader Market trader Middle
-aged 
F Widowed Low LH 
Trader Market trader Middle
-aged 
F Married Low LH 
Trader Market trader Middle
-aged 
F Married Low LH 
Trader Market trader Middle
-aged 
M Married Low LH 
Trader Market trader Middle
-aged 
F Married Low LH 
Trader Market trader Middle
-aged 
M Married Low LH 
Trader Market trader Middle
-aged 
F Unassigned Low LH 
Trader Market trader Middle
-aged 
M Married Low LH 
Trader Market trader Middle
-aged 
F Widowed Low LH 
Trader Market trader Middle
-aged 
F Married Low LH 
Trader Market trader Older 
person  
F Widowed Low LH 
Trader Market trader Older 
person  
F Divorced Low LH 
Trader Market trader Older 
person  
F Widowed Low LH 
Trader Home-based 
trader 
Middle
-aged 
F Married Low LH 
Trader Home-based 
trader 
Middle
-aged 
F Married Low LH 
Trader Home-based 
trader 
Older 
person  
F Non-marital 
relationship 
Low LH 
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Trader Business 
person 
Older 
person  
F Divorced Upper LH 
Trader Home-based 
trader 
Older 
person  
F Married Middle LH, C 
Trader Market trader Youth F Married Low LH,  FG 
Trader Market trader Middle
-aged 
M Married Low LH,  FG 
Trader Home-based 
trader 
Adoles
cent  
F Unmarried Low LH,  FG 
Trader Home-based 
trader 
Middle
-aged 
F Non-marital 
relationship 
Low LH,  FG 
Trader Business 
person 
Middle
-aged 
F Married Middle LH,  FG 
Trader Market trader Youth F Married Low LH, RFG 
Trader Market trader Middle
-aged 
M Married Low LH, RFG 
Trader Market trader Middle
-aged 
M Married Low LH, RFG 
Trader Market trader Middle
-aged 
F Married Low LH, RFG 
Trader Market trader Older 
person  
F Widowed Low LH, RFG 
Trader Business 
person 
Middle
-aged 
M Married Low LH, RFG 
Trader Market trader Middle
-aged 
F Widowed Low RFG 
Trader Market trader Middle
-aged 
F Married Low RFG 
Trader Market trader Middle
-aged 
F Married Low RFG 
Trader Lets out rooms Older 
person  
F Widowed Middle RFG, C 
Trader Business 
person 
Middle
-aged 
M Cohabiting Middle RFG, LH 
Trader Market trader Youth F Non-marital 
relationship 
Low RFG, DLH 
Trader Market trader Middle
-aged 
F Married Low RFG, LH 
Trader Market trader Middle
-aged 
F Widowed Low RFG, LH 
Trader Market trader Middle
-aged 
F Married Low RFG, LH 
Trader Market trader Middle
-aged 
F Married Low RFG, LH 
Trader Market trader Older 
person  
F Divorced Low RFG, DLH 
Trader Market trader Older 
person  
F Widowed Low RFG, LH 
Trader Market trader Middle
-aged 
F Married Middle RFG, LH 
Trader Market trader Middle
-aged 
F Married Low DLH 
Trader Home-based 
trader 
Middle
-aged 
F Married Low DLH 
Trader Supplier to the 
mines 
Youth M Married Middle DLH, C 
Trader Business 
person 
Older 
person  
M Married Low DLH,  FG 
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Trader Market trader Middle
-aged 
F Married Low DLH, RFG 
Trader Market trader Middle
-aged 
F Divorced Low DLH, RFG 
Trader Market trader Middle
-aged 
M Married Low DLH, RFG 
Trader Market trader Middle
-aged 
M Married Low DLH, RFG 
Trader Market trader Middle
-aged 
F Divorced Low DLH, RFG 
Trader Market trader Middle
-aged 
M Divorced Low DLH, RFG 
Trader Market trader Middle
-aged 
F Married Low DLH, RFG 
Trader Market trader Older 
person  
F Widowed Low DLH, RFG 
Trader Market trader Middle
-aged 
F Married Low DLH, RFG 
Trader Market trader Middle
-aged 
F Married Low DLH, RFG 
Trader Market trader Middle
-aged 
F Married Low DLH, RFG, 
C 
Trader Market trader Middle
-aged 
F Married Low DLH, RFG, 
C 
Trader Market trader Middle
-aged 
F Married Low DLH, RFG, 
C 
Unemployed Unemployed Youth F Unmarried Low FG, LH, C 
Unemployed Unemployed Adoles
cent 
M Unmarried Low FG 
Unemployed Unemployed Adoles
cent 
F Non-marital 
relationship 
Low FG 
Unemployed Unemployed Youth M Unmarried Low FG 
Unemployed Unemployed Youth F Unmarried Low FG 
Unemployed Unemployed Middle
-aged 
M Married Low FG 
Unemployed Unemployed Youth F Unmarried Middle FG 
Unemployed Unemployed Youth F Unmarried Low FG, C 
Unemployed Unemployed Youth F Unmarried Middle FG, C 
Unemployed Looking for 
work 
Middle
-aged 
M Married Middle FG, C 
Unemployed Unemployed Youth F Non-marital 
relationship 
Low FG, LH 
Unemployed Unemployed Middle
-aged 
F Married Low FG, LH 
Unemployed Unemployed Youth F Unmarried Low LH 
Unemployed Unemployed Youth F Unmarried Low LH 
Unemployed Unemployed Youth F Cohabiting Low LH 
Unemployed Unemployed Youth F Married Low LH 
Unemployed Unemployed Middle
-aged 
F Divorced Low LH 
Unemployed Unemployed Middle
-aged 
M Unmarried Low LH 
Unemployed Unemployed Youth M Unmarried Middle LH 
Unemployed Unemployed Older 
person  
F Widowed Middle LH 
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Unemployed Out of school 
youth 
Adoles
cent 
F Non-marital 
relationship 
Low LH 
Unemployed Looking for 
work 
Youth M Unmarried Middle LH 
Unemployed Unemployed Youth M Unmarried Low LH, C 
Unemployed Unemployed Youth F Divorced Middle LH, C 
Unemployed Unemployed Middle
-aged 
F Separated Low RFG, DLH 
Unemployed Unemployed Older 
person  
F Divorced Low DLH, C,  FG 
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Annex 2: Original interview extracts in Bemba 
 
i Gloria: Fwe banakashi tabaletupenda akale.  Namona bamayo twalecula. 
ii BanaMwimba: Baletititikishiwa sana, ukucila ba nomba pantu abakale... [she asks another] ni bani 
abakwata ubuntungwa – aba lelo.  Akale banamayo bali abatitikishiwa, nangu waipika nkoko kwali 
amaparts ya kuli bawishi.  Banamayo takuli ukulayako, nomba inonshita tulalya.  Na bakamfwilwa 
balebapoka ifipe kuli balupwa ba balume babo.  Munonshiku takwaba, equal rights yaliba bwino... 
Banamayo ba kale tabalelandapo icalubana panghanda.  Abalelanda e bashitata... [banamayo abakale] 
balume babo tabalebasuminisha ukushitisha.  Kali balebasunga.  Nga aliupwa afwile ukumfwa 
mulume mwakwe, so teti ashitishe.  Bamo balekwata icilumba, bamo balefwaya fye ukubacusha.  Teti 
alandepo, teti apingule.  Tabalebacetekela.  Banamayo abengi tabakwete iskuku ukuya ku sukulu.   
iii Helen: This time, akale a long time ago, nalapela example from my parents he was selling green 
market, bamayo, there were very few abaleshitisha, majority banamayo tabaishibe, what they were 
doing is to depend on their husbands, because amahusbands incito balekwata, they were working in 
industries, industries were all over, and they were getting maybe a small amount of money as a salary 
but it had value because ifintu in shops they were much cheaper, tapali ukuliplila amaskulu fees, 
twalesenda muti wa free, akale balecita examine bwino bwino ... akale everything was free, even the 
books at school... ubwikashi bwa banamayo I think this time nabuya pamulu, why I say so it's because, 
akale banamayo baletitikishiwa because even if maybe ena namayo she's educated, tabalefwaya 
bashibantu that person to go and work, eco balefwaya she's a housewife, she cannot participate in 
anything, in political parties, you cannot go at the market and sell because her husband 
baletontonkanya ukwebati maybe if she goes there aleumfwisha insoni 'why is she selling?  Ninshi I’m 
not keeping her bwino bwino', so you know, a long time ago banamayo twaletitikishiwa sana pantu 
abaume tabalefwaya ukwebati namayo kuti acita ifi and it can work, wamona?  So muno mwine mu 
zambia, kali me I talk about my country, there were very few women who were working, there were 
very few who was at icisankano.  balititikishiwa, tabalefwaya bashibantu bamoneka na ena namayo 
kuti abomba nalakwata indalama.  Now this time na ena namayo is a human being, kuti acita cintu ico 
bashibantu bengacita, they can have money, no mwaume kuti akwata inda-?  indalama.   
iv BanaMwila: Tatwaleshiba twalacula kuntanshi eco twaleupwila bwangu.  Akale fintu fyali cheap, 
fyali nakilila umutengo. 
v Alice: Umwanakashi uwashala panghanda fye kuti eshiba fintu fingi? 
Mike: Teti eshibe fintu fingi pantu ena mano tayali ayaswika mu cintu bwingi, tasangilwe na abantu 
abengi, takwetepo no mutwe wakwishiba ifyo engakala na bantu abengi nangu ifyo alesangwa na bena, 
wamona?  nangu ukwenda fine fena ukwenda mu ma distances ayatali, ena takwetepo ubwishibilo 
bwino bwino, taishibe ifyo benda na bantu, ifyo bekala na bantu mu cisankano, so takwetepo 
bwishibilo nomba, teti amano elwike bwino 
vi Alice: Cupo cenu caliba shani? 
Gloria: Balencusha, balintamfya, balikwata ubufubu [when she returned from chuch he’d ask, ‘waciya 
kwisa?’] 
Alice: Bushe mwaletontonkanya mwaletititkishiwa? 
Gloria: Nalekala bwino.  [she explains sometimes he went off for a month at a time, leaving small 
money for her] 1 month bafuma kunghanda, bashilako kanono, [nomba at least] fintu fyalenakilile fya 
mutengo.  Nalecula, natendeke akale, eco nakosela. 
Alice: Bushe mwalefwaya ukufyuka? 
Gloria: Ukufyuka ukuya kwi?... pantu amafunde yalikosa... nangu ku government, mulandu.  Wafuma 
kunghanda ulefwaya ukwendauka, government tabalefwaya, baletina amakwebo, takwaleba ukufuma 
panghanda..  nangu ncule te mulandu, kwikala fye, ukucila ukufuma panghanda.  Ukukonka ifunda ya 
government.  Balume --- ukuma.  Apo icalengele, nga bafuma mukwendauka, nomba kwisa 
mukubepeshe mulandu, ninshi kukuma apo pene.  Mulandu wa bwalwa. 
Alice: Mwaipangile shani? 
Gloria: Ukukuma fye, ukukuma tapali ukulandapo.  Ulelila fye.  Pantu balekwatapo maka. 
Alice: Bushe mwabebele nangu umo? 
Gloria: Inkama ya munghanda, teti ulondolole nangu cimo. 
Alice: Balemiuma imiku inga?   
Gloria: Limo limo.   
Alice: Bushe mwalekwata citemwiko? 
Gloria: Bwino bwino fye... amaprayers, nalepepela mulanda pakucula pakuti bacenje... akale abanandi 
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nshakewate... Impia twalekwata muli Kaunda pantu mutengo walenakilile.   
Alice: Mwaletontonkanya inshi pa imikalile ya balume benu?   
Gloria: Twaletititkishiwa fye, ulemona kwati fili bwino, fili normal, kanshi tafiweme.   
Alice:  Ninshi tamulatampa ukushitisha, bushe mwalesakamana pafyo mwingakwanisha? 
Gloria: Sana fye.   
vii BanaJessy: akale twalemona ulepitapo mu amacushi weka 
Alice: Ninshi pantu?   
BanaJessy: Ilyo tatulaamba ukusangwa na abantu abengi ku icisankano 
viii Mike: Nomba ilyo twapoka ubuntungwa abalwishe baume, nomba banamayo balisafumya insoni no 
mwenso.  ico cine, twapela ukwilula abanesu, nga twaikala fye, iyoo 'kano fye umwaume, kano fye 
umwaume, kano fye umwaume, calo tapali apo caliya.  Abene bakabana banamayo. 
ix BanaNkonde: ufwile ukunakilisha, mwaume emutwe wanganda, afwile ukukonka ifyo alanda, pakuti 
mu cupo mwikala bwino pantu nga wafuma apa wasanga cimo cine.  Wibutuka, wikale. 
Alice: Umwanakashi kuti alanda nga akwata itontonkanya? 
BanaNkonde: Nakwata insambu yakulanda, pakulanda takuli kubomfya bukali ateka mutima 
pakulondolola. 
Alice: Nga akana? 
BanaNkonde: Afwile ukulolela mutima waikale.  Bushiku bwapapita 4, elo futi kabili mwina mwakwe 
asuka, amweba, amwelela, fyapa.  Nga akana ufwile ukukonka, mwaume nga akalipa, mwanakashi 
abwele panshi.  Umuntu umo abwele kupanshi, umo mukulanda ninshi mwaumfwana. 
x Alice: Munjebe ico balekwata mwenso akale. 
Suzie: Pantu amafunde yalekosa.  Bena baKaunda, teti mwanakashi eminine pa platform ukulanda, 
tamwali banakashi mu parliament akale.  Nga mwaya ku cupo balemipela amafunde ya mucupo, 
‘uletina balume bobe, uleumfwa ifyo balelanda. 
xi Alice: nani afwaile mutampe amakwebo yenu? 
BanaMwimba: nebo, ne mwine.  Balume balekanya, balekwata ubufuba 
Alice: mwashile shani? 
BanaMwimba: balesa kumona twaamba ukucula elo basumina ati ‘kabiye mukushitisha’ 
Alice: ilyo balekele incito elyo mwafaile ukutampa makwebo?   
BanaMwimba: balekana 4 months…Amenshi twaisula fwe bene, illegal! 
xii BanaMwila: Inonshita te cisuma ukwikala panghanda, inonshita kusalapuka! namayo nomba 
tafwile ukwikala fye panghanda.  Namayo na ena afwile ukulabomba, umulume alebomba, umukashi 
nao alebomba, in case incito yapwa, nangu balume bafwa, nomba ngolekala fye, walacita shani? 
BanaChemba: tapali 
BanaMwila: tapali  
xiii BanaMwamba: Umwanakashi tafwile ukwikala fye: afwile ukwafwa umutemwikwa wakwe pakuti 
ifintu fyalaanguka nga afwa. 
xiv BanaDavid: Akale banamayo tabaleshitisha, mulandu wa balume babo balebakanya 
wakulangufwisha [wakulangisha] insoni ku abanobe ‘nshikusunga bwino’.  Efyo baleba akale nomba 
inonshita fyalipilibuka.  Inonshita abalume balakumbwa ukukwata mwanakashi uleeshitisha.  ‘kanshi 
uyu mukashi mwandi, alikosa’.  Ifwe abashitisha bantu batukumbwa pantu tulafwailisha ulupwa 
lwesu.  Balanda ati, ‘balikosa’, balekala bwino balya, mulandu wa bakashi babo balikosa ukushitisha’. 
xv Stephen: nalitemwa abanakashi ababomba, pakutila alebomba na ine ndebomba, bonse tuleafwilisha, 
tulesolvinga amaproblems, pantu kulaba nshilebomba ena alebomba, so problem nga yaisa, it's easy for ena 
ukunjafwe, wamona, nangu problem nga yamusanga tamukwete it's very easy ine kumwafwa.  Nshilefwaya 
ulya umwanakashi uwakwebati tapali ifyo alecita, taishibapo fili fyonse, ndefwaya umuntu uwaile ku skulu 
xvi Helen: So now this time bashibantu balelanda ukwebati 'you know i have to marry someone who is doing 
something',why?  it's because they have seen that even a woman can perform 
xvii Mary: banamayo balikwata ubwafya bwingi, economy ya nomba yalishupa shupa.  Umwanakashi 
afwile ukwulwisha ukwafwa mwina mwakwe panghanda. 
xviii BanaMwamba: mwanakashi afwile ukwafwa umutemwikwa, panghanda, not ukulolela 
umutemwikwa, efyalenga namayo ukwiposauka, namayo tasanga [?] mwaume awe, aisa mwaume, 
ninkwata 100, iyoo nshikwete, kapoka nokubomfya mubili wandi.  ninkosa ndelala panse, ndecita 
business, ndekwanisha fyonse ifyo ndefwaya, teti ndande umwaume ndefwaya 100 thousand, so teti 
ampele 100 thousand.  ndesunga..  citemwiko kunghanda 
Alice: banamayo abashifwaya ukubomba abene balakwata bwafya 
BanaMwamba: ee, pantu ifyo tufwaya banamayo, fingi, so uyo takwete, ndefwaya citenge, kubula, 
ninkwata impia.  'isa twakana', twasakana impia yalipila abana sukulu.  namayo kapata.  business ni 
up and down, ifyo yaba.  so afwile ukusuminsha.  up and down.  so ndefwaya ubwikashi ne ndalama.  
nomba nga nalolela... it's better twikala panshi, twaumfwana, tampa ukubombfya, nga twasanga 
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ubwafya panghanda. 
xix Rose: Inonshita [banakashi] abengi balakabila incito fya baume, nomba apa kutampila tabakwata.  
Balaba interested, amasecurity guards, ¾ banakashi. 
Alice: Abanakashi abafwaya incito sha baume, bushe bafwaya fye incito ishili shonse? 
Rose: Abengi balafwaya incito.  Nomba incito nga yaya kwingila yonse iyamoneka, nangu mwaume.  
Ninshi nalebomba nga cleaner, mukufwaisha incito.  There was an extent I wanted to be a morturary 
attendant, I was about even to write an application!.  Maka maka icalenga imikalile abalume 
pamayanda tabaposako amano ku bana.  Icisheleko fye banakashi ukufwaya incito ili yonse pakuti 
basunga abana nokutwala abana ku sukulu.  Balume bandi baleya ku banyina mukubutuka 
mukusunga abana.   
xx Daisy: Akale abantu balelanda: ukaleke incito iyabomba abaume, ukaleke pantu incito ya baume.   
Alice: ni nani uwalandilepo? 
Daisy: Baume – abalumendo, bafwaya ndepyanga, ni jealous fye, balekwata ubufuba.  [here] ubwafya 
tapaba, no problem in family, banakashi bapapa fye [didn’t discourage].  Ubwafya bukulu, nomba 
kukosa fye, kali naisa mukubomba [then explains what the problem was] pantu bafwaya ukuleka 
incito, bengi balanda, they are still talking.   
Alice: nani? 
Daisy: abengi tabaile kusukulu.  some they are just jealous 
Alice: jealous of what? 
Daisy: of work 
Alice: why? 
Daisy: maybe when i go out of work maybe they think they can replace there, maybe that’s what they 
think – bush mechanics, he knows how to repair but he didn’t go to school 
Alice: does it affect you? 
Daisy: no no 
xxi BanaNelson: Long ago, it was men who worked, so they controlled women 
Alice: now women sell, there’s a difference? 
BanaNelson: ee, tabatukontolola sana, abaume.  Abashishitisha balititikishiwa ku balume babo, muli 
fyonse, elyo balomba.  Abashitisha balikwata ubuntungwa munghanda 
BanaMwimba: ndalya bread, epo ndefwayako 
BanaNelson: ndanwa Castle [examples of freedom] 
Alice: londoleeni ifyo mwaumfwa ukutitikishiwa 
BanaNelson: ee culture mu africa.  tatukwete insambu shakucita  ifyo tutemenwe fwe bene, ifya 
kupingula, ndefwaya ukuya kukitchen party, tabasuminisha. 
Alice: ni lisa mwaumfwile ukutitikishiwa? 
BanaNelson: kale, ninshi tatulatampa ukushitisha 
Alice: munonshiku? 
AliceNelson: takuli 
xxii Mary: umwaume alabomba, mwanakashi tabomba muli bwafya munghanda, pantu mwanakashi 
tabomba eco mwabele ubwafya munghanda elyo nomba akulakonka ifyo alelanda umwaume pantu 
tabomba... 
Lucy: umwanakashi ushibomba teti aleya ukuli konse mukutandala.  Umulume nga tamusuminisha 
teti ayeko.  Pantu alelolela umulume ukumupela impia ishakutandala.  Ulupia lulecepa panghanda, 
ukwilishamo abana, ecalenga ukupusana panghanda.  Umwanakashi talekwata impia ishakushitamo 
fyakufwala, fyakulisha abana nokumoneka bwino ne mwine.  Ecalenga ubupusano.  Aleishiba ukuti 
mulume wakwe ewamusunga, afwile ukumfwila ifyo alanda. 
Alice: londololeeni, banamayo, abanenu, abashibomba nangu kushitisha, bushe basumina nokukonka 
amashiwi yonse ya balume babo? 
BanaHilda: ee, balasumina amafunde ya baume yonse, pantu tababomba.  Banamayo abashishitisha 
nangu kubomba tabakwata mutende no buntungwa mu mayanda yabo 
Alice: tabakwata ubuntungwa? 
-: awe 
Alice: tabalanda pa matontonkanya yabo? 
BanaMwimba: teti apingule fili fyonse, nangu alanda ifyo atontonkanya.   
Alice: banamayo abashishitisha bushe balapanda amano yabo pakupanga amapange munghanda? 
BanaHilda: takwaba, umwaume fye [uwalanda] 
BanaMakau: kali ewakwata impia.   
xxiii BanaMayuka: Banamayo mumayanda balititikishiwa sana 
xxiv Helen: Ilyo nakumenye bambi, bansambilishe kwebati nga waya kuBotswana ukwamba ukupanga 
profit ingi pantu kulya ifintu fyalinaka umutengo, much cheaper.  KuBotswana, natampile ukuleta 
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amatv, amablankets, amadvd, amahome theatre. 
Alice: Bushe mukwende calimipele icicetekelo [my bad bemba, it should be: bushe ulwendo lwenu 
lwalengele mwalikwata icicetekelo] 
Helen: Kabili palya nalekumanya abantu abapusana pusana.  Nalekwete insubilo ilya kuti naimina 
pali bacouncillor, abantu balinjishiba. 
Alice: Ilyo mwatampile ukushitisha, ilyo mwapangile profit, bushe musango wenu wacenja?  [bad 
bemba, should be: bushe elyo musango wenu wacenjele?] 
Helen: Nalikwata confidence, nalisambilila fintu fingi, nalelanshanya na bantu abapusana pusana, 
pafyo na bena batampile business, nefyo baya pamulu mukupanga profit na amakwebo yabo.  
Twapangile bacibusa abengi na nasambilile pafyo amakwebo yabo.  Nine nalitemwa ukwenda, 
ndesambilila fintu fingi.  ‘umwana ashenda atasha nyina ukunaya’ [proverb].  Nga ndetontonkanya 
panganda teti njishibe ifyo banandi bacita.  Cali shupa, tatwakakulwike. 
xxv Alice: Ninshi mwalekwata saloon, bushe mwaleisha na bacostomers benu pali fyupo fyabo? 
BanaBecca: Bambi balelanda.  Twaamba ukusambilila inshila sha kwikalalamo, amacustomers, they 
were coming with different stories.  Ndepicking fimo fimo, naamba ukubika mu practice 
Alice: cilangililo? 
BanaBecca: Ukulanshanya 
Alice: Bushe mwafwaile ukulanshanya ninshi tamulakwata saloon? 
BanaBecca:Ukukabila, nalekabila nomba nshakwete apa kutampile.  Nalekwata amthoughts mu 
thoughts.  You just keep quiet minus saying anything.  Nalemona abalepitapo mu amaproblems, 
balacimfya amafya ukupitila mukulanshanya so neo wine nalisalilepo ukulanshanya.  Nge inshila 
yakupwishishamo amafya.  Before that nshale-used ukucita associate na abantu abengi, kwati nalekale 
pa stand ninshi nshishibe ifyo abantu bekale.  So before i do anything mfwile ukucita consult.  Bushe, 
naleikala nga ubusha [slave].   
Alice:Shani? 
BanaBecca: Nga umuntu takwete insambu shakulanda pa amafya alepitamo...  pa first 
naletontonkanya fili fye bwino, elo (then she had her saloon), naamba ukwiluka...inshila 
twalekaliliamo pali inshita tufwile ukucenja, pantu ifwe banamayo twalenyantililwe, tatwishibe 
insambu, twalemona ifibi, kwati fili fye bwino, pantu akale namayo afwile ukwikala panghanda 
ukumona abana, emwaume uwafwile ukubomba.  Twaambile ukucenja panono panono. 
xxvi BanaRuth: nalikwata icicetekelo apo natampile, pantu nga nashitisha abana tababa mu insala, ku 
sukulu baleya, nokufwala, balefwala.  Apakulala nabakwata.  Nalikula sana icicetekelo candi 
Alice: Mulondolole ifyo mupilibwile pakulanda ati, ‘nalikula sana icicetekelo candi’ 
BanaRuth: Nalikwata icicetekelo muli fyonse, ukulanshanya na bantu, cakulanda na bantu, pantu 
abantu eba tukula, ebatulanga amano.  Akale, ninshi nalekala na balume bandi nalekwata icicetekelo 
muli bena.  Ebansunga, nomba inonshita...  nga mwashala panghanda, muli mweka.  Mubomba incito 
sha panghanda.  Nomba nga mwaisa muno mu icisankano, kulanda na bantu abengi abapusana 
pusana, pa muli abantu abengi.   
Alice: Akale, tamwalelanshanya na bantu? 
BanaRuth: Awe, kulanshanya na banono 
Alice: Apo balume benu bafwile, mwalilanshanya na bantu abengi, mwalisunga abana benu, 
mwalikwanisha mweka.  Pa icisankano mulanshanya pali inshi? 
BanaRuth: Pali makwebo, ifyo wingasanga capital. 
Alice: Akale bushe mwalekwata icicetekelo ukulanda na bantu abo tamwishiba?  BanaRuth:[she says 
she wants her daughters to study], nga basambilila they will be ok, baice babili balikwata amano, G2 
and G6, mukalamba takwata amano sana, tabelenga sana sana kunghanda] 
Alice: icicetekelo 
BanaRuth: pantu ndekwanisha fyonse neka, nangu nshikwete capital, icikulufi [as long as] ndi umumi 
[im healthy]..... 
Alice: Bushe mulomfwa insoni? 
BanaRuth: Awe 
Alice: Ninshi tamulatampa ukukwanisha fyonse mweka, bushe mwaile ku citente 
BanaRuth: Ee, cimo cine...  the more you are growing..  fwe bantu nga tulekala tulepitamo mu fintu 
fingi filenga ubupusano mu mikalile [way of life] na mu cicetekelo.  Kuti nakwata icicetekelo ukulanda 
ifingi ukulingana nemo napita.  Efyo nalandile kunuma, nefyo ningalanda palio lelo fyapusana.  
Munonshiku kuti nakoselesha muntu uwapitamo mubucushi ubo ine napitamo.  Kuti nalanda fingi 
pantu nalipitamo. 
xxvii BanaNancy: Baume kali, teti balinganye amano fifty fifty, like for example, teti tulingane amano na 
mwina mwandi.  Umwine mwandi alepitinkana, aleswangana mu fintu, abombapo, abomba.  That is 
knowledge, so teti tulingane amano.  things apo ningishiba nepo eshibe, ena alishiba ifintu.  so iwe 
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walishiba ifintu fingi, so iwe walishiba fingi, ine nshaswangana, walasambilila sana ifintu.  waile ku 
Twatasha, nshafikako.  Nausambilila fintu fya ku Twatasha, so Nsengala ukupusana amano, ka? 
Alice: Ngacakuti wakwata incito, elyo ukendauka nokukumanya abantu abengi, elyo mukalinganga..? 
BanaNancy: Ee, kanshi na ine ndepitinkana, uko nshishibe eko..  waishiba ifishinka, walasanga ati 
bakweba, waumfwa ka?  walaishiba, so ine mukupitinkana, ndebomba, twaamba ukukwata same 
knowledge. 
Alice: So ngacakuti mwakwata incito nokukumanya abantu abengi, elyo mulingana no mwina mwenu? 
BanaNancy: Kali, napitinkana, nasanga ati ico ndefwaya ifyo nshishibe, naisamipusha, aishiba, naisa 
ukusankanya amano. 
Alice: So you think if you had a job and were meeting people then your intelligence would be the same 
as your husband's? 
BanaNancy: Hmhm [nods]... ok, a man is a man, you cannot be the same, there's a difference, but 
some, ok, there's women have knowledge like man.  like these nowadays, that's why gender is very 
important, because you find the ministers are banakashi, it depends how experience you have. 
Alice: Are the ministers who are women the same as the ministers who are men? 
BanaNancy: For example, where you stay, with BanaSibeso, the same as like a MAN! they meeting 
different people, they get knowledge.  so they have knowledge like a man! 'ooh, i can do this and this'.  
Just staying at home, ahh, the whole day, you're just cooking ifishimu, can you have a knowledge?  No.  
from you [referring to me]here you go to Kamitondo, you're getting knowledge, you're talking about 
what? 
Alice: Pakukula amayanda kuKawama. 
BanaNancy: Waumfwa.  You're getting knowledge, 'twalacita shani?', nomba ine, just example, 
Nsengalapo, nshaishibe, Nsengalile ilya knowledge, i'll be dull.  So ngolepitinkana you can be like a 
man 
Alice: Do you be want to be like a man? 
BanaNancy: Yah, to know everything.  You, you are the same as like a man, moving up and down, to 
know everything.   
xxviii Susan: Abaume nalibacila, three quarters of them, nalibacila, ee 
Alice: Kuti mwabacimfya? 
Susan: Kuti nabacimfya [i show her the photos] 
Alice: namwishiba shani? 
Susan: nalecita compare, abaume balafilwa 
Alice: balafilwa pakucitenshi? 
Susan: ukubomba incito imo 
Alice: ukushitisha balafilwa? 
Susan: ee, abengi balafilwa, balalomba fye, balenwa bwalwa 
BanaMwamba: bengi sana 
BaShiMwamba: na ine wine ukulolela 
Alice: tabaishiba ifyo kusunga impia? 
Susan: tabasunga bwino, 'ndefwaya bwali'.  abengi muno muzambia tabomba, babomba contract, 
babomba fye one month elo babatamfya,  
xxix Alice: ninshi mwalekula bushe mwaletontonkanya abaume balikwata amano ukucila banakashi? 
BanaChola: ee, nomba inkulo ya inonshita naficenja.  Banakashi nabakwatapo amano ukucila abaume 
Alice: ninshi pantu? 
BanaChola: fintu fyalipilibuka muno muZambia 
Alice: fyalipilibuka shani? 
BanaChola: banakashi ebasunga abaume nokusunga bana, nokubalipila indalama sha kusukulu... 
banamayo balibikilishapo’  
xxx Alice: bushe muletontonkanya  banamayo ba inshita ya kale balekwata ubwafya? 
BanaChola: ee 
Alice: nshi? 
BanaChola: banamayo tafwile ukubomba, ukushitisha, [they should instead] ukusangwa panghanda, 
pyanga nokusunga bana...  ubwafya tabakwete tabalecula, ebabomba baume.  Pantu ilyonshita 
abaume balebomba fyonse, balebakwanisha 
Alice: bushe baletitikishiwa? 
BanaChola: ee, tabakwete amarights panghanda fyonse mwaume.  Tabasuminisha nangu cimo.  
Tabalebasuminisha nangu cimo.  Cakuti kuti balandapo ku balume caumfwika 
Alice: tabalepingula bonse pamo? 
BanaChola: awe, tabakwete amapowers.  Fyonse: yes, yes, yes.  Pantu abaume fyonse balekwanisha 
panghanda lelo namayo takwatepo pocket money.  Nga bantamfya, ndeya kwi?  Tapali ukondeya. 
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Alice: bushe muletontonkanya banamayo ba inshita ya kale balekwete insansa ukucila ba inshita ya 
lelo? 
BanaChola: balekwete insansa ukucila aba lelo 
Alice: nelyo tabalekwete maka, balekwete insansa? 
BanaChola: ee, nelyo tabalekwete maka, insansa balekwete 
M: nimfulungana 
BanaChola: happy is better than power 
Alice: nomba, munonshiku, bushe muletontonkanya ati banamayo abashishitshia balitititikishiwa? 
BanaChola: baliba slow minded  
[another] tatwatemwa ifwe ukulabomba pantu abalume tabomba 
M: nomba bushe muleumfwa insansa pakulanda ‘itoloshi kunuma, citenge kuntanshi’ 
BanaChola: awe, tatumfwa insansa.  Incito yesu yabashitata 
xxxi BanaChola: nomba tulecula.  nalisatitikishiwa pa lwandi pantu nalisasanguka mwaume.  Naamba 
ukubomba milimo ya baume.  ...amatontonkanya yalisafula sana, baliba disturbed mind.  
Balibwelamo inonshita  
xxxii Helen: ukutitikishiwa.  Banamayo abengi inonshita balititikishiwa - banamayo inonshita they are 
not free, pantu responsibility, akale tabalebomba, inonshita it's their responsibility.  Akale namayo, 
incito yabo, if i get married ninshi capwa, nomba this time uleisasanga ukwebati ifyo taufwile 
ukubomba ifyo wabomba, to earn a living, so namayo ifyo talebomba akale efyo alebomba nomba so 
aletitikishiwa pantu limbi umulume wakwe tafwile tabomba, fili fyonse akacita pantu akale 
bashibantu balekwata incito so bashibantu abengi they were helping, nomba bambi balecita retire, 
bambi balecita prune, so namayo naamba ukutitikishiwa, responsibility ileya,...balitikishiwa mulandu 
ukwebati where a man can do a woman is doing it, it's very difficult.  Whatever we are planning it's 
only you, not a man, so it's not easy, when you're planning for something you have to be both, a male 
and a female, not one headed, you are only alone, planning for anything, ah, it's really bad. 
xxxiiixxxiii BanaBecca: In short twaambile ukulanshanya 
Alice: Ni nani uwatampile ukwakana amatontonkanya yabo?... ukucita share amatontonkanya yabo? 
BanaBecca: Ni nebo, Mapalo ulanda ciBemba deep! Pa first calikosele, ukukonka insambu sha 
banamayo, pride epo ali.  Tabalefwaya ukushikonka.  Nomba pali inonshita bali ubupusana. 
Alice: Ninshi balicenja? 
BanaBecca: Ukupitilamo ifyo ndecita ine bamona ifyo ndecita, muleba progress.  At the end bena 
baamba ukucenja.  Tulafwilishanya ukusunga lupwa panghanda, ukwisunga pantanshi. 
Alice: Abakanakumona mwalibombesha kuti bacenja? 
BanaBecca: Awe, teti bacenje.  Cimbi icalenga balikwata icilumba ukwebati, ‘tapali ifyo ningacita’. 
xxxiv Alice: Ninshi mwalekala panghanda apabula amakwebo, bushe mwalekwata icicetekelo pakulanda 
na bena? 
BanaMwimba: Awe, not sana.  Kabili nga bafola impia shalekumanina bwino, shalecepa.  Nga ndanda, 
teti amfwike. 
Alice: So ni bena abakwanisha impia beka? 
BabaMwimba: Hm hm [concurs]. 
Alice: Bushe mwaleisusha amatontonkanya yenu? 
BanaMwimba: Awe, tatwalesusha amatontonkanya yesu.  Ebaume abashupa fye. 
Alice: Bena balesusha amatontonkanya yesu?  Apo mwatampile ukukwanisha mwe bene, 
balimicetekela? 
BanaMwimba: Ee, ‘kanshi umukashana nakwata amano ayasuma, kuti twasungana’.  Pantu balemona 
tapali ifyo ningacita. 
xxxv Gloria: Akale baletususha, ati, ‘namayo tapali ifyacita] 
Alice: Balileka ukumisusha lilali? 
Gloria: Abantu ilyo baishiba ukuti twabomba na ifwe, elyo balekele ukutusha.   
xxxvi Alice: Ndefwaya ukwishiba ico bantu balitampa ukwingisha banamayo ukupingula mu fililo. 
BanaMwimba: Pantu balimona banamayo ukuti balikwata amano. 
Alice: Nomba akale tabaletontonkanya banamayo balekwata amano? 
BanaMwimba: Akale banamayo tabalebapenda. 
Alice: Batampile ukubapenda lilali? 
BanaMwimba: 2000s 
Alice: Munonshiku bushe bapenda banamayo bonse nangu abakwata amakwebo fye? 
BanaMwimba: Maka maka abakwata makwebo.  Bambi abashikwata makwebo te sana sana. 
xxxvii BanaMayunda: Alikwata respect sana.  Nga aisa bamusekelela bwino, ukumukumbatila, ukunaya 
bwali, na menshi ayakusamba bwangu bwangu no kwipika inkoko... Umuntu uwafwilisha ulupwa 
alakwata mucinshi no kutemwikwa na mapalo. 
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xxxviii Alice: Munjebe ifyo mwatemwa ukumona banamayo balecita. 
BanaMwimba: Ukutungulula, ukubombesha, imilimo ishibomba bashibantu, ukulungulisha motoka, 
ukupyanga mu musebo, milimo ya pa mugodi, driver (trucks), ifyalenga icipale ne cilumba. 
xxxix Solomon: Tulabatasha, tulafwana. 
xl Samuel: We came together and saw her lying down under the motorcar and I said, ‘I’m very 
surprised’ , ‘Have you ever seen a girl in a garage?’, ‘No, this is my first time’.  I was impressed, very 
very impressed.  The very day we approached her we started asking her some questions, about how 
she became a mechanic... She even started teaching us.  Alikwata icicetekelo mu fyacita and 
pakulanda.  Customers are surprised, they are so impressed.  [some] Abaume bamo balanda ati, 
‘bikeenipo mwaume abombeko bwangu’, but the foreman insists, ‘awe, alabomba uyu wine’. 
Owen: Alikosa sana uku.  She has inspired me very much when it comes to the way she works.  She’s 
not married, she’s a single woman, with sisters.  She does everything in the house, but not married.  
Akale naletontonkanya kwati mwanakashi uwekala fye eka teti akwate ubwikashi ubusuma kwati 
Daisy.   
Alice: Ninshi pantu? 
Samuel: Kali girls went for early marriages.   
Owen: [seeing Daisy] it makes me to increase the faith in women.  Daisy is a woman and she is just 
like other women.  it’s just ‘cos she’s determined in what she’s doing, not lazy.  she’s not like those who 
think, ‘I cant do this ‘cos I’m a woman’.  She just do things on her own. 
Alice: Bushe ukumona Daisy akwata fyonse ifyo afwaya apabula mwaume icalenge wacetetekela 
banakashi bambi?  Mulandu uwalenga watampile ukucetekela banakashi ekumona Daisy? 
Owen: Ee, mulandu walengele ucetekela banakashi bambi namwene Daisy uubomba ku autorepair 
alelungisha motoka: ukubombesha, ukusunga baice bakwe nokutwala kusukulu, ukubomba milimo ya 
baume, living without a man, that’s also important.   
Alice: So seeing Daisy has changed your views about women? 
Owen: Very much, if they become more determined in what they’re doing.  Some women they think, 
‘I’m just a woman’.  If she only forget that then she can do it.  ‘Cos there are some women, they are 
married, but nothing she can do on her own, she will always just wait for the man.  But there are some 
things she can do to help the family, like start up a business, other than just sitting home, waiting for a 
man to buy food.  As for Daisy, she can just be married just ‘cos she wants to not to, not the fact that 
she NEEDS help.  She’s able to live on her own.  Daisy is just like other women, we all have five senses, 
but other women underrate themselves.   
Alice: Now you have more confidence in all women?  [both agree] 
Owen: E.g. Dora Siliya.   
xli BanaJacqueline: ifwe tuli mu system, natukwata icisubilo, twaingilile akale mu people's process.  so 
twalikwata icisubilo akale, 'namayo afwile ukubomba, kuti akula, namayo kuti alima, namayo kuti 
aimba foundations', twalisa akale.  Nomba abantu baleseka, 'ah, ninshi mucita apo pene?  mwaangala 
fye'.  Nomba inonshita, twakulako, balatasha, 'oh, ifyo mulecita kanshi, muli amano', nomba 
tulabomba, abaisa pa monday babomba, baya, abaisa pa tuesday babomba, baya, wednesday, 
thursday, friday, saturday, sunday.  Nomba twali abengi pano, ifyo fine, twaba, ama thousands, 
amathousands.  Fyonse tutashe lesa  
Alice: so ulupwa lwenu bushe bamicetekela sana munonshiku? 
BanaJacqueline: yes, 'my mother is doing something good'  
BanaBwembya: abapalamina balatupela mucinshi sana, ati, 'imwe banamayo namuamba ukubomba 
incito [word missing]', bambi balanda 'awe, mulecula fye', nomba bamo abatumona ifyo tulebomba 
baletasha ati 'mwe banamayo mulebomba incito ikulu, kabili isuma', baleba abanabo, ati 'banamayo 
bantu bakosa balebomba incito sana', nomba bambi batina, balemona kwati tuleangala.   
Alice: munonshiku bushe kwaba incito sha baume ne incito sha baume? 
BanaBwembya: shinonshiku natumona tapali incito sha baume na sha banakashi, pantu incito iyo 
tulebomba ifwe nincito sha baume, but tulebomba.   
Alice: so abanakashi kuti babomba mu mugodi? 
BanaBwembya: abanakashi kuti babomba mu mugodi. 
Alice: banakashi na baume, bushe balilingana? 
BanaBwembya: tatwalingana, twalipusana, lelo, abaume balikosa, balikwata amaka, ifwe tatwakwata 
sana amaka.  Nomba mu matontonkanya twalilingana ukubomba incito, ubupusano mu 
matontonkanya tapali.  Nomba abanesu Lesa abapele amaka sana, ifwe twakonka panuma.  Nomba 
mu matontonkanya tatwapusana.   
Alice: abapalamina bushe bamipela umucinshi ukulu ukucila inshita ya kale? 
BanaBwembya: abeshibe nabasumina tulebombesha, nensoni, baleumfwa fye insoni pafyo 
baletususha baletuseka, nomba baleumfwa insoni pantu nabomfwa nokumona.  Fwe bene nokubeba 
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tatwebeba, awe, nomba fya bene baletutila, 'ah, mwabombeeni', not filya balecita ilya, nangu ndepita 
bashala baleisha ati, 'balecula babaya mukulala nakacola', nomba shinonshiku ni 'mwa-bom-be-eni!'.  
Nabatumfwa ati namubomba ifitundulu.  Abene beka. 
xlii Chilando: Kwalipusana sana fye, ku mushi na ku town.  Banamayo ebabomba imilimo yonse ku mushi.  
Mwino mwine mu town, abaume baleipika nokwafwilisha ukuwasha nomba ku mushi teti! Balangafwako ..  
Balimona banamayo baya kumarket, tulebomba, tuleisa ku market, tulenaka, balisa ukwafilishanya 
Alice: bushe balikwata abanabo abasuka imbale 
Chilando: bengi  
Alice: bushe mwalenaka akale? 
Chilando: twalenaka nomba tabaumfwile uluse 
Alice: ninshi tabaumfwile uluse akale? 
Chilando: kali ku mushi amafunde yalikosa, balekuseka.  Kuno basanga abanabo baleefwilisha abakashi 
babo.  Kumushi fyalipusana.   
Alice: bushe basuka imbale libili libili? 
Chilando: limo llimo fye, limbi after 2 or 3 weeks  
Alice: te cila bushiku? 
Chilando: awe, kali balabomba [he makes flower pots] 
Alice: banamayo abekala kumushi, bushe batontonkanya balatitikishiwa? 
Chilando: balishiba nomba insambu tabakwata 
xliii BanaMayuka: Ukushitisha, wakwata impia, wasambilisha mwana, nomba pampela ya amasambililo 
yakwe afilwa ukusanga ncito nangu ukufilwa ukuya ku college pa mulandu wa calo ifyo ciletekwa 
buluku bululuka, kano teka bwino.  Fintu fyonse fili expensive, ecalenga mutima ukukalipa fwe 
bafyashi.  Twaiminina mu mapolitics ukucenja buteko, ubushiteka bwino... industry yalionauka, 
tamwaba... to sensitise amamarket traders, ukubelula amano... 
Alice: Balume benu batontonkanyapo shani? 
BanaMayuka: Each have rights to follow what they want... But sensitise abantu cila bushiku. 
Alice: Nimpapa ukumfwa banamayo bafulile ukucila bashitata. 
BanaMayuka: Inonshita we are all jacked up.  Inonshita twalisalapuka, these days ni 5050, tulelingana 
fye... 2008 baSata baponene ukusalwa banamayo cabakalipa sana, elyo baiminine mukwimbamo mu 
maproblems pantu tabcetekela baSata kuti bapona...  
xliv BanaHilda: pakusala umuntu, ukuba intungulushi tufwile ukumona ifyo aba, tatulolesha ati pantu 
mwanakashi, awe, tulolesha pafyo akosa.  Ngacakuti cabupe cabo kuti atungulula bwino na baume 
batasha.  Capwa. 
Alice: so munonshiku abantu tabatontonkenye ni mwanakashi fye? 
BanaHilda: awe.  Akale banakashi tabaleposelako amano pakutungulula, nomba bamona ukuti tapali 
abakubalandilako.  Bafwile ukukwata muntu uwakubalandilako. 
xlv Alice: Muletontonkanya inshi pali intungulushi shanakashi? 
BanaJessy: Shiletwalilile, shileya pantanshi.  Balikwatako imituma ya luse, kali balimona amafya 
tupitamo, fwe banamayo, ifyo tuculamo, pakukusha abana. 
Alice: Akale kuti mwavotela intungulushi yanakashi? 
BanaJessy: Akale tatwaleposako amano pakusupporta intungulushi yanakashi. 
Alice: Akale tamwaleishiba ukuti banakashi bambi balepitapo amacushi yenu?   
BanaJessy: Akale twalemona ulepitapo mu amacushi weka. 
Alice: Ninshi pantu?  Pantu musangwa na abantu abengi ku icisankano. 
BanaJessy: Ilyo tatulaamba ukusangwa na abantu abengi ku icisankano. 
xlvi BanaNkandu: Pantu balemona ubucushi ubu tulapitamo.   
BanaBecca: Cimo cine, ena apitamo.  Abaume baliba ne fifulo imyaka inga. 
BanaNkandu: Abaume baletuteka sana.  Abaume batubombela.  So pa ama elections tulefwaya 
abanakashi.   
BanaBecca: Abanakashi pakuti kuti bameeting amademands yesu... 
Alice: Akale ilyo mwamwene intungulushi shanakashi, bushe mwaletontonkanya amoile fye? 
Both: Amouile... 
BanaNkandu: Akale twaletontonkanya intungulushi shanakashi teti shilondole fishinka... akale baume 
balikwata sana amano.  Twalebacindika abaume sana fye, sana fye.  Akale banakashi bafwile balibeka, 
tatwalecita associate, takwali ukucita associate.   
xlvii BanaRuth: ifwe tufwile tulatemwa ukukwata intungulushi shanakashi pantu namayo ewasunga 
bantu, so namayo tafwile alecula.  Bonse basuma.  Mu intungulushi mufwile mwaba banamayo na 
bashitata pakuti baleakana amano, balelanshanya 
Alice: bushe muletontonkanya banamayo balibelela ukuba mu minwe ya intungulushi shaume? 
BanaRuth: awe, tulefwaya na ifwe ukukwata intungulushi banamayo abengi.  Tulefwaya tufume mu 
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minwe ya bashitata 
Alice: elo bushe muleumfwa muli mu minwe ya bashitata? 
BanaRuth: hmm hm [agrees]...  pantu intungulushi ishingi bashitata bafulamo 
Alice: ninshi mulefwaya ukufuma mu minwe ya bashitata? 
BanaRuth: tatulefwaya ukumfwa amano ya bashitata yeka, tulefwaya ukumfwa na amano ya 
banamayo 
Alice: mwatampile ukufwaya intungulushi shanakashi lilali? 
BanaRuth: last of last year 
Alice: finshi fyalengele mwatampile ukubafwaya? 
BanaRuth: [abaume] baletufyenga ifwe.  Namayo mwine kuti eshiba ifyo tufwaya pantu alepitapo.  
Twalelolela amaelections, kwakwata amaelections  
Alice: ilyo baiminine, elyo mwatampile ukufwaya intungulushi shanakashi shingi? 
BanaRuth: ee.  Kunuma nali mupya mu market, so nshaishibe nangu cimo, nshaishibe nefyo abalimo 
balitontonkanya.  nomba, inonshita, ninkokola, nimbona na bena intungulula.  tulefwaya intungulushi 
shanakashi nomba abaiminina takwaba.  Twalemwene intungulushi shanakashi shali ishinono, 
twalilolela amaelections nomba banamayo abaimininie bali fye batatu.  Nga kwali banamayo abengi 
abaiminine, nga twalibavota. 
Alice: so, lisa, mu bumi bwenu, bushe mwatampile ukufwaya intungulushi shanakashi? 
BanaRuth: nga wakula, waamba kumona ubucushi elo wingeshiba intungulushi ingafwaikwa 
xlviii Nancy: shinonshiku natufumyapo mwenso 
Alice: so tamuletontonkanya intungulushi shimbi shimisusha nangu shimitwishika? 
Nancy: ee, kulingana efyo cile, bambi baletwishiku kuti bateka nomba pali shinonshiku kuti twateka, 
abatwishika bakesamweneko pantu uno mwaka tulefwaya change 
Alice: pakulanda na bena zanama, bamo bamo balikwata bwafya ukucetekela banamayo.  umuntu 
umo alandile ati mwanakashi kuti atoba mushi 
Nancy: [laughs]  
Scott: awe, awe, bufi.  pali shinonshiku kubwesesha calo kunuma, amatontonkanya yamusangwa 
baMapalo [Alice], ebalebwesesha calo kwisa?  kunuma.  inonshita tatukwata mwaume no 
mwanakashi, ukulingana icilonganino cesu ca PF pantu bonse ukukosa, twalimona twalibe fye cinga?  
cimo .  pantu limbi ine mwaume muli fimo fimo nokutontonkanya ukwebati apandwik...  nomba 
namona banamayo ebali kuntanshi ebalikosa mu fyonse ifyo balecita, cinshi nalatwishikila? 
Alice: munonshiku bushe intungulushi shaume shicetekela intungulushi shanakashi? 
Scott: inonshita, ine intungulushi nincetekela, ukubikapo intungulushi ishakalamba isho twakwata.  
Natukwata icicetekelo ukwebati intungulushi shanakashi kuti shabombesha nokucilapo nefwe bene 
ifwe intungulushi shaume, pantu amaka ayo bakwata banamayo pali shinonshiku,  
[my phone rings - Joe] 
Alice:so natukwata icicetekelo cikalamba ukwebati intungulushi shanakashi kale lilya pantu icalengele 
tukwata icicetekelo pakale muli banamayo mulandu ukwebati banamayo balikwata mwenso, 
tabaishibe ico baimininepo no ico baba mu bumi.  pali shinonshiku baliiluka nokwishiba ati tapali 
nangu cimo icingabomba bashitata ifwe twingafilwa, pali shinonshiku bonse banamayo, ukulingana.  
Banamayo kuti babombesha ukucila ifwe baume 
[my phone rings] 
Alice: namwishiba shani kuti balikosa? 
Scott: ifyo twalishiba kuti balikosa, ukulingana, akanshita twabomba mu kabongwe ka fikansa fya 
calo, ukumona banakashi ababombesha pantu bena mu icilonganino cesu ca branch muno mwine mu 
cisokone, natukwata banamayo abalebombesha apabula mwenso, pantu tuli ne amafya ayengi 
BaMapalo [Alice] mufwe, ilo twaambile[word unclear] twisule kano kene kabungwe kwaliba akaswa, 
twalikwata banamayo abakosa, ebali kuntanshi pakutungulila cino cine tulemona mu chisokone, ebo 
twakwata.  bambi ebalinga, aba kuntanshi ebakulilapo ebaiminine efyo fwe bashitata tulaima 
nokwima... 
Scott: Twabomba na banamayo, nokwikala, lelo banamayo abene batontonkanya ebalanda mutitikisha 
muno m market ufumyepo.  ifwe fweka fweka bashitata ulya mutitikisha, elo twaisamona maka ya 
banamayo, ukukosa nokupambana, baima mu bwingi, nefwe bashitata twaima mu bwingi, 
nokwikatana.  elo banamayo abengi ebali kuntanshi so ni mu 2008, elo bashiletintananghombe 
ukutila bamonesha ukukosa balanda ukukosa kuli ifwe fwe baume... 
A: banamayo batampile ukukosa lilali? 
M: ukufuma 2001, naishilemonako panono, ukucefya mwenso ne nsoni.  imikalile naishupa, so abena 
beka balolesha bakwata ubwishibilo mu mikalile balekala, balisambilisha kuli bena, ico 
baishileiminina abengi, mu 2008, nokwebati nefwe bene nomba katwibimba muli cintu, 
mukupambana, and cacine banamayo balikwatapo maka nokucila bashitata.   
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xlixTranslated sections: Matthew: Akale twalelanda, teti bacite ifi fintu, sunga bwino mayanda, sunga 
bwino ulupwa, nokulasunga calo bwino bwino, tatwaishibe.   
Alice: so akale mwaletwishika banamayo, nokutontonkanya 'tapali nangu cimo engacita' 
Matthew: icalengele banamayo akale, mulandu banamayo akale tabaleipelesha sana ukwingila mu 
tubungwe, solvinga maproblems, baposele sana mano pamayanda as housewives, and small issues but 
concerning the big issues like utubungwe tulya twa fikansa fya calo, solvinga maproblems aya lekana 
lekana tabaleifumyamo... 
Matthew: twaishilemona, twaisaamba nokumona kanshi banakashi nabo balikwata mano, elo 
twalikwata na maka elo balikwata nobutungulushi, kanshi na bena bantu na tuba babili, twaleamba 
nokumona fintu fyaamba ukucinja...  After twaishilemona, twaisaamba nokumona kanshi banakashi 
nabo balikwata mano, elo twalikwata na maka elo balikwata nobutungulushi, kanshi na bena bantu na 
tuba babili, twaleamba nokumona fintu fyaamba ukucinja...   
l Chezo: Twalebomba pamo, twaleba equal, tatwalemoneka difference baume na banakashi.   
li Alan: Banamayo banono so amatontonkanya yacepa.  The ratio is very bad.  Icilangililo ca 
amatontonkanya ya baume yalipusana na banakashi.   
lii Charity: Akale naletontonkanya ‘teti mbombe’ nomba namona ifyakucita fyashupa, nasalapo 
ukubomba.   
liii BanaBecca: Nelyo nalikwete amano naletontonkanya ukuti baume balicilapo pali ine, not knowing 
ukwebati ine mwine nalibacila bambi. 
liv BanaBecca: Akale ukonka fye, nangu nafiweme nangu tafiweme, ukukonka fye.   
Alice: Ninshi tamwalepingula akale? 
BanaBecca: Tatwalekwata insambu shakulandapo, umwaume is the head.  Ifyo apingula mwaume 
ufwile ukukonka, icalenga cimbi ukupwa, upitapo amainstructions: umwaume nga alanda ufwile 
ukwikala tondolo.   
Alice: Bushe mwalefwaya ukulandapo? 
BanaBecca: Tatwaletontonkanya ati fibi, fyonse twalefimona fye bwino, mulandu ukwebati ninshi 
tatulailuka.  Fyaletucusha mumutima mwalesunga fye mu mano yobe, nga mwamwene tafiweme. 
Alice: Bushe mwalekwata mwenso? 
BanaBecca: Ee, mwenso, pali inonshita balume bali arrogant sana abaume. 
Alice: Abalume benu bali arrogant akale?  Balecitenshi? 
BanaBecca: Nga wakana, ubwafya kuli bena, nomba pali inonshita fyalicenja. 
Alice: Bushe mwatambile ZNBC pamo ilyo mwasambilile pansambu shenu? 
BanaBecca: Yalisa twice, radio, baumfwile pa icilimba, ‘iseni tuumfweko’, I said.  Ninshi nalekale mu 
sitting room, nakusha volume, balelanda, abantu bengacenja from past way of living, balundapo.  
Balikutika nomba.  Tabalandile nangu fimo nomba abena balicenja.  Tulalanshanya pali fili fyonse.  
Balefilwa ukucenja pamukumo, kwaliba amaprogrammes ayengi, pa Monday, 10 hours, Wednesday 
and Sunday.  Pa first calikosele, ukukonka insambu sha banamayo, pride epo ali.  Tabalefwaya 
ukushikonka.  Nomba pali inonshita bali ubupusana. 
Alice: Ninshi balicenja? 
BanaBecca: Ukupitilamo mu masambililo na ificitwa fyandi [ama deeds].  Ukupitilamo ifyo ndecita 
ine bamona ifyo ndecita, muleba progress.  At the end bena baamba ukucenja. 
Alice: Abakanakumona mwalibombesha kuti bacenja? 
BanaBecca: Awe, teti bacenje.  Cimbi icalenga balikwata icilumba ukwebati, tapali ifyo ningacita. 
lv David: nomba nshaposeleko amano pali fintu fya gender, natontonkanye ati tufwile ukulemba fye 
capwa. 
lvi Annette: tabaposako amano, balaseka fye, bali kwati kwangala 
lvii BanaMayuka: bambi balisusha, ati ‘awe, namayo, teti ateke’, balekana, ‘teti fibombe, 
tatutungulule... ukubomba kuti twabomba, nomba ukutungulula, teti tutungulule’.  Baletina 
bashibantu aba mu government, nga tabasuminisha na mayo ukutungulula.  Nomba pali inonshita 
balisuminisha.   
lviii Nancy: abo abalelanda pali gender balelandapo fye 
Alice: bushe ikalamba ukumona nangu kumfwa pali gender? 
Nancy: tulamona fye, twamona umwanakashi alelungisha amalights, umwanakashi, ah, ati, 
'umwanakashi uyu alikosa'.  ukumona icikalamba sana sana, wamona, waimona, kuti waumfwa.  
pantu tatuumfwa ku icilimbi, tuleumfwa fye.  nomba nga wamona ukwebati uyu umuntu alelungisha 
amalights, wakumona nokumona, ninshi naucetekela, nimmumona, alebomba. 
lix Alice: bushe mwaliumfwa pali gender? 
BanaJessy: ee, [to BanaBecca] kuti nalondola shani? 
BanaBecca: equality.  Umwanakashi kuti abomba incito sha baume, no mwaume kuti abomba incito 
sha banakashi.   
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lx BanaMayuka: NGOCC balandile ati, ‘banamayo iseni tubombe, not ukulekela bashibantu beka ifwe 
tatupusana na bashibantu, twaliba fye cimo cine, mufwile ukubomba pa lwenu...incito shingabomba 
bashibantu namayo kuti abomba’. 
lxi Chola: ifwe bakafunda abo twakwata, balanda ati, tufwile ukulakoselesha fwe banakashi, 
kulaishimpa imilimo ilebomba abaume pakuti abaume balemona ati tatwaba weak fwe banakashi, 
nefwe kuti twacita ifyo balefwaya ukucita, ifyo yaba 
lxii Alice: bushe mwalandile na balume benu ilyo mwaile ku NGOCC? 
BanaMayuka: [my husband] balandile ati, ‘wacita bwino sana’, balitemwa sana, balishiba bakashi 
babo tabakwete ubwafya nga tabalipo nangu bafwa.   
lxiii Alice: Mwacilanda ati, mukabafunda ukunakilila. 
Nancy: Ee.   
Alice: Ukunakilila shani? 
Nancy: ifyo ufwile ukwikala no mulume obe, ena aba pamulu na mulume aba panshi, awe.  Pantu 
umutwe wanghanda, mwaume.  Umwanakashi nga aya ukuba mutwe wanghanda, inghanda kuti 
yaonauka.  so tufwile ukumufunda. 
Nancy: [answers phone, speaks to her sister in Kasama] 
Alice: Mwacilanda mwaume afwile ukuba pamulu, kuti mwampela icilangililo icakulanga ifyo aba 
pamulu? 
Nancy: ngefyo twalelanda mailo pali gender, tatufwile ukusenda gender.  Afwile ukubomba, ifunde... 
Alice: So amayanda yalaonauka ngacakuti mwaume atampa ukunaya bwali? 
Nancy: Ee, kunauka, ukuyafwayako umbi mwanakashi, na family yakwe yalasuminisha 'fwaya umbi 
mwanakashi ulatemwa mwanakashi', mwamona ifyo besa ukulanda, te mwanakashi tabamufunda kuli 
ine, takwete ifunde iyafuma kuli ine, ena... Mulepingulushanya, mwanakashi kuti alanda ifyakwata 
mano nomba umwaume ico alefwaya, uyo mwanakashi afwile ukukonka, kuti wacikonka. 
Alice: Mufwile ukukonka ifyo alanda, pantu ngacakuti wakana, kuti abutuka? 
Nancy: Kuti aleka, kuleka, kuno kuZambia fyupo filapwa... Nga taukonka amafunde, alafwaya 
munobe, ee.  Elo umunobe akesa mukubomba ukulingana nefyo amufundile... fyupo fyapwa, 
amadivorce nayafula, nabonaula intambi, pantu we mwanakashi nga waupwa mwaume, ufwile 
ukucita fyonse panghanda we mwanakashi, pali incito shimo mwaume kuti abomba, nomba te shonse, 
mwamona?  kupyanga.  Nga ine nshilepo kunghanda, ndi ku market, mwaume ali kunghanda ndeisa 
'naya', cifwile ifyo nomba fyongo.  'naciya ku market, iwe tauteka nangu cimo nangu bwali!' Ni gender.  
So gender taiweme.   
Alice: Ninshi taiweme?  nga mwaisa kuno mukushitisha na balume tababomba, kuti bashala 
kunghanda nokunaya? 
Nancy: Kuti aipikila mukashi wakwe nga amona nanaka, nomba te lyonse fye, te cifwile ukuba awe 
[break].  Gender tafiweme, kuntanshi bakafumyapo.  gender mulebombela pamo, not mu mayanda, 
awe.  Mu mayanda tamufwile ukuba gender, awe, gender mu government, mu macito, uko 
mulebomba eko kufwile ukuba gender. 
